



SEMINAR

BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA AND THE PARTNERSHIP FOR PEACE

Sarajevo, 7 – 8 November 2001

CONTENTS

OPENING

Dr. Bisera Turkovic, Centre for Security Studies	1
Mr. Jozo Krizanovic, Chairman of the Presidency of Bosnia-Herzegovina	4

FIRST SESSION

Ambassador Robert Mason Beecroft, Chief of the OSCE Mission to BiH	8
Mr. George Katsirdakis, Sector of Defence Planning and Operations, NATO	13

SECOND SESSION

Mr. Ibrahim Spahic, Parliamentary Assembly of Bosnia-Herzegovina	22
Dr. Boris Shmelyov, Centre for Comparative Political Studies, Moscow	24
Mr. Zsolt Rabai, Coordinator for the West Balkans, NATO	29

THIRD SESSION

General Miroslav Nikolic, former Presidential Military Advisor	34
General Imre Agotic, Office of the President of the Republic of Croatia	35
Dr. Ognjen Pribicevic, Centre for Southeast European Studies, Belgrade	40
Major John Hampson, Military Cell, Office of the High Representative	43

FOURTH SESSION

Mr. Nikola Radovanovic, Ministry of Foreign Affairs BiH	49
Mr. Martin Francesevic, Ministry of Defence of the FBiH	50
Colonel Jovan Ostojic, Ministry of Defence of the RS	54
General Ivan Nagulov, Presidential Military Advisor	57

<i>APPENDIX A: SEMINAR AGENDA</i>	61
--	----

<i>APPENDIX B: LIST OF PARTICIPANTS</i>	64
--	----

OPENING

Dr. Bisera Turkovic (Centre for Security Studies)

Mr. Jozo Krizanovic (BiH Presidency)

Dr. Bisera Turkovic, Executive Director
Centre for Security Studies

Opening Remarks

At the start I would like to express welcome to all of our esteemed guests both domestic and coming from abroad. I would especially like to thank Mr. Krizanovic, who will be officially opening this seminar, His Excellency Ambassador Beecroft, Head of the OSCE Mission, Mr. George Katsirdakis, also well known to all of us, a distinguished personality who I may say is a person that is of the most significance at this moment in relation to the Partnership for Peace (PfP).

I will not be too long and take too much of your time, but allow me to perhaps clarify why are we organizing this seminar. You know that the Presidency of BiH has expressed its wish by sending a Letter of Intention, in which it is stated that Bosnia and Herzegovina would like to join the PfP – with Yugoslavia we are the only country that is not a member of this organization.

Since parliamentarians should also be informed about the responsibilities once the country has entered the PfP, in the overall process and procedure and what the PfP itself means, then I must say that I am very happy being the Director of the CSS, to see such a great response as well as seeing that we are joined by such distinguished speakers. I am also certain that after their presentations many more things will be clear. I also did not know that there are quite frequent misinterpretations due to the lack of information, and we also know that to BiH we have invited these distinguished speakers who are experts in this subject matter, and who will join and support us.

The orientation of armed forces before 1991 was towards a collective enemy; however, today we speak more about threats and risks. The events of the 90s changed the perceptions of security and armed forces. Armed forces lost their territorial orientation, and the question of security was no longer restricted to borders. The defence military strategy was given up in place of an active security policy. This has also meant that in place of numerosness, the impetus has been passed to concentrate on flexibility, mobility and rapid reaction. Indeed, this has been the trend in Western Europe, where in 1989 the Dutch army had personnel number of 100,000 and today this had been reduced to 60,000; the same is with the German army where in 1989 they had 470,000 and today that figure is 282,000.

The current situation of the BiH armed forces is that they are founded according to a definition directed towards each other entity. In this manner they currently justify their own existence. Consequently, the nature of change of the armed forces is systemic, really existential.

The armed forces of BiH cannot and should not satisfy a defence policy that is directed towards the resolution of problems as they arise – an offensive strategy is an active

strategy. The strategy must be directed towards the resolution of problems before they arise. An active security policy, the adoption of which BiH is currently working, is a policy of engagement and pro-activity with the objective of the prevention of problems before they become crises.

The defence of the political sovereignty of BiH does not have to coincide with the defence of territorial integrity. The security of BiH can be defended through joint military participation in the suppression of crises points that can reflect on the security of our country – for example, ecological catastrophe in the nearer or wider environment, influx of a large number of refugees, destabilizing tensions, terrorism of wider proportions.

When we speak about the armed forces of BiH then it is needed to grow away from the phase of confrontation and become an instrument of integration. The strategy of cooperation is popularly termed by the language of OSCE as “cooperative security”, the objective of which is the relationships of cooperation for which the military relationship is characterized by cooperation and transparency between potential conflicting sides, in order that they would contribute to sub-regional cooperation.

Only through the consolidation of the armed forces in BiH can we contribute to our own security. The armed forces have to be restructured according to the new security environment and reality:

1. Its numbers have to be in accordance with budgetary possibilities;
2. They must pass through a process of standardization.

Democratic control is an indispensable precondition.

Armed forces must have an element of compatibility in order to contribute to the collective defence and management of crises. Its dimension, composition and equipage must correspond to international requirements.

However, in order to generally be included in the PfP, there has to exist mechanisms on a state level through which can be secured that the armed forces in BiH effectively act jointly in the manner that is needed, from joint command of the military, towards doctrine, training and equipping.

The conditions that NATO Secretary General George Robertson has placed as conditions for the BiH membership in the PfP are:

1. The existence of political security in BiH;
2. The securing of state level parliamentary control of the armed forces in Bosnia and Herzegovina;
3. The securing of state level command and control over armed forces and BiH including also a Ministry on a state level responsible for defence issues;
4. The securing of full transparency of plans and budgets;

5. The securing of common doctrine and common standards for training and equipping armed forces;
6. To overcome the division of internal policy so that in full it supports the strengthening of institutions on a state level, and to improve cooperation, conciliation, and stability in the region;
7. The political leadership in BiH needs to support in full the agreement concerning refugees and displaced persons.

I believe that the knowledge that we shall receive from this seminar, besides a clearer understanding of the PfP and its significance for Bosnia and Herzegovina, shall help also in the development of plans for the restructuring of the armed forces as well as the formulation of the security policy, which shall also correspond to the conditions and realities that Bosnia is currently confronted with. Thank you very much and I would now like to ask His Excellency Mr. Jozo Krizanovic to open this seminar.

Mr. Jozo Krizanovic

Chairman of the Presidency

Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina

The Accession of BiH to the Partnership for Peace

Ladies and Gentleman, it is my pleasure to have the opportunity of being present at this seminar today, to join you in the debate of this significant issue, as is related to the joining of BiH in the PfP programme.

Allow me first of all to greet you and welcome you on behalf of the Presidency of BiH, and to express gratitude to the organizers of today's seminar, who have managed in such a short time to organize a third seminar in a row, and like the previous two, to present a direct contribution in finding a concrete solution for the further improvement of our socio-political situation.

Almost six years after the signing of the Dayton Peace Agreement we can say that in the field of security we have made significant steps forward, reflected in Confidence Building Measures, reduction of arms and personnel in the armed forces, common inspections, as well as the combined activities of entity armies under the supervision and organisation of the international community.

Significant progress in stabilizing the overall security situation and creating a favourable climate in order to fulfil the necessary conditions that would make possible for BiH to enter the circle of Euro-Atlantic countries is represented by the adoption of the BiH Defence policy. The transparent intention and orientation of BiH and its constituent peoples and citizens in both entities in the aim of lasting peace, security and prosperity is shown by this document.

The next necessary step for BiH that must be done without delay would be the development of a security policy where the Defence Policy is a component part.

I am familiar with the fact that the Working and Expert Group of the Council of Ministers is continuously working on the development of this document, which would provide answers concerning the issues of the protection of citizen's interests and priorities, the peoples, and the society of BiH from external and internal threats of any kind, as well as to envisage political, economic and military measures as responses to the mentioned threats.

Finally I wish to emphasize the declaration adopted by the BiH Presidency, in which was expressed the readiness of our state to accept obligations and rights in the family of equal Euro-Atlantic nations, clearly determining our position in the sense that with all existing capacities (scientific, political, military) we must work vigorously in the search for

solutions for the fulfilment of the conditions necessary for the realisation for the right of entry in the mentioned Euro-Atlantic associations.

The conditions set by NATO, which principally would be democratic control of armed forces, transparency of defence planning and budgeting, common doctrine and standards for the training of armed forces, are in the case of the open issues of our society, especially the system of defence, matters that require a decided and fast response. Consequently, the sooner we face this problem and devise corresponding solutions, the chances to come out of this complicated situation would be greater; therefore, inclusion in Euro-Atlantic associations is inevitable.

There are conditions with reference to issues such as military command on a state level, relating to the question of the possibility of the establishment of a Ministry of Defence or a body executing such function on a state level.

Regardless of how complex these issues may be, they still can be solved and I would like to believe that we are in a situation of finding the best solutions within a reasonable timeframe, which would exclude any type of enforcement, other than the roots of tolerance, understanding of the situation and mutual respect, as well as emphasizing the true interests of the citizens of BiH.

Issues like the implementation of the Dayton Peace Agreement, transparent solutions with neighbouring and other countries, legal support for refugees and displaced persons, co-operation and support to the ICTY, dedication to connections between entities, and support to state institutions remain our lasting task, and the future of BiH depends on the level of the realisation of those tasks.

Looking closer, what is it that the world is asking from us (NATO) and in return would give us a chance to join the PfP, we would see that those demands in a way make us equal with other country members of Euro-Atlantic associations. On the other hand they demand from us to create an environment and a country where it would be possible to live, where people would not leave in order to survive, the country from which you could easily depart from but also be glad to return to.

In joining the PfP, along with the establishment of the foreign political platform of BiH, we are also creating the preconditions for strengthening the internal economic, defence and security structures of BiH.

I am deeply convinced that the undertaken efforts so far and moves we shall make in the period to come shall result in the joining of BiH to the PfP programme, and that shall mean the creation of economic stability as well as security in BiH. I believe that in the near future BiH will participate in peace operations and be able to fulfil all international obligations. I also expect that soon we would have armed forces under full democratic control, created in accordance with the security challenges and economic possibilities of this country.

Finally, I think I am not over-exaggerating being so optimistic when I say I do believe that after we have met the requested conditions for joining the PfP, realistically we can think about the steps to take for candidature for the European Union and NATO.

My optimism is based on fresh impressions from the Warsaw Conference on Combating Terrorism. Seventeen countries of Central, East and Southeast Europe without reservation have accepted the Declaration and Plan of Action for the fight against terrorism. These documents also include a series of activities in the fields of legislation, mutual co-operation, and regional security, with whose implementation in all of these countries would in great part fulfil also the required standards for joining the EU, PfP and NATO.

At the end, one more time I wish to thank the organisers of this seminar for their efforts, and to congratulate on a well-selected subject and on a timely reaction (in the sense of the topicality of the theme) as well as the extremely successful choice of participants and speakers.

I sincerely hope that the result of this seminar, among others, would be a clarification of the position of BiH and realisation of visible progress on the way to join the PfP programme.

Thank you for your attention.

SESSION I

Ambassador Robert Mason Beecroft (OSCE Mission to BiH)

Mr. George Katsirdakis (NATO)

Ambassador Robert Mason Beecroft

Head of Mission

Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe - OSCE, Sarajevo

The Founding and Principal Aims of the PfP

Prelude to PfP: the NACC

- NATO in mid-1980's sleepy organisation. Then came the Wall.
- North Atlantic Co-operation Council (NACC): aim to bring together NATO Allies with former Warsaw Pact countries in a partnership forum for security dialogue and co-operation.
- Flashback: first ministerial meeting December 1991.
- NACC developed in parallel with intense debate over role of NATO as one of "mutually reinforcing institutions" in Europe, including OSCE and UN, and relationship among them.
- View of one ally: OSCE to replace / supplant NATO.
- Debate fuelled by events in Balkans. NATO declared itself "available" ("disponible") to support UN if asked. Sent HQ to region, but one ally objected to any ongoing dialogue between NATO and UN.
- Led to huge difficulties in defining chain of command (Akashi factor). Consequence: two parallel chains of command that never touched.
- Debate ended in 1995 when NATO replaced UN in BiH, >IFOR/SFOR.
- Throughout the 1990's parallel debate went on concerning NATO expansion. NACC seen by "hopefuls" as halfway house to full membership.
- Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) created in 1997 to replace the NACC and build on its achievements.

PfP is Launched

- PfP established in January 1994 at the NATO Summit in Brussels. Proceeded by intense debates inside Alliance about its purpose. Seen by some as "stealth enlargement".

- PfP launched to enable Partner countries to develop individual programmes of practical co-operation with NATO, as a complement to the opportunities for multilateral political dialogue afforded by the NACC.
- PfP based on conviction that stability and security in the Euro-Atlantic area can be achieved only through co-operation and common action (deepen political and military ties).
- In PfP, individual Partnership Programmes are drawn between NATO and Partner countries from an extensive menu of activities according to each country's specific needs and interests ranging from large military exercises to small workshops.

The Framework Document (1994) outlines the basic principles and objectives of PfP:

- ◆ Protection and promotion of fundamental human rights and safeguarding of freedom, justice and peace through democracy are shared values fundamental to the Partnership.
- ◆ In joining the Partnership, the members:
 - Reaffirm their commitment to preservation of democratic societies, freedom from coercion and maintenance of the principles of international law.
 - Refrain from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, to respect existing borders and to settle disputes through peaceful means.
 - Affirm their commitment to the Helsinki Final Act and subsequent CSCE (OSCE) documents.
- PfP countries co-operate with NATO in pursuit of the following objectives as outlined in the Framework Document:
 - ◆ Facilitation of transparency in national defence planning and budgeting processes;
 - ◆ Ensuring democratic control of defence forces;
 - ◆ Maintenance of the capability and readiness to contribute, subject to constitutional considerations, to operations under the authority of the UN and/or the responsibility of the CSCE (OSCE);
 - ◆ The development of co-operative military relations with NATO, for the purpose of joint planning, training and exercises in order to strengthen their ability to undertake missions in the fields of peacekeeping, search and rescue, humanitarian operations, and others as may subsequently be agreed;

- ◆ The development, over the long term, of forces that are better able to operate with those of the members of North Atlantic Alliance.
- ◆ It is also stated in the Framework Document that NATO will consult with any active participant in the Partnership if that Partner perceives a direct threat to its territorial integrity, political independence, or security.
- ◆ Military representations within Partner country diplomatic missions to NATO ensure that Partner country officers are involved in the daily work of PfP.

BiH and PfP

A) The development of PfP in close relation to peacekeeping mission in BiH:

- The NATO-led peacekeeping operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina has shown how important PfP co-operation is for effective multinational peace support operations.
- a) To match the increasingly sophisticated relationship being developed with Partner countries under PfP and in the context of peacekeeping operation in BiH, significant changes to PfP following the NATO Summit in Madrid (1997).
- The creation of EAPC reflecting the desire to move beyond NACC and to ensure greater decision-making opportunities for Partner countries. With EAPC, increasing Partner role in planning and strengthening of political consultation. (EAPC also included traditionally neutral countries such as Austria, Finland, Sweden and Switzerland).
 - EAPC proved to be a useful forum for political consultations in areas ranging from developments in BiH and to crisis in Kosovo to broad topics such as peacekeeping and regional security co-operation. Also provided a framework for the development of new areas of co-operation, such as humanitarian demining and control over transfer of small arms, and for the co-ordination of disaster relief and humanitarian assistance through the Euro-Atlantic disaster Response Co-ordination Centre (EADRCC).
- b) With the NATO Summit in Washington (1999), further steps were taken to reinforce PfP, especially its operational aspects, by taking into account the lessons learned and practical experience gained in IFOR and SFOR operations in Bosnia. These steps also address the specific challenges to military effectiveness and interoperability that such multinational operations present.
- Introduction of Operational Capabilities Concept (OCC), which aims to reinforce PfP's operational capabilities by establishing additional peacetime means and mechanisms for improving the interoperability of Partner forces and, thereby, the ability of the Alliance and Partner forces to operate together in future NATO-led PfP operations. Also to facilitate the integration of these forces into a NATO-led force in the future.

- Development of a PFP Training and Education Enhancement Programme (TEEP) to optimise and improve training and education in the Partnership. The programme aims to increase the ability of training and education efforts to meet current and future demands of an enhanced and more operational Partnership focusing specifically on interoperability and to promote greater co-operation and dialogue among the wider defence and security communities in NATO and Partner nations.
- During Washington Summit, the EAPC leaders endorsed the report "Towards a Partnership for the 21st Century - The Enhanced and more Operational Partnership", which states that:
- Future NATO-led PfP operations, which will introduce new requirements and challenges, are likely to be multinational at lower levels, involving Partners in both command and force structures. They are also likely to be made up of smaller nation elements, possibly at battalion or lower levels, be conducted outside NATO territory, and be longer in duration than NATO has planned for in the past.

B) Candidacy of BiH to PfP:

- Steps that BiH has to take (per SYG Robertson) to strengthen its candidacy to PfP (the list of measures given to tri-presidency by Secretary General during his visit to BiH in July 2001):
- Develop a BiH security policy.
- Be able, at state level, to provide democratic, parliamentary oversight and control of the Armed Forces in BiH.
- Provide State level command and control of its Armed Forces, to include a state level Ministry responsible for defence matters.
- Provide full transparency for defence plans and budgets.
- Develop a common doctrine and common standards to train and equip its armed forces. (the need for the VF and VRS to train and exercise together as well)
- Political requirements:
- Overcome internal divisions, fully support the strengthening of state level institutions, and promote co-operation, reconciliation, and stability in the region.
- BiH political leadership to fully support the return of refugees and displaced persons.

- Fulfil BiH obligations under the Dayton Peace Accords to detain persons indicted for war crimes.

Future of PfP

- Post - September 11th attack:
 - EAPC issued a statement of solidarity and support on September 12th. Moreover, on the same day as the North Atlantic Council's decision to invoke Article V of the Washington Treaty, the 46 member countries of EAPC issued a statement in which they agreed that these acts were an attack not only on the USA, but on our common values. And they pledged to undertake all efforts needed to combat the scourge of terrorism. Some Partners went so far as to declare that they would act as if Article V applied to them.

Mr. George Katsirdakis

Deputy Director, Defence Partnership and Co-operation Directorate
Defence Planning and Operations Division
North Atlantic Treaty Organisation - NATO

Achievements within the framework of the Partnership for Peace

Madam Chairman, Excellencies, Ladies and Gentlemen, it is a great pleasure and honour to speak here today. I wish to thank Mrs. Turkovic on her initiative because this country requires this kind of discussion.

You are in a process when you are looking for the right and deserved position in the world, and the common task of us all is to give you advice on how to do so. You shall of course decide which parts of this advice you will adopt and to move forward so that this country would achieve that what it deserves.

The previous speaker, Ambassador Beecroft, is a very important person and gave an outstanding contribution to the realisation of this platform we worked on in NATO Headquarters. The reason I am saying this is that I have worked for NATO for the past fifteen years. I joined NATO in 1976, when the missile crisis was occurring. I have to say that now, after 15 years, I do not recognise the security environment, which has completely changed. The Alliance Partners, ideas for which we thought would never stop existing, simply have disappeared. We live in a completely different world, and whether we wanted it or not, we have to adjust to that environment. The experience of the new world does not only concern issues on stability and security it also includes a great number of threats. The events of 11th September are the best witness to this.

I would focus on the main subject now, which is the Partnership for Peace. Before we start discussing the subject itself, we must see what is the PfP. People sometimes tend to misunderstand. Myself, as a mathematician, wish to say that first of all we have to define the problem. Talking of the PfP there is one thing we have to remember, what was it established as and what has it grown into? It was an initial approach, a process between NATO countries and the countries outside NATO, in fact a strategic requirement of that time. The beginning of such a process, that could be named 'co-operation', can be connected to the London Declaration from 1990, because right at that time it was obvious that the world was changing. At that time in the changing world there was no more NATO or Warsaw Pact that would divide the world into two spheres. We had to face the new world where the threats from the past were no longer present, rather there surfaced new kinds of dangers that already had began to occur. The problems in the Caucasus, and those later seen in this region are witnesses of the new situation. Therefore, it became clear that the new world we were about to live in and the world we are living in now,

mainly concerned issues for which countries would need to solve so that they would arrive at the end without ethnic, economic and social differences.

Terrorists became something that shall create the most serious threat to security and we have all become included in the endeavour to solve these problems. In that context, the requirement that is facing NATO is to defend the interests and security of its members, but in a different manner. We will no longer be faced with threats on borders, rather we have to create a safe environment in which Alliance countries shall exist, but also security and stability in the neighbourhood. This requires that not only NATO members work with other countries outside NATO that have a reason to co-operate with us. Towards this co-operation it is not the intention of NATO to find something to fool around with, as some commentators sometimes have said. If we do not understand that then everything looks like a bureaucratic exercise, which it is not.

What is the PfP? Some people say that it is a programme that was launched by NATO. In that context, a programme such as this has a few important characteristics. It is a voluntary program in the sense that in that programme there does not exist anything that you have to do. However, you have different options and it is up to you to decide which ones you will choose and how you shall continue in the implementation of your choice.

One of the most important characteristics is the voluntary nature of the programme. When we speak of the PfP, you can organise a programme that is designed for each individual country because the process of implementation goes through bilateral relations between NATO and every individual member. The reason of this bilateral nature is due to the lessons that we learned from the earlier phase of co-operation when all had to be multilateral. In a wider environment you cannot have common decisions for all issues because it is possible to reach consensus only in those fields and domains where there are no difficulties in achieving such a consensus. What is of importance for Switzerland may not be equally of importance for Russia and so on. This means we have to come up with a formula that will help us adjust the programmes according to the requirements of each individual country.

Talking of this, we have realised that immediately after this comes a second element that is only a differentiation, and that is, each country is free to choose its own path in that context without necessarily taking into consideration what another country is doing concerning the same issue, although a lot of common elements do exist. This means that this type of program can be adjusted specifically to each country. If you take one individual country, and now you have 46 members, where partners jointly participate, they have the opportunity to choose what they want out of the whole PfP programme.

You can imagine that the working programme of the PfP is similar to a menu in a restaurant where you can choose what you wish. Choices are placed in your individual programme of Partnership. Every one of us when we come to register choose what we require, and that is very interesting because this is a programme that develops on the basis of your own choice.

The final thing that I wish to mention is regarding that which is included. Besides the fact that everyone can choose, nothing in the programme refers only to one country and not to another. There is nothing stopping you from doing something you would like if there were already someone else doing the same.

Another characteristic is that we could call this a process rather than a programme. The explanation for this is simple, when we look at this as a process then we see this as a lasting initiation to the creation of a culture of co-operation. We are all aware that in Southeast Europe, and I know from my own experience, that co-operative culture is not something we like the most. In certain ways we are used to fighting with one another, maybe not as much, therefore what would be important is to leave all the bad past behind, and to remember that there is no precise reason for anyone to be blamed. The important thing for us would be to start working together and that is exactly the basis of the co-operative culture also of the PfP.

This co-operative culture can be divided into three co-operative forms. The first would be radial co-operation, every country works with NATO on bilateral grounds; the second would be bilateral co-operation, when states inside work with one another. There are various numbers of such examples in multiple forms, and another is regional co-operation, countries that have common interests to work together, to function and decide together as a group so they could solve common problems and take the direction that they think would be the most appropriate. Another thing in this process is that it can assist countries to work in that direction and create interoperable structures – to work jointly on problems that might occur and that they wish to solve, especially in a time of crisis. The third characteristic of this process is that this is a process that enables potential new NATO members to approach the Alliance and prepare for the new tasks that stand before them.

One other characteristic of the PfP is that it gives to you additional instruments with which to work, due to the fact that they have many elements that can be used in different circumstances. There are means inside the PfP that will help you to prevent conflict. That is what the OSCE does, and it should continue and there is absolutely no harm if we can strengthen the role of the OSCE by using the resources provided by the PfP.

There are of course resources inside the PfP that can be used in crisis management. It is obvious that there are many difficulties on how to come to an end with daily requirements, as Ambassador Beecroft mentioned that is the well-known Article 8 of the Framework Document, which is actually an attempt to reproduce to a certain point those measures that are mentioned in the Atlantic Agreement as guarantees of security.

Article 8 was applied just before the Kosovo crisis. In fact NATO gave a guarantee of security to the neighbouring countries of Kosovo, of course on a temporary basis, under the indication that NATO was prepared to undertake military action against anyone that would violate the security of the neighbouring countries in that region. That element of security is a part of the document and can simply be offered from case to case.

The second element is that we have 23 different areas in co-operation and NATO can offer, as well as the PfP, expertise in all areas depending on the requirements that would assist countries that want to go in one direction with their interests. Advice is based on the grounds of the experience of countries that had similar situations earlier.

Do not forget that today we look at a PfP that includes all member countries of the OSCE apart from BiH and FRY. There is no need for any further comments - everyone understands the importance of what I have said.

The other thing I would like to say is that the role of NATO in the European peacekeeping community is extremely important in the process of consultation, because the EAPC has an additional characteristic besides the consulting component, which is, to have a military component that can do more than consultancies themselves.

This characteristic of the European security architecture is an element of great importance. It is a permanent characteristic and it occurred in the newest Strategic Concept of the Alliance, along with the crisis management component as a fundamental basic task in the entire field of security activities. Speaking directly, it means that NATO cannot consider doing something in the area of defence and security without consulting and co-operating with its partners. It means that the partnership has become an integral part of the conception that the Alliance develops and shall develop relations not as a group of 19 countries, but already as a group of 46 countries that have common values and that work jointly towards issues of security today.

In the history of the PfP, let us mention the support of some of the processes: Mediterranean Dialogue, as you are aware this is one lasting process of the creation of dialogue that is flowing from NATO and states of North Africa as well as the Middle and Near East. This has still not developed completely as a co-operation of the PfP, but it is moving to one direction that is promising, because this process was established due to the experiences we have in the PfP.

On the basis of the integration of other countries in NATO there is also a combined action plan and an awful lot of influence to what is happening, referring to what is going on in the PfP. Besides that, it is also worth mentioning the PfP Framework Document, which explains that a country willing to join NATO cannot do so whilst it has not gone through the PfP process. Those countries that are capable and willing to do so need to organize co-operation with the UN – SFOR is the best example of this. In these coalitions and development of such, not only NATO member countries are involved, there are present also a various number of country members of other organizations that have given a large contribution.

If a country wishes to join the PfP than we start with a request by the country, which wishes to do so. BiH has already undertaken that step. The BiH Presidency gave a statement and it has been forwarded to the Secretary General during his visit in July. I escorted him and I can tell you that after we had left BiH we thought positively of that statement and we also considered it to be an extremely important move for BiH. We are

hoping that after this shall follow the corresponding political will and determination to prepare the country to move in that direction.

The following step after we have received such a request is that NATO usually establishes and sends a team of experts that will in detail talk with the authorities in the country; and I can say I was honoured to be appointed as the head of the team whose task was to meet the FBiH and RS representatives in order to fulfil the requests and approach to the PfP. I am very grateful for your ideas and honest statements. Consequently, the team forwards its reports to the Council, the High Body inside the Alliance, and we come up with an opinion to a concrete situation. The Council decides on the next steps to be taken, in fact it can be decided that according to the information forwarded, the country is ready to join the PfP. In that case, the country is invited to sign the Framework Agreement and that is the first step to membership.

However, if the Council decides that the country is not ready, they can offer a programme for co-operation in the field of security, and that is a pre-step for the PfP, where the country would arrive closer to the Partnership, and in fact without consideration to your request for membership in the PfP, you are already inside the programme for security that can assist you to refocus your actions in the sense of inclusion in the PfP.

In the case that the country has no chance for it to join then the Council simply states that the country is not yet ready and postpones the consideration of the request for later. This has occurred a number of times and I can say in the case of Croatia for example, which only after the third request came into serious consideration to become a member.

Concerning BiH, this is the second time for such a request. As soon as we receive such a request, and we have a positive decision, we invite the country to sign the Framework Document and we expect from the same country to provide us with what we would call the presentation document – in fact the government statement of the country where three facts have to be pointed out. One is, what are the political reasons for which that country would want to become a member of the PfP, why they wish to become a member of NATO or to state what possible kind of co-operation can be established through the PfP membership. Like Ambassador Beecroft stated, what it is that a country can offer to the PfP once it is a member. All these things are to be explained in detail in the Presentation Document. After this follows the preparation of all the programmes and arrangements of the programme of the framework of Partnership and participation in different structures inside the Partnership. During a period of adjustment, the countries pass through a number of sub-programmes.

It is important to mention the following. I would say that there are four main areas in the sense of achievements. In the first area, we managed to achieve an awful lot concerning the range of transparency. Some of us who come from this part of the world know what this really means: we have learned to be more suspicious and hide from our neighbours. This is a fact and it should be looked as the reality. Therefore there is a transparency level that has been established through the PfP. Every PfP member is obliged to put on the table all information concerning the inside of its defence systems for each one of the 46 members. Besides this, there also exists the process of planning and revision in which

speaks about the very important elements of defence structures of certain countries. The majority of that information is public and available to all other members. There exist some elements that insofar as a country especially insists can be withheld. We call that 19+1 information, because it is very delicate, but general information is available to everyone.

Now something about your country and look how it worked or it did not work for other countries. What is the importance of knowing your neighbours business, the structures, budgets, defence preparation plans? This is because you feel more secure talking of the neighbours. The establishment of trust would be the final result of such co-operation. If you have openness and transparency then that would lead to security and stability. We are not speaking here of something that is of great importance in this element because this is not NATO and voluntary co-operation in the PfP.

The second thing would be the establishment of good neighbouring relations. This could never be emphasised as much as it should be because it is an important element for this part of the world. For example, in the north of Romania there is an area called Transylvania, with a population of around 2 million ethnic Hungarians, and the history of the people living there is very complicated. Their presence at the moment is such that they are in a position where potentially it could end with military conflict between Romania and Hungary in connection to the ethnic rights of the Hungarian minority. Two things have become perfectly clear: in preparation to join the PfP these two countries have realised that they have to sit down and come up with a peaceful solution for this problem. A similar thing happened with Slovakia, and more examples could be provided. Therefore the consultation process is a new characteristic inside the PfP.

What are the achievements in the field of defence? One important item in connection with this is that we have a common forum inside which we can speak about issues of defence. An important thing about which we spoke more times is the creation of interoperability. We know that if we want to have a collective multinational approach in crisis situations, we have to enable forces that shall have a joint approach to work as a common group. One other large achievement of the PfP is the reform of defence. This concerns the restructuring of forces and democratic control of our forces, transparency in the planning of defence and budgets, the creation of a legal framework, security concepts and doctrine. In order to arrive at this we would need to develop a system of military co-operation so that it would be possible in an adequate manner to prepare for that process. It is also important not to forget the formulation of military co-operation. SFOR and KFOR are examples of that kind of co-operation, 6000 officers in these jointly also adopt important decisions and that is a very important contribution of the PfP for the Alliance. There exist also bilateral forms of co-operation in the framework of a "Clearing House" programme for the exchange of information so that each member can be informed about common activities.

A third thing is the economic dimension of the PfP, which sometimes we forget. This concerns budgets and planning of defence activities and the use of resources through the PfP, and we assist countries with advisory processes that would form the basis of those

issues. In order to arrive towards the improvement of the entire state economic picture, countries would ask us for advice. A stable economic picture is a magnet for foreign investors and only with this can be made possible prosperous countries in all fields.

Between the period of 1994 – 1997 better co-operation was achieved as well as the development of improved partnership relations, the foundation of the EAPC in 1997 and we moved towards the PMF, the Political Military Framework, and in that context we have a framework that can be used for the common adoption of the decisions of partners and members of NATO. There also exists a programme to equip and train members. Insofar as security is concerned, we realised new forms of co-operation, the humanitarian dimension is a programme from the PfP, the control of small arms, and we have also a programme of the security of borders and an entire field connected for terrorism, the exchange of information regarding antiterrorist activities, organised criminals, and the trade of human beings. We also have a programme of post-conflict situations in which the issues of refugees and children have a special place.

On the end I would say something about the specific requirements that are presented to countries that apply for membership to the PfP. The basic condition is that the PfP deals only with the state and not parts of the state. We expect that every member of the PfP has a unique structure on a state-level that would enable effective participation in the activities of the PfP. If this does not exist, we consider that that country cannot give a useful contribution to the PfP and we would not approve its membership. For this country that is perhaps the most controversial issue.

When we say that we need to have a defence structure on a state-level, what exactly do we mean? Advancement shall come in the moment when on a state-level we would have military units that could work together towards the purpose of the defence of the country. That is not something that is new. Only NATO has no personal forces, rather the country members direct their own forces and deposit them for NATO's disposal. This means in this manner in the context of entities and the state of Bosnia and Herzegovina. This in turn means that entity armed forces can prepare a part of their own forces so that they would work on a state-level and work in the interest of the state.

If you have a need to have also experts on an administrative level that shall not be military persons, it is necessary to have a corresponding military service that shall provide support to this structure. It is necessary to have a conceptual framework, a defence policy, a security policy, military doctrine and a military legal framework. Furthermore, you cannot have military forces that do not have financial support; you have to have some vision of a budget in order to provide support to forces on a state level. Of course, over those forces there must exist parliamentary oversight on a state level. That is one of the pillars of democracy as well as openness and transparency, due to the fact that all need to be aware of what is happening in the state.

Without corresponding training you cannot achieve anything, you have to have a corresponding military academy. How to achieve this? You have to have an academy in the Federation and RS, and these would need to train personnel in different things and

would need to work together. The best solution would be to found a school that would work on a state level. Where that school would be situated could be a problem, but for example in Scandinavia we see that officers are trained in various countries, but all work towards the same objective. Perhaps some of these things would be able to be achieved, but not all; however, we want to keep the entities the way that they are. We cannot change the constitution - the autonomous entities - that is a position expressed lasted time. I am not against this. We can go further with what concerns the upgrading of Dayton, that we develop additional points of changing the constitution without jeopardising the entities. This can be done on that manner but it has to come from conciliation and it has to be expressed through good will. Perhaps there exist reasons that express suspicion towards another side, but we must place the past behind us. There exists something that can be expressed with our point of view. We in organisations such as OSCE, and other international bodies including also NATO, are prepared to do all that is necessary that we would assist this country to find its path, but we cannot do this for you; you have to do this yourselves. We can offer our assistance. I would say that this is your process and we shall stand on the side and watch what happens. Thank you.

SESSION II

Mr. Ibrahim Spahic (Parliamentary Assembly BiH)

Dr. Boris Shmelyov (Centre for Comparative Political Studies)

Mr. Zsolt Rabai (NATO)

Mr. Ibrahim Spahic, Delegate
House of Peoples
Parliamentary Assembly of Bosnia and Herzegovina

It is my pleasure to participate in this seminar on the Partnership for Peace (PfP), organised by the Centre for Security Studies (CSS). I will open this session and it is my pleasure to say that in the second part we will be discussing two themes, with Mr. Boris Shmelyov, the Director of the Centre for Comparative Political Studies from Moscow, and Mr. Zsolt Rabai, NATO Co-ordinator to West Balkans on Russia's Perspective Regarding NATO European Policy and NATO Membership and Hungary.

Before I give word to Mr. Shmelyov, allow me to give a statement on behalf of the BiH Parliament that concerns all of us due to the fact we are represented here today as participants in this seminar.

In 1999, the BiH Parliament adopted the resolution on foreign policy, regional co-operation and security. This resolution is the only document on foreign policy fortified by the BiH Parliament that precisely emphasises that BiH is interested in joining the PfP. I assume that this seminar will help; the questions discussed here this afternoon by the speakers will contribute to bring these issues to the Parliamentary working table. You are all aware that the BiH Presidency adopted the document of the so-called BiH Defence Policy.

The BiH Council of Ministers is taking into consideration the Security Policy of BiH according to the instructions given by the Presidency. The BiH Parliament will discuss these two documents. I do believe that they will enable the realisation of one part of the conditions in order to join the PfP, and the basis of that would be parliamentary control of military potentials, police structures and all other factors in the security system.

I am convinced that after the adoption of the resolution as well as the Security and Defence Policy, shall follow the development of corresponding bodies in Parliament and the Council of Ministers, as well as the corresponding policy of the adoption of law and change to the constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina in connection with this issue.

You are also familiar with the fact that we undertook different aspects of co-operation in the regional plan in the framework of the Stability Pact; therefore that is the reason why the second session of this seminar draws such attention - the presentation of the position of two countries that enable an insight into what is the global security policy.

I want to remind you that exactly one year ago on the parliamentary assembly, in the declaration of both houses it was agreed to the decision on searching for full member status in the NATO Assembly. Up to date that request had never been sent.

For inclusion in the NATO Assembly there does not exist any kind of conditions. What is necessary is the political will expressed by the BiH Parliament in the resolution

document, but the necessary co-ordination for the realisation of interests in this field was never implemented.

Therefore, the role of this Centre seems to be of great importance to remind us of our responsibilities and obligations, and to enable a view into public opinion. It would be very useful if that what we have heard and shall hear today were to be publicised, not only in the internal publication of the Centre, but also for the general public. Also, it would be of great use for the media to transmit in full the statements we heard this morning so that citizens of this country would be introduced to the themes discussed.

One question arises, and that is, how can we lead a survey between the citizens of BiH about the interests for entry in the PfP when the citizens of this country generally do not know the advantages and interests of one country joining the PfP? How can you search for an answer from somebody when nobody has ever presented in a clear way the structure of that organisation, for which we wish to enter.

Now I wish to give the floor to Mr. Boris Shmelyov, Director of the Centre for Comparative Political Studies from Moscow.

Dr Boris Shmelyov, Director
Centre for Comparative Political Studies, Moscow

Russian Perspective of the NATO European Policy

Spring 1989 was the last time I was in Sarajevo and I spoke to the editor of *Oslobodjenje* in a youth club on the subject of the situation in Yugoslavia and USSR, and on development perspectives. At the time we were not able to foresee that such changes would take place. We could not say that in a few years time there would not be a Soviet Union or the Warsaw Pact, nor we thought that in the near future such bloody conflict would take place in Yugoslavia.

Now, here, 12 years later we are discussing different problems than the ones we discussed 12 years ago. Today's problems are of a great importance for Europe, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Russia.

I would like to say something about relations between Russia and NATO. NATO became one of the most important structures in the architecture of European security. I remember my first lecture at the Diplomatic Academy in 1991. I was lecturing in front of the Soviet ambassadors deployed in the European countries. Lecturing then I said that the situation is emerging in which NATO would be the most important structure of European security. My statement caused such a reaction from all present that for a few minutes I thought I was going to be eaten up, because no-one in the Soviet Union at the time thought that NATO would gain such a dimension and that it would play such a role in European security. However, now we cannot discuss European security without considering the role and the impact of this organisation.

The most attention in Russian foreign policy is paid to European trends. This is understandable because Russia is a European country even though Russia now is something different to when it used to be the Soviet Union - although we cannot talk of Russia as a small Soviet Union or rump Soviet Union. It is a completely different country with a new geopolitical, economical interest, and with different potential and different resources in order to fulfil these interests. Russia is continuing its policy of joining the European trends because Russia remained a European country.

We could say that Europe has great impact on the situation development in Russia, the following example could illustrate that fact. Forty-five percent of the foreign trade of Russia is with European countries. Each disturbance in the economic situation in Europe has a negative impact on the situation in Russia.

We are aware that in the past when Russia had bad relations with Europe it reflected the inner difficulties within the country. It would be difficult to imagine the development of democratic, social and economic life together with renewal of Russia without co-operation with Europe. It is certain that within the framework of foreign policy, Russia

ought to pay great attention to its relations with NATO as well as the NATO member countries. It is one of the most important structures of providing security for Europe.

Regarding the relations between Russia and NATO there are several problems arising, and the positive development of these relations could not occur without addressing these issues. Recently, until this year maybe, Russia did not consider NATO's role in providing security for Europe as important. There were several reasons for such a consideration. First of all, Russia strongly reacted against NATO aggression on Yugoslavia in the spring and summer of 1999. This NATO military action was also criticised by the Russian Government as well as by the public opinion of this country as aggression.

Russia was creating conditions to prevent the aggression but when it started it criticised such and tried to do what was possible for this action to end as soon as possible. It is certain that due to the situation in Yugoslavia great damages were caused to relations between Russia and NATO, this was due to the fact that the most important element in relations was lost, the mutual trust. Russia considered the NATO campaign in Yugoslavia as an aggression implemented without the approval of the Security Council where Russia has its role. Russia saw this as aggression against Belgrade.

Another issue would be what was the Russian relation to Milosevic and its policy, we are not discussing that now but aggression on Belgrade was estimated as a violation of International Law - as a position of force policy. Due to that, Russia lost the trust in NATO, and found NATO as an aggressive organisation, as an aggressive structure, and therefore Western countries marked the response of Russia as negative.

However, in 1997 the Act on Co-operation between NATO and Russia was signed. This Act represented a so-called compromise between NATO interests and the interests of Russia. What would be the problem in relations between NATO and Russia? Until recently Russia did not agree with NATO expansion to the East. It also would not agree with the inclusion of the new countries in NATO, in the first line countries of East Europe, and also countries of the former Soviet Union, such as the Baltic countries.

The political elite in Russia considers NATO expansion to the east as damaging to the national interests of Russia. There are two aspects of this problem, the military and the political aspect. Our generals say that NATO coming closer to Russian borders would mean NATO could have the advantage in any possible attack on Russia. It would mean they would be able to get to the centre of Russia in a couple of minutes and in that case, Russia cannot respond to such attack in the same way. I think there is not any possibility of military conflict between NATO and Russia; however, a part of the political elite in Russia has no trust in NATO. Therefore this part of the political elite in Russia criticises such expansion.

When former Soviet Union President Gorbachov and former USA President Bush Senior met in Malta 1990 they reached an agreement that NATO would not expand to the east. However, the new Clinton administration would not fulfil this agreement and therefore in Russia this expansion was characterised as a violation of this agreement. I think the main

problem in expansion is that Russia does not see this regarding the military but as a political plan. The problem is that NATO is at the moment the most powerful organisation in Europe supporting democratic transformation. NATO up to a significant degree creates the political dimension development of Europe and as such there is no place for Russia.

The expansion of mutual trade creates a completely different situation, NATO expansion forms a different political situation. We can see that OSCE now has not got the same role it used to have during the time of the Cold War. Russia would want this organisation to have the central role in creating security but that is not the case. The development of the situation here in the Balkans states that NATO has better results than OSCE, and the reasons for that would be that the OSCE's primary role was to solve the different kinds of problems that existed during the cold war.

Therefore, in such a situation Russia cannot find its own place in the creation process of the new security architecture and it therefore reacts to steps undertaken by NATO.

The document from 1997 takes into account this major concern of Russia, and included the idea of Russia and NATO establishing dialogue in adjusting their stands in the case of solving the European security issues.

I must say that since 1997 when the process had started, there also existed the parallel process of building a consultation mechanism; however in 1999 the process in full was determined. It became clear that Russia has no more influence on the basic political trends in Europe. The wishes and voice of Russia were no longer taken into consideration. Events after 1999 regarding the relations between the Russia and Western countries showed that in fact there is no alternative for co-operation between the NATO and Russia. The intention of Russia in finding an alternative in order to come up with the solution for problems of European security failed. It became clear that with no further development of relations, Russia would not be able to find its way out.

The establishment process of good relations with NATO started with President Putin, who, if I may say, understood the pragmatic situation as it was and that there was no other way out but to co-operate with NATO. Putin paid a visit to Brussels, to the NATO HQ, and met with Secretary General Robertson indicating the possible perspectives for the development of Russia.

Now we have to estimate the situation from the other side. What is the NATO response to this? I think that NATO realised that without the development of good relations with Russia there could not be a stable Europe. Hereafter we have to come up with a compromise. However, there are few problems creating obstacles in the development of these relations: firstly, it would be the new NATO expansion to the East. Now we are talking of the inclusion of Baltic countries which for Russia at the moment would not be acceptable. Our generals were quite strict on this. Speaking of instalment of new missiles, new troops on the borders to these countries etc.

I think that so far we would not take this into consideration as a serious move made by Russia. There will not be any military reactions but the problem does exist. NATO cannot reject the requests for joining submitted by the countries mentioned, and Russia would not agree with the development of the events as there is. For the time being there is no way out of this situation.

Secondly, relations with the USA. To analyse the relations between NATO and Russia would not be possible without taking into account the specific relationship features that exist between the USA and Russia. At the end of the last and beginning of this year the relations between the USA and Russia were burdened with lots of problems. The basic problem regarding the relations was that the USA took the position from a force standpoint. It is certain that Russia is weaker than the USA. The GDP of Russia quotes only 6-8% of the USA GDP. In fact it is nothing. In such a situation Russia could not be an equal partner to the USA. Russia is not used to being spoken to from a force standpoint. It is our tradition, therefore, that we cannot allow issues regarding international security, as well as the relation's issue to be solved from a force standpoint. This is the main reason of the worsening of relations in recent years.

Nowadays, a lot has been spoken about the future of the antimissile defence agreement. This agreement was signed in 1992 under certain conditions. USA now states that this contract has played its role and the USA is ready to come out of it. In principle Russia could not accept this. Up to date it was impossible to come up with a compromise. I want to say that the discussion on the future of this agreement is only an example of an iceberg against regulated relations between the USA and Russia, which existed in the past period. It does not concern only this agreement but also the complex problem that burdens our relations and also the principles on which upon these relations should be built. I want to repeat one more time that it is unacceptable for Russia to develop relations on the principle of the force balance. I think in June and July this year, relations between NATO and Russia were estimated quite pessimistically, Russia and Western countries, Russia and the USA. It was difficult to find a way out of such a situation - that not one party would want to come up with a compromise.

The situation after Sept 11th looked as though it had changed in principal; however, the New York tragedy changed the USA approach to providing European and international security. The tragedy showed that security understanding was different to one before, therefore in that context the USA looked towards the role and significance of Russia in a different way. I would say that after Sept 11th new positive grounds were created for the development of political co-operation and co-operation concerning security matters.

Therefore, we could say in combating international terrorism today, led by the USA, that Russia is an ally to the USA and Western countries because it is in the interests of Russia. The Taliban have caused great damage to the interests of Russia. Separatists in Chechnya receive support and finance means from the Taliban. A great number of separatists have been trained in Afghanistan in their camps.

Therefore, I repeat, this combating is in the interests of Russia and that is why Russia supports the USA actions undertaken. In these relations, which sees Russia and the USA as allies, we can find an exit from this type of situation in connection with the expansion of NATO and the growth of its role. The realistic exit out of this situation would be for Russia to become a NATO member. I would say that at the moment the conditions have been created for the signing of such a historical compromise between the West and Russia. This historical compromise could create completely different conditions for the development of the entire European continent. This is not about Russia becoming a NATO member over night, that is a process. It demands the political willingness as well as readiness of the West to accept Russia and also on the Russian side in order to join NATO. If I spoke of this in Moscow 6-7 months ago I would not receive any support. Nowadays the situation is changing and President Putin stated on several occasions that he does not exclude such a development. It would be a desirable option in the development of events. I would say that Russia forwarded the pilot "chess" to NATO to see its response. The first response was negative and everybody thought of it as impossible, but after Sept 11th in Russia we recognised several signs that situation in the West is changing. It means that the West is analysing such a possibility and taking into consideration the possible inclusion of Russia as a NATO member and the consequences of such event. It is for certain there will be a lot of influences on NATO. Russia is not interested in becoming a member in its military segment and there is not much significance in Article 5 of the Washington Agreement talking of the security of all members of Alliance. It is of much more importance for us to enter the political segment, to participate in the development and implementation of basic political decisions regarding European security. We could expect new things after Bush and Putin meet on Nov 12th and 13th.

The Italian Prime Minister Berlusconi stated that Russia has to be a member of NATO. We also have partial support from Germany. However, I think that today the most important factor is about creating the political climate in order to solve this issue. This concerns creating the preconditions for the joining of Russia in NATO. There are a lot of problems regarding this matter as well as a number of technical dimensions. The basic task at the moment would be the development of the political will of Russia and Western countries. On a technical level, Russia has quite a few good relations and co-operation with NATO.

In Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Russian battalion has good relations with its colleagues from NATO. Regarding that there is no problem. We could also mention the co-operation between Russian soldiers and the soldiers of NATO in Kosovo. It means that on a technical level we can find approaches to one another. These days it is about a political connotation and wish. I hope that today in Europe we are standing in front of the changes along principle lines. If Russia fails in joining NATO, Russia and NATO would be on different sides of the fight for European security. In that case the development of events would worsen due to the situation where a number of reasons exist for a conflict of interests. Time will show the further development of the situation, but I think the problem would be as to whether Europe and Russia were prepared to make these moves. Thank you.

Mr. Zsolt Rabai

Coordinator for the West Balkans

North Atlantic Treaty Organisation - NATO

NATO membership and Hungary

In 1999, Hungary became a full Member of the North Atlantic Alliance with all the rights, commitments and obligations of membership. Hungary has now achieved full political integration. However, full-scale military integration is an ongoing process. Many people say it is too slow. Perhaps. But we should not forget that it took the Federal Republic of Germany almost ten years to achieve full military integration in the Alliance. Today the task is even more complicated because Hungary has to aim at a moving target. NATO is rapidly evolving and this necessitates changes in all the Member States.

What was Hungary's motivation in joining the Alliance?

There was consensus amongst Hungarian policy-makers to reintegrate it into the community of free and democratic States. For Hungarian politicians, as well as for the public at large, the Euro-Atlantic integration had two pillars: NATO - the defence pillar and EU - the economic pillar. Therefore, by integration in the Alliance, a major goal for Hungary was to assure its smooth integration into the community of developed democratic States. Did Hungary's membership fulfil these expectations? I think the answer is definitely "yes".

The second major motive for Hungary was well defined in Prime Minister Orban's speech, "By NATO membership we would like to assure a stable, peaceful and secure environment in the long run". This goal was a clear challenge in post-socialist Central and Eastern Europe with its collapsed regimes, collapsed economies, vacuum of power, crisis of values with the rebirth of extreme nationalism, growing violation of human rights, etc. Did Hungary manage to secure its stable environment for a long term by NATO membership? Up to this moment and to the best of our best knowledge, the answer again is "yes".

It was clear from the very beginning that Hungary's main motivation for membership was neither a supposed direct external threat nor a concrete military menace. However, a fear of the return of the old Communist regime in Russia, especially after Foreign Minister Kozirev's unforgettable speech at the 1992 OSCE Summit in Stockholm, directly influenced the Hungarian Government's decision to seek NATO membership. Additionally, fears of a territorial spill over, as well as economic implications of the Yugoslav crisis, pushed the responsible politicians to urge membership of the Alliance.

I have mentioned economy. At that time the Hungarian economy needed a considerable inflow of foreign direct investment in order to re-establish a healthy economic growth. All economic reforms, the introduction of a free market economy, conditions for a free

and fair competition, were not enough to attract foreign investments - especially serious long- term investors - in the light of the Balkans War. According to the leaders of international companies, the prospect of their country's eventual NATO membership guaranteed them a security on their investments, at least from the point of view of hard security.

There was another important motivation factor in the Hungarian Government's decision. This was the opportunity to be part of the international decision-making process concerning the main conflict area of Europe - the Balkans - which is in the immediate neighbourhood of Hungary. Hungary's participation in NATO's political discussions and decision-making was challenged only a few days after it was formally accepted as a Member. NATO started its airstrikes in Kosovo and Serbia. Because of the close vicinity and the presence of a large community of Hungarian national minority in Vojvodina, this operation touched upon Hungarian interests. If somebody raises the question whether Hungary's membership of NATO was a good decision and whether it ensured representation of Hungarian interests in light of NATO's airstrikes, my answer would again be in the affirmative.

Neutrality versus membership

Since 1956 neutrality has been a dream of the Hungarians. Following political changes, the first freely elected Government did not want to provoke Russia by requesting NATO membership. However, the Yugoslav crisis and Kozirev's speech in 1992, convinced Hungarian politicians that the hard security of the country had to be strengthened. This challenge came at a time when the number of Hungarian Armed Forces dropped by half, whilst maintaining the existing structure. The defence budget had also dropped considerably. In April 1989, as a Member of the Warsaw Pact, Hungary had Soviet troops on its territory. The number of peacetime troops was 160,000 and the military expenditure achieved 3.5% of GDP. In 1996 the number of peacetime troops was 81,266 and the military expenditure dropped to 1.26% of GDP, which was also decreasing.

It was obvious that the country's hard security would be at a higher level, more effective and less costly with NATO membership. The inevitable reform of the Hungarian Armed Forces also seemed to be more efficient in the NATO context.

Is NATO membership really cheap?

Cheap security does not mean that a country can avoid military reforms and can further decrease defence expenditures. It just means that all the preconditions are there to ensure high-level security by sharing the tasks and burdens with other Allies. It also means, however, that Armed Forces have to be modernised and transformed to be able to participate in the Alliance's common tasks and commitments. To obtain NATO membership, Hungary had to make a commitment to increase its defence budget to 1.81% of the GDP.

NATO membership also meant active participation in its planning process, which resulted in efficient support to the reform of the Armed Forces especially to identify, develop and establish required capabilities. The first developed Target Force Goals

defined the main direction of the Hungarian Armed Forces in the medium-term. The focus was on: language training, high-level command, control and communication, host nation support, inclusion in NATO's integrated air defence system, preparation of Reaction Forces and participation in NATO's Strategic Intelligence Information exchange.

Partnership for Peace (PfP)

Partnership for Peace was an important element in Hungary's preparation for membership, especially in the field of defence planning and interoperability. Additionally, PfP membership added value to the internal stabilisation of the country by focusing on transparency in defence planning and budgetary processes and ensuring democratic control of the Armed Forces.

Foreign Policy

Preparations for NATO membership had also challenged Hungarian Foreign Policy. A prerequisite of any future NATO membership was clear reconciliation with all the neighbouring states, a diplomatic solution to the problem of national minorities and, of course, Hungary had to make it clear that it had no territorial claim against any other country. Hungary not only fulfilled these preconditions, but today has also become one of the major supporters of the neighbouring candidate countries for NATO membership.

National Consensus

A consensus from almost all the parliamentary parties carved a solid background for all governments in developing relations with NATO. Only two small political parties opposed NATO membership - the Workers' Party with 2-3% public support, and the Party of Hungarian Truth and Life with 5% public support.

The referendum on NATO membership clearly demonstrated that national support was not limited only to political parties. 49.24% of all voters participated in this referendum. Of this total, 85.33% of the votes were for. According to the latest opinion polls, public support for NATO membership is still very high - more than 70%.

Legal Issues

NATO membership also meant a psychological and legal challenge. After the political changes, one of the primary constitutional changes was forbidding foreign troops from entering Hungarian territory and sending Hungarian troops abroad without the agreement of the Hungarian Parliament. This constitutional change, however, limits Hungary's ability to contribute towards new NATO tasks or even to quickly react in case of activation of Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty. Public Procurement Law, National Defence Law, etcetera, also had to be adapted to NATO standards.

Hungary's Contribution as a Member Country to the work of NATO

By commencing the enlargement process, NATO wanted to extend its zone of security to a destabilised Central and Eastern Europe. We can already say today that this expectation has been fulfilled.

On the one hand, Hungary's neighbourhood with the major crisis area in Europe was of great importance for the work of the Alliance from the military and political standpoints. On the other hand, the special knowledge of Hungarian experts and their experience in the region helped in making a realistic assessment of the situation and in seeking more viable solutions. The experience of Hungarian experts with Ukraine and Russia is also much appreciated.

Last but not least, Hungary, together with Poland and the Czech Republic, has extremely valuable experience in joining NATO and in transforming its own defence system to conform to NATO. By sharing this information with the new candidate countries, they can render NATO's future enlargement process much easier.

SESSION III

General Mirslav Nikolic (Retired)

**General Imre Agotic (Office of the President of the Republic of
Croatia)**

Dr. Ognjen Pribicevic (Centre for Southeast European Studies)

Major John Hampson (Office of the High Representative)

General Miroslav Nikolic, Retired
Army of the Federation of BiH

Allow me to commence with the third session of today's seminar. I hope that it will be interesting enough to keep us awake after an excellent lunch.

So far we have heard very detailed and good quality presentations on what should be done in order to join the PfP, as well as experiences from other countries regarding the PfP and NATO. We can conclude that we have a large task ahead of us if we wish to enter the PfP.

What would be of particular importance is to show genuine preparedness regarding the performance of such a task. Everyone is aware that our present situation is very difficult, but the good side is that in the past certain things depended on others, and now everything is up to us, to our capacities and our willingness.

Just to mention a little joke regarding the situation in BiH: A pessimist and optimist are talking regarding the situation, the pessimist says, "The situation is horrible", the optimist replies, "It can always get worse". I hope that here this will not be the case.

After these well presented sessions for which we thanked our speakers, I do not think that this session will be of any less quality. We shall hear experiences from two neighbouring countries that share the same geographical space and destiny like us, but in some ways are in a different situation than we are.

The first speaker will be General Imre Agotic, Military Advisor to the President of Republic of Croatia, who will speak on the security profile of Croatia and PfP membership. Afterwards, we will hear Dr. Ognjen Pribicevic, the Director of the Centre for Southeast European Studies from Belgrade, regarding the transition strategy of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. After that Major John Hanson will speak instead of the Military Advisor to the High Representative on the identity and security of the state. Major Hanson is also a member of the Military Cell of the Office of the High Representative.

General Imre Agotic

Military Advisor to the President for Defence and Military Issues
Office of the President of the Republic of Croatia

Security Profile of Croatia and its Membership in the PfP

Ladies and Gentlemen, respected participants of this seminar. It is an exceptional honour for me to participate here today. The theme of today's seminar, considering the collective problems of BiH future membership in the PfP, is an opportunity to express the current Croatian experiences of co-operation in the framework of the PfP, as well as pointing out the place and significance of the PfP in Croatian efforts to enter Euro-Atlantic security processes. In particular, this relates to the achievement of the objective of the Republic of Croatia to become a full member of NATO. I hope that in this perspective, the Croatian experience will be also significant for the efforts of BiH to join the PfP, as well as the efforts for inclusion into other security processes in the European continent.

The inclusion of the Republic of Croatia in the PfP last year represents in many ways a significant step for Croatia in the process of achieving one of its key objectives of foreign and security policy - reaching out for full member status in NATO. This step, together with the intention of the Republic of Croatia to enter the European Union, should be considered in the light of achieving Croatian strategic goals - continuing the development of the democratic system that will assure the creation of internal political stability as well as to contribute to the establishment of a secure environment adequate for the Republic of Croatia.

Without further democratisation it would not be possible to include further Croatia in the European integration process, and without this, it is not possible to create and achieve economic development and prosperity in Croatia.

However, the creation of a stable and democratic order in the Republic of Croatia is not only of importance for Croatia. Success in achieving that goal will have a wider positive impact in region. Simply stated, stability in Croatia will significantly assist the stabilisation of the entire region. Without stabilisation in the region it will not be possible to achieve the further democratic and economic development of Croatia. Besides this, with its political and economic activities in the region, the Republic of Croatia shall in the best way show support to the efforts that the European Union has invested in this field, which can only speed up the inclusion of Croatia as a full member of the European Union. For us, the signing of the Agreement on Stabilisation and Accession between the Republic of Croatia and the European Union, signed on 29 October 2001, is of exceptional significance.

It is obvious today that one country cannot achieve complete security independently. This is of particular value for small countries in this region that find themselves in the process of political and economic transition. Independently keeping territorial integrity and

independence in this phase of globalisation is not possible. However, it is possible in the framework of a collective security system, such as NATO, and other international organisations (OSCE, UN).

In connection with the above mentioned, the positions of the Republic of Croatia according to the issue achieving membership in NATO are as follows:

1. Inclusion in NATO is the strategic aim of the foreign and security policy of Croatia;
2. NATO expansion will make possible for new members the advantage of collective security and at the same time further integration into European and Euro-Atlantic institutions, which will contribute to their further democratisation;
3. Croatia appreciates the NATO open door policy regarding membership of all European countries, but every potential member has to be looked at individually. Its entry to NATO cannot be dictated by the speed of fulfilment of the conditions of some other potential candidate.

We are aware that NATO membership, along with its rights, carries significant obligations. Due to that, along with the activities in order to join NATO, Croatia is undertaking efforts in order to reorganise its defence system. Concerning the above mentioned, our goal would be the transformation of armed forces into a small but highly professional army, with modernised equipment from the West. Such an army would have to, along with the allies, guarantee the territorial integrity of the Republic of Croatia, and implement the undertaken international obligations of the Republic of Croatia.

In accordance with above mentioned, the Croatian Defence Policy intends to contribute to achieving full member status in NATO through the following activities:

1. The development of an efficient defence system, under the full civil and democratic control of parliament;
2. Contribution to the development of a favourable security environment;
3. Achieving the full interoperability and compatibility of Croatian armed forces with NATO;
4. The creation of a Croatian army capable to participate in new missions and non-traditional tasks inside the framework of undertaken international obligations.

What is the significance of the PfP in the above-mentioned context? It is a fact that after the Washington Summit in 1999 the PfP became a major tool in connection with NATO actions to countries outside the Alliance, as well as the key framework for NATO work in this region. The PfP today is an integral part of missions and NATO activities. Therefore, every country that has an ambition to join NATO also must be involved in PfP activities. We are convinced that the PfP, along with other existing mechanisms, could significantly strengthen the influence of Croatia in solving the security problems present in region.

Since the very beginning of co-operation with NATO, Croatia has intended to take an active standpoint. We offer and not only accept services, especially we engage in activities that are mutually beneficial for the Republic of Croatia and also for the

countries of NATO. In the framework of the PfP, Croatia offers a contribution in support of the actions of NATO forces in Bosnia and Kosovo, and through security co-operation in the direction of the achievement of the stability of the region and the strengthening of trust between states of the region. This is achieved through the offering of logistical support and accommodation of international forces in Croatia, as well as the Croatian possibilities to influence the wider environment around the Republic of Croatia by spreading and promoting the positive principles of the western model of democracy, peace and coexistence, etc.

The above-mentioned activities would be the best and quickest way to prepare Croatian armed forces in order to join NATO. This would create better possibilities in modelling our own defence system and at the same time (along with undertaking the complementary political and economic measures) strengthening the role of Croatia as a necessary factor in the stabilisation of the region.

Since joining the PfP in May 2000, Croatia has undertook following steps:

- Two agreements have been signed (the Security Agreement, and the new SOFA Agreement -Status of Forces Agreement, that regulates the presence of foreign forces on the territory of Croatia), which is of much importance for further co-operation with NATO;
- A Mission of the Republic of Croatia with NATO has also been established, and Croatia is also involved in military consultations (on the level of the HQs) in the framework of the NATO HQ;
- With the Croatian government an inter-resource co-ordination body in co-operation with the PfP and NATO has been established, in order to harmonise the activities of different ministries and agencies inside the PfP and NATO co-operation programme framework, and preparation of the entire relations strategy between Croatia and NATO;
- Step-by-step, Croatia is increasing the quantity and range of participation in different activities. Regarding military activities in the period from 2000-2001, Croatia (observer status as well as active participant) participated in a total of 8 PfP exercises. For the period of 2001-2002, it was planned for Croatia to participate in 9 exercises, having in mind that next year in Croatia will be organised a large PfP exercise called "Taming the Dragon". Regarding the total number of activities in the period of 2000-2001, in total 74 planned and 19 unplanned additional activities will be conducted. In 2001-2002, there were a total of 131 PfP exercises with the planned participation of Croatia (Croatia would be the host country for 8 exercises). The above-mentioned increase of activities in the framework of the PfP is followed by a significant increase of financial resources for that purpose: in the fiscal year of 2001, for that intention 500,000 USD was assigned, while for the coming year it is planned that this amount will increase on 800,000 USD to one million USD;
- Last year the Republic of Croatia joined the PARP process (determination of partnership goals in co-operation with NATO, and forces that might be included in international operations under the NATO/PfP leadership). As a result of the activities in the PARP framework, by the end of this year Croatia will be prepared to assign one

military police unit to PfP operations, and by the end of 2002 another infantry company, nuclear-biological-chemical troops, two medical teams and one transport helicopter Mil Mi-8 with crew. In the near future we plan to extend these troops.

- In the framework of co-operation within the PfP, Croatia has accepted 28 Partnership goals (in the framework of the Individual Partnership Programme). These activities have been chosen on the estimated grounds that their fulfilment would help in the implementation of the above-mentioned Individual Partnership Programme. Among the activities the highest priority is given to the fields as follows: defence policy and strategy; leadership and command; language courses; general logistics; military exercises and relevant activities; military education; training and doctrine;
- The Republic of Croatia established the International Military Operations Department (in order to prepare Croatian forces for participation in international operations), and the Simulation Department (for the education and preparation of company and brigade commanders for international activities).

In the period to come, the key goal for Croatia is to become a member in the PfP MAP (Membership Action Plan) Programme for more intensive preparations to join NATO, in order to gain country candidate status for membership in the Alliance. In accordance with the above-mentioned, Croatia entered the process of intensive dialogue with NATO, in order for better preparation to join the MAP. Within the framework of intensive dialogue a series of different activities has been implemented in all fields significant for the achievement of membership in the Alliance (visits of NATO expert teams work to introduce NATO experiences in certain fields, as well as the overview of Croatian activities; organisation of seminars and courses; the distribution of practical suggestions for the resolution of specific problems). Particularly, a significant step within the above-mentioned dialogue would be the development of a document concerning major issues connected with achieving Croatian membership in NATO (the so-called "Discussion Paper"), in which the Croatia side points out its position on all issues connected with this problem. Comments on this are in process by the Member States of NATO, and for which their amendments will be forwarded. On the basis of the "Discussion Paper" and intensive dialogue, the first Yearly National Plan will be developed, as a key document for the inclusion of Croatia in the MAP and the further division of activities upon entry to the MAP.

In process is also the development of a series of documents that shall additionally facilitate Croatia efforts for its inclusion in the MAP. The implementation of constitutional reform in December 2000 and March 2001 created the grounds for the replacement of the bi-presidential system into parliamentary. With these steps normative grounds were created for the adoption of a series of key documents necessary for the reform of the defence system of the Republic of Croatia. Those documents are the Strategy of National Security, new Law on Defence, Law on Participation in International Military Operations, the White Book on Defence, and Military Strategy. Together with the formulation of detailed plans for the reorganisation of the Ministry of Defence and armed forces, the conditions for the resolution of present problems and speeding up of the process of the reform of the defence system have been created. All of the above-mentioned steps shall also accelerate the process of Croatian membership in NATO. Depending on

the tempo of all the above-mentioned activities, Croatia is hoping to join the MAP by the end of this or at the beginning of the next year. Along with the above-mentioned activities, Croatia is attempting to create the conditions in the shortest time possible to achieve full-member status in NATO. Therefore, the PfP is one of the key means for the achievement of this goal.

Finally, I wish to point-out that our wish is that Bosnia and Herzegovina would become a member of PfP as soon as possible. In the achievement of that goal, the Republic of Croatia is prepared to provide all necessary assistance, through the exchange of experiences and also through intensive bilateral security co-operation. It is in our mutual interest to advance the stability of the region. On one side, this would enable the further democratic and economic development of both countries, and on the other, it would reflect a mature and serious approach of both partners in efforts to enter the European and Euro-Atlantic integration processes.

Dr. Ognjen Pribicevic, Director
Centre for Southeast European Studies, Belgrade

The Transitional Strategy of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia

Mr. Chairman, Ladies and Gentleman, I also have to say I am very pleased to be here in Sarajevo – the first time after 11 years, and the first time to speak on such an occasion due to the fact at that time I was still too young to participate.

As you might notice, the title of my speech is "Transition Strategy of Yugoslavia". I am afraid that something like that does not exist. However, if it did exist, in that case we have at least two such strategies. In my opinion this is the major problem we are facing in Yugoslavia at the moment. The President of Yugoslavia Mr. Kostunica represents one strategy and the Serbian Government Prime Minister Mr. Djindjic represents the other strategy.

Today's seminar is on the Partnership for Peace (PfP), and it would be interesting to see the Yugoslav relation to this programme. Side by side with Bosnia, Yugoslavia is the only country in the region that is not a PfP member; and as a matter of fact, the difference would be that Bosnia submitted a request to join the PfP while Yugoslavia did not.

In this period Yugoslavia is still facing unsolved problems on vital issues of its statehood that also concern other concepts we are discussing here today. At this moment it is not certain if the Federation of Serbia and Montenegro will survive. Approximately ten days ago talks between Serbia and Montenegro were interrupted and it was decided to go for a referendum in Montenegro, which shall definitely decide how relations in the Federation will develop. It is a process ahead of us at least for another six months.

As a political analyst in Belgrade, many questions have been posed to me as to the way I foresee the referendum; I say it is absolutely uncertain. Firstly, what kind of referendum would that be, because you are familiar with the fact that the European Union and the USA are strongly against the manner in which the present government in Montenegro leads the entire referendum process. Secondly, the outcome of this referendum is uncertain. Therefore, a common state is also uncertain. This is only one out of many issues Yugoslavia is facing these days.

Another issue would be Kosovo. Unfortunately, as you are all aware it is only formally within the system of Yugoslavia. A couple of days ago the Yugoslav leadership, under great pressure from the international community, came up with a decision for Serbs to come forward at the Kosovo elections. I can tell you that the welcome to that decision was very cold by the Serbs, especially Serbs in Kosovo. Honestly said, there are no great conditions for democratic elections in that area, day to day murders on the basis of political background are taking place and the situation is very difficult concerning Serbs

in Kosovo. However, that is the decision that has been adopted and we shall now see how this finishes.

This means that there are two important political issues that Yugoslavia is facing, and these are certainly issues about which are discussing here today.

Today's subject is very interesting to me, due to the fact that within the framework of the Centre for Southeast European Studies we are actively pledging for Yugoslavia to join the PfP. We also held several seminars, and a large international conference at the beginning of this year where we discussed the views and the reasons as to why Yugoslavia should join the PfP. The conference was well attended, also by governmental officials and by the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Yugoslavia. He gave indications that such opinion does exist, but that this must wait until the problems I mentioned before are resolved.

I would like to say a something concerning these two existing strategies for the PfP. They are probably the key reasons for not undertaking any faster movements in that direction. However, on one side we have a strategy that is pledging for quite fast, some say a too fast, inclusion of Serbia in these most important European economic and political organisations. There are two variants, one led by the Prime Minister Dzindzic and a more cautious one led by Mr. President Kostunica. Dzindzic's representatives are more critical towards the other one considering that it is slowing down a wide range of reforms. The fight over political control has a great impact on such changes. The military and police are institutions in Serbia in which there did not practically occur any changes. Only cosmetic changes took place in the police, with one group of people replacing the other. The army is an institution in which the least changes took place. They are the same people without any kind of personnel change. Now you have a funny situation in which the generals who were so against NATO are now pledging for the PfP.

Between these two strategies exists a divide in which units belong to the police and others to the army. Naturally, doubts exist regarding changes within these two very important state institutions. At the same time, I think the problem would be that unfortunately in Serbia today much significance goes to these institutions. In the last ten years, I spent much time in the West and the USA; I could also see that such institutions, although they have large significance, are treated as services of society. Traditionally in our region this is not so, these institutions have much more significance than is needed and the problem is that they are placed in the context of political conflict, which we have today in Serbia.

Nevertheless, I think that changes are irrepressible, and this issue shall be resolved, and where this would be necessary also alongside pressure from the international community, which shall certainly be welcome and that matters shall go towards settlement so that new state elections would result in Serbia, which shall have to result with the decision as to which of these two strategies will be led by Serbia in the future. I believe that alongside the pressure from the international community changes shall take place in the army and police.

Finally, I would like to say that changes are certain and definite. There is no chance something shall return in Serbia like that which existed during the time of Milosevic. There is no chance of this and despite the local elections in Serbia, in which Milosevic's socialists recorded a large success of 20%, the societal atmosphere in Serbia has changed and that is the main thing.

The reform that is the road to European political integration is unstoppable. My most important message here is that there are no kind of dialogues concerning turning back, and these two political groups in Serbia truly pledge for inclusion in the PfP, as well as in all other types of integration processes. This shall proceed slower or faster, depending upon the internal situation and their political conflicts that at the end of the day is normal.

In Belgrade, I can say we are very worried concerning the situation in Macedonia. Macedonia represents one very critical point for our entire security. A very dangerous disintegration process is taking place; although Macedonia is a member of the PfP, that country is at the edge of war and from Belgrade I assure you we are very worried about that. We think that things going on in Macedonia would in full have great impact on the entire region, especially from the stand of its participation within the PfP.

The promises that Macedonia has received from numerous European organisations in connection with its integrity and independence today must be realised. Any split in the territory of Macedonia is not only a matter that would jeopardise the security of this region, but would bring into question the entire concept of security about which we speak here today. Macedonia and its destiny in great measure would impact the directions in this region. Thank you.

Major John Hampson

SCMM Liaison Officer, Military Cell
Office of the High Representative - OHR

***Bosnia and Herzegovina State Level Security and Defence Identity: Co-operation
towards European and Euro-Atlantic Integration***

Mr. Chairman, distinguished delegates. Thank you very much for having us here today. I would like to begin with an apology from Air Marshal Gardiner who extends his regrets at not being able to be here today - of course, there is no-one more in this room who regrets that more than myself, so I will be giving his speech for him.

The presentation today will be on Bosnia-Herzegovina State Level Security and Defence Identity: Co-operation towards European and Euro-Atlantic Integration.

Before I start however, all day we have heard about stability and the speed with which you want that to happen, and the international community, so I thought I would share a story with you of that very instance. Back in March of 1994, I was here in Sarajevo, and my commander came to me and he said, "There is a relative period of stability, so what I would like you to do is lead a patrol through Sarajevo and show everybody that the situation is stable." And I thought, no problem, I can do that for you. And he said, "The route to take is what we refer to as 'sniper's alley', which is the main route right through Sarajevo", and I told him that was not a problem, and he then said, "I want you to do it in your jeep!" I said, "Excuse me?" - a jeep is a soft-skin vehicle, it is very material. So I went to my driver and I said, "we are going to do a patrol to show how stable this area is", he said, "No problem Sir" "However, we are going to do it in the jeep" He looked at me very strangely and he said, "Do you mind if I drive quickly?" and I said, "I want you to move as fast as you possibly can" - so I think that I have the speed record from going from the PTT building to downtown Sarajevo and back, and we did that back in 1994, so this stability thing can happen quickly if you want it to happen quickly.

With respect to the Constitution of BiH, the PIC declarations from Madrid (1998) and Brussels (2000) emphasise the need for the BiH authorities to move decisively towards state building in the field of security and defence. This was to be achieved through enhanced co-ordination and co-operation, aiming at integration both within BiH and the European and Euro-Atlantic security and defence structures.

To this end, the BiH Defence Policy establishes the political guidelines on how to take responsibility and exercise civil command and control of defence matters at the state-level. As a political document, it provides the framework necessary for better information, co-ordination and close co-operation of the armed forces in BiH. It establishes the political basis for preserving the interests of BiH and its entities in terms of security and defence.

This BiH Common Defence Policy will contribute to the BiH Common Security Policy currently being developed by a working group set up by the Council of Ministers. This will be under the overall responsibility and oversight of the Presidency and the SCMM – aiming at a BiH State dimension for security and defence – in other words, a BiH State-level Security and Defence Identity.

Some 12 years ago, almost to the day, following the fall of the Berlin Wall on 9 November 1989, the spirit of Partnership of Peace was born. Overcoming the heritages of the Cold War, the western Alliance, during their Summits in London (1990) and Rome (1991), set up their new strategy – from confrontation towards co-operation and integration.

PfP was established as an expression of a joint conviction that stability and security in the Euro-Atlantic area can be achieved only through co-operation and common action. Protection and promotion of fundamental freedoms and human rights, and the safeguarding of freedom, justice and peace through democracy are shared values and fundamental to the Partnership.

Against this spirit of co-operation and integration, a State dimension of security and defence, a State level Security and Defence Identity, is not contradictory to the Partnership for Peace at all. Quite the reverse: commonly shared values, joint aims and objectives, necessarily require an individual, a Partners' national, State level identity both to preserve its particular interests and to adequately contribute to the common efforts.

Against this background, the idea of national independence in the field of security and defence is an illusion. The international dimension of risks and challenges definitely require an international answer, a common approach and joint action – to protect and preserve national values and interests – commonly shared among democratic states.

The challenges ahead require reliable partners - partners with strong convictions and a strong political will to promote co-operation towards integration into the International Community of democratic states.

The Challenge (The Identity)

With its Defence Policy, BiH has clearly identified the global, regional and internal challenges and risks. It calls for a BiH national response, imbedded in the overall strategy of the International Community, towards stability and security in this region. A much more comprehensive assessment – and related conclusions – will be substantial to the BiH Common Security Policy.

The Strategic Guidance as set out in the Defence Policy (Chapter III), the declaration of the SCMM on BiH's readiness and willingness to join PfP (December 2000) and the decision taken by the Presidency on this matter in July all underscore the strategic political decisions for better co-operation and further integration.

Entity versus State interests is considered to be an artificial alternative – playing into the hands of those who strive for separation instead of integration. In this regard, those who pretend to act as the guardians of Dayton should be reminded of the strategic spirit enshrined in this document: the spirit of co-ordination and co-operation towards integration, towards peace, stability and prosperity for BiH as a whole.

With regard to the international dimension of security and defence, this is definitely a matter of common, of joint decision and action – and the International Community will not recognise single approaches as adequate, serious or reliable. There is no single approach towards peace and stability – a single approach means being excluded!

The work on the BiH Common Security Policy will prove whether BiH is ready to substantially contribute to the international efforts in this regard. This requires joint decisions on BiH's commonly shared values and interests. It is a strategic decision on what for rather than against whom – the spirit of war and confrontation that has to be overcome.

A common approach calls for a joint strategic decision on the End State. In the months to come, BiH has to decide on its future status, structure and role as a Nation, as a State, and as a well-respected member of the International Community.

This decision on strengthening the State vis-à-vis strong entities will have to properly balance the rights and responsibilities at either level. As a matter of strategic importance, it is vital that the political authorities at State and entity level do not allow a matter of State interest like security and defence, to be held hostage to party political ambitions and internal power struggles.

With its decision on the BiH Defence Policy in May this year, the BiH Presidency has proven its readiness and willingness to set this process of strategic decisions on the future of BiH in motion. In so doing, it established the political basis for both preserving the interests of BiH and its entities in terms of security and defence, and paving the way for co-operation and integration into the European and Euro-Atlantic community. However, this strategic vision is not yet commonly shared! With major concern, the International Community takes note of the ongoing public debate on the nature and status of the BiH Defence Policy.

It is up to the SCMM to take a strong position on this matter. As a co-ordinating and advisory (see DP, Chapter V) body to the Tri-Presidency, in their capacity as the senior civil commanders of the armed forces, the SCMM has to preserve its dignity and further develop its authority in the field of security and defence at State level. The decisions on strengthening its capacities through a gradual upgrade of its Secretariat are merely the first step in the right direction.

To this end, the Tri-Presidency itself must clearly express its political will to take this process forward. This applies particularly to its mandate and obligation to perform

strategic supervision over the further development and implementation of the BiH Security and Defence Policy. In doing so, they act as State level authorities.

While the decision on the development of the BiH Common Security Policy under the authority of the CoM promotes the role and the responsibilities of the Government, defence matters at State level remain exclusively under the authority of the Presidency and the SCMM. Although rather vague, the Defence policy clearly calls for democratic, political control of the armed forces in BiH to be exercised through the Parliaments, the Council of Ministers and other legislative, executive and judicial powers in accordance with their constitutional roles and responsibilities. The implementation of these provisions is assessed to be overdue.

This applies particularly to the development of a legal framework that would provide for a Ministerial structure dealing with defence matters at State level and adequate provisions to exercise democratic control through the BiH Parliament (Parliamentary Assembly).

This requires a decisive commitment by the entities' political and military leadership. It must be a commitment to acknowledge the authorities at State level in dealing with defence matters, representing BiH in the forum of European and Euro-Atlantic structures. It must be a commitment to promote the further process of building a State-level Security and Defence Identity and related structures; it must be a commitment to co-operation among the entities towards BiH integration!

The European and Euro-Atlantic Strategic environment calls for a European and Euro-Atlantic common approach, which BiH – to its own benefit – has to be an integral part.

BiH has to identify itself with this strategic objective – and it has to decide on a common approach on its integration process. It has to understand that internal integration is not contradictory to, but mandatory for, its integration both in the region and beyond.

But BiH is probably already running short of time. If it misses this historical opportunity it will definitely run the risk of isolation and, eventually, destabilisation. Only a strong state, backed by strong entities, can prevent BiH from ending up in this strategic deadlock.

To this end, BiH has to decide on a common and a joint vision for its future. It is the State authorities – primarily the Tri-Presidency and the CoM – who need to take the lead. A BiH joint vision, however, will only reach its own aims and objectives if it takes account of the legitimate interests of the entities. On the other hand, it is up to the entities to responsibly contribute to this process – to the benefit of its people and to the benefit of BiH as a whole.

The development of the BiH Common Security Policy will provide an excellent opportunity to put this vision into clear political guidance. Alongside this process, the Tri-Presidency – through the SCMM – should launch the project for developing a concise and comprehensive BiH White Paper on Security and Defence. The most crucial step to

be taken, however, is related to its implementation. This needs both strong political leadership at State level and full, unreserved support by the entities.

Confidence, mutual trust and transparency among the parties are the mandatory requirements in drafting the end-state vision. It needs sober assessment, responsible judgement, and, eventually, courageous decisions. These decisions will only bear fruit when taken within realistic strategic scope and, no less important, at the right time!

Against the historical background of the past decade, the principle of politics as the Art of the Possible may apply to BiH more than to any other country in the region. With this in mind, the decision on BiH enhanced co-operation towards integration is of strategic importance to this country. Accordingly, this demands strategic focus and determination – day-to-day tactics, however, would definitely not meet these requirements.

Conclusion

In conclusion, every citizen has the right to expect its state to provide adequate security. Equally, the first responsibility of the state is the defence of its people. Bosnia-Herzegovina is now at a crossroads in its development. Your politicians must face up to the challenge that faces them now, and act responsibly to meet the nation's obligations as a democratic state. Nobody has said that this will be an easy process. What the international community has said repeatedly, loudly and clearly, is that now is the time to act. If Bosnia's political leadership fail to make the effort now then they will be condemning this country to a future of economic depression and international insecurity. Thank you very much.

SESSION IV

Mr. Nikola Radovanovic (Ministry of Foreign Affairs BiH)

**Mr. Martin Francesevic (Ministry of Defence of the Federation
of BiH)**

**Colonel Jovan Ostojic (Ministry of Defence of the Republika
Srpska)**

General Ivan Nagulov (BiH Presidency)

Mr. Nikola Radovanovic

Head of Department for Peace and Security
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Bosnia and Herzegovina

Your Excellencies, Ladies and Gentlemen, we are about to start our fourth and final session. I would particularly emphasise that although we are almost at the end, what we expect from the speakers here today is clear concrete details on activities implemented in the country regarding the Army of the Federation and the Army of the Entity of the Republika Srpska.

At the beginning, I would like to inform you of the fact that since the signing of the Dayton Peace Agreement began the process of common activities of representatives of the armed forces in Bosnia and Herzegovina with IFOR, SFOR and representatives of the OSCE, and through six years of experience, I think the understanding of the issues today that have been discussed, terminology and culture, have developed significantly.

All activities for the reduction and restructuring of the armed forces took place together with representatives of SFOR, NATO and OSCE, and this gives special significance and dimension to the efforts undertaken in that field. Therefore I would ask Mr. Francesevic to say more about this process in the Army of the Federation.

Mr. Martin Francesevic

Head of Office of the Federal Minister of Defence

Ministry of Defence of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina

New Framework for Security Co-operation: Downsizing and Restructuring of the Armed Forces of the FBiH

Mr. Chairman, Ladies and Gentlemen. My name is Martin Francesevic, I am the Head of Office of the Defence Minister Mijo Anic, and I would like to use this opportunity to greet you on his behalf and wish you a successful seminar.

We wish to welcome the idea of this seminar on the theme of the PfP. Within the several visits to the Ministry that we have had, we have had the opportunity to hear about the PfP, above all from the side of Mr. Katsirdakis in September when he visited BiH. We were informed about the advantages of inclusion in the PfP, as well as the necessary requirements and conditions to be fulfilled in order to join the PfP.

In my speech, I shall focus on the reduction and reconstruction of the Armed Forces of the Federation as one of the necessary steps that must be undertaken in order to join such an organisation. The need for the reduction of the Army of Federation appears due to a number of reasons; the first one would be of a financial nature. Therefore, firstly I would like to say a couple of words on the financial aspects regarding the reduction of the Armed Forces of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and afterwards on other reasons - although at the end it is all down to the financial aspect.

In short, budgetary means are insufficient to finance such an army. The real requirements that an army of this size has are far larger than the available financial resources. To illustrate this point I will outline a couple of examples from the year 2000. The budget proposal of the Federal Ministry of Defence was 960 million KM; the government, in fact parliament, approved 305 million - less than one third or 31% of the requested budget.

In the year 2001, the situation is almost identical, or perhaps maybe a little better. Looking at the figures, the budget proposal forwarded to the government was 760 million KM, that was a realistic proposal, and the approved means for this year are 290 million KM - in fact 27% of the requested budgetary amount. We were in similar situations throughout the previous years. This poses the simple question as to generally how we live and function when we require far more than the government could approve and allocate. We have found solutions in different ways.

One of the most significant resources in order to fulfil this gap has been international assistance. In that context, talking of the Croatian component, the Republic of Croatia helped us in 1999 with an amount of 170 million DM. Last year it was 75 million DM, and this year unfortunately or fortunately that help was terminated. Therefore, we are in debt, contributions for pensions have not been paid, nor water, nor electricity, nor the

suppliers. Currently, the Croatian component alone has debts over 150 million Marks. What would be the total and overall debt of the entire Army of the Federation – I have no final information but I would assume it would be a couple of hundred million Marks.

We heard General Agotic before talking of an unfavourable balance of distribution of financial means from the army budget, its breakdown for personnel and other requirements, and we heard that almost 70% of military budget is spend on personnel. In the Army of Federation, it is an incredible 110%. It seems unbelievable but that is our case. In this year, our budget proposal for personnel wages was 340 million marks; I said before that the total budget approved was an amount of 290 million.

What to do and how to function? The further that we do not pay contributions and taxes that otherwise we would need to pay means that we go further into debt and that 150 million increases every month. Education, modernisation, equipment, maintenance etc, are things we can only think about. I think that over 90% of more complex equipment at the moment would be out of use. In short, the Ministry of Defence at the moment functions like the Ministry of Social Care for war participants. We became a welfare institution with no money for education, maintenance, catering etc.

The perspective? Bad like before, if not even worse and unfavourable. There are neither the indications nor the possibilities that the budget of the Federation for military purposes shall significantly rise, even there is more of a chance that it shall decrease in the coming year.

Therefore, we have no other way out but to drastically reduce the military potential. Besides these economic aspects there are other aspects I would mention here. The army presents an obstacle for the implementation of Annex 7 of the Dayton Peace Agreement referring to the return of refugees and displaced persons. I shall illustrate a couple of examples, talking more of the Croat component of the Federation. For an example Drvar, where the entire city district was fenced with a sign "this is a barracks" and everything within that circle, schools, public institutions, buildings, were announced to be at the time a barracks. Fortunately Drvar is solved, but we still have such situations that the army is located in private buildings, houses, and schools. Therefore, I consider that the army with such a structure as one of important factors that hinders the implementation of Annex 7 of the Dayton Peace Agreement.

One of the conditions to join the PfP is a professional army. With such limited financial means I think it would be very difficult to talk of the possibilities of the establishment of a professional army. It is hard to establish parliamentary control over the army forces under these circumstances. We require 760 million KM from parliament this year, and it is been distributed as follows: wages, fuel, clothes, education, etc. Parliament places this entirely in one sentence: defence expenses 290 million KM - here is what we can provide and it is up to you where you would distribute it. In these kind of conditions to establish oversight of the distribution of those means I think would be impossible.

What is then the sense of an army or armies in BiH? In my own opinion at the moment we do not have real external threats. My estimation, and I believe many others think alike, is that there is no possibility for an attack by any other country. If no real external threats exist, what then would be the sense of the existence of a military structure in BiH? The logical conclusion would be that the source of dangers and threats is in BiH itself, and that actually those armies are preparing and rebuilding for a new conflict in BiH. Every consideration and evaluation of the potential danger for BiH is in fact a danger itself. Therefore, I think of large armies as a large threat. Small armies are a small or at least reduced threat from that what happened recently in BiH.

As far as I am aware we all agree on the fact that there is a need for a reduction in the military potential, and on that mainly exists consensus in BiH. We also all would agree to perform this reduction and to reduce the number of soldiers to the figure established by the Defence Policy, which would mean a total of 19,800 soldiers in BiH – 13,200 for the Federation Army and 6,600 for the RS Army. Now arises the following problem. The Defence Policy implies that this number would be achieved by 2005. The question then would be as to whether we actually have those five years and if we can wait so long to bring this situation to that level.

I would like to remind you of the process of the reduction of the armed forces so far in the Federation. In the month of July 1997, the structure of the Army of the Federation of BiH was defined with 33,000 professionals and another 12,000 comprised the recruited contingent, plus the civilian part, so almost 50,000 people only in the Federation are listed on the pay role. The first reduction was implemented in 1999 by a total of 15% and that number was reduced down to 28,000. The next reduction was implemented last year to the present number of 24,000 professionals. Therefore, the present situation is comprised of 24,000 professionals, plus recruits and civilians.

According to the Defence Policy that number is supposed to be 13,200 - the difference goes over 10,000 soldiers that have to be dismissed or demobilised from the army. The question then would be how and in which way and tempo to do such a thing - in fact 40% of present army professionals should be demobilised. Is that to be done at once, or through three phases, by 10%, by 15%, like previous years? That is the question we are discussing.

Ahead of us stands two options: the first would be a fast and energetic process in order to reduce the army and to dismiss 10,500 soldiers as fast and as soon as possible; the second would be to do this in a number of phases by 2005. Each of these options has its advantages and disadvantages. It would be difficult to say one is one hundred percent better than the other. However, if we want to react quickly in order to help this society and assist in the economic recovery of this country, to accelerate the process of the return of refugees and displaced persons, if we want a professional army, and to join the PfP, then we come to the necessary conclusion that reduction has to be a very fast radical process in a short time period. If we decide to go for the second mentioned option, then we have a step-by-step choice.

Before I state my final position and conclusion, I would like to mention the speech of Dr. Pribicevic about how Yugoslavia is situated in similar problems and about whether that process would go quickly or slowly in the reform of the army. I would also mention the gentleman who spoke of a jeep in which he should go through a certain place and where he choose to drive through that place as fast as he could and in the shortest time period possible but with a greater chance to survive. My opinion and point of view, and at the same time the stand of Minister Anic, would be marked with a number 4. A mutual decision would need to be adopted in a period of 14 days concerning the reduction of 40%, and that decision needs to be passed in a period of 4 months. We cannot wait four years. Thank you.

Colonel Jovan Ostojic

Head of Verification Centre

Ministry of Defence of the Republika Srpska

New Framework for Security Co-operation: Downsizing and Restructuring the Armed Forces of the Republika Srpska

Mr. Chairman, Ladies and Gentleman I would like to greet this gathering on behalf of the Minister of Defence of the Republika Srpska, Mr. Slobodan Bilic, and to express his respect and regret for not personally attending, due to duties taken on earlier.

I will be speaking on behalf of Mr. Bilic on the reduction of RS military forces in the light of the determination of the Republic Srpska to contribute to Bosnia's admission to the PfP.

The decline and reconstruction of armed forces is an issue to which the RS pays great importance and considers from all aspects and at all levels.

The Military Defence Council of the RS has considered this issue and has defined the duties of the Ministry of Defence of RS and the Army of RS, and formed a working group that is working on preparations for the final version of a profile of the armed forces of the RS in accordance with its needs, but also taking into account its economic possibilities.

Although the RS military forces were reduced two times so far by 15%, and although this reduction took place in 1996, we still consider that we are at the beginning of a process that requires the present armed forces to transform into forces that would be financially sustainable. Therefore, taking into consideration the collective security system in the surrounding area, in which we wish to be included, to be able to answer to our own purposes and aims. Besides today's reduction in personnel, the RS has also reduced a specific number of arms in five categories, in accordance with the regulations of Sub-regional Arms Control Agreement. Therefore, the signed limits have been achieved in 1997. The admission of Bosnia and Herzegovina to the PfP programme, and the integration of BiH into European and international frameworks also determines the place, role, tasks, size and organisational format structure of the Entity Army.

Therefore, the RS is making concrete steps which do not endure delay and which represent the connection of the Army of the RS to its future role. Above everything else this concerns a change of plans and programme of training, and qualifying the professional members of the Army of the RS for UN peace operations.

The second wave of observers for the mission in Eritrea and Ethiopia is in preparation, as well as preparations for participation within units of the UN in the same mission.

The armed forces in the RS are intended for:

- The protection of sovereignty and territorial integrity;
- Security and assistance to local authorities in cases of catastrophe and accident emergencies;
- Contribution to international missions in order to support peace;
- Providing assistance, de-mining, as well as infrastructure development.

Based on the following principles:

- Full respect and observation towards the UN Charter and duties towards the OSCE;
- Respect and implementation of the Dayton Peace Agreement;
- Implementation of the Agreement on Arms Control;
- Peaceful and friendly relations with neighbouring countries and further;
- Democratic and civil control of armed forces.
- Armed forces are to be harmonised when necessary to NATO standards in order to join the PfP.

This type of specific intention and principles, upon which the armed forces of the RS are founded, demands a reduction and reform of existing armed forces, and represents a process that must follow laws and specific regulations for which would require certain time.

It is foreseen that the remaining changes in the Army of the RS would be carried out in two phases: from 2001 to 2003, and from 2003 to 2005.

The present organisational formation structure of the Army of the RS consists of:

1. PEACETIME

- Headquarters
 - 4 Corps
 - War Air Force and Anti Aircraft Defence
 - Central Military Schools
 - Background Units of Headquarters
 - Background units and institutions
 - Repairs and Military Institutions
- In total 11,552 professional military personnel, at the moment 8,932 professional military personnel or 77,31%.

2. WAR

- Headquarters
- 4 Corps
- War Air Force and Anti Aircraft Defence
- Background Units and Institutions

- A total of 207,882 personnel.

By the end of 2003 we plan a reduction of the peace army from the present number of 8,932 to 8,000 professional army personnel or for 10%, therefore we would have one corps less in the organisational formation structure. This would cause changes in the organisational formation structure of the other three corps, which again would not have the same structure though they would be adapted to the role, tasks and possibilities of every corps individually.

By the end of 2005 we are planning to carry out restructuring in the Army of the RS so that the peacetime structure would have:

- Headquarters with 150 professional army personnel;
- 2 Corps each with 2010 professional army personnel;
- Air Force and Anti Aircraft Defence with 842 professional army personnel;
- Central Military Schools with 100 professional army personnel;
- Background unit Headquarters with 760 professional army personnel;
- Background unit with 728 professional army personnel;

- With 6600 professional army personnel in total.

Therefore referring to the year 2003, a reduction of 1400 professional army personnel or 17,5% has been planned. Naturally, this reduction inevitably requires changes in the organisational formation structure from the smallest units to the Headquarters of the Army of the RS.

The wartime structure of the Army of the RS would not change in relation to the present structure but we are planning a reduction of the present number of 207,882 personnel to the number 90,800 or 56% of the total of professional army personnel.

Industry for the production of NVO – the so-call industry for military purposes, follows the reduction in the Army of the RS through the conversion into civilian production in the framework of 24 offered programmes that have been accepted by the RS Government.

The above-mentioned dates represent a plan, and our objective would be to reach a level of defence forces with 6,600 professional army personnel and to have the kind of forces that would not hold back the admission of Bosnia and Herzegovina to the PfP. The Ministry of Defence and the Army of RS would give a full contribution for the faster realisation of the planned decrease and restructuring of the armed forces of RS.

General Ivan Nagulov

Military Advisor to the Croat Member of the Presidency
BiH Presidency

Perspective of PfP Membership for Bosnia and Herzegovina

Allow me to greet you on behalf of the Secretariat of the Standing Committee on Military Matters of BiH.

Coming now to present my speech, I thought of a great advertisement for a forbidden product that states: "No matter how quiet you keep about it, a good product is a good product".

There is not much talk about the Secretariat of the Standing Committee on Military Matters, and in previous discussions we often have mentioned an alliance level. We do have that alliance level and it is functioning.

The truth is that I am subjective, but I cannot keep quiet about the efforts that the Secretariat is undertaking, and I do see a perspective way out of this situation.

I foresee, concerning this Secretariat, if I may say a historical role in finding the solutions and taking on the burden of responsibility in order to find an exit out of this situation - not in terms of survival but in order to create the new conditions that would place us in the line of the countries of the Euro-Atlantic circle.

I am the last speaker here today and it seems to me that everything that could be said about the PfP and BiH as a candidate to its membership has already been said. In short I will present the theme BiH and PfP.

I shall shortly remind you of some of the historical elements concerning the commencement of the PfP. After the fall of Berlin wall, at the NATO Summit in London 1990, NATO adopted the declaration that NATO would not consider any one state to be an enemy, and that the countries of the former Warsaw Pact were invited into partnership and common efforts in the direction of practical co-operation.

During the Summit in Brussels, in 1994, NATO invited all democratic countries of North America and Europe to join the Partnership for Peace, in order to eliminate mutual distrust from the past, and to come closer to strengthening peace, democracy and security.

Today, the PfP is the main organisation of the European security architecture, involving all European countries but BiH and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.

The countries of the former Soviet Union, including Russia and Ukraine, have also been interested in PfP membership, and it would be interesting to say that Switzerland play a

very active role in the PfP. Switzerland has evaluated that membership in the PfP would affirm its traditional neutrality concerning foreign policy. You are aware that Switzerland is not even a member of the United Nations.

In joining the PfP programme, countries are obliged to preserve and promote human rights and freedoms. Partners are obliged to act in accordance with the regulations of the UN Charter and General Declaration on Human Rights. They must also pledge to support the preservation of peace and justice, democracy, the development of democratic society, fulfilment of the principles of international law, as well as respect of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of other states. Partners are obliged to refrain from using force, rather to solve conflict in a peaceful manner.

The aims of the PfP: partner countries have the possibility to individually formulate their aims according to their own priorities in their partnership with NATO.

The founding field of activities are political and security issues, economic issues, science and protection of the environment, co-operation and protection from industrial catastrophes.

The process of joining the PfP programme formally is done through the signing of the General Framework Document. Every member country has a wide range of possibilities to choose models of activities within the framework of the PfP, and in accordance with the individual partnership programme.

So I have briefly repeated what has already been said in the first session. Now I would like to say something about the interests of BiH to join the PfP programme. BiH would accomplish the targeted goals from its foreign political platform, and a stronger internal economy and defence structure of BiH through the fulfilment of the membership conditions of the PfP. By this act, BiH plays a major role in the creation of co-operative security, and in the end this is a way towards inclusion in the processes of Euro-Atlantic integration.

General conditions for membership to the PfP programme:

- Defence and Security Policy. The Defence Policy has been adopted, and the Security Policy is in process of development. According to words of Mr. Kadic, that document should be developed by the third month of the next year. The Council of Ministers formed a working and expertise group tasked with the development of this document;
- Democratic control of armed forces;
- Transparency of armed forces budgets;
- International Humanitarian Law;
- Training and equipment standards;
- Co-operation between military and governmental bodies;
- Co-operation in the field of arms control;
- Fulfilling the agreement on limiting weapons of mass destruction.

These are general conditions that every candidate country ought to fulfil before joining the PfP. BiH as a country has special qualities and specific conditions that must be fulfilled. Before the reduction of armed forces we have the issue of the democratic control of armed forces on a state level, which is an open issue and very specific in BiH. That is one routine question. Then we have the issues of the reduction of armed forces, the issue of command over armed forces, common doctrine on a federal level, identical standards of equipping and training of armed forces, full implementation of the Dayton Peace Agreement, ordered relations with neighbours, co-operation with the International Court for War Crimes in the Hague, and the creation of conditions for the return of refugees and displaced persons.

Activities undertaken to date. I would like to remind you that the political will to join the PfP has been expressed - by the BiH Presidency declaration delivered to NATO. The BiH Defence Policy has been adopted, the Security Policy is in the process of development, and we are actively participating in the work of the Common Administrative Committee for the reorganisation and reduction of armed forces, which is led equally by OSCE and SFOR.

Within that committee we participate in the strongest line of entity armed forces and ministries, and within that committee there are working groups dealing with the problems that previous colleagues have mentioned, about the model of reduction of the armed forces.

Further on, we have intensive contacts with representatives of NATO; I would mention the visit of the Secretary General and complete NATO Council, which was an exceptional honour. We are participating in the NATO's security and co-operation programme, which is continuously held in Oberammergau, at the NATO school. The most recent activity was the participation of a BiH delegation in the PfP workshop on defence policy and strategy in Geneva on 11th and 12th of October.

Tasks to be fulfilled in the future. I am subjective and I do not hide that, so on the first place I place the affirmation of the Secretariat of the Standing Committee on Military Matter of BiH as the contact point and co-ordinator in activities connected for inclusion in the PfP; to ensure the co-operation of all of the competent ministries and institutions on an entity and state level; to finish the process of the reorganisation of the armed forces; to adopt a security policy; to continue with intensive co-operation with NATO Command. After this would follow the development of an official application for joining the PfP, and after that, the individual partnership programme.

The vision of future relations and situation of BiH in the PfP. In joining the PfP programme we create the conditions for achieving economy stability in BiH, the system of state institutions would receive full functionality, armed forces would lie under democratic control, the fulfilment of international obligations would be a matter of routine, and in the end this would be a precondition for the entry of BiH in the EU and NATO.

I would also like to remind you that at the last meeting of the Standing Committee on Military Matters, the green light was received of the initiative for opening a military college for Southeast Europe with its base in BiH. The Secretariat has been authorised to develop this idea and to prepare the next steps, and already some things have been done.

We have to definitely move from this 'death spot'. We could find the space to save the best quality personnel after the reduction of the armed forces, and I am deeply convinced that BiH will join the PfP and its future is within the PfP programme. For this kind of activity it is necessary to have political will in the right measure and at the right time.

APPENDIX A

AGENDA SEMINAR ON THE PARTNERSHIP FOR PEACE

SARAJEVO, 7-8 NOVEMBER 2001

Wednesday, 7

Nov
emb
er

Arrival of the participants

18:00

Welcome reception
Hotel "Holiday Inn"
Hosted by the Centre for Security Studies

Thursday, 8
November

08:30 – 09:00

Registration

09:00 – 09:30

Opening

Dr. Bisera Turkovic

Executive Director, Centre for Security Studies, BiH

Mr. Jozo Krizanovic

Chairman of the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina

09:30 – 11:00

Session 1

Chair: Dr. Bisera Turkovic

Executive Director, Centre for Security Studies, BiH

"The Origins and Development of the PfP"

Ambassador Robert Mason Beecroft

Head of Mission

Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe, BiH

“Achievements of the PfP”

Mr. George Katsirdakis,

Deputy Director

Defence Partnership and Cooperation Directorate

Defence Planning and Operations Division

North Atlantic Treaty Organisation – NATO

11:00 – 11:30

Coffee break

11:30 – 13:00

Session II

Chair: Mr. Ibrahim Spahic

Parliamentary Assembly BiH

“Russian Perspective of the NATO European Policy”

Dr. Boris Shmelyov

Director

Centre on Comparative Political Studies, Moscow

“NATO Membership and Hungary”

Mr. Zsolt Rabai

Coordinator for the West Balkans

North Atlantic Treaty Organisation – NATO

13:00 – 14:30

Lunch break

14:30 – 16:00

Session III

Chair: General Miroslav Nikolic

“Security Profile of Croatia and its Membership in the PfP”

General Imre Agotic

Military Advisor to the President of the Republic of Croatia

“Transitional Strategy of FRY”

Dr. Ognjen Pribicevic

Director

Centre for Southeast European Studies, Belgrade

“State Level Security and Defence Identity: Co-operation towards European and Euro-Atlantic Integration”

Major John Hampson

SCMM Liaison Officer, OHR Military Cell

Office of the High Representative - OHR

16:00 – 16:30

Coffee break

16:30 – 18:00

Session IV

Chair: Mr. Nikola Radovanovic

Head of Department for Peace and Security

Ministry of Foreign Affairs BiH

“New Framework for Security Co-operation: Downsizing and Restructuring of Armed Forces of FBiH”

Mr. Martin Francesevic

Head of Office of the Minister of Defence

Ministry of Defence of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina

“New Framework for Security Co-operation: Downsizing and Restructuring of Armed Forces of RS”

Colonel Jovan Ostojic

Head of Verification Centre

Ministry of Defence of Republika Srpska

“Bosnian Perspective of PfP Membership”

General Ivan Nagulov

Military Advisor to the Presidency

Standing Committee on Military Matters, BiH

APPENDIX B

LIST OF PARTICIPANTS

Abazović, Mirsad, Mr
Professor
Faculty of Criminalistic Science, Sarajevo University

Abazović, Sakib, Mr
Assistant
Faculty of Medicine, University of Tuzla

Agotić, Imre, General
Military Advisor to the President of the Republic of Croatia
Office of the President of the Republic of Croatia

Ahić, Jasmin, Mr
Assistant
Faculty of Criminalistic Science, Sarajevo University

Ahmed, Ismail, Mr
Third Secretary
Embassy of the Arab Republic of Egypt, Sarajevo

Ajanović, Jasna, Ms
Ministry of European Integration, BiH

Ajnadžić, Nedžad, Brigadier General
Joint Military Command, FBiH

Alihodžić, Amela, Mrs
Assistant Minister
Ministry for European Integration, BiH

Ambroise, P, Mr
Stabilisation Force - SFOR

Amidžić, Marko, Mr
Delegate
Parliamentary Assembly, BiH

Amirhalili, Seyed Homayoun, Ambassador
Embassy of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Sarajevo

Andersen, Frode Overland, Ms
First Secretary
Embassy of the Kingdom of Norway, Sarajevo

Avdić, Ismet, Mr
Delegate
Parliamentary Assembly, BiH

Bećirević, Edina, Ms
Assistant
Faculty of Criminalistic Science, Sarajevo University

Beecroft, Robert, Ambassador
Chief of Mission
Organisation for Security and Cooperation – OSCE BiH

Beridan, Izet, Dr
Professor
Faculty of Political Science, Sarajevo University

Bilbija, Željko, Mr
Delegate
Parliamentary Assembly, BiH

Bogdan, Nikola, Mr
Embassy of Romania, Sarajevo

Borić, Adem, Mr
Party of Democratic Action - SDA

Brka, Osman, Mr
Delegate
Parliamentary Assembly, BiH

Buturović, Sead, Mr
Delegate
Parliamentary Assembly, BiH

Coduri, Michelle, Ms
Embassy of Switzerland, Sarajevo

Dahl Hanson, Johannes, Ambassador
Embassy of the Kingdom of Denmark, Sarajevo

Duchamps, Colonel
Military Attaché
Embassy of the Republic of France, Sarajevo

Dudaković, Atif, General
Commander
Army of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina

Đerić, Zoran, Mr
Deputy Chairman
National Assembly, RS

Ferzanović, Branislava, Mrs
Delegate
Parliamentary Assembly, BiH

Filipović, Omer, Mr
Delegate
Parliamentary Assembly, BiH

Fitzgerald, Jeff, Mr
Policy Analyst and Researcher
Centre for Security Studies, BiH

Frančesević, Martin, Mr
Chief of Cabinet
Ministry of Defence F BiH

Gavran, Dušan, Lt. Colonel
Secretariat Member
Standing Committee on Military Matters, BiH

Godinjak, Šerifa, Ms
Ministry of European Integration, BiH

Goluža, Nikola, Mr
Verification Centre, Ministry of Defence, FBiH

Güntelberg, Georg, Mr
Political Analyst
Stabilisation Force – SFOR

Hadžajlić – Dedović, Azra, Ms
Assistant
Faculty of Criminalistic Science, Sarajevo University

Hadžović, Denis, Mr
General Secretary
Centre for Security Studies, BiH

Halilović, Zara, Ms
Ministry of European Integration, BiH

Hampson, John, Major
Military Cell, Office of the High Representative

Heidari, Mahmud, Mr
Second Secretary
Embassy of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Sarajevo

Humo, Emir, Dr
Professor
University of Mostar

Janjetović, Željko, Mr
Deputy Minister
Ministry of Internal Affairs, RS

Jusufović, Munib, Mr
Delegate
National Assembly, RS

Jusufović, Sejo, Mr
Ministry of European Integration, BiH

Kadić, Amel, Mr
Technical Assistant
Centre for Security Studies, BiH

Kamberović, Violeta, Ms
Delegate
Parliamentary Assembly, BiH

Karavelić, Vahid, General
Joint Military Command, FBiH

Katsirdakis, George, Mr
Deputy Director, Defence Directorate
North Atlantic Treaty Organisation – NATO

Kocsis, Kalman, Ambassador
Embassy of the Republic of Hungary, Sarajevo

Korski, Daniel, Mr
Political Analyst
International Crisis Group – ICG

Krischer, Andre, Mr
Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, Sarajevo

Križanović, Jozo, Mr
Chairman of the Presidency
BiH Presidency

Kržalić, Armin, Mr
Technical Assistant
Centre for Security Studies, BiH

Kuzman, Vojko, Mr
Charges d'affaires
Embassy of the Republic of Slovenia, Sarajevo

Lanschot, Robert, Mr
Stabilisation Force - SFOR

Leca, Vasile, Mr
Ambassador
Embassy of Romania, Sarajevo

Leonhard, Peter, Mr
Regional Stabilisation Department
OSCE, BiH

Lopez, Jose Angel Joins, Ambassador
Embassy of the Kingdom of Spain, Sarajevo

Ljubičić, Sanja, Ms
Assistant
Faculty of Criminalistic Science, Sarajevo University

Malkić, Abdurahman, Mr
Delegate
Parliamentary Assembly, BiH

Mašić, Damir, Mr
Delegate
Parliamentary Assembly, BiH

Mašović, Aida, Ms
Ministry of European Integration, BiH

Mašović, Amor, Ms
Delegate
Parliamentary Assembly, BiH

Mollander, Anders, Ambassador
Embassy of the Kingdom of Sweden, Sarajevo

Morales, Colonel
Stabilisation Force, SFOR

Muslimović, Fikret, General
Retired

Nagulov, Ivan, General
Military Advisor to the Presidency
Standing Committee on Military Matters - SCMM

Nešković, Branko, Mr
Secretary General
Independent Social Democrat Party

Nikolić, Miro, General (Rtd)

Ollis, Jeffrey Craig, Mr
Department for Human Rights
International Organisation for Migration – IOM

Omerbegović, Sead, Mr
Professor
Faculty of Philosophy, University of Tuzla

Omersoftić, Amila, Ms
Women's Party, BiH

Osmanović, Bahrija, Mr
Delegate
Parliamentary Assembly, BiH

Ostojić, Jovan, Colonel
Head of Verification Centre
Ministry of Defence, RS

Patry, Jean-Jacques, Mr
Political Advisor to DECOMSFOR
Stabilisation Force - SFOR

Perry, Valery, Ms
Political Advisor

Pribičević, Ognjen, Dr
Director
Centre for Southeast European Studies, Belgrade

Prlenda, Antonio, Mr
Military Analyst
Oslobođenje

Pušina, Jusuf, Mr
Delegate
Parliamentary Assembly, FbiH

Rabai, Zsolt, Mr
Coordinator for the West Balkans
North Atlantic Treaty Organisation – NATO

Radeljaš, Elvir, Mr
Technical Assistant
Centre for Security Studies, BiH

Radovanović, Nikola, Mr
Head of Department for Peace and Security
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, BiH

Roche, James, Lt. Colonel
Stabilisation Force - SFOR

Sandberg, Patrik, Mr
Political Analyst
Stabilisation Force – SFOR

Sedić, Mirsad, General
Army of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina

Selmanović, Suvad, Mr
Director
Agaua Enterprise, BiH

Shmelyov, Boris, Dr
Director
Centre for Comparative Political Studies, Moscow

Simić, Novica, General
Head of General Staff
Army of the Republika Srpska

Spahić, Ibrahim, Mr
Delegate
Parliamentary Assembly, BiH

Stanimirović, Dragi, Mr
Delegate
Parliamentary Assembly, BiH

Sušac, Niko, Mr
Delegate
Parliamentary Assembly, BiH

Šabanović, Almedina, Mrs
Ministry of European Integration, BiH

Šafran, Vitomir, Mr
Faculty of Criminalistic Science, Sarajevo University

Šahurić, Arnel
Technical Assistant
Centre for Security Studies, BiH

Šarganović, Senad, Mr
Delegate
Parliamentary Assembly, BiH

Šuaib, Šeta, Mr
Joint Military Command, F BiH

Tagliavini, Heidi, Ambassador
Embassy of Switzerland, Sarajevo

Tihić, Alija, Mr
Agency for Civil Protection, FBiH

Tošić, Momir, Mr
Delegate
Parliamentary Assembly, BiH

Turković, Bisera, Dr
Executive Director
Centre for Security Studies, BiH

Valasopolou, Yolanda, Ms
Embassy of the Republic of Greece, Sarajevo

Vermier, Jean-Paul, Mr
Military Attache
Embassy of the Kingdom of Belgium, Sarajevo

Vranj, Sulejman, General (R'td)

Zahiragić, Munir, Mr
Ministry of Defence of the Federation of BiH

Žilić, Mehmed, Mr
Professor
Faculty of Criminalistic Science, Sarajevo University