



**ROUND TABLE ON DEMOCRATIC CONTROL OF ARMED  
FORCES: THE ROLE OF PARLIAMENT, ACADEMIA, AND  
THE MEDIA**

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## **OPENING**

**Dr. Bisera Turkovic, Centre for Security Studies**

**Mr. Zeljko Mirjanic, Parliamentary Assembly of BiH**

**Mr. George Katsirdakis, North Atlantic Treaty Organisation**

**Ambassador Dr. Bisera Turkovic, *Executive Director***  
*Centre for Security Studies, Bosnia and Herzegovina*

Ladies and Gentlemen:

At the beginning I would like to wish a warm welcome to everybody present at today's seminar. I would especially like to express gratitude to George Katsirdakis, Deputy Director of the NATO Defence Partnership and Co-operation Directorate, who is a person of great importance for BiH on the road to membership in the Partnership for Peace.

Today with us are representatives from the BiH Parliamentary Assembly - Mr. Zeljko Mirjanic, Deputy Chairman of the House of Representatives; and I would also like to cordially greet the representatives from the entity parliaments. At the same time, I would like to express gratitude to General Bernd Papenkort from the Clausewitz Centre and the professors from the Universities of Sarajevo and Banja Luka who have given up their time to be with us today.

I shall not take much of your time, but during the opening of this seminar I would like to explain the significance of this event and why we decided to organise it. The seminar is concerned with the role of parliament, academia and the media in the democratic control of the armed forces. In order for BiH to become a member of the PfP, which is our true intention, among other factors at a state level the country must secure democratic parliamentary control of the armed forces. Democratic control is a necessary condition for acceptance into the Partnership for Peace.

As you can see from the title of today's seminar, we shall today become familiar not only with the role of parliament in the control of the armed forces in BiH, but also with the role of academia and the media in the securing of that control. From the presentations of our esteemed local and foreign speakers, we shall see the kind of place that these segments of society have in the securing of the democratic control of the security sector.

When we speak of the role of parliament in democratic control we must bear in mind that Bosnia and Herzegovina is a specific country. We have a parliamentary assembly at a state level, but also the entities have their own parliaments. The key factor is how to secure parliamentary control at a state level and with that to fulfil this important condition that has been placed before our state.

With the Dayton Peace Agreement the armed forces fall within the competencies of the BiH Presidency and the entities, but the current practice has been that control has also been exercised by the entity parliaments and members of the Presidency through the Standing Committee on Military Matters. However, this is not an adequate solution, because the NATO Secretary General, George Robertson, was explicit towards the placing of conditions for BiH membership in the PfP, emphasising that parliamentary control of the armed forces at the state level is necessary. I think that the time has come that this question would be placed on the agenda of the BiH Parliament - in order to see where the problems lie and where there are disagreements in different viewpoints. We know that the BiH Parliament does not have a Commission for Defence and Security, which would directly be engaged in these issues; rather that, in an indirect manner, is exercised by the Commission for Foreign Affairs, whose

majority of members are present at today's seminar, and which I use the opportunity to welcome.

I think that you would all agree that the type of situation that we have today is not sufficient that BiH would fulfil the conditions concerning that which I have spoken. I sincerely hope that today's seminar shall shed light on this subject matter and to offer conclusions with the aim that they would help BiH create this necessary democratic control, and with that come closer to membership in the PfP. I consider that above all the political maturity of parliamentarians is necessary in order that they understand the importance of this issue and that through constructive dialogue they adopt solutions to the welfare of all the citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina. This is not only a political issue, rather that is also a question of legality and efficiency because all European countries have parliamentary bodies that must be informed about the budget foreseen for the armed forces, about the import and export of arms, as well as other important military issues. Parliamentary oversight is not intrusion into the management and command of the armed forces, rather it simply concerns the activities of their organisation to all contemporary citizens of the state. I would like to repeat, if as we want, and as we have clearly stated, that we wish to enter the PfP, then this procedure that is at the beginning in the BiH Parliament needs to be executed until the end in a manner that is agreeable to both us and NATO.

When we speak about academia and the democratic control of the armed forces, it is of utmost importance that this subject matter be considered in universities. The rule of law and democracy in the security sector is a theme that our students must become familiar with, because those are the people that in a short while will assume responsibility for these affairs in this state. We need to provide them with the foundations of this subject matter, in order that at a later stage it would be easier for them to understand and grapple with the challenges and threats that are today present in the world. Naturally, the role of academia is that with its professional and theoretical hypotheses and ideas it would make possible that the people today that make decisions in legal and executive bodies would be able to make the right decisions that shall lead BiH into European and world integration.

However, we must pose the question as to whether the carriers of knowledge are sufficiently educated themselves in order to convey that knowledge to others? Finally, there is one question that is very much present as well in other fields, and especially when we are speaking of university education. How much are we in the situation to prepare intellectual personnel that shall be the bearers of positive changes or to provide that they would become familiar with the standards that exist today and that are present in the world?

The final segment that we shall endeavour to consider in the framework of today's gathering is: what is the role of the written and electronic media in the education of the population, in the conveying of knowledge, and in the offering of new perspectives? I am pleased to see present today and to welcome journalists from various media houses, but at the same time also representatives of the information offices of the Ministries of Defence. I believe that they shall today engage in the discussions and shall offer us their viewpoints and a perspective of the problems that exist between them.

Journalists above all love crises. That is the time that they become political actors. At the same time we can hear from journalists that they criticise the Ministries of Defence because they do not have trained people as spokespersons, nor are they prepared to give the information for which journalists have the right to obtain. On the other side, the Ministries of

Defence often criticise the work of journalists, which, according to them, frequently pretentiously or sensationally report the news or attempt to manufacture various affairs when they do not exist.

At the end I would like to state that what has for a long time been a problem in neighbouring states, and in the same manner for our politicians and politics in BiH, has been that for far too long they have been buried in the past. It is very difficult even today to pull away from this. A clear and objective possible vision of the future and readiness to work towards that vision is missing. There is also missing, as we say, the view ahead. As Jean Paul Satre once said, "Life is lived looking forward, but understood looking back".

I shall finish on this point, believing that the knowledge that we shall obtain today at this seminar, besides the clearer understanding of democratic control over the armed forces, shall also help in the elaboration of plans and the fulfilment of conditions in order that BiH as soon as possible would become part of the family of the Partnership for Peace.

I shall now give the floor to Zeljko Mirjanic, Deputy Chairman of the House of Representatives of the BiH Parliamentary Assembly. Thank you.

**Mr. Zeljko Mirjanic, Chairman of the House of Representatives**  
*Parliamentary Assembly of Bosnia and Herzegovina*

Thank you very much Mrs. Turkovic. As one of the participants of this seminar and a participant of some other seminars that the Centre for Security Studies has organised, I would like to thank the Centre and to personally thank Mrs. Turkovic for all that they have done, so that today I am able to talk about this theme, in the wish that we establish democratic control in the security sector and that we arrive via a democratic route to that control.

A part of that democratic route is, naturally, also a change of opinion, the removal of individual positions, positions that are known in literature, and through a change of opinion to search for corresponding solutions. Today our colleague, Mrs. Turkovic, in her introductory speech, opened a number of issues and in a sympathetic manner concerning each of those issues gave the thoughts of many people. I consider that this is needed in today's debate; I shall endeavour to conduct my participation in the same manner, at least in the beginning, to open questions. What are the most significant issues in these three areas, in view of the role of parliament, academia and the media? I think that not only visually we are reminded of a round-table, rather already today it is a kind of round-table alongside the value of that what we shall hear as the position of official international institutions in the further debate.

When I speak about the position of the parliament then, above all, we have to keep in mind a number of questions. Firstly, the relationship of the BiH Parliament and the Entity Parliaments, which is specific in this country. When I say 'relationship' then I do not think that there exists a relationship specifically between them, rather they have, naturally, each their own authority, but it is a specific relationship in view of the authority that concerns the security sector. Towards this, according to my opinion, we have to find a solution that would enable Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) to enter into the Partnership for Peace (PfP). In this manner I also understand our conversations, our seminars and debates - in order to find a solution that this country could enter into the PfP. That is the next logical move, the next logical step.

Please allow me a small digression, at the last session of the BiH Parliament when we debated about the budget, I brought up an affirmation, and that was: the institutions of BiH were tasked to bring this country into the Council of Europe. As a parliamentarian, my service is pledged to the Parliament, and I said that the most I am supported with the evidence in the fact that we adopted a number of laws, between which was also the Election Law. Consequently, I think that there exists an open space in today's convocation of Parliament, that also these issues we place on the agenda so that we see which are the suppositions for entry into the PfP and that we draw concrete moves.

Now we are in a phase when we are preparing to change the Book of Procedures of the House of Representatives. Towards this factor concerning the change in the Book of Procedures, we opened some other issues when we saw during the debate that there exists certain implicit procedures. Then, naturally, there also exists variants, possibilities and requirements; in the framework of this factor about the change in Book of Procedures, we have also opened the issue concerning the functioning of the parliamentary control. We concretely have that possibility or that we form a special commission or in some of the competent institutions we give jurisdiction within this sector. Now the situation is the kind that we do not have a special commission, neither do any of the commissions engage in these issues. Indirectly the

Commission for Foreign Affairs can engage in these issues, but in the framework of considering international documentation that concerns the entry of BiH into the process of Euro-Atlantic integration; consequently, something indirectly, and not directly. Now we have formed two temporary research commissions that have a higher character, which is that they present to Parliament information concerning actual individual events. I shall not speak about those events because I do not consider that they are important for our debate today. Important is the manner in which Parliament works, which is that we formed a temporary commission that shall gather information and forward this to the BiH Parliament. It seems to me that with this we showed political maturity. We agreed that we shall have to place at a particular level of importance the division of responsibilities. Consequently, we shall also value the positions and opinions of the Parliament of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Naturally, in question of some events in the Republika Srpska (RS) I expect the same relationship also towards the National Assembly of the Republika Srpska. Consequently, we must have mutual trust, trust as parliamentarians in the Entity Parliaments and in the competent institutions of the entities.

The next important question is the relationship of the BiH Parliament towards the institutions of Bosnia and Herzegovina, specifically towards the BiH Presidency and the Standing Committee on Military Matters (SCMM). Consequently, in order for us not to enter into their competency with our moves, we must take care that we would not arrive to mixing in executive and legislative authorities. We must ask what is it that is our measure of relations towards the Standing Committee on Military Matters, especially towards the BiH Presidency, which also forms the Standing Committee on Military Matters?

The following question, consequently not only the relationship towards the institutions of the entities and the other institutions of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which I think we need to have in mind when we speak about this problem, is consideration about public opinion. I have always been a parliamentarian and now I am in the state-level parliament, before this I was in two terms in the National Assembly of the Republika Srpska. Consequently, I have a very rich experience in this sense, as much as can be gained in Bosnia and Herzegovina after the war. I very much appreciate positions of public opinion for the simple reason that if the general public accepts our position, our decisions, then it is completely sure that they shall be implemented. That which my students are learning, I look upon as a lawyer, as that which I learnt when I was a student, that if we wish to reduce the difference between normative and real, to secure a change of laws in practice, then we must lead an account concerning the legal conscience of the addressee to which we direct norms, to which we direct decisions, and that means how much are they in the situation to understand our decisions. Naturally, the decisions need to be explained to the public in a specific manner, but prior to the adoption of the decisions there needs to be led an account concerning the opinion of the general public. My opinion is that the opinions of the general public are satisfactory, and that within the general public in BiH there exists the readiness and will for BiH to enter into the PfP. Consequently, I am not speaking about the political consensus that exists between political parties, between personalities, between delegates, concerning that which is official, rather I am speaking about something that is deeper, that which is more significant than official political opinions, and that is the opinions of the citizens. I have the impression that in that variant, in the accession to the PfP, that there would be support, the absolute plebiscitary support of the citizens of BiH. It falls upon us to find the wisest solution.

I do not want to speak about that which Mrs. Turkovic has spoken, and that is the function of parliament. That is something that we are all know. I would prefer if we have a real



conversation, that we speak about the problems that burden us, and that we rather less hold on to theoretical hypotheses. Consequently, when we speak about parliament the question is how to organise the internal parliamentary life? The fact is that we deputies must be a little more critical in the terms of the Parliamentary Assembly, which we secured the adoption of a number of laws, a number of decisions, and which showed maturity, to the happiness of us all, for this country, and to reduce the tasks of the High Representative. Consequently, we have all the more taken the fate of this country into our hands and I think that this process shall also further flow and naturally it needs to continue. In that process we have come to a phase where it is needed to specifically talk about the manner of the organisation of democratic control. I am initiating a debate here concerning the founding of a special commission or some other commission. In conversation with parliamentarians from a number of countries, representatives of parliaments, speakers, representatives of various commissions I have received a number of arguments for a special commission and for a commission, we could also say, for foreign affairs or something else depending upon the country and what are the types of experiences of other countries.

Allow me at the end, so that I do not take too much time, to speak shortly in order that our special guest Mr. Katsirdakis would be able to provide that which is especially interesting for us. Some of us have already had the opportunity to listen to Mr. Katsirdakis, but others have not, and I think that they are impatient, so I shall be quick. When we speak about students, as a professor of a university I know the thoughts of the young generation. I think that our young generation, the student generation, is ready to accept democratic achievements. They are not only prepared, but they are also ideologically committed, ideologically in the sense not of ideology but in the sense of an ideological framework for a democratic state in which there shall be the Rule of Law, and a multi-party system, etc. They are already part of this and know much about it. Concerning this, if we were in the situation a few years ago that our public, our citizens, our students, and even our professors knew more fundamentally, rather than was the actually the case, then they would have had no deeper knowledge. I think that our student population is at this level and that they can accept this. We have overcome many barriers within the student population. If it was a problem a few years ago to organise, at a state-level, student meetings, then now there is not any kind of problem and there already exists the strong will and wish for association, for that co-operation, and I think that is a reflection, above all, of the understanding that BiH enters into further development as a democratic country in which shall be respected all fundamental values, so that they guarantee that the young generation shall live in a normal country.

As far as that which concerns the media, I have both good and bad experiences. When I am speaking about the activities of the parliament, in the current term, I have to say that I frequently noticed that the media has preferential treatment to a specific understanding, a specific party or a specific political personality or towards that which is most interesting for the public for specific commercial reasons. I am not satisfied in the manner that a particular media, and I would not mention names because this is not the place, has followed the work of this parliament. Frequently it has happened to me when I read a particular newspaper and even when I read another newspaper that I was not in a parliamentary session, even that I was not at two sessions.

I think, and with this I shall finish, in the domain of the media, at least in this field, that we must liberate the media from the various political promotions of individual personalities especially because the pre-election campaigns are running, and we are going to ask the media to orient themselves towards this, because we cannot precisely order their work, but we can

suggest that within this field they allow all viewpoints and not through the reports of the electronic media to see that there were only individual participants and only one viewpoint, and to report as if there were no other participants.

I shall now finish, it has been an honour for me to have this opportunity, on the invitation of Mrs. Turkovic, to participate in the beginning of this gathering. I have participated in a number of gatherings and I think that this is the right direction. Towards this, if we would like to achieve democratic control, I shall repeat that what I have said, and the road to that control has to be democratic. Thank you very much.

**Mr. George Katsirdakis, Deputy Director,**  
*Defence Partnership and Co-operative Directorate,*  
*Sector of Defence Planning and Operations, NATO*

Thank you Dr. Turkovic for inviting me, first of all, here because it is an opportunity for me to have one more, let us say, stance in the effort to prepare Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) to come to the family of the Partnership for Peace (PfP), because I think that as we have said in the previous occasions that I had the privilege to be here that BiH really deserves to be part of that group of countries, and it is only the circumstances that came about some years ago that have actually hampered its due entrance to this organisation, to this process. So I think we own it to ourselves to try to find the proper arrangements, the proper way, to see BiH where it rightfully belongs: to a group of nations that are trying to improve their situation, both internally and in the prospect of relations among themselves in the best possible way.

I had an opportunity to be here back in September in another activity of this institution here, and at the same time, around that time also, I had the opportunity to bring a team here from NATO, where we had the opportunity to discuss with the leadership of this country on prospects and possibilities for Bosnia and Herzegovina to join PfP. I believe that we still have some work to do in that field, but what appears to be the situation is that we are gradually moving in that direction. Yes, there is a lot of work to be done, but what I say sometimes when everybody becomes impatient is that it is only five or six years since this country was actually fighting a war and to expect that in such a short time all the problems that were created by those circumstances would be lifted is a 'little bit' extremely optimistic. So yes, we all want this to be over and take a new fresh look at everything, but it does take some time.

I believe, however, that some of the developments in the region will play a role, because as you very well know Croatia since 2000 is a member of the Partnership for Peace, and as of earlier this month in Reykjavik the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of NATO invited Croatia to be a member of the Membership Action Plan, which means that Croatia is now very rightfully preparing to become a member of NATO, not just the PfP. At the same time, another neighbour - the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, which as of last night I believe should be officially called Serbia and Montenegro and not anymore the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, since both parliaments have now passed the necessary arrangements for the future - that country is now actively pursuing its way into PfP. We have received a letter from the Federal Government where they expressed their wish to start the process of joining the PfP. I had a chance to speak repeatedly with Minister Svilanovic in Belgrade and his position is that the Federal government and also the leadership of Serbia and Montenegro are very much eager to see Serbia and Montenegro become part of PfP, with a support of about 74%, as he claims, of public opinion. We are in the process of actually discussing details of how that will take place and actually a week from now I plan to be in Belgrade to continue these contacts and see how we can expedite the process of that country joining the PfP.

Once we see Serbia and Montenegro join the PfP and become an active partner, because we are very much willing to see them take an active part in the deliberations of this process, there will be no more excuse, I would say, for this country to stay behind. Not that there is any relationship between Serbia and Montenegro and Bosnia and Herzegovina joining PfP, but at least it will become apparent that the two neighbouring countries of this country have chosen to follow that kind of road and accept the current arrangements, whatever they are, for themselves, not looking for support of any kind to secessionist attitudes that originate in this

country. Consequently, the members of this country will have to start thinking as members of this country, not as potential members of another country. Therefore, they will have to start seriously thinking how to organise themselves to make the best of their presence in this country, and therefore make necessary arrangements that will allow them to live better, to co-operate among themselves, and present themselves as a normal state, which of course will then open the door not only for PfP, but also for all kinds of international functions that the country would like to undertake.

Now, one of the elements of course that is required in the process of preparing the country to join PfP, and to find its rightful place in the international community, is the issue of democratic control of the armed forces. I am sure that what I am going to say is not news to anybody, or I hope it is not, but I think it is always good to repeat few things just to bring them back to light. Consequently, please allow me to start by saying few things about my views, and I always underline that this is my personal view, not the view of the organisation I represent, because obviously this is only expressed by the North Atlantic Council and the Secretary General, and I am neither. So, with that covered, let us look first at the nature of democratic control.

What do we mean when we say democratic control? Maybe the first question that we have to ask ourselves is why do we need democratic control? I think this question could be answered by first looking at the nature of the military. The military is a special type of organisation, it is not let us say like a bank, or academic institution, it has an additional element. The military has the element of power and discipline, and by nature it is not organised in a democratic way. One should not expect it to be organised in a democratic way. I think that the easiest way to demonstrate how absurd that might be is if you imagine that a commander is ready to charge against a hill and occupy a hill and then he will have to take a vote to see how many of his soldiers think that it is a good idea or not and then to go on, you realise that cannot be done, and so by nature a military organisation is not meant to be a democratic organisation, otherwise it could not do its job. Yes, of course, having said that it does not mean that is not possible to have certain parts of military life that follow democratic principles. So, if we take away the elements of operational activity, a lot of the other elements of military life could be subjected to democratic control.

Now, the other thing that we need to consider is that the military consists of people, citizens of the country that they belong to, and as citizens they have rights and obligations, and the only difference is that they are professionals in a certain area that is difficult for others to get that kind of expertise. And one should look at them as, I think, in a well organised society, as uniformed citizens, citizens that have the rights of a normal citizen, the obligations of normal citizens, but they have a specific speciality in a certain area to work and do things that they know better than others. Because of that, I think that one should also be extremely careful not to convey the message to the military when we talk about democratic control that they are somehow inferior and they need to be especially controlled because they are troublemakers or something like that. But, in an organised society where we have elected members that govern the country, obviously those elected members of the society must be able to control the various elements of that society, because they act on behalf of the people. This is one element that we should not forget, because sometimes I have been talking about these things in many cases I hear military representatives from various countries complaining and saying, "Well, this gives us the idea that somehow we are the ones that are doing things wrong and everybody needs to control us and this is not fair", and I think we need to make this very clear from the beginning: yes, there is requirement for control but at the same time we need to

understand that this group of people are professionals and they make a contribution to society that nobody else can make. They are a very important component of the society, they have to be given the right position in society, but they in return need to understand that there are not a state within a state but they have their role in society and like other elements of that society they need to make their contribution in the best possible way. So, this is some set of thoughts of why I think that democratic control is required.

Now, the next question is, ok, if we establish that the military needs to be controlled, like indeed other elements of society, who should control this military? That is of course a very thorny question, because depending on what country you are looking at, you have different answers to that question. The local conditions of each country, the historical conditions, the structure of a country, generate different forms of democratic control. There is no single model for example in the nineteen countries that constitute the Alliance, every country has its own system of democratic control. Of course, depending where you see it, you might say, "Well, this control is not exactly what I would like to have for my country". Maybe you could be critical about some countries in the Alliance of the way they do business in the area of democratic control, but each country has developed its own system according to its own circumstances. So, I am not going to say who is better than another because it is up to each country to decide how they do it.

However, according to the models that we have seen, for example the President could have an important role, or the Head of State to that effect, in the exercise of control of the military. Additionally, another possibility could also be that he who has the role of the Prime Minister of a country assumes the responsibility for control of the military and is not just the nominal Chief of the Armed Forces, the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces, but has actually control, direct control of the military in many respects. However, that same model may not be a good model for another country.

We had quite a long discussion with our friends in Croatia, where they had established before 2000 the idea that the President should have full control of the military and not the government. And of course when we were discussing ways of how the rearrangements of distribution of power should be made in view of Croatia joining PfP, that was a major point of discussion, and the new administration after 2000 indicated that they were very much interested to change that situation, because they were afraid that if you concentrate all that power in the hands of the President, then the President could actually intimidate the government, which was elected of course by the people as well, and was representing the various tendencies in the society. Therefore, there was a move to share power between the President and the Government. The arrangement that has been found so far, according to some people is better than it was before 2000, because the President maintains control of the armed forces in war time, but in peace time that control is exercised through the Ministry of Defence; and of course what still remains to be decided, and we have been working with the Croatian Government to maybe see if there is a possibility to further improve that, is the point that the Chief of Defence, the Chief of General Staff, reports directly to the President, which of course creates a little bit of a problem. In other countries, however, that has been tackled differently. The President, or the Head of State, takes the role of the nominal Chief of the Armed Forces, the nominal Supreme Commander, who has legal responsibilities, and some minor role in actually running the military, but the real responsibility for the military rests with the government. Now, there are various forms that that can be done. When we refer to the government that could be the Prime Minister or the Minister of Defence; and again because of the various circumstances, there are countries, even in the Alliance, where the

Minister of Defence has a very nominal role. However, in most cases, the Minister of Defence is the one that is in charge of the military, and the military is under the Ministry of Defence. So, again, there is no single model here. The important element is to try and see then what are the checks and balances between the various elements that contribute to this relationship. And that leads us then to the role of what the subject of today's discussion is, of other constituent elements of the society: the parliament, academia, and the media.

I think that one extremely important element in the control of the armed forces is the role of parliament. The parliament has, and should have, one of the most important roles in controlling the armed forces. The reason because although the President and the government may represent of course elected representatives of the state, they do not always represent all the tendencies in the political spectrum, which is the case in the case of parliament - because parliament is much more representative of the people than obviously the government can be. The government represents only the leading element of political opinion at a certain point in time, but what about the other elements? So that is why parliament has such an important role in democratic control.

Now, if we refer to what was said earlier by Mr. Mirjanic about the Federation Parliament in this country it appears that maybe we need to think a little bit more of how that can be done in the case of BiH, because in a organised state what counts is not what we refer to as entities or federal components, but the state structure. This is what represents the state internationally. Yes, of course we understand that there are reasons why this is so, and we are not going to debate here why it was done that way because that is past, it is done. We are not going to change it with this discussion here, but the important element is, and I would refer to the point made sometimes by people saying that what is not mentioned in Dayton should not be done. No, it is not like that. What is not mentioned in Dayton does not mean that it cannot be done. You could add to Dayton elements that would not make it void, but make it more functional, and representative of the new requirements of this state. And in this content then, the requirement of strengthening the state structures is something extremely important, because control of the military by the parliaments of the individual entities is of course important, and it could play a very important role, but it could make it correct if in addition to that you had state-level control. And as far as I know, and was already mentioned earlier from my previous contacts, this is not the case with the Federation Parliament. We need to create the right arrangements for the parliament to be in a position to take that kind of role.

What would that kind of control be from the part of the parliament? One area would be the area of legislation, because this is maybe the strongest power that parliament has. It creates laws, and it can change laws. And of course by creating the appropriate legislation the parliament has the power actually to orient the interest of the state in the direction of the control of the armed forces.

Another important weapon in the hands of parliament is, of course, the control of the budget, because regardless of what military leaders say, if they do not have money to do it they will have to compromise as to what needs to be done. So, a very important weapon is to make sure that the control of the budget is done in a transparent way and is in the hands of the parliament.

Why transparent? Because it seems that in many cases the judgement that is made, or was made in the past, was that the military is a very sensitive organisation and the operations that we are doing are so sensitive that we need to keep secret what we are doing. Therefore, do not

ask us where that money goes. This is the lump sum we need for armed forces, just vote for it, and do not ask questions about it. That is a totally undemocratic approach, because the military, of course, is an element of a democratic society and it has its own role. Yes, there are some elements of its work that one may want to keep under very sensitive treatment of the facts behind those numbers, but after all the money that goes into the military comes from the money that is contributed by the people, it is the money contributed by taxation. Therefore, where that money goes is the right of the people to ask for that information to be given to them. Why are we using taxpayers' money in that direction? What is more important in that field than in another? Is this work been really required? Is it in line with our understanding of the security concept and the defence concept of his country? So these are the questions that can be asked legitimately by the Members of Parliament, and they can question some, at least, of the orientations of the military. That is why we need to be transparent there, that is why we need to have details of what the defence budget includes, and not just a lump sum and say this is a total amount, take it or leave it.

I think an important element is also to speak not only of the rights of the parliament, but also of obligations, and this is to have parliament adequately educated about what they are asking. Just asking questions, which are silly questions, please, excuse my blunt language about it, does not help, because then you create a distance between the parliament and the military. The military feel that the politicians do not know what they are talking about. You need to be educated, which means that parliamentarians have an obligation to themselves to try and be well-educated as to how the defence structure is organised, how the defence is run, what are the priorities of the defence effort, how that relates to the defence concept and the security concept, and that of course lead us to the question how can we explain that this country still does not have a Security Concept, as far as I understand. But that is another debate. And of course, have the necessary information and contacts with the military structure to have inside information in certain fields that would allow then the parliament to make clever questions, and raise the issues that would then require answers. I think this also creates a feeling of, let us say, a responsible position from both sides and the military then will have hard time not answering those questions, because they are well put, they have reason why they are there and then they will have to answer those questions. So, this builds confidence between the two sides, and that is why parliamentarians need to be well-educated.

There was a time in the early days of transition of some of the countries in Eastern Europe when it was an extremely good idea to have a lot of parliamentarians come from a military background, because those parliamentarians then knew very well what they were talking about. However, we should not over stretch that kind of situation. The moment you have the defence committee of the parliament consisting essentially of former military then you run another risk, the risk of, let us say, collaboration between parliamentarians and the military to promote class interest, because they feel that although that are retired they may also feel that they are part of that kind of grouping. So, there is some sort of a plus and minus in this kind of relationship so we have to be careful about it.

Of course, there are all kinds of controls that could be exercised by the parliament, but I am not going to take the thunder from the remaining speakers.

Let me then move to another element which is part of our agenda today, and that is the role of academia. Discussing about the military is not the prerogative only of the parliament, but it is also of academia. Educating the people on what is the role of the military and the other elements that contribute to the stability of the state is an important contribution of academia.

It does not help to have academic teachers take positions against or for the military. It needs to be a balanced position. This is for the reason that the moment that we give the impression that a certain professor thinks that this is the wrong attitude, that we should not be doing this or that without the right justification for what is said, it is considered partisan. We need to educate the young generation to understand that the military is not an aberration but it is a normal element of an organised society. It is a professional element and they need to obtain the right information about it, and the right attitude towards the military. At the same time, because many of those young people will become the future of the military, they also need to understand what their obligations towards a democratic society are, and how they can maintain their allegiance to the state first, and then to the military, rather than the other way around. Of course, that could be done not just by providing the appropriate education, but by having a lot of those tools that academia uses, like seminars, work-shops, training sessions, and all kinds of educational approaches that they have in their hands.

However, maybe one element that could play an extremely important role in this democratic control of the armed forces is the set of media, both printed and, of course, electronic media. Normally the media just try to pass information, but that information as we all know, and it was mentioned earlier, could be very partisan and very partial. So it is important for the media to provide the appropriate objectivity in the information they produce. Of course, having said that we are not naive. We know that the media works on the basis of an enterprise, and therefore they need to make money; and because something appears to be very interesting for the public and sells they prefer to say that, although they know that must not be exactly correct because that sells. The real truth does not sell all the time. That is why having the appropriate members of media organisations should be seen by the various media owners as an obligation to the public, to select responsible people. Yes, you can tell the truth in a sensational way if you want, but tell the truth, or at least give objective indications of why you are saying what you are saying, and then you can have a position on these facts, and say, "This is what happened, but my view is that this is what should be done". That is legitimate. However, refusing to give the facts, and giving only some elements of what was said by those that support your view is something that is violating the democratic right of the people to be adequately informed.

Naturally, that also raises the question of access to information, and this is another element that is difficult. In many societies, the media do not have access to defence related information because people consider that, "If this television station hears about our planning for this area of defence that is going to create a big problem." However, that is not a way of doing business. In a democratic society the media should have access, and that means that the Minister of Defence, the Chief of Defence, the President, whoever is doing business in the area of defence, the parliament, should have ways of keeping the press, the media, adequately informed. If they do not do that, eventually they will have to produce their own stories which would be on the basis not of information, but of what they think is what happened, and that, of course, is going to be wrong information, and it will make a wrong impact and then we all complain about the media saying the wrong things.

However, do we take our position to inform them, because the moment that they are informed, not just as individuals but as groups, by having press sessions, press conferences, then it is difficult for them to bend the truth, because somebody else will write about the things they did not write, and it is easier then to, if you want, make sure that the media provide the right information.



Normally, one would expect the media to question priorities in the area of defence, the funding of defence, and of course issues relating to specifics of various personnel related issues, social issues, and some things like that. But it is all legitimate, we should not explode when a newspaper writes something that criticises the military, because in the experience that has been accumulated through the years in many countries it is sometimes thought that the press should say nothing about the military, that this is sacrosanct, and it is thought that we not should really say anything about that, and if anything it should be praising the military. However, we should be prepared for healthy criticism, and this is something that is normal in a democratic society - maybe annoying at times, but it is part of life.

Now, I think that I said enough, which I believe, is already known, but let me then turn into my part of work, the nature of democratic control, and NATO and PfP. In NATO, we have tried many times to define what is democratic control and came to the conclusion that there is no definition of that, and that there is not even a check list that we could give you to say, "This is democratic control, and that is not". The only thing that we managed to do is to have a presentation of various views that have been presented in discussions we had among ourselves. Maybe, one major push to paying attention to democratic control has come with the Partnership for Peace.

The Partnership for Peace is, as you know, a program that was introduced in January 1994 at the Summit Meeting in Brussels; and of course, it has been one of the most successful programmes that NATO ever launched. As a result of that programme, the kind of relationship between NATO and non-NATO countries of the OSCE region has changed dramatically. Out of those countries, many of which used to be former adversaries of NATO, we now have three new members of the Alliance, and allegedly in November in Prague, when we will have another Summit Meeting you might see another set of new members of the Alliance, of the same set of counties that would enrich the Alliance with their experiences and their backgrounds. We do not know how many of those countries will join, but hopefully we will see several of the nine aspirant countries becoming the new members of the Alliance.

Now this has put on the table, in the context of the PfP, the requirement to actually look more carefully in the direction of democratic control of the armed forces. Actually if you read the Framework Document of the Partnership for Peace, you would see that democratic control of the armed forces is one of the five objectives of the Partnership for Peace. The others being transparency in defence planning and budgeting, and of course three more relating to co-operation in the military field. Now, both democratic control of the armed forces and transparency in the defence planning and budgeting are actually elements of the same entity, because they belong to the way that society looks at the military.

In PfP, as you know, all the kinds of relationships that are created are only political commitments, not legal commitments; therefore, any country that wishes to become a member of PfP does so without creating legal obligations for itself. It is up to that country to decide how far the country wishes to go, and it is all voluntary, and if a country wishes to take itself out of the programme that can be done. Actually, as you might know, we had a case like that, the case of Malta, which joined the PfP, then because of a change of government and internal political reasons, nothing to do with what was done in PfP, they decided to go out; and I was in Malta just a few months ago and I had contacts with people there and the indication is that they are eager to come back to the PfP, so much for withdrawing.

So, what happens then is that as a result of this nature of PfP we have today twenty-seven partner countries in PfP, which include a large array of different political backgrounds of countries that include neutral and non-aligned countries like Austria, Sweden, Finland, Ireland and even Switzerland; then, in addition to that some aspirant countries, the nine countries that hope to be selected in Prague in November, we have countries of the Caucuses in Central Asia, we have Russia and Ukraine, with special types of relationships, we have countries like Moldavia, and Belarus, and of course countries that are not yet members of PfP but with which we have kind of relationship, like the Special Security Co-operation Programme we have with BiH, and also a programme we are now considering to start with the case of Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY).

Now, we are even considering, and this is in a process now, of changing the geographic limits, which have been so far the OSCE - the Organisation of Security and Co-operation in Europe, and to expand the limits, to include countries outside that area, so countries like, for example, Mongolia, or Australia, or Argentina, or even Japan, that have expressed interest to join the PfP, maybe considered as new members. So you see that this is a program that actually goes much further than the initial consideration of bringing together the old adversaries of NATO and Warsaw Pact, and working together, it has gone much further.

In that context now, we have been paying a lot of attention to the democratic control of the armed forces, because in many of the partner countries, not all to be fair, but many of our partners, in the past the military was something like a state within a state. Yes, there was control of the military but by the party, or by limited elite of people that had control of the military; with the rest of the people have nothing to do with the armed forces. There was no such thing in many countries as defence planning, and the reason was, because in the case of countries that belonged to the Warsaw Pact, defence planning was done in Moscow. It was not done in the capitals of those countries for obvious reasons, in Moscow they did not want them to do defence planning, that just wanted them to listen to what they were told to do in the best way what they were told and never mind about what they need as priorities for their national interest.

Consequently, when these countries broke loose and they came closer to NATO through the PfP, those of us that had the privilege to visit those countries in those early days were very much surprised when we tried to explain how defence planning was done to have blunt looks from the people in the audience; and then gradually we realised that we were talking to people that had no experience in that field because they have never done things like that. And, of course, defence budgeting, defence planning, resource management, all these things were more or less unknown to many of the people that we were talking to. Therefore, we launched a very major effort that we referred to, not just democratic control of armed forces, but in a broader sense, defence reform. And defence reform is an effort, which has been going strong since we started co-operating with many of those countries. To be fair, defence reform is not an issue for the partners alone, it is also for NATO countries. Many of the NATO countries need to reform their defence structures from what they have been so far. So, do not think that it is a one-way street. It goes in all directions, and it is a long process. It is not something that can be done overnight. It takes years and years to have meaningful results from defence reform. But we need to start somewhere, and one meaningful way of starting is redefining the relationship of the military with the state. And that is why we need some conceptual elements like defence doctrine, like security policy, like military doctrine, and military relevant legislation.

I was surprised to hear in many cases in the past when I was visiting some of the current partner countries, that there was no such thing as a law for the military, there were some laws, but obviously the administration had quite a lot of authority to do things, not necessarily following the laws, because they had the prerogative of appointing officers, giving them ranks, or doing this or doing that, without necessarily following any laws, but because they had that power of doing things, and of course, all these things need to be well laid down in legislation, again the role of the parliament. The officers and the soldiers that serve in the armed forces, before even going there need to know what are their options as they go along; and these options need not be the prerogatives of specific people, but according to law, in a state with the Rule of Law everything should be regulated by appropriate legislation.

Then the other thing is that we need transparency in the defence activities. This is what we promote with defence reform, and of course to build that transparency is not an easy thing - you have to change mentalities, people are used to secrecy, and of course another element that comes into the picture is defence procurements, and there another factor comes in, which unfortunately most countries are plagued by, NATO countries included, and that is corruption. And corruption plays its role in reducing the effectiveness of the measures of governance. And this is another element that we need to look to in the concept of defence reform.

Now, I will finish, and sorry for taking long, but I think I had to say a few things in this field by saying something about Bosnia and Herzegovina's bid for PfP. As you know, last July the Council visited this country, and we had an application by the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina to join PfP. The response of the Council was that although we welcome this application, we are not ready yet to agree to accepting Bosnia and Herzegovina into the PfP. Essentially because we need to have in place certain elements that will make Bosnia and Herzegovina a suitable partner, and could make it possible for that country to make a contribution in the PfP, rather than just to be a consumer.

One needs to remember some of the elements that we put to this country as things to consider in preparing for joining the PfP, and for example what is required is an agreed security policy in Bosnia and Herzegovina. I understand that work has been going on and that it is in an advanced stage as far as I know, but we need to get on with it and finish it. At least, if my information is correct, and I would be glad to be corrected that I am wrong and that has already been done, but I am afraid that maybe not. Why is this important? Because, the Security Policy of the country not of the entities is important in this context. We all know why this is important, and I am not going to expand on that. Unless you have the priorities of what this country wants to do as a country you cannot operate as a normal country, and you cannot hide behind Dayton. Dayton was a requirement some years ago, but we cannot stay in time. Time advances, situations change, and of course we need to adapt to the new situations. Yes, we do not want to renegotiate Dayton but there is a ground to adding to Dayton.

(tape changes).....that could not join immediately PfP, we are not aware of any country that is a member of PfP that has three armies. I think it speaks for itself. Yes, everybody understands why this situation was organised the way that it has been organised, but it is time to start building elements of a state-level defence structure.

We refer to it as Unified Command and Control and I had the opportunity in the past to explain what we mean by that. That is that we do not want to abolish the entity armies, because obviously they are there for reasons which we are not here to renegotiate. But the

important element is also to build an overlay of relationships of the militaries of the two entities that would work together under unified command and control. That is, you need to have senior officers that are drawn from the two entities, but whose responsibilities are to the State of BiH, not to entities. Now, these officers would then organise certain units that could be state-level units. I am not going to go into the specifics of how many units, what structure and this and that. That is for the members of this state to decide with the help of international community of course, where that is required, but you need to have something like that. And you do not need it only at the military level, you also need it at the political level; because for a proper state you need to have adequate democratic control of those armed forces, even at the state-level. Therefore if you have a military structure that operates at the state-level then you need to have some sort of political element that controls those armed forces. You do not want to call it Ministry of Defence, I do not know, call it Ministry of Agriculture if that is going to makes things easier for everybody, but it must be some sort of a political structure that has responsibility of those forces that are entrusted to work at the state-level.

Naturally, if you organise forces at that level, those forces cannot just be there, they need to be supported, so you need logistics that support those units, and they need to be trained so they can do their job. Obviously you need then training standards, and you need training institutions, and you need training courses that need to be undertaken.

Where would these training institutions be? Well, there are many options about that. You could have a training institution, if both sides can agree, that is located somewhere and operates with combined staff from both entities, or you could, in the worst case, have let us say two forms, two cycles of training, one cycle in one entity, the other in the other entity in the different building with trainers that come from both sides, and so the prospective country level officers and soldiers could be trained on both sides, if that is going to make things easier and get the necessary training they need. They need also to be educated in how other countries are doing business, also concentrate on peace keeping issues, peace support operations, and we all know that even the concept for peace support operations has not gone very far, or at least I thought that we had gone some way but not this is not the case, I believe. So, there is work that needs to be done there.

Important in the context of our discussion is the provision of state-level parliamentary oversight, and that does not exist, as far as we know at least. And control, of course, of the armed forces of BiH on the basis of what we discussed earlier, transparency, confidence building, and ensuring that the armed forces are accountable to the elected officials of the state is of paramount importance in this context.

Of course an issue that we need also to be reminded of is the requirement to maintain a close relationship with the International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia, which remains also an issue for the international community, and it is not for many members of the international community a good excuse to say that there are people out there in the mountains and that we cannot still catch them and send them to the tribunal. So, we have to make sure that the appropriate measures are taken to apprehend those people that are wanted, and only then can a feeling of justice be established in this country.

The question that I had in my notes originally was that there is a requirement for external countries to stop supporting directly elements of this state. This has been the case in the case of Croatia. Croatia has stopped directly financing the Croat element in this state, and I understand that since March this year that also the Republika Srpska (RS) has also stopped

receiving direct support from Belgrade, and in my latest discussion with Minister Svilanovic, I understand that the intention of Belgrade is to start a meaningful relationship with the Standing Committee on Military Matters (SCMM) and the state-level institutions of this country similar to what Croatia has been doing. Consequently, that would normalise the relationship between Belgrade and Sarajevo, and then stop this kind of abnormality of supporting an element of the state from an outside country. That can be done, I mean the supporting RS, do not misunderstand me, is not excluded in this process but it should be done in a transparent way, and through the state authorities as assistance provided by another country to this country, but should be done in transparent way not under the table and in the ways that are not transparent.

I think that I have said enough and what I would like to say in conclusion is that those of us who are looking at this issue from Brussels are very eager to see progress in this context. We would like very much to see this country come and have the flag of Bosnia and Herzegovina in the flags of the PfP. We had very important first step in that field, small as it may be, last October, when we had a work-shop on Defence Policy and Strategy in Geneva, which I chaired, and we had a delegation from this country that for the first time came for a genuine PfP activity with all the other countries represented there, and they put the flag of BiH rather than a sign of BiH, and they spoke as BiH for the first time at least, in an activity of that nature. And I cannot tell you how happy everybody was to see that three people who came there, regardless of what their backgrounds were, we are not interested in that, came there and spoke on behalf of BiH. Everybody was impressed, it was documented very well in NATO, and we are looking forward to have more of that thing. Thank you for giving me little bit of extra time, more than extra time, but I think I needed to say a few things.

## OPENING SESSION DISCUSSION PERIOD

**Dr. Bisera Turkovic**, *Executive Director*  
*Centre for Security Studies*

I would now like to call everyone for a small discussion, if I can say that, concerning these points that have arose today. In our eyes how much are they real? How quickly can we achieve that what has been placed before us? Do you think that this is possible or not? How much time would we need? Would this be possible before the elections or will we have to leave everything until after the election and wait for a better period in the future, and that we allow Yugoslavia to enter the PfP before us, and perhaps also that Croatia would enter NATO before we muster the strength to agree to our entry into the PfP?

How much can you in parliament influence the acceleration of the adoption of the security policy in this country? Obviously, already a year has passed and however much has been done to this document has not resulted with its conclusion. Professor Mirjanic has illustrated to you, nevertheless, the moves when *ad hoc* committees are in question, if I understood correctly, which exist at the state parliament level when we speak concerning the control of the armed forces, especially democratic oversight.

**Mr. Ibrahim Spahic**, *Representative*  
*BiH Parliamentary Assembly*

When we speak about this problem that is on the agenda today I would not only stick to that which is real. Due to this I think that the real becomes the artificial, and the possibilities became real and that is the distinctive feature of today's BiH. If we wish to make a step forward then we must realise how artificial are the political positions of those that try to delay solutions and wait until something is solved by the neighbours, and those that have a position in the international community in the framework of the interest in the realisation of the Dayton Peace Agreement that concerns defence and security. Firstly, the BiH Presidency really obligated the Council of Ministers to develop the study, especially the real, clear programmatic security problems that are connected to BiH, with a platform that should result with the basis for the organised work from this field. This document has not yet appeared in the BiH Parliament, and it is precisely due to this that the realities are rendered artificial by the specific political forces that consider that they can still avoid the responsibility for issues that are of especial importance.

I would like to say two things about which I am directly involved in connection with these problems. Firstly, I initiated the procedure of the change in the BiH Constitution that is completely acceptable and in accordance with the Dayton Peace Agreement. Annex 4 implies that the BiH Constitution can be changed with a two-thirds majority and that is the first time legitimately has began the procedure for the change in the BiH Constitution, and in one part I also considered the problem of defence and security in BiH. I have to say that the Commission as well as the House of Peoples legitimised my position that is normally constitutional, and also the constitutional basis because in the BiH Constitution it states that it is possible to change the constitution by the will of the elected representatives with a two-thirds majority, etc. Besides those changes in the constitutional amendment that has been foreseen, I would like to say what happened with this blockade, consequently, with these

artificial realities. It has not been decided as to whether a six-month or longer or shorter debate about the constitutional amendments shall take place. Of those, there are six that I suggested that some kind of committee, political force or body cannot put a stop to. They have to become transparent to the public, and the public must become familiar with them and their work. Above all, the Council of Ministers and Members of the BiH Presidency for around 9 months have blocked the giving of their opinions regarding this, and that was according to the constitutional and legal procedure and at the end the BiH Presidency and Council of Ministers nevertheless gave their opinions, especially the Ministry of Civil Affairs stated that it is necessary that they cannot halt the right that a debate would be lead concerning the changes in the constitution and with that they deblocked that which concerns the BiH Presidency and Council of Ministers in that process. It remains at the level of the House of Peoples to confirm the time period for the public debate concerning those six amendments. When we now speak about this problem I would like to stick to that. This means, that almost more than half a year was necessary, somewhere between eight and nine months, for the Members of the BiH Presidency and Council of Ministers to explain something that had been their obligation to explain within the period of thirty days.

The other suggestion that I sent to the parliament before the reported time was the suggestion concerning the amendment to the Law on the Council of Ministers. In that amendment to the Law on the Council of Ministers I suggested the formation of a Ministry of Defence. The Ministry of Defence is, according to my opinion, as a civil control and very clear and transparent organ, which does that job and needs to exist in BiH, and that extends from the BiH Constitution and only the competencies of the BiH Presidency in this moment according to the concept that I suggest is the abandonment of the semi-presidential system of BiH and the placing of things in the right place. The BiH Presidency should be representative, and the Council of Ministers should do its job. In connection with that the Standing Committee on Military Matters in the BiH Presidency and this monthly event between the entities and the BiH Presidency without the control of the BiH Parliament means, according to my opinion, the skirting of the constitutional responsibilities of the BiH Presidency.

I would like to ask Mr. Katsirdakis: Could you make some effort in the name of your structures with the BiH Parliament, to develop a large, wide, societal campaign together with us in order to convince people that they need to execute real democratic pressure and in the coming four years to resolve the question connected to the transparency of expenditure for military effects, for the necessity of entry into the PfP, and for a joint command over the armed forces in BiH?

**Mr. George Katsirdakis, Deputy Director**  
*Directorate of Defence Partnership and Co-operation*  
*Sector of Defence Planning and Operations, NATO*

Yes, indeed it is an issue that we try to propagate concerning the PfP. You have seen that at least, personally I have come here already three times for that purpose. There are others that have come as well. Also, there are courses in Oberammergau, with a limited number of people that teach what is required in the context of the PfP. I think what is required now is a much broader program. That is the authorities of this country to organise, let us say, lecture tours, comprising of people from NATO and NATO countries to come and help in this process. I think that the people of BiH do not know very much about what we are talking about. Yes, the idea of the PfP as a term is probably known to everybody, but very few people

know what it is and how it works. So the parliament, the government, even the armed forces of the two entities might wish to take this forward, and say, let us look into the issue and see what are the benefits and maybe the negatives, if there are any negatives, from joining PfP. That is, what would be our obligations and what we stand to gain from it. But it is this country that will need to undertake this. We cannot from the outside impose on you a series of speakers that will come here and start talking without you inviting us. So it is up to you now, it is your kind of game. This is an activity of the Parliament of the State of BiH that they could actually initiate. You are actually part of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly, and as such you have quite a lot of contacts. Maybe you could use that as a basis. So, yes, the answer is yes to your question. We need to do that, we are doing it already with other countries in the region, and we would be more than happy to help in that direction.

**Mr. Iacob Prada**, *Charges d'affaires*  
*Embassy of the Republic of Romania*

Does NATO envisage, in any way, arrangements for helping Bosnia and Herzegovina within the NATO framework to come closer to other countries that already have a lot of experience in the PfP, or to allow BiH to have its own arrangements?

**Mr. George Katsirdakis**, *Deputy Director*  
*Directorate of Defence Partnership and Co-operation*  
*Sector of Defence Planning and Operations, NATO*

Maybe the quick answer to that is that it is not for NATO to arrange that. We have a sovereign state here that has its own authorities, and it is those authorities that will need to take those initiatives. If they need support from the international community, I am sure that there is no element in the international community that will refuse that support. But, we should not create the impression to this country that it is a 'client state', which depends on the international community for everything. They will have to take the initiative and they are capable of doing all these things by themselves. It is just the idea that the appropriate elements of this need to take the step. In the context of the parliamentary, academic and media capabilities that this country has, please use those experiences because they have a lot to tell you. I would also go ever further and say use the experience from those three countries that have recently joined NATO, like the Czech Republic, Poland and Hungary, and see how they manage to go from being members of Warsaw Pact, to being partners in the PfP, and then eventually joining NATO. What were the challenges that they faced, and I think that later on you will be presented with case like that. So, this is something that should be initiated by this country.

**Mr. Osman Brka**, *Representative*  
*Parliamentary Assembly of Bosnia and Herzegovina*

All that you have said Mr. Katsirdakis is really the case and I prescribe to that. An additional thing that pleased me was when I heard the High Representative said that Dayton was not a ceiling but a foundation. I hope that we shall quickly come to that ceiling if it is known and that all should know. That is one thing.



The other thing that I would like to outline is something that I consider to be of importance. It is accurate that the entry into the PfP falls upon us, as you say, but it is accurate that you are present in BiH and that we at the moment cannot do anything without you. It is also accurate that there are specific political forces that do not want what you are talking about and what I think. I really believe and maintain that Bosnia and Herzegovina as a state does not have any other alternative than the PfP and further steps towards democratisation and those values that the world is offering to BiH. Due to this I shall conclude with an additional statement. Yes the entry into the PfP falls upon us, but we cannot arrest war criminals without your help, we cannot advance some things without you, you should know this. And you do not need to constantly tell us that this is upon us, that is also upon you Sir.

**Mr. George Katsirdakis, Deputy Director**  
*Directorate of Defence Partnership and Co-operation*  
*Sector of Defence Planning and Operations, NATO*

Thank you for that comment. What I would like to say in response is that indeed the role of the international community is not finished. We have our own role in here, now responsibilities. But I think what should be appreciated is that the authorities of this country should become more and more active by the day. I know that certain political forces are trying to do that, while others maybe dragging their feet, but unless we face this kind of situation, with a little bit of a push maybe from the outside, we cannot get anything done. Because if we only expect the international community to take action in respect of what is required for this state, we will find ourselves facing two important difficulties. One would be that the decisions of the international community that are imposed will not be acceptable, and therefore there will be efforts of parts, at least, of the public opinion to react to those decisions, and in the end we do not have what we want to have. The second element is that this is a state that has been going through very difficult times, and needs to take its issues in its hands. And if there is a reaction, obviously that reaction will have to be factored into the process. There are many countries that do not have the same background, but they do have strong opposition into what some parts of the public opinion want to do. But they find ways to get them on board. So, I do not think that the right approach is to say some of us want to do this, some others do not want it, so make it happen by pushing them to do things they do not want because we want them. This is maybe one way of looking at it, but we have to be very careful because in the end it might backfire. If you force people to do things they do not want, that may have to do it because they have no alternative, but they find a chance to go against what you force them to do. The ideal way is to convince them to do it, because they want to do it. I believe that the time will come soon when these things will happen, and that reason is because so far there has been the logic that we are only temporary in this country, and maybe in the near future we may go as parts of another country. This time is finishing. At least one of the directions is not interested in harbouring that kind of aspiration. The other direction is also going very soon to make it very clear that there is no such alternative. And so those groups that are looking outside rather than inside for some reason - it is fact of life, we are not going to change it overnight - these groups, when they see that their future is not in other directions, they will have start looking inside. And when they learn that their future is in this country, then they will find ways to co-operate. So, I would urge you to be a little bit more patient and use your abilities of reconciliation, hard as it may be, and in the end it will pay off. The international community will be next to you trying to help, but help not in forcing people to do things, but trying to make it possible for them to join consensus. So I think that is the appropriate way and thank you very much for your point, that is very good point.

**Mr. Paulo Rocha Trindade, Advisor**  
*Embassy of Portugal, Sarajevo, BiH*

I would first of all like to say thank you Mr. Katsirdakis for your interesting words, I would like to say that I learned a lot from your statement. I would like you to comment, if possible, on the last decision of the RS to refuse the proposal of OHR of a joint army. My question is how to overcome this decision?

**Mr. George Katsirdakis, Deputy Director**  
*Directorate of Defence Partnership and Co-operation*  
*Sector of Defence Planning and Operations, NATO*

I think that the point we have been debating all along is whether we are going for a single army or unified command and control, which is a different thing. A single army means unification of all defence structures, so that you would not have entity forces at all. Frankly speaking, and that is not a secret, we have said in the past that this would be an ideal situation, if it could happen, but we also have to be realistic. The reason for the entities being there today is because half of the people of this country were fighting with the other half. The decision was to stop this nonsense and as an intermediate solution, to organise Dayton. Dayton gave the idea that we need to have separate armies because that would give the feeling to the people that at least they have security within their enclaves. Now we have to move further than that. This state cannot afford to have the forces that had originally been there, these forces are being reduced by the day, we have come to the point where we are talking about very small forces, and even those are not affordable; so I think what will be the case as we go along, regardless to the various incidents, is that the economic realities will make it necessary. It will become evident to the people of this country, regardless where they belong, that they cannot afford to be the last in the list of developing counties in Europe forever. Because, these same families want to have better future for their children, want to see that this country goes forward, and the only way to do it is by improving the economic realities of this country, and they cannot do that by spending ten percent of what they make for an army that is not required for any reason. Because, if we still have the thought that tomorrow we may fight between the two sides of the country, we are very much mistaken. I do not think that this is an option to begin with. It is only question of time, I believe, that people will come to realise that what they have been harbouring all along cannot happen. The other question which was raised by the gentlemen who spoke before, that some of the people that are behind the scenes, and who pull the strings, and we all know who those people are, are the ones that are blocking these developments. I have been talking to a lot of people in the RS, who have hidden behind the lines that others have spoken before, and I can tell you that there is the genuine interest of many of these people to see change. But, some of those people have explained it to me that the reason they cannot go forward for changes, which they see as obvious benefits, are because some of those leaders in the mountains, which we all know about, essentially still control the situation and they will not allow change. I think it is only a question of time between now and the time these people face The Hague Tribunal that we will have to wait, and then the things will change, because there is a lot of good will in the RS as well to make things happen, it is only a question of time. They are also interested to see their families live better, and to see development, but the realities of this country make it difficult. So I am more optimistic than you are.

**Mr. Zaim Backovic**, *Representative*  
*Parliamentary Assembly of the Federation of BiH*

We would like a multi-ethnic Bosnia and Herzegovina. We must remember that what we want does not have any other alternative than to go towards the unification of the armed forces and an additional factor - the Ministry of Internal Affairs. Namely, that youth should fill the military and Ministry of Internal Affairs from different ethnic groups and from different peoples. But it is not possible that people from Banja Luka would serve in the Army of the Federation of BiH, and from Sarajevo in the Army of the Republika Srpska. This means that the basis is that we would generally have normal communication in this state when international policy and relations with NATO are in question, as well as the unification of the armed forces and as soon as people accept that, from one and the other side, this will be better.

Due to this, on the basis of that which has been done until now, not only during this session, as an ordinary citizen, I would suggestion to you and the international community that if the entities shall not do this then you at least should commence with the creation of something called the nucleus of the military and society, and in the framework of international forces these are forces that should participate as forces for peace. Through this we can create the nucleus of the military and the state.

**Mr. George Katsirdakis**, *Deputy Director*  
*Directorate of Defence Partnership and Co-operation*  
*Sector of Defence Planning and Operations, NATO*

Thank you for that. Just a quick reaction, I think, I would be patient for a few more months, for the reasons that I indicated earlier, and I am sure that you will see changes, you will see it because everybody will realise that there is no other way. So, just be patient a little more, you have been patient for so long, it is time to get things done the right way, because if you start imposing solutions those solutions will not last very long.

**Mr. Sead Buturovic**, *Representative*  
*Parliamentary Assembly of Bosnia and Herzegovina*

I am a member of the state-level parliamentary assembly and I am one of the people that belongs to the faster entry of the state into Euro-Atlantic integration, especially the PfP, which is our first step of entry into the system of collective security where in that manner in a secure and stable country we shall be able to attract foreign investors in order to commence with the process of economic reconstruction. I think that it is very significant that only people who are economically independent can think with their own heads. In this current very difficult economic situation it is very easy to manipulate people that belong to different options that we do not want in this state and country.

The most important exported article of BiH is now its youth; it is leaving the country. What is going to happen? Who is going to stay here? This means that we must energetically approach these issues.

We need to wait? We have already waited for seven years. We know everything. I have to tell you that in parliament at this moment there does not exist this quantity of people, an energy that wants what is clear to everyone. In order for us to enter the PfP we need to have, if nothing else, a common command, common management, one telephone. With whom to contact? We do not have and there does not exist the will nor the critical mass in order for us to make this, and I am afraid that this shall not happen before the election - I am absolutely sure in that. And before us shall enter Yugoslavia, respectively Montenegro and Serbia, and I am sure of that, and that is not good. We are an area of this region. I am afraid that these things shall pass.

**Mr. George Katsirdakis**, *Deputy Director*  
*Directorate of Defence Partnership and Co-operation*  
*Sector of Defence Planning and Operations, NATO*

I would like to thank you, I do not have any comment to make to what you said, which is I think is very legitimate set of ideas, but what I would like to say is that what are you saying is not unknown to the international community. You probably have heard the Secretary General and others make statements very much in line to what you said. Yes, we need to move on, we cannot waste time, time is running by as you very correctly put it. Important investments are not coming to Bosnia, because of the felling this is not stable area, and the country is loosing, and the situation is becoming worse, by the day, because of lost of opportunities. But when I say, be little bit more patient I do not mean wait for another ten years, I mean wait for another few more months when the things will start changing in the region so dramatically that there will be no room to do things otherwise. I think that the moment that we get membership of FRY or Serbia and Montenegro into PfP I can tell you a lot of things that cannot happen now will start happening. So it is a question of a little more time, and I share your frustration, and if I were in your position I would be even more vocal then you have been, but unfortunately this is the only way we can take it at this moment. I would only like to thank you.

**SESSION I**  
**THE ROLE OF PARLIAMENT**

**Mr. Marko Amidzic, Parliamentary Assembly of BiH**

**Dr. Marie Vlachova, Geneva Centre for Democratic Control over  
Armed Forces**

**Mr. Marko Amidzic, Representative**  
*Parliamentary Assembly of Bosnia and Herzegovina*

Ladies and Gentleman, allow me to thank the CSS, OSCE, NATO and the academic community for the organisation of a number of round-tables, which have created the conditions to allow into parliamentary procedure activity concerning the formation of a parliamentary body for democratic control. I think that this is exceptionally important.

I ask that you do not take my presentation as a connection with theoretical debate, nor as a emphasis of the problems of specific material, rather, perhaps as an attempt to provide a picture and documentation of the foundation concerning the situation in the Parliamentary Assembly of Bosnia and Herzegovina and in this sector, and perhaps my own thoughts about specific issues. In this manner, further consideration and suggestions could be initiated. At the beginning, I would like to point out the possible responses to the problem concerning the question: where is the current position of the Parliamentary Assembly of Bosnia and Herzegovina in this domain?

The BiH Parliament does not have a Commission for Security and Defence or some other similar body that would be engaged in these issues. As we said at the beginning, with these issues, in an indirect manner, the Commission for Foreign Affairs, of which I am Chairman, currently is engaged. Due to this fact I am duty bound, in accordance with the Book of Procedures, to say that I shall speak concerning the results of my work in the Commission, but these are my opinions and not the opinions of the Commission. I do not have any documents from the parliamentary body that would be able to point out my positions. Please understand this as the position of a Delegate in the Parliamentary Assembly of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Where are the dilemmas? Where are the problems? Above all, I think that in this type of debate it is required to be maximally pragmatic, in order to see where are the obstacles and problems. I think that the main problems in parliament are not especially of a political nature, rather through work in these issues it is necessary to redefine or harmonise the thoughts of the members of parliament concerning some ideas: the issue of the military, the ideas of the armed forces and the security sector. You see the ideas of some parliamentarians and theoreticians that are engaged in these issues. These issues are not so simple. Why do they require the definition of ideas in order later to be able to work in procedure, and respectively, in work? Due to this Bosnia and Herzegovina is organised on more levels of authority. It is accurate that the Presidency and the entities are engaged in the issues of defence. However, when we speak of the security sector, does it contain also the armed forces or something else? For example, very frequently in our debates can pass security, but not defence, etc. This means, defence and security, defence and/or security. Frequently, according to my opinion, is established a non-existing relationship, when we speak concerning the guests from abroad in our country. Due to the structures of their armed forces, they always speak concerning military - parliamentary control. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, I understand that 'oversight', above all, is the relationship between executive and legislative authorities. Is this the responsibility of the BiH Presidency or the Council of Ministers towards the BiH Parliamentary Assembly? I think, for example, in issues within the domain of defence, of democratic oversight and issues of the control of the budget, that commissions and entity parliaments must be engaged - due to the fact that BiH at a state level, objectively, does not have the capacity to evaluate in this domain. Consequently, within this category I am placing

all those that think that BiH in the existing constitution has very much work to do within the domain of the oversight of the security sector. I am an advocate also of defence and security, as people point out, and perhaps later I shall say why.

What is still current, and especially what still exists at the BiH state level? There exists the statement of the BiH Presidency concerning the necessity of democratic control, as a document, which was given to NATO. There also exists the support of the entity authorities for the statement of the BiH Presidency. Additionally, there also exists my initiative to change the Book of Procedures that entered into parliamentary procedure, the new article 37, which defined the title of the Commission for Defence and Security and its competencies. I think that these are in the competencies of the state, in that field. We have heard that there also exists some agreement between the two parliaments, perhaps between the members of those parliaments concerning a joint commission: I am thinking of a joint commission between the House of Representatives and House of Peoples. I know that also the initiative of some people that this needs or that could be situated in the Commission for Foreign Affairs, in which these competencies would be widened. These are alternatives for which we are discussing in Parliament.

However, with consideration to the ambient and time in which we work, I think that this shall dilute all our initiatives and shall not come into effect until 05.10.2002. I am then in favour of a rational approach. Why do I believe this? We do not have experience in the work and formation of a joint common of the House of Peoples and the House of Representatives. The formation of this type of commission implies a new Book of Procedures comprising of at least twenty to thirty articles, it needs to define the manner of decision-making, and it also needs to define the procedure of work, etc. These are all legitimate initiatives, but they have now multiplied sufficiently that not one of them will materialise in the end. This means that we shall have to answer to voters as to why BiH, for somewhere in the region of nine months, shall not be included in the Partnership for Peace. I am prepared for all compromises.

In the second part, I shall try to be shorter and to speak about my understanding of the role of parliament, especially concerning the practical question of the position of the Parliamentary Assembly of Bosnia and Herzegovina and its deputies in this sector. I think that in this subdivision of the competencies of the BiH Parliament, in this sector, the issues of constitutionality and legality must be examined. For me, as a parliamentarian, it is not the issue as to who has sold weapons and to whom these weapons were sold. These are false dilemmas, and are political dilemmas that are placed in a political conflict, in the pre-election campaign, to use. The dilemma is as to whether that was a planned act, whether this was in accordance with the constitution and law, and under whose supervision and in which procedure was it conducted. That is the issue that a parliamentarian must deal with, and let the entities or some other competent bodies establish all others. This is not concerned with, generally, any doubt as to whether that work was undertaken in a qualitative manner, but it is the need and right of parliament to be informed concerning this. Towards this I am searching for the possibilities for the activities and work of a permanent parliamentary body on that theme.

I think that in Bosnia and Herzegovina, nevertheless, the Executive emanates from the Parliament. Even two Members of the Presidency were appointed in the House of Representatives and only the manner of election, Book of Procedures and the law that regulates that in its logic imply their responsibility towards parliament. Who voted for the

domain of their work? Especially there should be the leading of an account of at least some issues.

The international position and foreign policy of the country are inseparable from the issues of defence and security, and that is the competency of state level organs. The issue of integration, which is an issue of Bosnia and Herzegovina, is in the least hands of the Parliamentary Assembly. Maybe the Parliament should also speak about the PfP and NATO. I would like to pose a question: are we in the constitutional position to speak concerning these issues? Is only the Presidency the competent body or perhaps the entities or Council of Ministers? Furthermore, who ratifies the contracts and agreements in the field of the military and other co-operation, if these are inter-state contracts?

Is it the right of the BiH Parliament to debate and be informed concerning these issues? In the end there exists the need to execute co-operation with entity bodies in the field of defence and security.

Towards and in that, I see the contents of the work of a parliamentary body and let it be called whatever all would accept. I am not for that title to be, for example, the Ministry of Agriculture, but let that be a name that in the logic of our language holds a part of the contents. My opinion is that parliamentary oversight, for which we continuously speak at these round-tables, is not mixed in administration and not in a command role over the armed forces. As a parliamentarian or member of a commission I would not generally like to be involved in those issues. We need to explain what does that mean. Parliamentary oversight is not revision according to lists of papers; rather above all it is the work of parliament and its bodies. Germany and other states have a Commission for Foreign Affairs, Commission for Defence and Security, Commission for the Evaluation of the Work of the Intelligence Services, but out of these last two issues we do not have anything.

On which basis have I arrived at this conclusion? I posed myself a question as to what could be generally considered as security threats to the citizens of BiH. When we speak about the armies we have to be real. Our armies are completely unsuitable armies and can easily go to historical waste. Furthermore, if this is the case then really from this we do not have any threats, or democracy. It is impossible in BiH that somebody would make a coup d'etat to endanger democracy. That is not possible due to the situation of the kinds of organisations present, due to the presence of SFOR, etc. I even think that this exists in the minds of our people who lead the armies, who are in principle honourable men, they are aware of these democratic changes.

What are the threats then? For me a threat is the remainder of a multitude of intelligence services, and that is the first threat to the citizens of BiH. The intelligence services were mainly half private, and if they would not be placed into a legal framework, then they represent an objective threat to democracy. Nobody manages them and they are not managed in the right manner.

Secondly, a threat is the remaining weapons. We should not deceive ourselves; there is not one village that does not have weapons from a military unit or troop. I ask that there be an account of how many have been collected, and it is known how many there were. I am not speaking about the stock of explosive material etc. This is the largest check of security and material goods and I hope that Operation Harvest shall provide some results. Do not ask me to say where are those remaining weapons, but really somebody knows that, somebody who was



engaged in the military. I am not generally speaking of one particular nation - we shall not speak about that. We are speaking about people that simply did not want to return these arms.

Thirdly, the next threat is the remaining mines. Fourthly, natural disasters and man-made catastrophes. We should defend ourselves from these threats. I think that without a united act of the BiH Parliament and its bodies it is not possible to establish contact between parliament and international organisations and institutions that would be interested to help us quickly resolve these issues. However, we have to fight for the logic that would combat the threats to all nations and citizens, and not my nation, another nation or me. We have to understand this.

Furthermore, we must find a democratic manner in order to complete the already commenced work. I am optimistic of a lasting result, but at this time, 05 October 2002, I am not greatly optimistic. In the public very frequently, individual responsibility, when we speak about democratic control, is identified with party responsibility. Very frequently when some issues are opened the individual is placed within a party context and then comes the political account and pre-election account, this does not have any connection with a party. Due to this those parties managed or attempted to manage people, and I abandoned my political options, because it is impossible to function in this manner. This means when we are speaking about responsibility, this is not the responsibility of a party, nor the responsibility of parliament, of a nation, rather it is the responsibility of the signer of that act, those that completed that act, as well as a prize for success. In the relation between executive and legislative authority we do not have an assessment of the work of the individual. To be incumbent in the executive authority of a state is an honour and responsibility. Nevertheless, unfortunately, very frequently we do not search for where the constitution or law was broken, rather to which nation that person belongs and in which party. I am for this approach, which means that through parliament, above all, the legal basis of activity is considered, and that it is understood that over everybody's work, even over parliamentarians, there has to be oversight as a permanent parliamentary activity. We are under the largest level of oversight because the public follows our work, watches what we say, listens and sees our effects. Let all affairs be transparent.

At the end I would suggest and especially ask the academic community, as soon as possible, to define and clarify some ideas. I want us to clarify and especially to answer the following question: how is it possible for us to lead to the end this procedure that began in the BiH Parliament, in a manner that corresponds to us and the PfP? In the same manner I would ask OSCE and OHR, when this would enter into procedure, to follow its development, and to give their thoughts, suggestions, and if it is necessary to lobby for specific solutions. I only want that a solution is found. What that shall be, from the three existing variants in parliament, I do not know. Naturally, I am advocating my variant, but if that would be turned down I would accept the other or the third, only I would want that the BiH Parliament, as the largest legislative body, would not be outside those processes and changes.

I apologise for my long-windedness. I wanted, perhaps more practically, to open these issues and to inform the public and academic community about these processes that are in development. This is due to the fact that at earlier round-tables we mainly spoke concerning regulations, which of course was needed. However, this has already entered into procedure and as to whether we shall come to the end in that procedure or stop depends upon us. Thank you for your understanding. You shall have an opportunity to all give your opinions.

**Dr. Marie Vlachova**, *Senior Fellow of the Think Tank*

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## *Geneva Centre for Democratic Control over Armed Forces*

Thank you very much. I am sure that we have not met because this is my first trip to Sarajevo. Naturally, I was in the Former Yugoslavia many times thirty-five years ago. It was the country of my youth and I have very nice memories from this region. Nevertheless, I am for the first time in Sarajevo, and I am very glad to be invited, even if I have a little bit weird feelings because I am not quite sure which experience I can share with you, to tell you the truth. When I was listening those who spoke before me, I was reminded of one aphorism by the Polish humorist Jiri Letz who wrote some time in the 1970's that there are always Eskimos hovering to come to tropical Africa to teach the natives how to deal with heat. I am not sure that I am not in the same position, but I will like to avoid something like that.

I am a civilian and I have been working in the military for the past ten years. I am from a military family, which explains why a civilian woman entered into the military. I am a sociologist, and I headed a small research department within the military, that means I was participating in our defence reform from the beginning. A year ago, I was seconded to the Geneva Centre for Democratic Control over Armed Forces as an expert, who should with the other scholars who have experiences of the first countries who entered NATO learn whether there was some lesson that could be transferred to the other countries. I will be very brief, I am glad that I do not have much time and I think that in fifteen minutes I can easily manage to tell you what I consider the most important from our defence reform.

I would like to talk about two things: first, it was already mentioned that there is no single model or pattern of how to conduct reform of the armed forces - the Czech Republic is a very good example; and in the second part of my speech, I would like speak about parliamentarians, a group that is very important, very interesting for a military sociologist; and I had a great experience with this group, because in 1999 I was asked by our Minister of Defence to carry out interviews in our Committee for Defence and Security, so I got in touch with them and I learnt how difficult the task is that these people have.

Let me start with the reform. Very briefly, we started the reform in 1989 by depoliticisation, as in other countries. There was a huge number of problems with Soviet troops in our territory. We had to displace them in 1993. The country peacefully divided the federation between the Slovak and Czech Republic, and we had again after fifty years national sovereign armed forces. At the same time, we had a population that did not appreciate the military. Czechs are not a very military people and there is not a very large military tradition; and the military, when it was quite clear that armed forces will be loyal, they were shifted to the margin of the society, and in fact they were left alone with their reform. The reform was a huge task, we had to downsize the military we had to get rid of stores, we had to listen to many problems, we had a lot of obsolete munitions which had to be guarded by the conscripts, and it was a lot of money that we do not know what to do with it. Lots of problems are very similar. When it was decided that the way how to secure our security is NATO, the Czech Republic and the Czech armed forces begun to prepare for the accession, and it was a rather rushed process, it is not a novelty for you that entering NATO was a totally political decision, and I think that in the Kosovo crisis, which was just a fortnight after entering NATO, most of the population for the first time realised that we were in when we were watching the "white lines in the sky". Most of the population realised "Oh, God!"

When we realised that we were not able to achieve the capability that was asked by NATO, this was a signal for new military reform, a very radical one, which was prepared by the new Minister of Defence, and a group of people, most of whom had experience from NATO Headquarters and also from military colleges abroad, from peacekeeping and so on, so this was the reform that was prepared by the new generation.

The reform is very radical, we should have all volunteer forces, there will be a totally new system of military education, there will be a huge downsizing, and we should have a totally new system of recruitment, retention, and transferability, and we should also have a brand new system of mobilisation to provide the country with a territorial defence. Quite a huge task, it would be done with the money that was allocated to the military. This is, I think, a very important point in our whole reform process because the soldiers who prepared the reform, it is important that this reform is prepared within the military, ten years after reforming the military and coping with parliamentarians came to the conclusion that the first thing if they want to achieve something so radical, and let us say to shift from the conscript army to a volunteer army, is to persuade parliamentarians, government and politicians about the necessity to conduct such a radical step. They managed it, because the present Minister of Defence is a military economist, and they made a very profound analysis and came to the conclusion that with the budget, which is guaranteed by law to up to 2004, reform can be achieved. Naturally, this will be dependant upon the possibility of the growth of the economy in the country, but even in the case that the military will not be given as much money as possible, there exists a political consensus regarding reform.

Why am I talking about this? I am trying to show you that after ten years of the very large and substantial change of the military, we, if I exaggerate a little bit, are again at the very beginning, starting with radical reform that will change the military, and which will reach that which we are obliged to reach – that means full compatibility with NATO. One can ask what these ten years were about in the reform, the people who took part in it – civilians, parliamentarians, soldiers – what precisely was the experience? The experience is that first there is no model. Every country has to find its own way.

The new Defence Minister is a man who is thirty-three and he is a former soldier. To tell the truth, five years ago to come with the suggestion that a former soldier will be installed as the Minister of Defence would have been totally unacceptable – both for the international community and for our country – but they learnt, those politicians who decide about the Minister and so on, that they simply cannot do without military expertise. They learnt, and this is another lesson, those parties, parliamentarians and soldiers learnt to communicate. Still it is not a process that can be compared with, let us say, the UK. It is very different. We are very far from sharing the responsibility, sharing information, and so on. However, during NATO accession and with pressure from the side of NATO, these two groups, parliamentarians or more generally politicians and civilians, were forced to co-operate with the military. They lost or got rid of the prejudices they had that those are the old structures, old guards, old thinking, old mentality people; and what they have in common with them now, they learnt that these people have very precise expertise that they would need, and the same with the group of parliamentarians, they learnt that they could not conduct reform without the soldiers. It took, by the way, ten years, to come to this conclusion.

The other lesson learnt was that there were a lot of practical things that needed to be solved, and I am not talking about the legislation. If you meet our Minister of Defence, or someone from the Committee for Security and Defence, and ask them, especially at an official level

like this seminar, what is the level of democratic control, I am sure you would be given the answer that we have achieved it, we have full democratic control of armed forces, because in the Czech Republic there is a bulk of military defence laws, we have a State Security Council as a consultative body to the Government, and every formal actor has a divided place by legislation. If you take into consideration these bench-marks or mile-stones or issues, which are in expert literature, you will learn that this is not true because communication is not as it should be. These two groups are not able to share responsibility. Soldiers sometimes try to avoid the responsibility, politicians are trying to be too responsible, but still they do not know how to gain the expertise they need for decision-making, and so on.

What I want to say in the time given is that one thing is probably the stage in which your country is, that means to gain what is called in expert literature the "framework of the control", and unfortunately it is only one step, and then there comes years of learning how to use this control, and that can be done only in practice.

The last point I would like to mention is something that was very painful for our country, which also is not very far from your experience, and that is the pressure, in our case, from NATO. The pressure was very unpleasant, when after three years of reform, after three years of declarations and statements made by soldiers and politicians in the media, the highest representative of NATO comes and says quite openly to the media, "No, you have not achieved what we asked you. You have not deployed as many soldiers in peace keeping missions, you have this and these troubles", and so on. It was very unpleasant for almost everybody, even for the public who were not very eager to know what was going on in the military. However, this pressure, at least in our case, was necessary. Without this pressure we probably would not have been able to overcome this old mentality as fast as we did.

So, if there is some lesson learnt, which I am not sure that there is, but let us hope that there is, I would say that the lesson learnt can be very briefly marked as different security reform, and I think that in every country, should be considered as a long distance run. If you have too great expectations at the beginning you can be sure that you will be dissatisfied at the end of it. Another lesson learnt is the more actors the better. These actors, these elements of control must learn to co-operate. Another lesson learnt is that pressure from outside is unpleasant, but probably necessary. Another lesson is realism in everything is very, very substantial, especially in planning. We were quite fast to design good strategic documents, strategic doctrine, international policy, strategic policy, but the goals and missions of the military were very unclear and they were not joined with the resources, with the possibilities of the country, with human resources, with intellectual resources. This made space for better decisions, because if it is not quite clear what are the goals of the military, if it is not quite clear how many soldiers you will have in the military after five to ten years, or that there are at least three to five variants, contradictory of course, of course then your General Staff is always the one who wants to have a large military, and there is also the MoD, politicians, and so on, then if you do not have clear figures how many soldiers you will have in ten years, you will not be able to build up a recruitment system. If you do not have a recruitment system you will never be able to change the structure. I do not know how the situation looks like here in Bosnia and Herzegovina, but in our country we had an overstaffed top rank, and not enough people for NCO structures, which was a great problem.

I think that is all. Of course those who would like to learn more are very welcome to ask me questions. Thank you very much.

## FIRST SESSION DISCUSSION PERIOD

**Mr. Ibrahim Spahic**, *Representative*  
*Parliamentary Assembly of Bosnia and Herzegovina*

Mr. Amidzic, how do you see an obstacle if you are already the Chairman of the Commission for Foreign Policy? Mr. Mirjanic is the Vice-President of the House of Representatives; here is the Representative Sead Buturovic. You belong to a team of completely different political options, alongside those from both entities, what is the obstacle that you make concerning that which you have so beautifully spoke? Who is an obstacle in parliament, when you are not only yourselves, and when you understood that you must change the option?

**Mr. Marko Amidzic**, *Representative*  
*Parliamentary Assembly of Bosnia and Herzegovina*

I do not believe that between us there are large obstacles. In this content we have participated in a large number of gatherings, and expressed our opinions, anticipated concerning that what I have said, about the possible contents of the work of that commission. However, I think that the last decision of the BiH Presidency, connected to the organisation of the Standing Committee has made our work more difficult, especially the postponement of those solutions for later. Secondly, we must not be naive; the sixth month has already begun. Those elections that follow objectively make harder the position of representatives in parliament, when the opposite of this comes into question. At the end you saw that our debates have acquired some other connotations. Towards this, more due to time, who should finish these procedures? I see specific difficulties and problems, and not in a personal sense.

**Mr. Armin Krzalic**, *Student*  
*Faculty of Criminal Sciences, University of Sarajevo*

I have a question for Mrs. Vlachova. You have come to us from the Geneva Centre for Democratic Control over Armed forces; I would like if you could give us some wider information about that centre, what it is engaged in, and what it does.

**Mrs. Marie Vlachova**, *Senior Fellow, Think Tank*  
*Geneva Centre for Democratic Control over Armed Forces*

It is a relatively young body, just founded two years ago, and is under Swiss law. It is a typical Swiss NGO. That is not a typical NGO in other countries. What is very important is that the NGO has a long experience, not of the Centre for Democratic Control over Armed Forces, but other institutions, which are in Geneva. It is a very fast developing centre. When I came there were about twenty people, now there are about forty people. The main region this and last year was the Former Yugoslavia. Last year there was a huge project, probably some of you know about it, for President Kostunica, this year it is Macedonia; I think also Croatia. There are other smaller projects, and what I like, because I am a sociologist, is DCAF, Democratic Control of Armed Forces. What is important is that the institution is slowly moving with the building up of its diplomatic context. That means that there are some projects

that will be launched that concern BiH in the area of demobilisation. I am not involved in it, I was promised that I will be next time, so next time I will have more information.

**Mr. Iacob Prada**, *Charges d'affaires*  
*Embassy of Romania, Sarajevo*

In 1968 you had in your history a very difficult moment. Despite the fact was very far away in history, when you came to democracy still some of your former officers during that period were still in high positions in your army. Did you have some officers being charged or accused for misbehaviour during that period of 1968, when democracy came to your country?

**Mrs. Marie Vlachova**, *Senior Fellow, Think Tank*  
*Geneva Centre for Democratic Control over Armed Forces*

The military in 1968 executed the last attempt to make what was not possible to reform socialism. The military played quite a substantial part, which can be shown by the fact that after 1968 30,000 military personal were discharged, because they were not trusted by the communists. After 1990, most of those people returned back and they made a very good job for the military of course. Most of them were people very close to pension age or over pension age, but still the knowledge that they had in this situation, any knowledge was very important. The Czech Republic was probably depoliticised the fastest, that means that most of those who were responsible or in charge of some positions were discharged from military which, let me say it with perspective, was of course alright from the point of ideology. From the point of expertise this meant that an influx of incompetent civilians came to the Ministry and this formed a very wide gap between the General Staff and the Ministry of Defence, which took us a very long time to overcome. It is always double, you get rid of those who are not reliable, if you do it in a not very good way, in a rush, you can damage in fact many things.

**SESSION II**  
**THE ROLE OF ACADEMIA**

**General Bernd Papenkort, Clausewitz Centrum**

**Dr. Dusko Vejnovic, Centre for Geostrategic Studies**

**Dr. Izet Beridan, University of Sarajevo**

## **General Bernd Papenkort**

*Clausewitz Centrum, Fuhrungsakademie Der Bundeswehr*

Good afternoon. I would like to start with Session Two, which deals with the role of academia. I can promise you that you will have a totally different team in front of you because in the middle is a military man, and I am flanked by civilians, by professors, teams from the University in Sarajevo and Banja Luka.

Sitting in the middle, between politicians, I remember very well one piece of advice that was given to me as a military person when you need to talk to politicians, because the advice was to stick to three rules. The first rule, which was told to me, was to always try to cash in advance. The second rule was to speak very quickly; and rule number three was, and I believe it is for the politicians sitting here sometimes the most important rule, to disappear immediately after you have finished. What I want to do today, as we will not disappear, we have not made cash in advance, but we would like to offer to you some ideas, what the role of the academia could be in the context of the democratic control of armed forces.

I need to tell you that for me it is a great pleasure to be back here in Sarajevo again, and to see some of the faces that I had to deal with in the past five years, from the military side and the political side. And I would like to thank Mrs. Bisera Turkovic for having been invited today, to be the chairperson of this session, and to present to you some ideas in order to move this country forward.

I think that sometimes it is easier to realise what has changed in a country if you come back and if you come from abroad, because if you stay in a country, and if you have daily hard work then sometimes you do not realise in which way Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) has moved forward.

Ladies and Gentleman, even when we were listening to the discussion this morning, and for some of you it might not go and progress in such a quick way, like you expect, then I would say as a German to have in mind that it took us about forty years to come for example to a good understanding between France and Germany, and to form for example one military unit. We heard from the Czech side the experience by separating into two different parts and that is a process that will take some time. However, I believe that now looking at your side, looking at BiH, it is high time in view of the on going developments outside of the country. I will come back later to this issue too.

When I told you that probably if you stay in the country you do not realise what is happening, for me coming back to Sarajevo yesterday was a great thing to hear that three schools are meeting today in Mount Igman, from all nationalities, and 1,500 children are playing together there. I ask myself only why do they need to be transported by a German Unit from Rajlovac to get to Mount Igman, and why the Army of the Republika Srpska and the Federation Army could not do this? Why do you need SFOR for example to do these kinds of things?

I know of another event that is in realisation, that the Major of Kiseljak, the Mayor of Foca, and Mayors of some areas of Sarajevo are sitting together with the German Contingent Commander and are talking about civil-military aspects and in which way to help to each other. And from that point of view again the question as to why are not both armies joining and trying to make a joint approach?



For me one thing was very clear from the very beginning when I came in 1995 when the war was still on-going in BiH, and it was my firm conviction that the future of this country, and I would say the whole region, lies in the multiethnic orientation of its states, of its regions. And as a consequence, all states in the region should be orientated towards tolerance under the democratic principles of government. And I will come back later to this too. I would like to offer to you two reasons for it. My first reason is that I believe, and that has nothing to do with BiH, but the world outside of this area, that it is a logical consequence of the impacts of globalisation and of this kind of effects, which many other states inside and outside of the Balkans are facing too. If I look at my own country, that is changing too, and you know how many people from your side live in Germany. And from that point of view, to live together as minorities is not the only thing that is typical for BiH; I think it has become typical for many other country states outside.

From that point of view I believe that everybody, every nation is wise to develop very early ways of integrating different efforts and to try to integrate different minorities in their own nationalities and in their own states. Because I believe that the wrong empire approach of building a wall around it will not survive, and it will fail. Sometimes, I need to tell you I do have the feeling that still some things on your side are running along this line.

Secondly, I believe that if you look back in your history is there anything new for you in BiH to live together with different minorities, with different cultures? And from that point of view my answer is no, and I think that BiH has, despite of all the current problems, still the chance to change from a problem provider for the international community, because so far in many areas you are problem provider, and to change this kind of position into a problem solver in the region, and to become a model for many other states, but demonstrating that all people can live together. I urgently ask you to take this kind of chance, because if you look on the big quarters of France, or big quarters of Germany, or the US, all these states are confronted with the same problem. If you demonstrated this kind of capability here to live together in all spheres of life, we will later talk about military too, and then you can really become a model.

I think that the new High Representative, Lord Paddy Ashdown, has delivered a very remarkable speech in which he hinted what should to be done, very clearly, in BiH, and you can choose this as a check-list of what should be done, and if you ask me having worked here in the political-military interface, I can tell you that if you have the political will it could start tomorrow morning, because on the expert side and the military on both sides, or all three sides here, there are many things available. But as far as political backing is not available, and as far as on the political side still other opinions are available, nothing will happen. And I have this in mind when I come now to the question of Session Two, what could be the role of academia in the context of the democratic control of armed forces. And let me first hint to the two consequences of the current political trends for armed forces and for citizens in each country, and not only in BiH. I am talking to you now as a military person.

On the military side we see in many countries the tendency towards only small and professional armies. It goes away from the large masses of conscription armies to smaller elements. If you look back, as an historian that is nothing new, we are falling back to the Middle Ages in reality, because at that time we had small armies. And as a logical consequence, only a few people in a state had in the future or today a clear knowledge and idea what the military is, what does the military require, what should it be, and lot of other very important questions that need to be answered in a very honest way for the sake of your soldiers too. And as a military person I would say that the military has a right to have good,

well-educated, well-trained counterparts. When we talk about democratic control over the military then this implies a certain knowledge, a certain training, and control must be exercised by you in the political and civilian leadership; and I need to tell you if you want to exercise good governance and democratic control over the armed forces, then you need to have a very good knowledge and expertise in public, in your political parties, as members of parliament, in all these kinds of issues, not only on military, but also on security policy, and wider.

Now, looking at the role of the academia there is a simple saying, someone has to teach it, to civil society, and also to you as Members of Parliament this kind of knowledge, because the military normally is concentrating on their own affairs. Who does it in BiH?

Let me mention a second aspect. I think that after 11 September last year one thing has become quite clear, that it is artificial in future to separate between so-called militaries, and talking about the defence of one's own country, and what we call in Germany, for example, internal risks, coming from organised crime, coming from weapons of mass destruction, coming from terrorists. So in reality, security policy is a very wide field of teaching. Here again the question is who does it in BiH? If not at the universities and if not in centres, like this kind of studies, the Centre for Security Studies, and I do have two colleagues sitting next to me who I would like to congratulate for their efforts. I know how difficult it is, for example, and the budget constraints after war to start this kind of teaching at a university again, and afterwards, I would like to offer them the floor in order to tell you what are their kinds of activities, and their concept will be.

I must say, it is a good sign for me that I have been joined by a Dean from the Federation and by a Dean from the Republika Srpska, because just to hint to the political situation in the country. In the real life, like telling you the two examples that I mentioned earlier, a lot is ongoing. A lot of efforts are available and I would like to ask you today to back this kind of efforts. On one side it is a precondition, because you as Members of Parliament without a good professional knowledge cannot exercise control over armed forces, because we have normally on the military side quite good counterparts available. Having said this coming as an outsider who knows a little bit what is available in other countries, and who is responsible on the German side for an such area, I would like to propose forward to you to think about the idea, to establish a BiH Academy for Politics. What I would like to do is to explain you shortly the proposal for the whole of the Academy in the context of, and in the network of activities, which we heard this morning, and in the context of for example PfP, or in the Stability Pact activities, which are known to you too.

You will find in your folder some short information about it, I have talked to Mr Busek about it, and know that many people are keen to support it when it will become an idea from BiH, and not as an idea landed from outside upon you.

Let me start really by hinting with the Dayton philosophy, and I think that it must be the aim, and I do not tell you now that the organisation is good and I think, and it was mentioned this morning, that it is a starting point on the organisational side. However, there is one good thing in the Dayton philosophy that could guide all activities, because it is the aim of peaceful and co-operative coexistence within one region whatever the region is. This is nothing new for this area of geography.

We should be aware, and I appeal here to you whether you are politicians or from media, or citizens of BiH and from other spheres of life, that after seven years of Dayton Peace

Agreement (DPA) implementation activities, BiH has mastered more than half of the way and there seems to be no alternative than to continue the process. However, I would say, please continue it a little bit more effectively.

What I want to tell you if this philosophy, I am talking about philosophy of Dayton, peaceful coexistence, is successfully implemented, then an important part of the Balkans will be politically stable, and it will surely have positive spin off effect in other areas too. The PfP should not be looking only at the military side, because for investors outside in the region they know if the PfP, for example, is happening, then there is a certain political stability, and they are ready to invest, and from that point of view the PfP is an important economic signalling tool.

It does not matter, but what I want to do is to explain in more details what I think. We should be more aware of what is happening, and I think that it is now a more crucial phase for BiH in the context of the implementation of the Dayton Peace Accords. If that is successful a lot should be achieved for the country itself.

Let me explain now the reasons why such an Academy for Politics will be very urgently needed in BiH. I think that even the people of BiH must finally decide on their own political way to go. Both sides, on one side the international community, and on the other side BiH itself has in its own self-interest, to help to set the conditions for open minded, well-informed citizens, and citizens who are able to co-operate in an efficient way in the environment of a modern security policy, and to join globalisation of course at a regional and international level. I believe you know the situation in BiH better than I, that many citizens of BiH do not have this kind of knowledge.

I would like to mention another fact. I think that additionally government branches at many levels need proper training in doing government business, with modern techniques and in a more efficient way. I believe you all know the current situation with the problems and deficiencies. From that point of view, together with the universities, such an academy could form a strategic community of informed citizens for BiH, and to train for an efficient public civil service, like it would be available, or is available in other countries.

In order to participate in a better way, and I know that your people are dealing in different areas in a better way when you are looking forward to join European structures, whether that is PfP, or whether it is an implementation of the Council of Europe, the Academy would be such an institution to inform, to educate and to train current and future senior representatives, from all Government branches, from the media, the field of science, religious leaders and business in the broader elements and concepts of modern security policy and politics. It could inform and educate on human rights issues and provide for government officials high quality training.

The concept as such would be to form an Academy like institution, which on one side could be sponsored by the international community, in the beginning, but my proposal would be that it should have from the early beginning leadership and participation from BiH, and here I look, for example, on the political side, I look on the university side as well. The main aim that could become later, for example, an institution of BiH, and from that point of view, it could be sponsored by the Presidency, and by the appropriate levels of the Government.

What I am aiming at is to form an institution that many other countries is available, and I can tell you, you need it. In Germany we do have the Bundeswehr Academy, that is above

universities, in France you have Ecole Nationale Administration, in Great Britain you have, for example, the Royal College of Defence Studies, and other institutions, and I think that this in a certain way as a compliment to universities is lacking in BiH. And my idea would be to incorporate from the very beginning the faculties, and both are sitting here next to me in this kind of work, and to engage their professors, and their academics' activities too.

I do not want to over-stretch my time, because I have handed over to Mrs. Turkovic a more detail paper and there are some slides available, which could provide in more depth information to you and to place forward this kind of proposal in order you think about the need, in order to make for this kind of workshop afterwards a concrete flowing activity, because I believe and we have heard this morning a lot on the political side, lot of discussions and proposals, and from that point of view I thought it would be time to place this kind of proposal forward.

I would like now to hand over to my two colleagues, because I know one of them from earlier working here in Sarajevo, and I am grateful to have met Professor Vejnovic, from Banja Luka too, because I believe without taking anything from them away, what they can tell you is that in reality below the top political floor, very much is ongoing in BiH, and having said this I would like to end my first part and I would like to hand over first to Professor Vejnovic, to give us some remarks about his ideas, and what is happening in Banja Luka.

**Dr. Dusko Vejnovic, Director**  
*Centre for Geo-Strategic Research, University of Banja Luka*

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It is a pleasure for me to greet you in the name of the Centre for Geo-Strategic Research of the University of Banja Luka. In the university there are thirteen faculties in which study around fourteen thousand students. Also, I would like to greet you in the name of the non-governmental organisation that is engaged in defence studies, of which I have been the Director for six years. Defence studies is the science concerning protection, security and defence.

My presentation is comprised of two parts. In the first part I shall point out some hypotheses concerning democratic control, especially parliamentary control of the state organs of coercion, consequently the military and police, and certainly the security services - depending on which part and how they are called. In the second part I shall demonstrate to you the education of defence studies - education according to the issues of protection, security and defence - and how we execute that in our framework and attempt to innovate this with academic themes, to consequently present defence studies as the science of protection, security and defence. We would probably be happier if the theory concerning the explanation of this subject, as that what it is, could provide a larger contribution for the advancement of practice. However, in an academic sense, we attempt in measures that we know to explain that practice, to educate on the basis of fact (with arguments), to the choice and with the selection of results, and to realise that knowledge in every day life. There has been many statements concerning the functioning and non-functioning of the legislative and executive authorities, whether this concerns entity level or state level. Eternally it is stressed, in the objective and sense of democracy, that it is necessary to secure the political, especially the parliamentary, control of those organs: consequently, the military, police and security services.

Models of democratic control, especially of parliamentary control, then the need for the professionalisation and depoliticisation of the military, police and security services, their reorganisation now, for the conditions of BiH, is possible only if the reorganisation is structurally, organisationally and functionally executed from top to bottom in its components. This is connected to a number of problems. To execute the reorganisation of these three components: the military, the police and security services in itself contain, at first hand, political, economic and social aspects. It is difficult to separate these components and to state which one is more important. We can place them all on an equal standing.

The problems in this field are large, and the reasons are numerous and fall into the following categories: social, national, historical, history of the war, cultural science of contemporary times, Euro-Atlantic developments, international standards, and the existence or non-existence of human rights and freedoms. I would now like to engage in the recommendation that many of us should remain without work and that we should speak in real terms in entity parliaments and in the state-level parliament as to how we shall alter and how we shall execute demobilisation in the police, military and security services, as we know on which bases we employed them before. As a person engaged in theoretical approaches, I shall say that most of them were employed on the basis of political factors and we have to be conscious that the consequences are large. The way out from this has to be found in economic development, prosperity, fitting into contemporary developments, and in the necessity to secure social security for all citizens irrespective of race, religion or nationality.

In order to avoid manipulation according to the issues of the state organs of coercion, consequently the military and police, and according to the issues of the security services

through history it is known that their functions were priorities in the following triad: 1) to defend the state insofar as it is constituted, and BiH in theory is still not constituted as a state according to all international criteria, although I am not a lawyer; 2) to establish legal functioning in which internal order and peace shall be maintained and protected; 3) to establish a cultural function that shall realise the engagements of the state to advance material and spiritual culture generally.

The aim of the control of the armed forces, police, and security services should be to enable the corresponding legal organs of the state, on one side, to secure their efficiency in practice, and on the other side, that we are able to measure their efficiency according to results and not according to programmatic orientation and not according to the law how they are constituted. When there would be those results in practice, then we would speak less concerning organised crime, corruption, 'white collar' crime, and all other sources and forms of threats.

The relation of the executor of civilian functions towards the armed forces, police and security services, certainly needs to be based on the respect of their professional honour, the expert leadership of that professionalism, internal autonomy, and the political neutrality of the police, military and security services - consequently, professionalisation, depoliticisation, 'deideologicalisation'.

I have not stated any new political principles that would be unknown to you, but I am not sure that it goes like this in practice and as to whether I have convinced you. Now I would like to engage in a political evaluation that these three components, in all choices, shall play a large role in the forming of choices and their results, because they have an established technology of their work, and it is not a secret to you that all services in all the states of the world have a methodology of lasting work: secret, partly secret, and legal. In an academic sense these three views are sufficient to define concepts and conceptually analyse and it is clear to you then when you, according to the objectives, select each category. Mainly we know that all that was conducted secretly is considered undemocratic, and that survived in autocratic tyrannical regimes and similar. As to whether we have that today and in which merit, I shall not go into. Those of you that have the instruments to execute civilian control should be engaged in this, or those alongside you together in parliament, or experts that know and have the instruments to conduct investigation and control, to increase institutional validity, consequently academic material with facts and to state what is and what is not in that area.

A professional soldier, professional police officer and professional member of the security services, especially the security services, should, in the first place, be motivated by ethics. He is obligated to use his capabilities and knowledge for the protection, security and defence of the state, exclusively according to the direction of the legal state organs of authority. Consequently, the legislative functions of authority, Parliament, executive functions - I am thinking of the executive, especially the Government - military, police and security service functionaries, need to be representative and to give tasks for state objectives in the interest of the protection, security and defence of the state. I am not quite sure if I know all of those state objectives, those that concern the territory of BiH, and I usually give the comment that I do not know this, but I am appalled daily with all those that explain that they know all of this and I listen to them in different forms of the media and similar.

The control of the military-police and security forces needs to be external and internal. External control, in the form in which I pointed out, needs to be established and executed by the legislature and executive, as well as the judiciary. In this should be given the all the more

emphasised role of public opinion, consequently the means of informing and information. In democratic systems the activities of all state organs should be exhibited in the courts and public. The military, police and security services do not have the need to be excluded from the public, because that is also not in their use, but I think that it would be in their use that their activities would be public in sufficient merit, at least in this segment in which I am familiar with these activities. Internal control of the military, police and security services needs to be based on the values and norms of these members, such as social, political and moral values that are derived from the democratic constitution and adopted by the members of these state organs of coercion. If conceived and conceptualised civilian control is conducted consistently, then these components become compatible with the democratic order and with a planned, modern and legal state. Certainly, the role of training and education, in this field, comparably is important for the members of the military, police and security services, and in the same manner the education of citizens on a wider basis is also necessary.

With the large contribution of the international police in this region, in good measure, the maximum education of members, especially of ministries, was executed. However, the executed education of the citizens for the mutual understanding between the police, citizens and public is still not sufficient, for the strengthening of the consciousness of one and another, mutual co-operation, and in different directions that one and another would more effectively participate and co-operate in the exposure, fight and elimination of all sources and forms of threats to the state.

Now I shall say to you, after our colleague from Germany pointed out the idea of a political academy in Bosnia and Herzegovina, that the maximum political education is needed also in the state organs of coercion, but not political education that leads to indoctrination and insensibility, in the manner that is executed in autocratic and undemocratic regimes. Political education is also necessary for the military, police and security services in order to exclude the possibilities of disagreement and misunderstanding. This does not refer to political tuition or indoctrination; rather it refers to state and citizen education and information. Certainly it is needed, which is clear to us and in practice we adopt and in the measure we apply, that political work and activities are not in the internal organisational formation of activities. From the side of the members of the military, police and security services at the highest level of organisation, how can such complex, state and internationally important tasks be executed if a person does not understand the concepts and processes? Consequently, somebody must participate in their political education of understanding, both national and international policies, which are policies that are in the interest of the collective security of all. Political education, certainly, should not only be informing the members of the military, police and security services, rather it should encourage that they actively act against racism, nationalism and extremism, stressing the importance of their organisations, formations and all other structures. When I speak about political education I am not thinking of the classic themes and Marxist concepts, but without conception and ideas there are no objectives. I, as well as the majority and those present here today, support the idea that through this education we can combat every attempted racism, nationalism, extremism and other adversities that were, historically considered, from ancient times to today concurrent concepts in world relations, as well as in this region.

The other part of my speech is connected to the programmatic activities of education concerning these issues. We, as you know, frequently meet each other and I do not want to repeat myself too much, that these security components are united in the academic discipline that is called defence studies, a sociological-philosophical view on the protection, security and

defence function of the state. We give priority to the emphasis of education in the following themes: societal aspects of the defence studies of specific states, political, social, national, geographic, strategic, geostrategic, geopolitical and others that I have not specified. Subsequently, then causal relations, the causal-consecutive relations of the functioning and non-functioning of the societal system and its protection, security and defence. Then, a triad that is reflected in the position, function and organisation of the protection, security and defence of a specific state, and also BiH. For which in the first part we intensified the consideration of the aspect of international security and the security of the state generally in that educational principle, always with the reality in our state, consequently in BiH, in the manner that is conceptualised in the BiH Constitution. Then, from that part towards education in the work with students, with non-governmental organisations, with the wider population, we research the security threats of the modern state and social values generally, which endanger general security and public order, and the determinants of those social values, in the first place moral, religious, ideological and legal. Then, the connectivity of social and security phenomenon, their interconnectivity and research of one and another although these services according to their own professions engage in the problems of these issues with those that disturb the constitutional order. Then, we investigate the sources and forms of threats to the security of the modern state, whether that concerns the wider spectrum of social sources of threats, future natural and technological sources of threats that are reality from a general global viewpoint, and in the same manner on the territory of our communities. Then, we investigate in a general sense the forms of threats to the security of the modern state, with priority on aggression, armed intervention, armed oppression, rebellious-subversive activities, and similar. Then, armed forms of threats to the modern legal state, political, economic and military oppression, intelligence activities, subversion, psychological propaganda activities, and criminality and its apparent forms such as violence, economic crime, traffic delinquency, political criminality, juvenile delinquency, organised crime, corruption, 'white collar' crime and recidivism. Certainly, we investigate also all segments that provide a negative reflection for the disturbance of public order and peace, which is a general need for every citizen. Consequently, those worries should be paid attention to and valued at a higher level, but also practically conveyed. When we investigate, for example, this situation and consideration, eventually what a person, ontologically considering, can meet in those adversities, and then also the community and state, then we consider those functions to see how far they function or not, and we consider them in more aspects, as social functions, as functions of the political system and combined as socio-political functions. And then, certainly, methodologically correct factors are considered that influence the variability of protection, security and defence functions in a specific state.

Some of those factors would be the following: the character of societal and state organisation, general political relations in society, the level of development of state apparatus and other capacities for the management of public affairs, differentiation of administrative apparatus, administrative traditions, conception in societal order, law, moral and criminal law, the level of democratisation and humanisation of authorities in society, characteristics of social structures, regional specific circumstances, co-operation in the region and environment, the influence of the surroundings on vital functions. Then, we consider the basic contents of the functions of protection, security and defence of the modern state. Precisely here I am speaking of a modern state, consequently, the planned, ideal type that it should be. I am not, again, speaking in favour, in a theoretical sense, of idealism after philosophers daily state, "perfection that carries specific ideas is nothing other than a fault of the same idea".



I shall summarise some factors. We consider also which of those functions the state should execute in its legislature and executive, in the general interest of the citizens without consideration of race, religion, nationality, political affiliation, and similar. The first would be the protection of sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity. The second, the protection of human rights and freedoms. The third, the protection of public order. The fourth, the protection of personal and property security with emphasis on the prevention and fight against criminality, especially, organised crime, corruption and 'white collar' crime to lessen the criminality of the governing structures. Then, the maintenance of public order and peace, ecological issues, the protection of living effects and similar. And finally, the fourth component which can be looked upon in a number of manners: socio-philosophically, legally or any other considerations in this triad; consequently, the position, function and organisation that is the organisation of the security of a modern state. You are aware of this more than I as people on an expert and practical level that engage in the law, that an efficient state organisation is the strongest condition for a stable state. Then, we comparatively investigate the consideration of the systems of security of foreign states, their many-sided components with the aim that comparatively looking some of those models could be adapted to our conditions, specific circumstances and similar. We consider the newest achieved characteristics of the system of security of the most developed states in the world that are completely professional and after democratic elections do not tolerate radical shocks and changes, rather they are simply state affairs that have their own technological functioning, and in politics it manages with this, co-ordinates and, normally, in this civil control secures all mechanisms of control in order that they would not be ill-used. In the interest of a collective system of security of all, and then also citizens as individuals for recommendations that should be in these functions and aims as in all other places. We also consider the role of the state organs of administration and the manner in which they strengthen the inspection services, organs of justice, and remaining social actors. The role of the education system is also important as education is of the utmost importance in all of this. The role of non-governmental organisations is also of exceptional importance. The co-ordination of all subjects in noble objectives should be to give a contribution to raise, in BiH and the region, the level of political culture towards a political culture of participation. With arguments, I maintain that on the territory of BiH there is still present a subjective and parochial political culture, and not participatory. There needs to be a larger contribution to ethnic confidence, and to strengthening culture, dialogue and tolerance. Science together needs to give its contribution in measures that it is able, this also applies to the media and politics, that we rise above the language of hatred that is still present in this region that finds a place in specific groups and forces. The maximum needs to be invested and we have moral obligations towards the future that we fight all elements of the manipulation of citizens, nations, peoples, religions, beliefs, religious objects and all other things that serve for dishonourable objectives. Often we are witnesses that all that I have previously mentioned, many times specific circles and groups place and use in the aim of the classic fight for authority, for a position, for a position that belongs with status and belongs in a socio-economic formation of feudalism, we know that in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century. Without political action, my modest contribution of academic, professional, political and normal messages would remain abstract and unused.

Thank you very much. I would like to thank the CSS and I wish them much success and that we further co-operate in the measures that we have until now co-operated in.

**Dr. Izet Beridan, Professor,**  
*Faculty of Political Science, University of Sarajevo*

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I would like to greet you in the name of the University of Sarajevo, the Faculty of Political Science in Sarajevo, the Department of Security, and myself. I would like to thank my colleague, Bisera Turkovic, for the opportunity to be able to speak shortly concerning the education plans and programmes of Security Studies at the Faculty of Political Science. I shall limit my speech today to this theme. I shall begin with an anecdote that I found whilst scratching around in many papers.

A long time ago, before 2,500 years, Sun Tsu, an old Chinese theorist, wrote in his memoirs how he was chosen as Commander of the Chinese army. The Chinese Emperor was without a Commander, then he requested that they question a number of men, one of which would be chosen as the Commander of the army. When it came to the turn of Sun Tsu, the Emperor asked him, "Young man, how do I know that you will be able to command the army well?", Sun Tsu replied, "Your Excellency, give me two hundred young women, leave them with me for fifteen days and in fifteen days you shall have two hundred female soldiers. That the ladies do not feel offended, I shall not make soldiers from men, rather from women, and in fifteen days you shall have two hundred soldiers." The Emperor gave him that chance and watched the whole process from his balcony. Sun Tsu took two hundred young women and said to them, "Each time I shall repeat each military action for a couple of times, when I ask if you understood, upon my command you shall attempt to execute that action." After a specific period of time he requested that the action was repeated, some young women laughed, then he sharply stated that they have to listen to his orders. From his balcony the Emperor intervened and said, "Young man, be careful, those are ladies from the Royal Court." Sun Tsu said, "Your Excellency, do not mix in my affairs". And of course after fifteen days he gave to the Emperor not 200 but 197 female soldiers. With this anecdote, in one part, I would like to point out the importance of the theme that we are discussing today - civilian control of the armed forces. Consequently, before 2500 years ago the place of the Emperor and the Commander of the army was known, and it was also known in which jobs somebody could mix with their competencies.

Again, this works as an introduction, a part of my professional consideration concerning some things. I am animated by the debate in the framework of the first session. I shall misuse my current position to express some specific thoughts. In thinking about the current situation in BiH, from a military viewpoint, listening to some initiatives that came from the end of the war in 1995, even until today, and also initiatives concerning the demilitarisation of BiH to the current ideas concerning that at the state level should be formed a united army, I shall say the following: completely responsibly, and I am not politically engaged, I maintain that BiH cannot be demilitarised. If under the concept of demilitarisation we imply the abolition of official military structures, then that decision could be adopted by the High Representative, Parliamentary Assembly, or some other level. If we disband the current armies, disarm them, destroy the weapons, conduct all that what is available, I maintain to you that within three months we would have three, four, five or six new paramilitary formations of an ethnic or multiethnic type. Consequently, that idea is an idea concerning that which I do not like to begin to speak except when I must. Two possibilities remain for us: that it contains the current position or, eventually, some decisions concerning something that shall raise the current situation.

Both things that I have stated are an introduction, indicating the necessity of security studies in BiH, and in that view the Faculty of Political Science last year, alongside the large

engagement of the international community, established its education plan and programme of the Department of Security. That programme was adopted by the university in September last year, and this year we enrolled a group of students on the basis of this new education plan and programme. With this opportunity I shall thank the Geneva Centre for Security Policy. We requested from them professional suggestions in that prospective, and we sent to them suggestions of our education plans and programmes for professional examination. We received very competent suggestions and some of these were built into that plan and programme. My young colleagues shall distribute some plans in English and Bosnian, and I would ask that you would seriously consider them. We are ready for all observations that we are in a position to consider. The education plans and programmes are factors that can be modified every academic year. This education plan and programme is conceptualised on four years of study as a department of the Faculty of Political Science, with thirteen common subjects with the remaining departments of the faculty, in which we have: sociology, political science, journalism, social work, and security. Consequently, the first twelve to thirteen subjects are joint. The other group of subjects are of a theoretical nature, and the third group are subjects that theoretically and practically enters into many aspects of security. I have to say to you that this program is very difficult to create, for that reason for us it was an aim, really, to encompass the majority of the aspects of security: military, police and legal aspects. In the second year, you see, we have the subject of democracy and human rights. Then, civil protection, security and peace studies, war studies, all to one, I would say, an interdisciplinary or, even, a natural subject from the field of natural science - ecology. This is a study with around nine and more subjects in every year. Most probably students are too burdened, but I hope that after four years they shall receive knowledge and be in a position to respond to some tasks that would be before them. You know, I have engaged in the thoughts that the Federation of BiH and the state in its entirety, at this moment, would need around fifty to one hundred experts, young experts that are engaged in issues of security, generally also according to fields, but when I heard today's speeches then I extended that figure and much more. I hope that my young colleagues, which sit on my left and right sides and many others that finished their studies shall have work, shall contribute to this social community, but in the same manner I must be critical, and some people will not understand me personally in the view of the state, cantonal, all down to district organs, that today concerning issues of security there is very little talk, and at the least requires experts that shall suggest specific things from a professional point of view.

Let somebody correct me if I am wrong, in the last year the Army of the Federation of BiH, and even the Army of the RS, engaged in issues relating to their downsizing. I have the feeling that those decisions were taken *ad hoc* over night, dependent upon somebody sitting with somebody else. These are things that are conducted in serious states through projects, where a specific number of experts are paid to make an entire feasibility study, because for serious states these are things that must be considered with every aspect, with economic and social aspects, etc. I have to say that I screw up my eyes when I read in newspapers the manner in which is executed the downsizing of military structures in the FBiH and Republika Srpska, and then guess is that 10,000 KM and when that 10,000 KM shall be given as a compensation for those that voluntarily left the army. I would like to see the project, at least a few pages, in which it shall be stated what shall be done further with the military, in one, two, three phases, or all at once. How to enable the maximum capabilities of those armies in a year? What kind is the content of the personnel in terms of professional, age, education and other structures? With this I only want once more to emphasise youth, which shall be engaged in the affairs of security, and it should not be in a small way.

I shall mention three more facts that in a positive or negative sense come alongside with security studies. We are very disposed, at the Faculty of Political Science, towards international co-operation in view of the academic exchange of personnel, literature, information, but high education in the whole of Bosnia and Herzegovina, even also in Sarajevo, although perhaps in Sarajevo the least, social activities are limited by material factors, but then with every citizen. We would gladly bring people from abroad, from London, Geneva, Hamburg, Moscow, here for seven days, to see Sarajevo, to hold a few lectures and to highlight the experiences from those countries. We are not in the position to pay for even these people's travel. In the same manner we are limited in the possibilities of research and, of course, publishing activities. In this plan and programme there is foreign languages. We, at the department, had planned that foreign languages would be for four years and would be English, and then the Faculty administration said to us, "Do not have such a long period because we need to find a professor who shall teach English for four years and to pay them; reduce that to two years".

That was, in short, what I wanted to say to you about the Department for Security and the education plan and programme, especially the plan that has been put before you. I, as Head of Department, shall take note of all future suggestions and observations. Those of you that have the opportunity deliver to us any observations, suggestions, in a positive sense, send them to the Faculty of Political Science in Sarajevo. Thank you for your attention.

## **SECOND SESSION DISCUSSION PERIOD**

**Mr. Ibrahim Spahic, Representative**  
*Parliamentary Assembly of Bosnia and Herzegovina*

Above all I would like to thank everybody for some excellent presentations. I would like to suggest two things to the General from the Clausewitz centre: firstly, that you form in co-operation with the universities in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the so-called post-diploma, specialist studies for the beginning, which would create the conditions for a new BiH Political Academy. If these institutions could be quickly constituted with its work, then it would be good to make effective communication between a number of different faculties - law, economics, political science, criminal sciences - that would be in the position to organise this type of post-graduate studies in co-operation with your institute and with other institutes that are interested.

Secondly, the BiH Law on Education is in its stage of drafting. That draft Law is one of the elements of the standardisation of the education process at the state level. I would like that your academy in parallel with the adoption of this law obtains also its own legislation and in that manner, that which is your intention, to gradually transfer this institution to the state level, would not be a process, rather I would say, it would be something that constitutes a serious academic institution at the state level.

In BiH, in this moment, the adoption of various laws concerning the reorganisation of universities is in process. When you look at the number of universities and the number of subjects that are engaged in the problems that would be treated in your academy, the education programmes, the professors that lecture and students that study, then for a country of 3,5 million people that represents a too large number of institutions, on one side. On the other side, the actual reform of universities, for example in Sarajevo, is completely in contradiction with the basic principle of the autonomy of the universities, human rights and freedoms, as that what it is in the majority of universities in BiH.

I would like to say, for example, for the modern study of security in Europe in your programme Mr. Izet it would be logical that under point 10 you learn three foreign languages in four years, and that one of Bosnian, Croatian or Serbian is learnt. On those three it would be understood, if we would know English, German or French then it would be easier to understand the standards of the European Union. But if you would know or only learn Bosnian, Croatian or Serbian and one foreign language you shall not be at the beginning of European standards because in Europe a third language is introduced and naturally that about which you speak, the mother-tongue. Here is completely inverse logic, which you very well registered, in connection with the material possibilities of your faculty.

Secondly, if in your programme you do not have Modern European History in the education programme, then it is in question as to how we shall understand the processes that already follow for BiH. The European Union police are coming here, Europe constitutes the military and it already has this example in Kosovo. Europe considers a common security structure in the framework of the future. It thinks ten to fifty years ahead. We cannot have a programme that shall be under the different requirements of the future and place of the BiH in that area.

At the end, I think that it is very useful that you have started this programme and I believe that you shall be a very good partner in this BiH Political Academy as well as Mr. Vejnovic who spoke in the name of the University of Banja Luka.

At the end I would like us to hear from Professor Beridan how much according to your evaluation today students in BiH at different levels of university are gathered in these faculties that consider similar subject matter as you do. Do you have in mind the possibilities concerning that which the academy states, that BiH obtains its own academy, consequently that BiH obtains its own state institution similar to that which is administrated in France or in other places? I am very happy that the German institute decided together with Mr. Busek and Mr. Ashdown to install this type of system of education and I hope that it shall be sufficiently attended.

**Mr. Kemal Begovic, Representative**

*Parliamentary Assembly of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina*

I shall be very short. I would like to pose only one question for Professor Vejnovic, Professor Beridan as they are professors from two centres, respectively from two entities. Does there exist the possibility that the Centre for Geo-Strategic Research and the Department for Security at the Faculty of Political Science would make a joint plan and programme of education for citizens in the space of BiH and that this would be the future basis of that academy about which you speak Sir, a BiH Political Academy? If that is possible, and I consider that it is, that would be very significant and would show what we want. Thank you.

**Mr. Mehmed Zilic, Representative**

*Parliamentary Assembly of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina*

The theme is so interesting that I am not able to stop myself posing some questions and to give my thoughts, because I sometimes have the feeling that people objectively are not familiar enough with this material, not those that sit here, rather the majority of the people, the voters, to those that we should answer on the following question: for all of that what we are speaking about we have a solution in the BiH Constitution, and now I shall confirm some facts. I am a person that has contributed in the demobilisation of 40,000 police officers four years ago. Currently in BiH we now have somewhere around 60,000 uniformed persons, over 5,000 people in the security services or security in the state, in which we have around 600,000 unemployed persons to a population of 4,000,000. Take a look, what are these relations and what does this research mean when it comes into question the education and supplying of new personnel that should take the state towards new democratic principles. This especially when it is the case that the BiH cannot in future be a state without them. I hope that BiH shall have a professional, joint army, which shall objectively serve in peacekeeping missions. It should be investigated what is the necessary number. I know that very strong police forces are necessary to correspond to all of the complicated issues in a state like BiH. Again I would like to mention that BiH only in customs and excises losses a complete investment programme on which the state could survive if someone were to help solve this issue. Keep in mind, the experiences of democratic, national states are difficult to apply immediately, as sometimes the West applies to us, in our situation. I consider that the creation of this type of centre in the faculty departments is a solution for the education of personnel that can transfer the State of BiH towards new democratic principles. The change of the constitutional programme is necessary, and above all, change in the complete thinking in the heads of the people. That can be achieved if we concretely respond to the citizens for all that we are losing and have lost for these four years. I am sometimes sure that even also with the international forces that are

installed in BiH it is not possible to come to these large changes. I shall perhaps outline some economic indicators. Bear in mind that objectively we have in Europe the best field for military training, there is no better in Europe. Furthermore, we have forces from thirty-six countries installed here, which are executing the peacekeeping mission, and in unison they train their forces. All of this should be placed in a programme of prosperity when the import of goods is in question, and I am not saying when these forces are in question how they should protect this. I say that we have to find arguments, and only academia can respond to that.

**Dr. Izet Beridan, Professor**

*Faculty of Political Science, University of Sarajevo*

Thank you very much. When we are speaking about demilitarisation I use the opportunity to be explicit and rigorous. This state is threatened by civil war. The situation of peace in this state depends only on two basis: the presence of the foreign military and balance of power. I could talk about this more, but I hope that we understood one another. Due to this I would call upon all those present here, and if they are in the position, to influence the decisions that the situation of the military factor in BiH strongly changes so that we would not be in fear from civil war. I hope that you shall not misunderstand me here. I would agree with the answers from my colleague Dr. Vejnovic, and it is the case that there exists some forms of co-operation between Banja Luka and Sarajevo in this point; although, they are not the same level or levels of investigation, especially relations. The Faculty is educational, and the Centre is a research institute. However, I would agree with the other parts of the answers that the economy determines much of this.

### **Unknown participant**

Professor Beridan, I ask you for an explanation so that things would be clearer for us. If I heard you correctly, you said that this country is threatened by civil war. Is that your view, is that the conclusion of some academic research, or is that somebody else's view? It is not clear to me.

The second question, I would like that something is made clearer to me regarding this BiH Political Academy. I would return to the beginning, to the exceptional, brilliant sentence of Professor Mirjanic when he stated that there should be always the leading of accounts when regularly sending messages to whom these should be sent. I think that is the basis of everything.

The third item, Mr. Zilic knows very well how much time and effort was spent in the endeavours to form an academy. And, whoever has had some engages in military issues knows that in BiH there is no institution established that would educate military personnel. Thank you, and please answer my first question.

**Dr. Izet Beridan, Professor**

*Faculty of Political Science, University of Sarajevo*

I hope that you were present during the first part of my presentation when I stated that I shall say some parts from my professional consideration, independent from politics. These are only my words, that this state is threatened by civil war. In every state in which exists three armies if you do not secure the conditions that they cannot come into conflict they shall indeed do that. In this state that depends upon two factors: the presence of foreign military forces and the balance of power in which three military structures are situated. If by chance some foreign factors would leave this state before time, while relations are not a little better ordered, and that Europe would engage more with itself, but then the remaining elements of the foreign military factor would also go, we can only shrug our shoulders. If you think otherwise I would like to hear your opinion.

### **General Bernd Papenkort**

*Clausewitz Centrum, Führungsakademie Der Bundeswehr*

I would like to make a proposal, because what I propose is that on this kind of issue you can continue to discuss with Professor Beridan, but I would like to summarise because if you look we are a little bit out of time, and give me an opportunity to say to you three points. My first point is I think that it is time, and it is a chance for you, to bring your house to order, and when I say to bring your house, it is a difference to what the international community told you in 1995 and 1996, because I was a member of the international community at the early beginning too, and I know that we came in and said that you have to do this and that, and now the situation has changed, and that offers you a great opportunity.

I believe listening to you today was good for me, because the discussions in the morning that were more related to political issues in a certain way showed too that you take your leadership into your own hands, because the questions as to what kind of army, what is the purpose of the army, and how many forces do we need to have, must be discussed by the political side on your side. You should not leave your military alone, because that is my experience from the first time that you left your military alone. These issues are pure politics, because the question what kind of army do we have in the country must be decided on the political side. And do not complain, because if I look from the point of view of my country, and you need to look a little bit over the horizon into other countries, and the same applies to France, to the UK, we in a certain way do have a fixed society, and the changes in a fixed society are not easy to do either. We are faced with challenges too. From that point of view, even with your great problems, with the support, for example from OHR, and there are new directions in it and from other international organisations, take it and do it, because I am convinced that on the international side everybody is happy when you really take your own leadership. You should be aware that all countries around you have started to do it, so please BiH try it.

My second point is, and I am now focusing on the topic here, with the role of Academy, if you look outside then a lot of ongoing things are on the security policy side. My country, and I take only one example, in which I have to redirect my teaching and training of people, and there are key elements like weapons of mass destruction, there are key elements like the terrorist attacks that happened in New York, and it can happen in Berlin, or London tomorrow too. We are engaged in Afghanistan in fighting wars not only on the international policing inside, and from that point you should be aware that the whole security environment around BiH is a totally different one. It is high time that you start training your own people, because you have to connect sooner or later. As a Member of the PfP, do you believe that Mongolia is interested to look towards your problems, or do you believe that, for example, Russia has any



keen interest to listen to what problems you face here. You must have the capability to connect in order to co-operate, and that needs and requires a certain knowledge. I can tell you that I am really fascinated by both of my partners who are sitting here, because what they have done, and I come now to point three, is that in reality they have provided a foundation.

Consequently, my third point is, what I purpose, and it means for me only to take the links and to link it in reality and to provide a concept on a very quick basis, because a lot of good work was done here in Banja Luka, and is done in Sarajevo, to go forward with this kind of idea as the Academy for Politics, which would be at a senior level. In reality what I am looking for and I can tell you only what I do is the training of members of Parliament, of diplomats, and of assistants for example in doing government business, and from that point of view my proposal in number three is that we use the Centre for Security Studies as a focal point to co-ordinate, and I am ready to invite, for example, a group to come to me and we make a first proposal. Because I know, and you have two contact points on the information sheet, that a lot, looking for facilities was done. There are two ideas on the table, one is to use, for example, the houses on the university campus, another one was looking for Ilidza's Hotel Terma Bosna, to create and to use these kind of facilities, so the ideas are on the table and we could provide the first step. I would like to use my both colleagues here in order to move forward.

This is the end of my section here, as far as I understood. I would like to thank you for your participation, for the questions you have provided for me, and I propose that you continue with these different discussions, and I would like to hand over now to the next chairman who takes over section four. Thank you very much.

**SESSION III**  
**THE ROLE OF THE MEDIA**

**Mr. Antonio Prlenda, Oslobodenje**

**Mr. Radomir Neskovic, Radio Television Republika Srpska**

**Mr. Nerzuk Curak, BiH Dani Magazine**

**Mr. Antonio Prlenda, Journalist**  
*Daily Newspaper "Oslobodenje"*

I enjoyed listening to Professor Beridan's story about the great Chinese thinker Sun Tsu and something consequently came to mind. In that period when he made a unit from 197 girls, if at that time there had been a developed media in the form that we have today, I doubt that somebody would have allowed him to train some military unit, and we all know the great inheritance that he left according to the study of defence and the armed forces.

We are the media so important? We can say today in relation to the time of the JNA. Today, at least in theory, we have the situation that when we consider the issues of security and defence debate in parliament that the issues are in theory open - more parties talk about this and with this we can be satisfied. But can we be satisfied with this in consideration of how this practically occurs? I believe that we shall see a part of that during the next speech. Namely, the work in parliament can only be successful if exists, besides the pressure also of the public ideas of academics, pressure and public opinion on that parliament. In my opinion, public opinion regarding these themes depends upon the media; and in this manner not from their expertise, rather from the most usual everyday media that the general citizen can encounter. This is because only if we seriously meet with some of these issues of defence from the general media can some public opinion be formed that would be able to execute some pressure and influence on parliament that there they make some decisions efficiently and effectively concerning some issues of defence that would result with some decisions that would influence the armed forces.

Today I am pleased to be able to chair this session, in which shall speak the Director of Radio Television Republika Srpska, Mr. Radomir Neskovic, and Mr. Nerzuk Curak from the magazine 'BiH Dani'. I would now like to give Mr. Neskovic the floor. Thank you.

**Mr. Radomir Neskovic, Director**  
*Radio Television Republika Srpska*

Thank you. I shall endeavour to take a smaller amount of time. This military subject matter of the control of the armed forces is extremely difficult and I think that the media in Bosnia and Herzegovina, especially the electronic media, at the current moment, are not adequately prepared to consider this subject. The level to which the media goes is information and informative programmes, following events, etc, but this subject in the media still does not extend to themes with some special programmes where these programmes would be produced in a more precise and concise manner. The formulation of the theme "The Role of the Media in the Control of the Armed Forces" is not the best, I think that the point should be more concerning the roles and obligations of the media in informing the public about the place and roles of the armed forces in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the processes of the Partnership for Peace.

The process of the PfP is an overused theme. In our public it is not known what that concretely means, what that is, what would be achieved with that, what would be lost with that, what would change, would anything change, would there be changes at an entity level, at a state level, etc. In this manner it is necessary that the media, especially the television, according to this issue, would approach this theme with special programmes in the sense to explain exactly what this issue concerns. All these moves about which we are speaking today, one option, two options, all that could be done, shall have a counter-effect to public opinion if public opinion in an adequate manner would not be prepared and familiar with these things.

The media have a dual role; on one side they report what are events, conditions are indicators in society; on the other side they are also a factor that influence public opinion. I think that their second role, when we consider this subject, for now has not been forthcoming. I sincerely say to you that this media subject is so complicated that it is very difficult to approach. Every aspect of the problems, if you take them, is contradictory and for the media insurmountable. If we speak critically concerning the armed forces then we sink into a closed space, because in public opinion the thinking prevails that, in reality, only the army has the furthest set off in the implementation of the Dayton Peace Agreement, only that structure over time and has normally implemented that and all remaining structures of society fall behind. How should we speak to the people regarding control over the armed forces in a country that cannot establish control over customs, executive authority, over executive authorities at lower levels, nor over any other institution of executive authority. If you cannot have Parliament in control of customs, how shall you have control over the armed forces or control over the security services. In that manner it is difficult for the media to consider this subject.

The other thing that is very important is that it is difficult for the media to determine from which value system they should start, what to consider, etc. If you start from the point where the state character of the armies are considered, then it is said the army of BiH, the army of the Federation of BiH, the army of the entities and if you take that approach regarding that in order to emphasise the state character, then the media are in danger to consider that issue from only one side, separately, incompletely and inadequately. The media in this issue can start with aspects of the realisation of human rights and with aspects of some principles that are generally adopted in Europe. If you start in that problem with aspects of human rights then you shall establish the right of people not to go into the army, the right of civilian serving of military service, and already that has begun in the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina; insofar as I have been informed, some actions have already been commenced regarding this. Then you shall establish voluntary service, about which Mrs. Vlachova spoke, the voluntary right of military service, or to not go into the army, or for those that do not want to serve do

not have to go into the army: rather that this would be on a voluntary basis, a professional basis or that they do not have to carry weapons.

If that is approached from the perspective of human rights then that looks completely different than if approached with aspects of the state, state military, etc. Only the situation in practice is changed. The role of the army, and one or another component, now and before five to six years has radically changed. Today it is now spoken regarding the adoption of standards on the basis of which the armed forces would become an integral element of the PfP, and in the future NATO. The downsizing of the army, training, education, budget transparency, legislative control of the armed forces is now spoken about. Consequently, those are questions today that are at the top. Nobody any more speaks concerning certain armies, moves, plans, the defence of borders from neighbouring states, from enemies, etc. So that in a specific manner some military resistance that earlier dominated is now overcome. Now there exists something else. Now in order for the media to follow this subject matter they must increase their size, not only at a state level, but they must somehow increase at the level of the whole region in order to have synchronisation, in the sense of an identical approach to this problem, with consideration that the PfP and those integration processes simply in the region are occurring or not occurring. It is not possible in only one country to realise the European process, and in neighbouring countries that this would not take place. Insofar as I understand things, that shall proceed in parallel across the entire region.

The second significant factor, which the media considers with difficulty, is if you start from some political platforms, there is no governing policy, no common credible governing system, and no common ideology.

The next problem for the media is how to consider this subject matter, especially entry into those integration processes. Should, for example, the entry of BiH into European frameworks, entry into the PfP, be treated that now BiH, with all the problems that it has, would simply join and enter some organisation, and then there with the entry of BiH in that organisation all problems would be resolved. Today we heard that this is not the case, that in this or another manner it requires from BiH, before they enter, to form those European elements, European construction and European values - to place in order and organise the state, and then integration into the European community, and the PfP, would be a matter of routine and a factor of procedure, etc. This means that we ourselves shall build these set European standards, and then to enter into European integration. Regarding this question, really, I cannot say something interesting or clever to you, but this is a good reason at the state level, which means at the level of Radio Television Republika Srpska, Federal Television and the Public Broadcasting System, to very seriously speak about this subject in order to find a common, professional solution. This means to find a modus with which the radio television system of BiH, with its three equal broadcasters, could devote themselves to this issue, in order that all would devote themselves to this issue and there would be an identical manner of considering the PfP and the process towards NATO, in this type of situation, with its current realities, with these kind of political, military and every other realities. In order for this to be accomplished the media would have to be independent; if their personnel, financing, policies / politics would not be independent, then all of this story, as every other story, would fall into the water.

Today we have spoken about ideas, which is very important. When we speak about establishing civilian control over the armed forces, what exactly is that? We have defined that the emphasis is upon parliament. Parliament controls the armed forces through the tool of the

budget, the tool of laws, etc. Consequently, does the media treat this as civilian control over the armed forces, in reality the keeping of the military in its constitutional position; does the army adhere to its constitutional role, which means that the army does not venture from the military sector into the civilian sector and does not come into the position to militarise society - the important factor being that the military is kept in the framework of its constitutional functions.

This is the situation in theory, but what exactly happens in practice? You have the close relations of the components of the army and intelligence services that flow between the military and civilian structures and where the civilian and military structures are increased and that comes to the influence of the military on the civil, much more frequently than comes the influence of the civil on the military. The media does not have any conscious platform, harmonised positions, a constructed starting point from which they would start to consider specific subject matter, rather they consider these issues in the manner that they are able, and with consideration that this is a 'hot' theme, according to the rules, mainly the media skirt around this problem and generally do not consider it except as events - yearly brigades, air displays, meetings of military committees, and some ceremonial parades, etc. In this manner, outside the following of those events the media in essence, when we speak concerning this subject matter, do not engage in this issue, which is on side the avoiding of the obligations of the media. Many things happen in BiH according to this issue and events, and processes oppositely unfold, and the media does not report concerning this, and that it is really the problem that the majority of the media does not how to approach this subject.

It is obvious that programmatic content outside the information space is needed, as a special contents, which in continuity shall more comprehensively, precisely, completely and responsibly consider this subject matter, at least when we are talking of the electronic media with the aim that the public, which means the citizens of BiH, become familiarised with these issues, dilemmas and options that happen around the armed forces and PfP. The reporting of the media is devoted only on the taking of statements from ministers, politicians and generals, and that is not sufficient and is only one-sided. We shall not be able to achieve much with that. The role of the media can be, to some level, to influence public opinion, to create a political opinion. However, in all places in the world political opinion has a range to government, to districts and to national assemblies, etc, rarely does political opinion have a range to military components in the state, and intelligence components. Simply, that is outside the influence, outside that political range; so in that manner the role of the media cannot be in the sense of establishing control, rather the role of the media could be in the sense to inform the public concerning these issues in a full, complete, comprehensive and serious manner, and that would require that all three broadcasters would have common founding principles and starting points that there would not be three television broadcasters with three approaches to this subject. Thank you.

**Mr. Nerzuk Curak, Journalist**  
*Magazine "BH Dani"*

Good day Ladies and Gentleman. The theme "The Relations of Media and Security" is an unusual theme for Bosnia and Herzegovina. It is unusual because it is an unusual state in which we live. I agree with Mr. Vejnovic that in a functional sense BiH is not a state, I refer to it as a "quasi state". In that sense, I think that all that passes from this founding idea also has the attribute of "quasi", because I think that we have a "quasi media" and "quasi security". Consequently, I consider that the problem of the unresolved political-legal status of BiH is a serious problem. In that sense I shall, in the framework of the theme "Media and Security", endeavour through a theoretical application method to say how I see this issue. Please do not resent me because the introduction shall be theoretical, but I think that this has sense in the initial consideration of this subject matter in BiH, for which Mrs. Turkovic and the Centre for Security Studies deserves all congratulations.

Consequently, firstly I would like to point out, beginning from the Gulf War when we directly watched footage of the war through CNN, and with that CNN and other global media networks dissolved the significance of local time-zones. We have all become captives of world time and in that sense the local forms of existence have become less important. So in media discourse the rigid nature of BiH security forms generally is not detected as a problem, local time security is renounced before world time security. What does that mean? That means in our media there is more present talk regarding NATO, talk regarding the Partnership for Peace, talk regarding Euro-Atlantic integration, positive talk, because they became general factors that made possible a collective media approach in BiH that is only a cover for the lack of work that concerns the serious fragmentation of security problems in BiH, in post-Dayton BiH.

Today all relevant political parties are in agreement that they are for Europe and for Euro-Atlantic integration. That immediately leads to the issue of their credibility and without deeper insight into the concrete work of those parties we can say that they are not speaking the truth, because it is impossible that all have the same ideological dispositions. In the same manner this also happens with the media, because the phenomenon of security in the BiH media mainly is interpreted so; consequently, it is placed as the most important that we enter the Partnership for Peace, as a precondition for our entry in NATO and similar. Above all, the media, electronic and printed, in different manners in the presentation of the problems follow the ideological line of policy, which corresponds to their editorial policies. So you have a general environment in which journalists from different ideological areas advocate entry into the PfP and Euro-Atlantic integration. Above all, in whichever manner, internally the media does not formulate the manner of arrival to those wished for security forms and that remains as a problem. When specific political representatives say that their basic task, while they are in power, is to make possible that BiH enters into the PfP, then that as a political position is completely correct. When the media in that manner convey this then that is completely correct, but now when responsible journalists pose questions to those politicians do the politicians know what that means, and when in the analysis of what that means immediately you see that their principle viewpoint is false, and for that there are not any kind of consequences, and that remains as a problem. Consequently, in that sense the media would be able to lead the politicians to the standard of truth.. If you really credibly speak about the necessity of BiH to enter into Euro-Atlantic security organisations then you must establish political, legal and every other kind of framework that implies that. We, unfortunately, live in a false time period, an age of hypocritical politics, what I consider as one of the founding problems in general BiH politics, due to which it disgusts the general public and results in a lack of credibility and belief. Consequently, I see a role for the media that could be in some

manner to create an environment where concerning a pretty closed theme they could break the silence in a new manner and that politicians that irresponsibly make statements are in some manner sanctioned.

If we long for a responsible democratic society, that would imply in an unusual state, like BiH, that those that have the authority sanction politicians that in their public presentations lie, interfere and do not implement that which is in their first strategic framework they think and say. That means that the High Representative, on the track of that which the previous High Representative did, use his authority and to dismiss those kind of people. I know that this is not the kind of talk that the international community likes, because immediately that counters the thesis that this is our country and that we have to do everything, and that the international community is only here as a moderator. However, naturally with this theme I do not agree because this kind of state is a state of the international community, insofar as they would like to admit this or not. This is a state of the international community, this is our domain, but nevertheless it is a state of the international community. In that sense, the authorities need to execute this until the end. I sincerely say, it is strange to me why NATO was prepared to execute some radical moves and to conduct bombing in order to create the security basis for stable peace, and then in the peace phase they are not prepared for some radical moves that would accelerate the joining of BiH to Euro-Atlantic integration. In that sense, the media were in a dilemma as to how to consider this subject matter. You see that the predominant form of the consideration of this subject was a positive and impressionistic approach to these themes, so that NATO invites our journalists that they go on an aircraft carrier and to fly a little in order to feel that menacing power, and normally all people absorb that menacing power, and then they show that in the media. In that manner we have the consideration of security subject matter, and our internal situation, which is completely in collision with that story, very weakly or not at all considers it. In that sense the assistance of NATO's public relations for our media houses would be really able to establish concrete co-operation with a few serious media subjects, so that we do not go into the hyper-decentralisation of the media infrastructure from which nothing remains and so to make possible the presentation of these security problems to the public. I think that this is necessary in order to stop with the lies that are present when this subject matter is in question, because believe me, journalists are confused.

If we continue, starting from NATO Secretary General Lord Robertson, to speak about what BiH needs to do in order to fulfil the conditions for entry into the PfP, and if in the name of very desirable compromises those requests are more and more lessened and reduced, even from a joint army we have come to the level of common command and a state-level Ministry of Defence, then the public remains confused and even the media. How to present that problem? Consequently, now it is the current approach that civil management of defence at the state level is needed, i.e. a state-level Ministry of Defence. So, what should we do if that would not be sufficient for a functional compromise? At that time will another approach come that will dilute that and again delay the entry of BiH into the PfP? Because that would be clear to me about that which we speak in public, especially in the electronic media we flirt with those terms very frequently that BiH is before the PfP, but really BiH is the furthest country from the PfP and I believe that this will be the case for a long time to come, not only due to our internal non-functioning, but also due to the interest of some other factors that continue that in order to examine other security forms. BiH shall obviously contribute to the new security form of Europe if it shall enter the PfP with two armies. That is a new theoretical phenomenon that needs examination. Consequently, generally I do not express its worth, rather only I say that as a fact.



One of the largest concrete problems that concerns the media in BiH and their following of security issues is in the fact that the people and institutions that should co-operate with journalists, in the realisation of this theme, still belong to what some people term the "age of secrets". That means that those people were forged in the former rigid, conservative structures and the mental inheritance of the JNA's concept of life, and in that sense secrets are made from banal things; consequently, we cannot arrive to the information that the public should know. In that sense, I generally do not plan on the change of those type of people, other than with their education. Why? Because people in Europe are not any better. These security studies in Europe are mainly leftover from a militaristic milieu and generals in that manner are pacified, and then we obtained a structure of people that began very seriously to consider this subject matter, and in that sense, through various workshops and education initiatives it should make possible for the people that are engaged in security issues in institutions that they are not afraid, as they say, that somebody they know does not make for themselves some position from which in reality they do not have anything. That is, consequently, an aspect of the problems concerning which I wanted to speak.

The other aspect concerns the manner of the presentation of security problems in the BiH media with the viewpoint of powerful technical and technological changes that have happened in the world, and which, it seems to me, in some manner the people that are engaged in these issues in BiH skirt around. An American Colonel brilliantly noticed that with satellites following the war in the Gulf censorship lost all meaning. The 11 September, that sickening terrorist act in which innocent people were killed, in a completely new manner placed the relations of security and the media. We notice, on a global plane, that it has come to the shutting down of security sources when journalists are in question. It would not be good that BiH and its journalistic sources, and also journalists, suffer from this new, conservative discourse, because I think that in some manner this limits freedom.

As far as some concrete things are concerned, when the media and security are in question, I would like the help of the international community. Consequently, this is now the realisation of a suggestion that I mentioned shortly before when NATO is in question, that technical and theoretical assistance is really offered and simply that close relations are established between European security structures and the BiH media in order that the media would be able to easier consider this subject matter. What does that mean? It means going to press-briefings in Brussels or somewhere else, but that definitely means, also we can say, serious support in the development of a regional security media network, that would in a certain way engage in these problems on a regional basis. It looks like that is the only chance for BiH to overcome the problems that it has, and that no other country has.

At the end I shall finish with a statement. I hope that the citizens of BiH shall come into the situation that in the media they can read about qualitative security and simultaneously that they live in that type of security environment. Consequently, this means that we are not presented with the picture that we live in this type of security environment, when in reality we do not. That further means that BiH citizens should be equally secure as citizens in an ordered state. In that sense I really believe that the main priorities are that through education and the media those mediums can change the inherited forms of the consideration of this problem. Thank you.

### **THIRD SESSION DISCUSSION PERIOD**

**Mr. Antonio Prlenda**, *Journalist*  
*Oslobodenje Daily Newspaper*

My colleagues did not hold back in their opinions regarding the media, and I think that this adds to the quality in the fact that we can criticise our own sector. The majority can agree that in our media, according to the issue of the following of security issues and issues of defence, that the situation is catastrophic. It is a shame that Ariane Quentier, NATO spokesperson, although there existed that possibility, could not come today, but perhaps she will be in a position to see our proposal that the NATO Office of Information and Press would work more with the local media according to this issue. Allow me to invite you to open the discussion, and I would like to turn your attention to one fact that I encountered whilst following the armed forces and security issues, not only in our country, but others as well.

It is correct that we have poorly educated journalists, but I can say to you something more from the media as the kind they are that you cannot expect more even also if the NATO Office of Information and Press concretely works with journalists. What is the real obstacle here? According to my opinion, the real obstacle with which we are confronted is the institutions of Bosnia and Herzegovina. To be specific, in this case, the entity Ministries of Defence.

Here it is the openness of institutions towards the media is important. I agree that in this country the media do not enter deeply into security questions. Why is that the case? According to my opinion, many more important facts are the "walls" with which the media are confronted with here when they want more deeply to consider some problems, let us say some issues of defence. The basic problem with which journalists are confronted is that the Ministry of Defence of the FBiH and Ministry of Defence of the RS do not have a permanent press conference regime. In normal countries that is very commonplace, often once weekly. It is known that on Friday at 10 o'clock there is a press conference by the Ministry of Defence in Hungary, in Budapest. We have other examples, in Germany if there is no press conference by the Ministry of Defence once weekly, then the government has a press conference on which all Ministers and journalists are present, where all questions can be asked. There is nothing like that here. In this country press conferences are *ad hoc* from case to case and then when that is agreeable to the senior staff of the Ministry of Defence. This is the case for both the Ministry of Defence of the Republika Srpska and the Federation of BiH.

The other problem is that besides that what NATO could help in the education of the media according to the issues of the following of the armed forces and security, much more can help towards the education of the spokespersons of the Ministries of Defence. This means education in relations to the public. The persons here are duty-bound to inform the public and journalists; however, even also when they have the best intentions their hands are tied. A spokesperson cannot give information if beforehand they have not contacted the Minister, and nothing can be obtained without the Minister. I believe that is the case in every Ministry, and the Minister does not have the time for every journalist - he is frequently at government sessions, frequently abroad, frequently engaged in some important questions where there does not exist the possibility to reach him on a mobile phone and obtain the information. Consequently, the spokesperson, according to my opinion, even does not deserve the title of spokesperson if they cannot say anything without the Minister. If we were lucky all Ministries would have people that would contact journalists, to know what people from the media are doing, to have developed relations with them, but to be constantly on track with that what is happening in their Ministries. And they would know what they can and cannot tell to the

public. If they cannot or do not know what to say they shall ask from where can they come by this information in the easiest manner. I am pleased to have experience in the work with many armed forces; I was in Europe, I was in America, but if it had not been for that, I would sit in Sarajevo and would have nothing else to reflect upon. It is bad luck that we have foreign peacekeeping troops here, but it is good luck that they can offer us not only the education of our armed forces, but also the education of the media. Here is SFOR that has a joint Centre for Public Relations and Information. If I need to ask something then SFOR's spokesperson is always well disposed and very frequently immediately gives me the information, for which with the local armed forces I would have to wait at least two days. Then when they cannot give me the information, they tell me that they will ring in two or three hours and they shall ask when they can obtain that information, then they call and tell me. For me that is science fiction, when the Ministry of Defence of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Ministry of Defence of the RS are in question, although there exists many obstacles.

I would like to say something more concerning that which journalists cannot approach this subject matter and do more. We have already stated that security and defence is a regional problem. However, in this country the journalists that follow these issues not only have a problem to encompass regionally this subject matter, but also even at a state level they cannot encompass it. This is because, we can say, if I shall follow some subject that is current in BiH, I shall obtain some information from the Ministry of Defence of Federation of BiH. I have to know about that problem is the Republika Srpska, but in the Ministry of Defence of the RS, I suppose I am a journalist from the FBiH and I do not see any other reason, I come to a wall of silence. I am waiting for more than a month and a half to receive an answer to the request to have an interview with the RS Minister of Defence, Slobodan Bilic, to see what are their opinions about defence, not only on joint issues, but also on issues that are connect to them. How can I conduct some deeper analysis concerning questions of defence in BiH if I cannot obtain official information from the other entity? And then what happens? It happens that journalists are condemned to search for information from some of their own sources, and that they stab in the dark, which is a "double-edged sword". If I shall obtain some information that is unofficial, how can I be sure how much of it is correct, that I stab in the dark and that I have a specific debt towards the person that gave me the information and I must be careful that I do not hurt them when I write something. In the same manner, I cannot be too critical towards them because the next time I would not be able to obtain some information from them. I shall not know what has happened and the Editor shall tell me that I have not given anything and that I have nothing new. In light of this, this is a basic problem that I, as a journalist that follows events here, I see that local institutions could do much more towards this problem. However much we journalists education ourselves, if that "wall" is not taken down then we shall not obtain increased quality in informing the public. However much journalists are confused, the public shall be even more confused, and when the public is confused there does not exist public opinion, when there is no public opinion there is no pressure on parliament to lead debates concerning the right issues in a real and open manner, and if parliament is not right then the armed forces cannot be right. I hope that we shall discuss some of these things.

**Mr. Ibrahim Spahic**, *Representative*  
*Parliamentary Assembly of Bosnia and Herzegovina*

I would like to say that at the Frankfurt Book Fair I found a large stand of the Bundeswehr. There they were showing over ten quadratic metres everything that the German army is doing, in the framework of the NATO programme, in the framework of European structures, and in the framework of their own country. They have their own web-site, they have a department for communications with the public, they have a department for communication with education institutions, a department for education concerning the role of the army, and altogether it is a complete demystification of the position the army in the country, but a country that has emancipated and opened those structures until the end and in a very transparent manner. All of this was at a World Book Fair and that is something that you can remember with great satisfaction and to follow all possible structures. I am pointing this out as a positive example that the armed forces in BiH could use.

**Brigadier Hamza Visca**

*Army of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina*

Before exactly three years I suggested to OSCE, OHR and the UN at that time to begin a programme titled "Security and Peace in BiH", in which would be given contributions from both Ministries of Internal Affairs, both Ministries of Defence, SFOR, other international organisations, the Ministry of European Integration and Ministry of Foreign Affairs. I think that all of these have their place in this type of programme. OSCE told me that they did not have any money for that, and they spent who knows how much money on billboards in which the nation needs to carry me because I wear a uniform.

On politician's shoulders is to decide that tomorrow there is only five thousand soldiers, and that is not my decision as to whether there will be five thousand soldiers or not. And the media presentation has put us in a very unpleasant situation that we feel when we pass through town in a uniform. This means that we must be prepared to spend money on that Public Broadcasting System, and there is FTV and RTS, and those three systems could have a once monthly programme on "Security and Peace in BiH" with the corresponding concept, which provide a clearer picture to the people. There are people, for example, that think that Radisic refused that and that or those that proposed this and that, and many do not know what was proposed or refused, rather refused something that would be joint. As to whether that is a department, as to whether that is a Ministry, as to whether that is something else, people do not have the opportunity to understand or explain what that is. There are still people that think that the PfP is some kind of alliance. I understood that as a workshop in which people need to learn how to execute work in the framework of NATO and in affairs of "Peace Support" or in something similar. It means that you can do that.

Now I would like to say something regarding the other issue that we are talking about, in which it is said that the Ministries of Defence, military, and other Ministries do not have trained people as spokespersons, etc. It is accurate that the law does not define that they must have this, that is one thing. The other thing, in the behaviour of some journalists it is precisely like this, it is possible, I would not like to name anybody, to change five ministries, to be Minister or Deputy Minister here, but we know exactly who shall tonight on television shall give the news what their Ministry is doing, whether that is the Minister of Foreign Affairs or the Deputy Minister of European Integration - in other words certain journalists have an affiliation with certain politicians. This means that you have your private sources, and the Ministers and Deputy Ministers have their own private journalists, which is surely completely wrong. However, if we want to place all of this in order, the first thing, to go back to the

beginning, is that parliament must begin to be engaged in these issues. If parliament would be engaged in these issues and if that shall be placed with the obligations of every Ministry as well as in every subject, the bearers of some functions in the state authority, then there would not be any kind of problem to secure transparency. I am embarrassed that my army does not have any kind of web-site or is present on some other web-site in which it could present itself.

**Mr. Iacob Prada**, *Charges d'affaires*  
*Embassy of Romania, Sarajevo*

I am a diplomat. I am the Charges d'affaires of the Romanian Embassy in Bosnia and Herzegovina, but I do not want you to take me as a diplomat, even less as the head of my mission, but rather like an analyst, as I was for fifteen years in my country before coming into diplomacy. I would like to make an introduction before I say what I want to say. And this will be about the relationship between my country and Ex Yugoslavia. I say Ex Yugoslavia as a space, not as Ex Yugoslavia that has just disappeared.

Just imagine a family, and you are a part of that family. There is another family, you are very good friends, you spend time together, including some holidays, having nice dinners, chatting to each other about very, very friendly matters, and suddenly you realise that in that family they are beating each other, that in that family they are beating their children, killing each other, and you are so sad, because you still feel that you are best friends, best neighbours. After that you realise it is not possible to deal with them as a family because they are divorced, and their kids are maybe in an orphanage and they are no longer husband and wife, but separate. You did not see anything wrong with them, in particular, so you realise you should deal with them like human beings and still be friends with them. This was the situation of Romania and Former Yugoslavia. We did not take Former Yugoslavia as Serbia and Montenegro, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Slovenia, and Macedonia. In our public opinion Former Yugoslavia was our best neighbour. Our former President used to say, and this was quite well known in history and one of the most important historians in our country said, "Romania never had such good friends as the Former Yugoslavia". So, what shall we do now? It was quite a big problem for us, because it was difficult for public opinion in our country to accept what was going on in Former Yugoslavia, it was difficult for our politicians who knew more about it to convince them that we should act differently now. We should take all countries, all members of that "ex family" like our friends. It is difficult for us now to convince you, as you used to be part of that big family already destroyed, that you are still our best neighbours. Romania considers the "parts" of Former Yugoslavia to be our closest neighbours. It is difficult for us to deal with Belgrade, with Zagreb, Ljubljana, you here in Sarajevo, and to convince you that this is the situation. I am telling you this because I asked a question here to the representative of NATO here about PfP. The question was not for him, it was for you. I knew, I foresaw his reply. Definitely, you should decide who are entering into bilateral relations with, to include this PfP matter. I offer, because my Minister of Defence when visiting Bosnia and Herzegovina to visit our SFOR troops wanted to offer help, the assistance of Romania for both entities, for both armed forces, to go further, to proceed towards joining the PfP. This was in Banja Luka, and the Minister of Defence of Romania visited all troops in Prijedor, I was first there.

The approach to this seems to me to be little bit reserved, because there is a lot of sensitivity, there is a lot of suspicion, as to why was I first in Banja Luka, why did I pass this message first to the Minister of Defence of the Republika Srpska? Why did I not come here first? I shall explain the situation. He did not ask me just like that, but I had the feeling, and the same

feeling exists for all internationals, that there are too many suspicions, and the lack of flexibility, and how do you want us, that come here with lot of good will, to understand you? Please believe me that it is well spread this image that diplomats speak a lot. We would rather listen too; I am speaking too much. It is extremely necessary for you to know yourself and after that to come and say something, to speak out about your own situation. We realise you still look at each other with lot of suspicions.

I want to tell you something about our experience immediately after the revolution. There were some special circumstances, the armed forces in Romania were involved in it, and it was a pillar of stability in Romania immediately after the revolution. The police disappeared, political parties also, the security service disappeared, and only the armed forces remained. Despite of this fact, we understood that it was necessary to make big changes in the structure of the armed forces, I am talking about the democratisation of the armed forces. It was by far more difficult than in the Czech Republic and Slovakia, because armed forces had not played a special role in the stabilising of society. Despite this, we succeeded in making dramatic changes. Most of the generals and high-level commanders in a very short time were changed, more than 95 % of them. What were the results? Normally some findings or charges came out of civil society that some members of the military were involved in killings during the revolution, these disclosures did not affect people being in charge of the armed forces. So, armed forces in Romania, fortunately, are clean nowadays, because those who were involved, or were making mistakes, or misbehaved are not in the armed forces. You realise what I am targeting now. Definitely it was a difficult moment in your history, in BiH, but you know that some of your senior ranked officials, including those in the military, were involved in abnormal things, that the international community could not see as normal behaviour. That is why The Hague is asking for some of them to be sent there. It is difficult for us to understand why after such a long period of time you do not clarify the situation between yourselves. First of all, it is not up to the international community to say what was the legitimacy of the war in BiH, because it is quite clear that it was not only an aggression. There was an aggression, but not only an aggression. Nobody could deny that what was going on in different parts of BiH was not the result of aggression, so it is not just up to international community to say who was the hero or who was the criminal here. You first of all should clarify this, and after that you will see if you are clean and you could speak out in an easier manner, even to relate to the international community. I wanted to be here when the Dean of the Faculty of Criminal Science, Mr. Repovac, gave his speech, and Mr. Vejinovic, because I wanted to see if that touched this extremely sensitive matter. Even the media does not do it, and I am really sorry about it. We could not say the media in BiH is not well trained, and well positioned, it is a good media. I was in a lot of countries in Europe, and even outside of Europe, you know how to do your job. It is not necessary for somebody to teach you, just do it, including from this point of view; and after that, you will see, it will be by far better for all of us, for you, because you are involved here, and for us because we are dealing with you. This is a part of that ownership, maybe one of the most sensitive parts of that ownership we are talking about for a such a long period of time.

**General Bernd Papenkort**

*Clausewitz Centrum, Führungsakademie Der Bundeswehr*

I would like to join my Romanian colleague and I think it was good that Mr. Visca was like a vulcano proposing his own statement. I would like to join him, because I must say that this was my experience working in the military on the defence side too. And what our Romanian colleague has said I believe is the way forward. Take ownership, you need to do it on your own, do not look too much on the international community, because the international community is shifting focus away. I know, for example, in my own country and you are aware that we are cutting down forces, for example, in the Balkans, in order to be prepared for other things, and that will, as consequence, be next step on the economic side too, and when you have this kind of consequence, and it will come, I believe that on your side, and that is my experience in BiH, on the lower level and mid level, a lot of good activities are available. There are many reconciliation efforts because people talk to each other. And if you have this in mind, and that is my experience working in your country that in many occasions I was wondering why on the top political sides certainly it was always like on the ghost of here that things went away. There was an agreement between RS and the Federation on many issues. And I can tell you that even in 1996 the Brcko solution would have been available, but when it was transported to the top floor it was blocked afterwards. From that point of view, I believe that looking on the next elections, and we should be realistic whether old parties will continue or not, but for those people in these parties it is the last chance to switch in a different direction, because I am convinced if I look towards the younger people on your side, and I can tell you when I went back to Germany in order to keep track what was happening I went to Universities, and was teaching, and there is a new generation coming. Youngsters are not any longer willing to accept this kind of slow move delaying process because it is their welfare; it is their future. In reality they are your children, yours sons and daughters, and from that point of view I believe it is really high-time for some from the elder generation level to get away from the ghosts of history and to look forward and to take the chance, and you have the chance. I can promise you that whether it is in Europe, or whether it is other countries everybody is hoping for it, and would support you, but you have to do it in your own way. Do not ask, and that is my point looking at the media, which was correct description too from all three, do not always look to the other side the international community needs to help, because in reality a lot of help was provided, and it was mentioned what had happened with the international help, so take it in your own hands and you will see that as consequence like in Romania and like in other countries who are now joining NATO, each country took their own way, and was not asking Germany or NATO, or whoever from the European Union side as to what we need to do now. The Rumanian way was quite different from the Czech way, and the Czech way was different from the Polish way. I hope that this will be done on your side too, and you will see that in reality it will be a quick move forward, and will not be a slow process.

**Mr. Braco Kalaba, Editor-in-Chief**

*Prva Linija, Official Magazine of the Ministry of Defence of the FBiH*

I agree with that what has been said now in connection with the analysis of the situation, and in relation to the media towards this subject matter. I would like to pose a question of the Director of Radio Television Republika Srpska, Mr. Neskovic. Yesterday a cameraman from a small television production house in Sarajevo has just returned from the Caribbean, he was filming sharks. For a year and a half soldiers from BiH went to Eritrea and Ethiopia, to the peacekeeping missions. That is one of the largest successes, it seems to me, in this plane that we have achieved in BiH, that soldiers from BiH five-six years after the war are there far-away in the war and watching and implementing peace. So, I would like to place a suggestion,

idea, and question; could we jointly with Federal Television, with the Public Broadcasting System, to send a television crew to follow that? Nobody for a year and a half from the electronic media, from the written media, did go to follow the activities of those men.

**Mr. Radomir Neskovic**, *Director*  
*Radio Television Republika Srpska*

We do not have any objections against that, but RTRS does not have the financial resources for that. However, it would be possible for the three television companies to make up one team to visit that unit from BiH. The only reason is due to financial resources; there do not exist any other obstacles towards this. I hope that this shall be done, and that is something possible.

**Mr. Armin Krzalic**, *Student*  
*Faculty of Criminal Sciences, University of Sarajevo*

Are the media today sufficiently professional and how much can they influence the forming of public opinion?

**Mr. Radomir Neskovic**, *Director*  
*Radio Television Republika Srpska*

The media are much more professional than before. However, there exist different forms of the media - state, party, private, commercial and a small area that is independent, which is slowly spreading its activities. The problem with the independent media is that those that begin in this form must remain completely alone without any kind of assistance, without the financial assistance of anybody.

I think that there is much more objectivity than before. There is good quality and bad quality media, there is political party media and biased media, and that cannot be looked at in black and white. Probably the answer would be selective and would change from media to media.

**Mr. Nerzuk Curak**, *Journalist*  
*BiH Dani Weekly Magazine*

Firstly, the media in BiH is a reflection of the society, and that can be seen in the media, and then criticism towards the media is naturally stronger than towards other professions that are less visible. In that sense journalists are confronted with this. Professionalism exists and at the same time does not exist. I think that this is the largest criticism towards electronic media as opposed to the printed media. We have very low quality journalists, and also financial situation. I think that the main problem of the media is irresponsibility. We live in an age of information, an age of knowledge; however, in reality that is only a horizontal, superficial knowledge, and there is no deeper knowledge, and this prolongs the many disagreements that we are faced with. I have only one observation, very beautifully initiated for me by Mr. Spahic. When we speak about the regional aspects of security, it is very important that this does not proceed to the detriment of the state, especially perhaps as step would be needed



before inside the state to resolve all problems, and I think that the basic communicational thesis should be consequently to strengthen inside the state all necessary criteria that would enable us to enter into different forms of regional integration. I am saying this for the reason that we would not lose or miss regional integration because again the question shall appear that if we want to enter regional integration than we must have a well-ordered state. Consequently, an account would need to be led into this, especially when these aspects of security are in question.

**Mr. Zaim Backovic**, *Representative*  
*Parliamentary Assembly of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina*

Today there is no independent media. This depends upon four things: who is financing them, who is supporting them, and for whom is it intended, and who is writing. The next thing when the media is in question is that they must begin to write in a more affirmative manner. They have become apathetic and are "killing" the citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina. You cannot read an affirmative article anywhere.

**Mr. Antonio Prlenda**, *Journalist*  
*Oslobodenje Daily Newspaper*

I would say that from this presentation we have seen how much the media are professional or not; and regarding this how much they are affirmative or not, I think that this depends more upon institution than only the media, this is due to the fact that if the media do not have the opportunity to obtain affirmative information, they shall rely on the information that they obtain from politicians, which is frequently directed against somebody else. Then they remark as to what is written in the media, and I think who gave that information to the journalist, the journalists did not make that up. I would just like to say to Mr. Kalaba that the idea regarding Eritrea and Ethiopia does not have any problems, you could say to me tomorrow that there is the change to go there. The spokesperson of the UN Mission, which has the money, knows that I requested from them to possibility to do this, but they are not in the financial position to allow this.

The media cannot be much better than what they are and you cannot expect that the media shall have people that shall even a little understand the issues around the armed forces, what they do and where to follow them. Usually, editors and newspapers have journalists that follow a wide range of issues from culture to politics. It is very rare that newspapers would have a person that specifically can follow the armed forces. Towards this, that where it is possible to do something is that ministries would have spokespersons that would be continuously in conferences with journalists, because only when there exists continuous relations towards the public can there come to mutual education.

## **APPENDIX A:**

## AGENDA

*This seminar has been organised by the Centre for Security Studies BiH  
through the generous contributions  
of the Royal Norwegian Embassy, Sarajevo and the NATO HQ, Brussels*

### **ROUND-TABLE ON DEMOCRATIC CONTROL OF ARMED FORCES: THE ROLE OF PARLIAMENT, ACADEMIA AND THE MEDIA**

**SARAJEVO, 31 MAY – 1 JUNE 2002**  
**HOTEL “HOLIDAY INN”**

**Friday, 31. MAY**

Arrival of the participants

**19:00 – 21:00**

Welcome Reception  
Hotel “Holiday Inn”  
***Hosted by: Centre for Security Studies***

**Saturday, 1. JUNE**

**09:00 – 09:30**

Registration

**09:30 – 10:30**

**Opening**

**Dr. Bisera Turković**  
*Executive Director*  
*Centre for Security Studies BiH*

**Mr. Željko Mirjanić**  
*Deputy Chairman of the House of Deputies*  
*Parliamentary Assembly BiH*

**Mr. George Katsirdakis**  
*Deputy Director*  
*Defence Partnership and Co-operation Directorate,*  
*Sector of Defence Planning and Operations, NATO*

**10:30 – 12:30**

Session I: The Role of Parliament

**Chair: Marko Amidžić**

*House of Representatives*

Parliamentary Assembly BiH

**Dr. Marie Vlachova**

*Senior Fellow of the Think Tank*

Geneva Centre for Democratic Control over Armed  
Forces

#### DISCUSSION PERIOD

**12:30 – 13:30**

**Lunch**

**13:30 – 15:30**

Session II: The Role of Academia

**Chair: General Bernd Papenkort**

*Clausewitz Centrum*

*Führungsakademie Der Bundeswehr*

**Dr. Duško Vejnović,**

*Professor*

University of Banja Luka

**Dr. Izet Beridan**

*Faculty of Political Science, Sarajevo*

#### DISCUSSION PERIOD

**15:30 – 16:00**

**Coffee Break**

**16:00 – 18:00**

Session III: The Role of the Media

**Chair: Mr. Antonio Prlenda**

*Journalist,*

Daily Newspaper "Oslobođenje"

**Mr. Radomir Nešković**

*Director General*

Radio Television Republika Srpska

**Mr. Nerzuk Ćurak**

*Journalist*

Magazine "Naši dani"

DISCUSSION PERIOD

**CLOSURE**

**APPENDIX B**

**LIST OF PARTICIPANTS**

1. Amidžić, Marko, Mr  
Representative  
BiH Parliamentary Assembly
2. Antešević, Milenko, Mr  
Representative  
RS National Assembly
3. Backović Zaim, Mr  
Representative  
House of Representatives, FBiH Parliament
4. Bajić, Dragana, Mrs  
Project Assistant  
Centre for Security Studies, BiH
5. Beecroft, Robert, Ambassador  
Chief of Mission  
OSCE Mission to BiH
6. Begović, Kemal, Mr  
Secretary  
Committee for Defence and Security, House of Representatives, FBiH  
Parliamentary Assembly
7. Beridan, Izet, Dr  
Professor  
Faculty of Political Science, University of Sarajevo
8. Bevanda, Martin, Mr  
Professor  
Faculty of Economics, University of Mostar
9. Brka, Osman, Mr  
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House of Representatives BiH Parliamentary Assembly
10. Brotlija, Aziz, Mr  
Representative  
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11. Buturović, Sead, Mr  
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House of Representatives, BiH Parliamentary Assembly
12. Carter, David, Mr  
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Office of the Personal Representative of the OSCE CiO for Articles II and  
IV, Annex 1B of the DPA – Vienna

13. Carlson, Alan, Mr  
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14. Ćurak, Nerzuk, Mr  
Journalist  
Independent Magazine «BiH Dani»
15. Đokić, Petar, Mr  
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16. Fitzgerald, Jeff, Mr  
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17. Hadžović, Denis, Mr  
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Centre for Security Studies, BiH
18. Halilović, Zara, Ms  
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19. Hanson, Samuel, Ambassador  
Ambassador  
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20. Hebib, Avdo, Mr  
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22. Jusufović, Sead, Mr  
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24. Kalaba Braco, Mr  
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25. Koukakis, Mihail, Mr  
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26. Katsirdakis, George, Mr  
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27. Kebo, Mirsad, Mr  
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30. Latinović, Đorđe, Mr  
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31. Ljubičić, Sanja, Ms  
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32. Mašović, Aida, Mrs  
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33. Nešković, Radomir, Mr  
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34. Osmanović, Bahrija, Mr  
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35. Pajević, Mirsad, Colonel  
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Secretariat of the Standing Committee on Military Matters BiH
36. Papenkort, Bernd, Colonel  
Clausewitz Centrum, Führungsakademie der Bundeswehr
37. Pojskić, Sabrija, Mr  
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38. Prlenda, Antonio, Mr  
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Daily Newspaper Oslobodenje

39. Puljić-Cadman, Sanda, Mrs  
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43. Salkić, Ismet, Mr  
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51. Turčalo, Sead, Mr  
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- 52. Vejnović, Duško, Dr  
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