

National Exit Poll:



2014
Parliamentary
Elections



Ilko Kucheriv Democratic Initiatives Foundation

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INTRODUCTION

Never during the times of independent Ukraine was the election conducted in such exceptional conditions as Parliamentary elections 2014. Euro-Maidan, President's V. Yanukovitch and his power elites get-away, annexation of Crimea by Russia, separatists' activities in the South and East, combat in Donbas and creation of self-proclaimed DNR and LNR, undeclared «hybrid» warfare by Russia – all these factors have changed Ukraine.

The society demanded renewal of authorities and after the Presidential elections there was a need to conduct the Parliamentary elections as that time Verkhovna Rada was discredited and incapable.

Elections campaign of Parliamentary elections 2014 significantly differed from previous elections. For the first time during both pre-term elections (Presidential and Parliamentary), the election itself was not the focus as the society's attention was fixed on the warfare in Donbas, aggressive invasion by Russia, refugees problems, etc. At the same time the political framework was rapidly changing – Parliament old timers were losing their positions, new political forces were appearing, some of them were very similar to old ones, with vague programs, which made the process of election for people more complicated. So, it's not surprising, that during our last pre-election opinion research, one third of voters could not provide the unambiguous answer regarding their electoral choice. Besides that, up until the day of elections it was not clear how many voting stations will be opened for voting in Donbas, thus there was no possibility to conduct the exit poll there.

In such circumstances of uncertainty the election results could be (and really were) unexpected. That is why, the exit polls along with their regular functions (control over the fairness of elections, prevention of violations) gained a new meaning – to confirm election results, which could be really unexpected for both the society and election participants, especially if they did not explain the expected result.

And this was exactly what happened. If not the unanimity of all exit polls, probably, some of the political forces would for a long time try to prove that real results of elections were completely different.

Like at the Presidential elections, the exit poll at the Parliamentary elections 2014 met outstanding difficulties.

The most serious problem was to conduct exit poll in Donetsk and Luhansk provinces, where intense military actions were taking place, and up until the day of elections it was not clear if there would be a possibility to conduct elections at certain voting stations. The accuracy of exit poll greatly depended on the number of voters able to vote in Donetsk and Luhansk provinces. Unfortunately, it was impossible to organize the voting in 9 out of 21 voting districts in Donetsk province and in 6 out of 11 voting districts in Luhansk province.

One more significant problem faced by the sociologists during the exit poll was the different level of voters' preparedness in different regions to participate in the poll. In general, the response rate (the percentage of those who did not refuse to answer the questions of sociologists) was approximately the same as during the previous elections – 73%. But the problem laid in the fact that the response rate was quite different in different regions: in the west it reached 87% and in the east it was 20% lower. As the electoral choice in Ukraine has certain regional specifics, it appeared that parties more popular in the west had exit poll results a bit higher than Central Elections Committee data, and the parties supported in the east had lower results in the exit poll. Although these fluctuations did not go beyond the announced sampling error, the emotions of «Svoboda» deputies/candidates, who in all exit polls received 6% and in reality did not receive 0,3% of the votes necessary to overcome the voting threshold, are quite understandable.

Traditionally, there were several exit polls conducted at the same time during the Parliamentary elections 2014. As usual, we explain the difference between our exit poll and the rest of conducted exit polls. Firstly, we had maximum transparency both in the methodology and the sources of funding. We've created the Exit Poll Supervisory Board, which consisted of the leaders of the most respected NGOs and professional sociologists. Secondly, two sociologic companies – Kyiv International Institute of Sociology and Razumkov's Center – worked in parallel, each had its own

sampling, thus actually there were two separate exit polls, which is an additional index of data reliability. Thirdly, experts from other countries were involved into the observation of the exit poll: Joanna Konieczna-Salamatin – expert at the Institute for Public Affairs, fellow at the Institute of Sociology at the Warsaw University (Poland), Kateryna Kozerenko and Veronika Bizyukova expert-consultants at Levada Centre (Russia).

The traditional distinctive feature of our National Exit Poll was independence of any political influence, as it was funded by several international donors. We would like to use this opportunity and thank international foundations that supported 2014 National Exit Poll: International Renaissance Foundation, Matra program of the Kingdom of the Netherlands Embassy in Ukraine, the National Endowment for Democracy (USA), PACT project of UNITER (Ukraine National Initiatives to Enhance Reforms), and the European Union.

One more tradition, which Ilko Kucheriv Democratic Initiative Foundation is keeping: after each election to publish the book that includes detailed exit poll data analysis. For us, in addition to the fact that exit polls are inseparable component of night shows, the method of control over the fairness of results and the safeguard from falsifications, they are also an irreplaceable source of knowledge about the elections processes in Ukraine. From presented publication you will be able to get to know about the peculiarities of voters of different political forces and candidates, the dynamics of electoral choice and a lot of other interesting things. We hope that this book will be riveting and useful for our readers.

Ilko Kucheriv Democratic Initiatives Foundation Director,
Project Manager of 2014 National Exit Poll and the editor of this book

Iryna BEKESHKINA

Section 1

Iryna Filipchuk

FOURTEEN EXIT POLLS IN ELECTIONS HISTORY OF UKRAINE (chronology of survey)

Each National Exit Poll conducted either at Parliamentary or Presidential elections is a unique history, separate research having certain features and held in certain circumstances. Basically, each exit poll has its short life cycle, and there are fourteen of them in the history of national exit polls in Ukraine.

From the very beginning of conducting exit polls in Ukraine we kept the chronology of these surveys so that anyone interested in electoral processes in our country could easily call them up and form a complete picture of exit polls in electoral history of Ukraine.

So, this time we would like to remind you how the exit poll was started, how it changed with time, and which peculiarities exit polls had in different years of the independence of our country.

As such, the Democratic Initiatives Foundation introduced the conducting of exit polls in Ukraine in 1998 and the first such polling was conducted on March 29 during the parliamentary elections. The idea was formed in the process of cooperation between the Democratic Initiatives Foundation with its U.S. colleague QEV – Analytics. From that time the Democratic Initiatives Foundation, which was the pioneer of this project in Ukraine and the designer of the project, conducted 15 exit polls, 13 of which were nationwide in Ukraine and two in Kyiv and Mukacheve.

The author of the idea of the first exit poll in Ukraine was the Democratic Initiatives Foundation and the first to react to it were Ukrainian journalists. So, through mutual efforts the Ukrainian Media Club, the Democratic Initiatives Foundation and the Studio 1+1 television channel broadcast a successful TV show on the basis of the results of the exit poll on the day and night of the elections. The Socis company was responsible for all aspects of the field work and sociologist Elegiya Skochlyas of the U.S. company QEV-Analytics consulted on the process of the exit poll. The results of the first exit poll held in Ukraine were quite close to the election results and allowed in advance to name eight parties and blocs that surpassed the 4% threshold and won seats in the parliament.

During the 1999 presidential elections the Democratic Initiatives Foundation organized exit polls in the first and second rounds, when then President Leonid Kuchma and leader of the Communist Party of Ukraine Petro Symonenko advanced to the final round. Three Ukrainian sociological services – Kyiv International Institute

of Sociology (KIIS), Socis and the Sociological Monitoring center – conducted a public opinion poll. The results of the polls coincided with the official results with a great degree of accuracy. It was then that the first exit polls demonstrated its specific nature in Ukraine as it turned the attention of the people not only to the elections, but also served as control mechanism that lowered the probability of falsification of votes. During those elections we not only improved the methodology of polling, but also the means of informing citizens. We did not limit ourselves to television channels, but instead developed a special strategy that would capture the greater attention of the mass media.

The fourth exit poll organized by the Democratic Initiatives Foundation during the parliamentary elections on March 31, 2002 was conducted by the same three sociological firms that conducted them in 1999. The Exit Poll 2002 was a triumph of Ukrainian sociologists. The results of the Central Election Committee were very close to those of the exit poll and showed that the Our Ukraine bloc was victorious. The experience of 2002 demonstrated the ability of Ukrainian sociologists to conduct quality exit polls and the reliability of exit polls as a means of control of the honesty of tallying votes.

The true test of democracy and sociologists in Ukraine was the presidential elections in 2004. Then the Democratic Initiatives Foundation organized three exit polls – October 31 (Round 1 of elections, on November 21 (Round 2 of the elections) and December 26 (revoting in Round 2 of the elections). Unfortunately, in the first round two participants of the consortium conducting the National Exit Poll 2004 – the Socis and Social Monitoring centers – rigged the results of polling that were made public the night the voting booths were closed.

With all due respect to the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology and the Razumkov Center, they conformed to the highest professional standards, withstood the pressure from the previous exit polls and came out unscathed by this scandal.

The results of the exit poll conducted during the second round of the elections showed that Yushchenko beat Yanukovych by 11% and became one of the realistic arguments for the Orange Revolution. On April 18 of this year a regional exit poll was conducted in the elections of the mayor of Mukacheve, which showed that the ruling power at that time ignored the real expression of the will of the people that voted in favor of a false winner. From that time the notion of an exit poll has been viewed as a unique possibility to counteract the falsification of the voting process, which is quite a new phenomenon in world practice.

The data gathered from the eighth exit poll on March 26, 2006 conducted by the Democratic Initiatives Foundation in the consortium with KIIS and the Razumkov Center differed from the official results of the elections by no more than 1,1%. This exit poll provided grounds to believe that there was no vote-rigging during the parliamentary elections in 2006 that would essentially change the results of voting.

The ninth exit poll had its peculiarities, one of them being that four organizations announced their intention of conducting exit polls during the 2007 elections. The ICTV channel announced its intention of conducting an exit poll ordered by the European marketing agency TNS and the U.S. companies TNS, PSB and Public

Strategies. The sociological companies R&B and the Sociovymir also planned to conduct their own research. One American observer Elegiya Skochylyas noted: «I would jokingly say that the U.S. is way behind Ukraine as it conducts only one exit poll, while in Ukraine several held. Mind you, there is no sense in holding more than one exit poll.»

At the same time, Executive Director of the International Renaissance Foundation Yevhen Bystrytskiy noted: «At the moment, we do not understand why four exit polls will be held in Ukraine. On the one hand, this is a good thing. After all, the more exit polls, the better. But given the current circumstances there is a real threat that certain political forces may stand behind the exit polls. This is quite dangerous as certain political forces that order and pay for the conducting of an exit poll can exploit it in their own personal interests.»

For this very reason the 2007 National Exit Poll consortium proposed to organizers of other exit polls to make public their surveys, sources of financing and research methodology so that every exit poll would be under self-control. The consortium called on organizers to ensure that alternative exit polls conform to professional standards of WAPOR/AAPOR, ESOMAR regarding the conduct of exit polls and election research.

DIF very peacefully reacted to the phenomenon of cloning of exit polls as it does not fear competition. However, if to legally investigate the publications about the work of sociological companies in Ukraine, one will find that no other organization aside from DIF provided transparent information regarding its financing.

On September 30, 2007, on the day of the snap elections to the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, the Democratic Initiatives Foundation, the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology and the Razumkov Ukrainian Center of Economic and Political Studies conducted their ninth exit poll.

The final results of the exit poll on the day of elections to the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine on September 30, 2007 exceeded all expectations of sociologists. The results of votes upon exit from the voting stations were almost equal to those counted by the Central Election Commission. The margin of error was only 0.96%, though according to sociological norms a swing from 3% to the negative side is permissible. As such, these results showed that early parliamentary elections in 2007 transpired without serious falsifications.

Immediately after the results of the exit poll were announced politicians began speaking about the preliminary election results, though a proven fact did not wait for the data of the Central Election Commission and announced the composite of the future coalitions in the parliament.

The Democratic Initiatives Foundation conducted the 10th and 11th national exit polls in the 1st and 2nd round of the presidential elections on January 17 and February 7 in 2010. They were conducted by the 2010 National Exit Poll consortium of the Democratic Initiatives Foundation, the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology and the Ukrainian Razumkov Center for Economic and Political Studies.

The main distinctive feature of these exit polls is that the Democratic Initiatives Foundation appealed to average citizens, presidential candidates and businessmen to make charitable contributions for conducting them. Such support of civil society

demonstrated the democratic sentiments of Ukrainian society as it alone must build democracy in its native country to guarantee its successful future.

The project was executed under the monitoring and control of international observers and the Oversight Council, which authoritative national and foreign experts were part of. In addition to the independent exit poll conducted by the consortium, three nationwide exit polls ordered for the presidential elections in 2010 were conducted.

Despite the particularities of all exit polls conducted in Ukraine, the results were similar. Only the nationwide exit poll conducted by the Democratic Initiatives Foundation, the Razumkov Center and the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology showed a lower deviation between the leaders of the election race. The organizers explained that such a deviation was due to the lower coverage in election constituencies in Ukraine.

One of the distinctive features of the 2010 National Exit Poll was the use of New Media (namely, direct broadcasting of the announced results of the exit poll in the YouTube network. Besides that, this information was synchronously published in the Ukrainian and English languages on the websites <http://www.exitpoll.org.ua>, dif.org.ua and newcitizen.org.ua disseminated through the electronic mail and social networks Twitter, Facebook, Livejournal and V Kontakte.

2010 Presidential Elections once again confirmed the popularity of such a lever of public control of the results of elections such as exit polls. On the day of elections to the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine on October 28, 2012 National Exit Poll consortium the Ilko Kucheriv Democratic Initiatives Foundation, the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology and the Razumkov Ukrainian Center of Economic and Political Studies conducted their 12th exit poll.

The Democratic Initiatives Foundation financed the project and media management of the exit poll. The Kyiv International Institute of Sociology and the Razumkov Center conducted the poll. The aggregate of the exit poll results was set by the electorate that voted at constituencies throughout Ukraine (with the exception of special voting stations). The margin of error was representative for Ukraine in general. During the exit polls a total of 19,600 respondents at 400 voting stations where the methodology of «secret voting» was applied.

The maximum divergence in the results of the exit poll was no higher than 1.9% for five parties that won seats in the parliament and did not exceed 0.2% for the other 16 parties that ran in the elections. Overall, this means that among the «proportional» part of the elections (during voting in a large-mandate constituency) there was no falsification during the counting of votes or it was no higher than 2%.

The exit poll project, aside from conducting it on the day of the elections, included several serious and large-scale programs and measures, in particular pre-election and post-election surveys, training of journalists, surveying of experts and the preparation, publication and dissemination of books about the National Exit Poll 2012 to the rest of the world.

The 12th exit poll was financially backed by international donors: the International Renaissance Foundation, the Matra program of the Embassy of the Netherlands in Ukraine, the National Endowment for Democracy (U.S.), PACT, the UNITER project and the European Union. It was conducted under the monitoring of international

observers of the Levada-Center (Russia), the Institute of Public Affairs (Poland) and the University of Essex (UK).

The project was executed under the control of the Oversight Council, which leaders of non-government organizations, leading Ukrainian journalists and Ukrainian and foreign experts joined. Information was made public in the Ukrainian and English languages on the websites dif.org.ua and chesno.org was disseminated through electronic mail servers and social networks.

The 13th exit poll regarding the early elections of the President of Ukraine on May 25, 2014 conducted by the Ilko Kucheriv Democratic Initiatives Foundation, the KIIS and the Razumkov Center was marked by the extremely difficult socio-political situation in the country. The elections themselves were the consequence of three months of acts of protest on the Maidan and ousting of the former president Viktor Yanukovych from office. In addition to that, these acts were conducted in conditions of a non-declared war by Russia, which is why the distinctive feature of this exit poll was that sociologists did not know which constituencies would be working in the east of Ukraine to the very last day and whether they would even be able to conduct public opinion polls in those regions.

As a result, of 68 constituencies in which KIIS and the Razumkov Center that had planned to conduct exit polls in the Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts, polls were only held at 24 of them. But this did not obstruct receiving reliable data in those oblasts and quality results all over Ukraine. In the Autonomous Republic of Crimea annexed by Russia no exit polls were conducted at all.

The difference in the results of the 2014 National Exit Poll and the official data from the presidential elections were much less than those in the announced margin of error – the maximum difference in the results of the exit poll published at 20:00 from the data of the CVU were no higher than 1,2% and the final data did not differ from the elections results by more than 0,9%.

One of the surprises in the presidential elections in 2014 was the support of the newly elected president Petro Poroshenko in all regions of Ukraine and his victory in the first round. So, this was the first time that only one exit poll was held during the presidential elections

The 14th exit poll at the pre-term Parliamentary elections on October 26, 2014, was also conducted not at the whole territory of Ukraine, during the external military aggression from Russia and armed stand-off with pro-Russian militants. The peculiarity of this election, as per sociologists, was the fact that never in a history of elections voters were so uncertain in their choice as before the Parliamentary elections 2014. Only 54% of voters who came to the voting stations answered that they've made up their mind regarding their vote during the last month prior to elections. The rest, i.e. the second half of voters who participated in election, decided on their vote either during the last week before elections or at the voting station. Experts explained the significant differences between pre-election surveys and the exit poll by the availability of the big part of uncertain voters. The exit poll itself recorded quite weak electoral activity of citizens – the level of participation in the Parliamentary elections was significantly lower than at the Presidential elections 2014.

National Exit Poll was conducted at 400 voting stations in all provinces (oblasts) of Ukraine, except for Autonomous Republic of Crimea. In Donetsk and Luhansk provinces the exit poll was conducted at the territories, where elections were conducted.

The survey was conducted by the regular Consortium of Ilko Kucheriv Democratic Initiatives Foundation and two sociological companies – Kyiv International Institute of Sociology and Ukrainian Centre for Economic and Political Researches named after Oleksandr Razumkov (Razumkov Center). Each sociological organization conducted the exit poll at 200 voting stations, thus there were two exit polls conducted at the same time. The overall number of interviewers was 1,000. Totally on the day of elections 17,800 voters were polled. The number of people who participated in the survey made up 73%, at the same time 27% of respondents approached by interviewers refused to answer survey questions.

The maximum difference between exit poll data and election results made up 2,6% for Political Party «Union «Self-Help», the support of which was overestimated, the deviation for other political parties did not exceed 1,9%. These differences were explained by the sociologists by the fact that during the exit poll certain categories of the population were not polled, for example those who voted abroad, at home, in prisons, medical and military institutions, as well as by different readiness of inhabitants of certain regions and supporters of certain parties to participate in the exit poll and honestly answer about their electoral choice (in particular, inhabitants of the West of Ukraine were more open to participating in the exit poll).

For the first time the exit poll questionnaire included the question regarding which problems are considered to be of a top priority for voters. Thus, according to the survey, 46% of participants of Parliamentary elections responded that the top priority for Ukraine is peace and strengthening of the defense capacity of the country.

The National Exit Poll at the Parliamentary elections 2014 was conducted due to the financial support of international donors: International Renaissance Foundation, MATRA program of the Kingdom of the Netherlands Embassy in Ukraine, the National Endowment for Democracy (USA), PACT project of UNITER (Ukraine National Initiatives to Enhance Reforms), and the European Union.

As previously, this exit poll had a Supervisory Board which included members of different civil and media communities, including key observing and monitoring NGOs dealing with elections issues. The Information Sponsor of the National Exit Poll was the National Information Agency Ukrinform.

International professional observers – Joanna Konieczna-Sałamatin, expert at the Institute for Public Affairs, fellow at the Institute of Sociology at the Warsaw University (Poland); Kateryna Kozerenko, Department Head at Levada Centre (Russia); Veronika Bizyukova, expert-consultant at Levada Centre (Russia) – have acquainted themselves with survey methodology, attended voting stations where exit poll was conducted and presented their conclusions at the press-conference.

The general conclusion of the 2014 National Exit Poll was that despite the difficult political situation in the country, it was conducted at the high level and confirmed that the elections were fair and democratic.

Section 2

Anton Grushetskyi, Volodymyr Paniotto, Natalia Kharchenko

METHODOLOGY AND TECHNIQUES OF 2014 NATIONAL EXIT POLL

1. Introduction

On October 26, 2014, on the day of pre-term elections to Verkhovna Rada (Parliament) of Ukraine, the Consortium that included Ilko Kucheriv Democratic Initiatives Foundation, Kyiv International Institute of Sociology (KIIS) and Ukrainian Centre for Economic and Political Researches named after Oleksandr Razumkov (Razumkov Center) conducted **2014 National Exit Poll**.

Overall project management, its financial and media management was implemented by Ilko Kucheriv Democratic Initiatives Foundation. Scientific supervision of the project, sample design and coordination of the poll were conducted by KIIS. Polling at the exits from voting stations was held by Kyiv International Institute of Sociology (KIIS) and Ukrainian Centre for Economic and Political Researches named after Oleksandr Razumkov (Razumkov Center).

Project «2014 NATIONAL EXIT POLL» **was conducted with financial support of international donors:** International Renaissance Foundation, MATRA program of the Kingdom of the Netherlands Embassy in Ukraine, the National Endowment for Democracy (USA), PACT project of UNITER (Ukraine National Initiatives to Enhance Reforms), and the European Union.

Project «2014 NATIONAL EXIT POLL» Manager – **Iryna Bekeshkina**.

Scientific supervisor – **Natalia Kharchenko**.

Polling manager at KIIS – **Anton Grushetskyi**.

Polling managers at Razumkov Centre – **Andrii Bychenko, Mykhailo Mishchenko**.

Consultant – **Volodymyr Paniotto**.

International observers over exit poll and foreign consultants: **Joanna Konieczna-Salamatin** – expert at the Institute for Public Affairs, fellow at the Institute of Sociology at the Warsaw University (Poland); **Kateryna Kozerenko** – expert-consultant at Levada Centre (Russia); **Veronika Bizyukova** – expert-consultant at Levada Centre (Russia).

2. Methodology of exit poll

2.1 Sample

2.1.1 Sample concept

Sampled population of the exit poll are voters who balloted at voting stations on the continental territory of Ukraine (except for specialized voting stations), excluding respectively the temporarily occupied territory of Autonomous Republic of Crimea. Sample was planned as representative for Ukraine in whole and for its 4 regions (West, Center, East, and South¹).

Offered sample concept ensures obtaining unbiased result and equal chances for each voter to be polled.

Sample is representative for each of two companies. The level of results coherence of both research companies serves as an additional tool of quality control.

Sample is two-stage stratified. The stratification was conducted by two features – province (oblast) and the type of settlement (city/town or village), there were 49 strata distinguished (24 provinces, each of which has rural and urban population, and the city of Kyiv). The number of city/town and village voting stations that were subject for selection was represented in an equal proportion, and the distribution of voting stations between province (oblast) strata was carried out proportionally to the number of voting stations in each province.

At the first stage of selection voting stations in each stratum were selected with equal probability. Further the sample was divided between two research companies by means of systematic selection – each second voting station was given to one company, and the rest of voting stations made up the sample of another company.

At the second stage of selection the random systematic (step-by-step) selection of voters at the voting station was conducted. The constant step of selection was used during the day of elections without specifying the necessary number of conducted interviews. At that each voting station was «self-weighting», i.e. the number of respondents selected at each station was proportional to the number of persons who came to vote at this station and, accordingly, the number of polled persons in each stratum was proportional to the number of those who came to vote in this stratum.

Used methodology of sample design and systematic selection of respondents in one step provides the possibility to receive independent from the Central Elections Committee evaluation of the structure of those who participated in elections if not by provinces (due to the insufficient number of voting stations in each province) then by earlier defined four regions.

¹ **West** – Zakarpacie, Volyn, Rivne, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Ternopil, Chernivtsy and Khmelnytsky provinces (oblasts); **Center** – Zhitomyr, Vinnitsa, Kirovograd, Cherkasy, Poltava, Sumy, Chernihiv, Kyiv provinces (oblasts) and the City of Kyiv; **South** – Odesa, Mykolaiv, Kherson, Zaporizhia and Dnipropetrovsk provinces (oblasts); **East** – Kharkiv, Donetsk and Luhansk provinces (oblasts)

2.1.2 Voting stations and voters that were not included into the sample

Sampled population of the exit poll are voters who balloted at the voting stations on the continental territory of Ukraine. At that the specialized voting stations (hospitals, prisons, etc.), foreign electoral district, as well as voting stations in Donetsk and Luhansk provinces (oblasts) where elections were not conducted, were excluded from the sample. In case specialized voting stations got into the sample, they were replaced. The selection of the replacement was conducted by random selection within the province (oblast) boundaries.

Voters who voted at their homes were also not included into the sample.

2.1.3. Sample size, sampling spacing, planned sample error

The number of voting stations included into the sample is 400 (200 for each of research companies). The stations for each company were distributed proportionally between all strata (see Paragraph 2.1.1).

It was planned in average to poll approximately 45 respondents at each voting station, thus approximately 18,000 respondents. The total number of polled respondents is 17,610.

Calculations of the step of selection were based on the previous experience of exit polls and electoral statistics data²:

Total number of electoral districts*	198
The number of voting stations	29 786
The number of voters included into the voters lists at the voting stations, where election was organized and conducted	30 921 218
The number of voters in the extract from the list of voters for voting at the place of temporary residence	838 136
The number of voters who participated in voting at the voting stations	15 258 203
The number of voters who participated in voting at the place of temporary residence	722 674
General number of voters who participated in voting	16 052 228
Expected voting turnout	60%
Real voting turnout (among those voters at whose voting stations election was organized and conducted)	52,4%
Average number of voters**	1098
The number of voting bulletins for voting in national multi-mandate electoral district recognized null and void	298 402

* The data is dealing only with those territories where election was organized and conducted.

** The average number of voters was calculated for all voting stations, including those where election was not organized and conducted.

² Minutes of the Central Elections Committee on Elections to Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine Results// http://cvk.gov.ua/info/protokol_bmvo_ndu_26102014.pdf

Based upon the experience of previous exit polls, the average step was defined at level 12 (the same step was used, in particular, at the Presidential elections on May 25, 2014).

The experience of previous exit polls shows that using selection step 12 at big voting stations in the morning hours of the highest activity of voters, interviewers should poll 20 persons per hour, i.e. spend less than 3 minutes for polling, which was obviously not enough.

That is why for the province (oblast) centers due to the big size of the voting stations we've selected the «technical» selection step of 18, to decrease interviewers' workload (later we've introduced the weight 1,5 to reevaluate the step to 12). Therefore the step equaled 18 for province (oblast) centers and 12 for other towns and villages.

Planning of the sample error was conducted due to the following reasons. Statistical sample error taking into account design-effect does not exceed 1,3%; nevertheless there are difficulties to estimate systematic errors, which depend upon many factors (including weather conditions). Relying on the experience of previous exit polls, which were carried out using the same methodology, we assume that sample error will not exceed 2,5% for the leaders and will be within the range of 0,5%-1,5% for other parties. During the Presidential elections on May 25, 2014, the maximum sample error for all candidates did not exceed 1,2%.

2.2 Data collection methods and tools

Data collection during the exit poll was carried out by means of «secret ballot», when the respondent was offered to independently mark answers regarding his/her electoral choices on the special form with the names of parties and to put it into the sealed cardboard box containing the questionnaires of other voters. Using the methodology of «secret ballot» during exit polls offers the possibility to raise the level of respondents' trust to the anonymity of the polling and to avoid interviewer's influence. Interviewer's participation was allowed only in special cases, for example, when respondent could not fill the form because of the poor eyesight.

The main question of the questionnaire was about the vote of the respondent, on top of that, the questionnaire offered to answer several additional questions mainly of a demographic character, but it was stressed that these questions were not obligatory. Additional questions included the following parameters: gender, age group, education, time of making decisions about the vote, etc.

Questionnaires were prepared both in Ukrainian and in Russian. The respondent could choose the language that was more comfortable for him/her.

2.3 Data collection

2.3.1 Interviewers' training

Approximately 1,000 interviewers participated in the survey, two persons at regular voting stations and three at very big stations as a rule located in province (oblast) centers. Almost all interviewers have completed the general training and had practical experience of work. If one of the interviewers at the voting station did not meet the criteria he/she was offered to count voters who already made their choice with the given step at the exit from the station and direct contact with potential respondents was done by more experienced colleague.

Before the exit poll regional groups of interviewers completed centrally managed training by supervisors-instructors from research organizations. The consulting over the phone was provided prior to as well as on the day of survey.

2.3.2 Polling procedure

The procedure included the following stages:

- Interviewer chooses the respondent using the set step.
- Interviewer asks respondent to participate in the survey, using the text of appeal. During this contact the details of the research necessary to get the most sincere information are provided.
- In case respondent agrees to participate, the interviewer offers respondent to choose the language that would be more comfortable for filling in the questionnaire. Then respondent is given the questionnaire and offered to fill it in individually, fold it and put into the box.
- If the chosen respondent refused to participate, the refusal was recorded (reasons for refusal and approximate age of a person) in the «Refusals register». The respondent who refused to participate was then replaced with the following one.

The poll was conducted in the following time intervals:

In the regional (oblast) centers, other towns and urban settlements	8.00–20.00
In villages	8.00–17.00

The percentage of those who participated in the poll (Response Rate) made up 73%. The division of the reasons for refusal is given below:

The reason was not named	35,1
No free time	21,1
I've voted, but do not want to answer	17,9
I do not want my choice to be known	15,4
I do not believe in the fairness of elections	2,9
I do not trust sociologists	2,6

I was recommended not to answer	1,3
Other reasons	4,4

As it can be seen from the following table, the comparison of demographic data of voters who agreed to participate in the poll and those who refused to participate discovered several significant differences:

- Elderly people (from 60 years old and older) and youth (up to 30 years old) were more eager to participate in the exit poll. People aged 40-59 years old were less eager to participate.
- Inhabitants of the Western regions agreed to participate more often, inhabitants of the Southern and Eastern regions agreed to participate less often.
- According to the type of settlement the biggest number of refusals was recorded in province centers and towns with population exceeding 100,000 people, and the most active participants of exit poll were rural residents.

	Respondents	Nonrespondents	Difference
Gender			
Male	46,3	45,7	0,6
Female	53,7	54,3	- 0,6
Age			
18–29	15,6	14,6	1,0*
30–39	18,5	17,6	0,9
40–49	19,1	21,5	- 2,3**
50–59	21,1	23,1	- 2,1**
60 y.o. and older	25,6	23,2	2,5**
Macro-regions			
Western	29,0	22,3	6,7**
Central	37,2	36,3	0,8
Southern	23,6	28,3	- 5,9
Eastern	10,3	13,1	- 2,8**
Type of settlement			
Regional (oblast) center	34,5	37,7	- 3,1**
Town with the population of 100,000 and more inhabitants	7,0	8,8	- 1,8**
Town with the population from 50,000 up to 100,000 inhabitants	4,8	5,1	- 0,3
Town with the population from 20,000 up to 49,000 inhabitants	4,8	3,7	1,1**
Town with the population of less than 20,000 inhabitants	6,1	5,8	0,3
Urban settlement	7,5	7,9	- 0,5
Village	35,3	31,0	4,3**

2.5 Supervision over interviewers' work

10% cross-control over interviewers' work was implemented in the survey, i.e. supervisors from Razumkov Center controlled the stations where KIIS was polling and visa versa. Research organizations in addition to that conducted internal check-ups of work of their own polling networks. Besides that, regional observations of polling were conducted by invited survey auditors. The supervision was held throughout the whole election day and its results were regularly reported to the main office.

The supervision was implemented by means of visual observation, at that special attention was paid to the following details:

- The availability of two interviewers with recognizable badges and boxes for questionnaires collection at the exit from the voting station.
- Implementation of the «secret ballot» procedure.
- Keeping the selection step.
- Refusals registration.

Supervision results did not reveal any serious differences from the polling procedure. In case of registration of insignificant procedure violations (for example, the work of only one interviewer while the intensity of voting was decreasing, the growth of number of omitted respondents, crowding of people at the exits from big stations, etc.) the corrections in the work at the voting stations were made at once.

2.6 Data reporting and processing

2.6.1 Data reporting

Polling data were reported by interviewers to regional group leaders over the phone: four reports from the cities and towns voting stations and three reports from villages during the day.

As new information became available regional group leaders transmitted the data to the central office in Kyiv over phone, fax or e-mail for each polling station separately.

On the next day after the survey regional group leaders collected paper questionnaires, checked if the information provided was correct and sent data to Kyiv.

2.6.2 Entering data

Coding and entering data was done using standardized forms in statistic packages OCA and SPSS. Final data were presented in SPSS format for Windows and OCA. Entering data was performed in two stages. During the day of exit poll aggregated data were entered at the level of voting stations. Upon receipt of paper

questionnaires from all regions the data were entered once again, at the individual level.

2.6.3 Methodology of weighing data

We've used two types of weights – intermediate and final. Intermediate weights were used for the first dissemination of the information, which took place right after the voting stations were closed. At that time there was no complete information (in particular, there was no information about voting in the cities and towns after 18:00, as interviewers sent us information as of 18:00 and continued working).

Intermediate weights compensated the absence of this information.

Final weights were used upon receipt of complete information. They included:

The weight that compensates the difference of steps.

Basically, the methodology of research foresaw the polling with single step (12), but in province centers twice as big «technical» step was used (18) so that interviewers had time to poll all those who got into the sample. That is why the usage of this weight includes the number of those polled in province centers, which would be if the step was 12 and not 18.

The weight that compensates pre-schedule end of works.

In cities and towns the polling was carried out until the end of voting (20:00), and in the villages the works were over at 17:00. That is why for the data received from villages the weight that allowed foreseeing what data would be collected if interviewers worked until 20:00 was applied. The data of post-electoral research from previous years were used to calculate this weight.

The weight that compensates disproportion of sample according to the type of settlement.

The sample included equal number of voting stations in cities and villages, though the general number of voting stations in villages is bigger (the correlation between the stations makes up approximately 45% to 55%). The weight compensated the disproportion.

The final weight is a product of three abovementioned weights.

3. Comparison of exit poll data with elections results

Exit poll data were updated three times:


- Right after the voting stations were closed – based on generalization of polling data completed at 18:00 and received over the phone;
- 3 hours after the voting stations were closed – with added data collected at the stations where work lasted until 20:00 (also received over the phone);
- Upon receipt of questionnaires hard copies from provinces and entering their data.
- That is why we compared preliminary and final exit poll data with election results.

Table 1 and Diagram 1 show the comparison of exit poll data announced after the voting stations were closed and election results.

Table 1. **Data of 2014 National Exit Poll as of 18:00 on voting results by voters of Ukraine on October 26, 2014:**

Political Party:	Election results	Exit poll data as of 18:00	Difference
Political Party «People's Front»	22,14	21,33	0,81
Party «Petro Poroshenko's Block»	21,82	23,05	-1,23
Political Party «Union «Self-Help»	10,97	13,20	-2,23
Political Party «Opposition Block»	9,43	7,62	1,81
Oleh Liashko's Radical Party	7,44	6,44	1,00
Political Party «All-Ukrainian Union «Motherland»	5,68	5,56	0,12
Political Party «All-Ukrainian Union «Freedom»	4,71	6,32	-1,61
Communist party of Ukraine	3,88	2,91	0,97
Serhii Tihipko's Party «Strong Ukraine»	3,11	2,60	0,51
Political Party «Civic Position (Anatolii Hrytsenko)»	3,10	3,46	-0,36
Political Party «All-Ukrainian Agrarian Union «Spade»	2,65	1,79	0,86
Political Party «Right Sector»	1,80	2,40	-0,60
Party «Solidarity of Women of Ukraine»	0,66	0,63	0,03
Political Party «5.10»	0,42	0,47	-0,05
Political Party «Internet Party of Ukraine»	0,36	0,37	-0,01
Party of Greens of Ukraine	0,25	0,24	0,01
Ukrainian Party «Green Planet»	0,23	0,25	-0,02
Party «Renaissance»	0,19	0,17	0,02
Political Party «Single Country»	0,17	0,23	-0,06
Political Party «New Politics»	0,12	0,10	0,02
Political Party «All-Ukrainian Political Union «Ukraine Is a Single Country»	0,12	0,17	-0,05
Political Party «People's Force»	0,11	0,11	0,00
Political Party «Ukraine of Future»	0,08	0,08	0,00
Political Party «Force and Honesty»	0,08	0,13	-0,05
Political Party «Civic Movement of Ukraine»	0,08	0,05	0,03
Political Party «National Democratic Party of Ukraine»	0,07	0,08	-0,01
Political Party «Block of Left Forces of Ukraine»	0,07	0,09	-0,02
Liberal Party of Ukraine	0,05	0,04	0,01
Political Party «Congress of Ukrainian Nationalists»	0,05	0,11	-0,06

Diagram 1. **Comparing the exit poll data, announced at 20:00 with election results (parties that received more than 1% of votes).**



Preliminary exit poll data differ from election results for not more than 2,2%.

Table 2 shows results of comparison of updated exit poll data and data, received not over the phone, but in hard copies.

Table 2. **Final results of 2014 National Exit Poll on voting by Ukrainians on October 26, 2014:**

Political Party:	Election results, % FOR	Final results of the exit poll	Comparison by Central Election Committee
Political Party «People's Front»	22,14	21,32	0,82
Party «Petro Poroshenko's Block»	21,82	23,31	-1,49
Political Party «Union «Self-Help»	10,97	13,57	-2,60
Political Party «Opposition Block»	9,43	7,56	1,87
Oleh Liashko's Radical Party	7,44	6,43	1,01
Political Party «All-Ukrainian Union «Motherland»	5,68	5,46	0,22
Political Party «All-Ukrainian Union «Freedom»	4,71	6,25	-1,54
Communist party of Ukraine	3,88	2,77	1,11
Serhii Tihipko's Party «Strong Ukraine»	3,11	2,61	0,50
Political Party «Civic Position (Anatolii Hrytsenko)»	3,10	3,40	-0,30
Political Party «All-Ukrainian Agrarian Union «Spade»	2,65	1,74	0,91
Political Party «Right Sector»	1,80	2,47	-0,67

Political Party:	Election results, % FOR	Final results of the exit poll	Comparison by Central Election Committee
Party «Solidarity of Women of Ukraine»	0,66	0,58	0,08
Political Party «5.10»	0,42	0,51	-0,09
Political Party «Internet Party of Ukraine»	0,36	0,37	-0,01
Party of Greens of Ukraine	0,25	0,22	0,03
Ukrainian Party «Green Planet»	0,23	0,24	-0,01
Party «Renaissance»	0,19	0,13	0,06
Political Party «Single Country»	0,17	0,23	-0,06
Political Party «New Politics»	0,12	0,09	0,03
Political Party «All-Ukrainian Political Union «Ukraine Is a Single Country»	0,12	0,17	-0,05
Political Party «People's Force»	0,11	0,12	-0,01
Political Party «Ukraine of Future»	0,08	0,08	0,00
Political Party «Force and Honesty»	0,08	0,08	0,00
Political Party «Civic Movement of Ukraine»	0,08	0,05	0,03
Political Party «National Democratic Party of Ukraine»	0,07	0,05	0,02
Political Party «Block of Left Forces of Ukraine»	0,07	0,10	-0,03
Liberal Party of Ukraine	0,05	0,04	0,01
Political Party «Congress of Ukrainian Nationalists»	0,05	0,05	0,00

As we can see the maximum difference between exit poll data and election results makes up 2,6% for «Union «Self-Help», the support of which was overestimated. The deviation for other political forces did not exceed 1,9%. The difference can be explained by either occasional stochastic deviation or the fact that we, as it was already mentioned, did not poll certain categories of population that participated in elections: those who voted abroad, at their homes, in prisons and medical institutions, it was also impossible to poll military men. The differences can also be connected with different preparedness of inhabitants of certain regions and supporters of certain parties to participate in the exit poll and sincerely answer about their electoral choice (in particular, as mentioned earlier, inhabitants of the West of Ukraine were more eager to participate in the exit poll).

Section 3

Mykhailo MISHCHENKO

ELECTORATE OF PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS IN DEMOGRAPHIC SURVEYS

The results of exit poll provide the possibility to analyze peculiarities of voting and the level of electoral activity of the representatives of socio-demographic groups of voters, distinguished by region, settlement type, age, and gender characteristics and according to the level of education.

The differences between the regions of Ukraine in the level of support of political forces appear during each election. During the last Parliamentary elections, according to the exit poll data, Party «Petro Poroshenko's Bloc» received the most support in the Central and Southern regions, Political Party «People's Front» in the Western region, and Political Party «Opposition Bloc» in the Eastern region and in Donbas.

Among political parties that did not clear 5% election threshold, the biggest difference in the level of electoral support between the regions has the Communist Party of Ukraine – in Donbas it has 10% support and in the Western region the support was only 0,3%.

The number of those who answered that all parties were crossed out or the bulletin was spoiled was the highest in Donbas (3,1%) comparing to the rest of the country.

Table 1. «Please mark for which political party did you just vote at the Parliamentary elections of Ukraine?», division by regions, %

	Ukraine in whole, N=17610	Regions*:				
		Western, N=3893	Central, N=7158	Southern, N=1555	Eastern, N=3418	Donbas, N=1586
Party «Petro Poroshenko's Bloc»	23,0	22,3	26,8	24,1	17,5	12,9
Political Party «People's Front»	21,0	31,5	22,2	12,3	12,3	8,1
Political Party «Union «Self-Help»	13,4	16,2	14,0	9,7	12,0	6,0
Political Party «Opposition Bloc»	7,5	0,7	2,4	11,4	20,9	25,4
Oleh Liashko's Radical Party	6,3	5,6	7,6	4,7	5,5	6,0

Continuation of Table 1.

	Ukraine in whole, N=17610	Regions*:				
		Western, N=3893	Central, N=7158	Southern, N=1555	Eastern, N=3418	Donbas, N=1586
Political Party «All Ukrainian Union «Freedom»	6,2	7,8	7,2	3,8	3,8	2,3
Political Party «All-Ukrainian Union «Motherland»	5,4	4,5	6,0	5,0	6,1	2,2
Political Party «Civic Position (Anatolii Hrytsenko»	3,4	3,8	3,2	3,4	3,3	2,2
Communist Party of Ukraine	2,7	0,3	1,4	6,0	5,4	10,0
Serhii Tihipko's Party «Strong Ukraine»	2,6	0,8	1,3	7,9	4,2	5,8
Political Party «Right Sector»	2,4	2,5	2,3	2,3	2,3	4,2
Political Party «All- Ukrainian Agrarian Union «Spade»	1,7	1,6	1,8	2,9	1,4	0,5
Other parties	3,1	1,8	2,7	4,6	3,7	8,0
Crossed off all parties or spoiled bulletins	0,8	0,3	0,6	1,2	0,9	3,1
Do not remember their vote	0,5	0,2	0,4	0,5	0,7	2,6
Questionnaire incorrectly filled in	0,2	0,1	0,2	0,2	0,1	0,9

* **Western region** – Zakarpattia, Volyn, Rivne, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Ternopil, Chernivtsi provinces (oblasts);

Central region – Zhytomyr, Vinnitsa, Kyiv, Kirovohrad, Cherkasy, Poltava, Sumy, Cherkas, Khmelnytsky provinces and the city of Kyiv;

Southern region – Odesa, Mykolaiv, Kherson provinces;

Eastern region – Zaporizhzhia, Dnipropetrovsk, Kharkiv provinces;

Donbas – Donetsk and Luhansk provinces.

As it can be seen from the Table 2, the significant differences are observed in the support of political parties by city residents and villagers. However, largely they were dependent on the different level of regions' urbanization, that is why there was a sense to survey these differences in voting of urban and village inhabitants separately in accordance to the regions of residence (see Table 3).

Table 2. «Please mark for which political party did you just vote at the Parliamentary elections of Ukraine?», responses in accordance to the type of settlement, %

	Cities, towns and urban settlements, N=12737	Villages, N=4873
Party «Petro Poroshenko's Bloc»	21,9**	25,0**
Political Party «People's Front»	18,5**	25,6**
Political Party «Union «Self-Help»	16,4**	7,9**
Political Party «Opposition Bloc»	8,9**	4,7**
Oleh Liashko's Radical Party	4,9**	8,9**
Political Party «All-Ukrainian Union «Freedom»	6,7**	5,3**
Political Party «All-Ukrainian Union «Motherland»	4,9**	6,3**
Political Party «Civic Position (Anatolii Hrytsenko)»	3,7**	2,8**
Communist Party of Ukraine	3,1**	2,0**
Serhii Tihipko's Party «Strong Ukraine»	2,6	2,5
Political Party «Right Sector»	3,0**	1,4**
Political Party «All-Ukrainian Agrarian Union «Spade»	0,8**	3,3**
Other parties	3,4**	2,4**
Crossed off all parties or spoiled bulletins	0,7	0,8
Do not remember their vote	0,3**	0,9**
Questionnaire incorrectly filled in	0,1	0,3

* The difference is statistically important at the level $p < 0.05$

** The difference is statistically important at the level $p < 0.01$

Rural inhabitants voted for Party «Petro Poroshenko's Bloc» more often in the Central and the Southern regions (in other regions no statistically important differences in voting for this political force between urban and rural areas were observed). Villagers of the West and the Center of the country gave more votes to Political Party «People's Front», i.e. in those regions where this political force received the biggest support. The difference was especially notable in the Western region, where this party received 36,9% of rural inhabitants and only 26,0% of urban residents. Villagers supported Oleh Liashko's Radical Party more often in all regions except for the Southern region, and Political Party «All-Ukrainian Union «Motherland» in the Western, Central and Southern regions, as well as Serhii Tihipko's Party «Strong Ukraine» in the Central region, and Political Party «All-Ukrainian Agrarian Union «Spade» – in the Central, Southern and Eastern regions.

Urban residents voted for the Political Party «Union «Self-Help» more often than villagers in all regions, for Political Party «All-Ukrainian Union «Freedom» in the Central, Southern and Eastern regions, for Political Party «Opposition Bloc»

in Donbas, for Political Party «Civic Position (Anatolii Hrytsenko)» in the Western region, and for the Communist Party of Ukraine in the Southern region. Political Party «Right Sector» was voted for by urban residents in the Western and Central regions and by rural inhabitants in Donbas.

Table 3. «Please mark for which political party did you just vote at the Parliamentary elections of Ukraine?», responses depending on regions and the type of settlement, %

	Western region		Central region	
	Cities, towns and urban settlements, N=2237	Villages, N=1656	Cities, towns and urban settlements, N=5103	Villages, N=2055
Party «Petro Poroshenko's Bloc»	22,5	22,1	25,5**	29,3**
Political Party «People's Front»	26,0**	36,9**	21,0**	24,3**
Political Party «Union «Self-Help»	20,7**	11,8**	18,0**	6,3**
Political Party «Opposition Bloc»	0,7	0,7	2,6	2,0
Oleh Liashko's Radical Party	4,4**	6,8**	5,5**	11,7**
Political Party «All-Ukrainian Union «Freedom»	8,1	7,6	8,4**	5,1**
Political Party «All-Ukrainian Union «Motherland»	3,8*	5,1*	5,5**	7,1**
Political Party «Civic Position (Anatolii Hrytsenko)»	5,0**	2,7**	3,3	3,0
Communist Party of Ukraine	0,4	0,2	1,5	1,2
Serhii Tihipko's Party «Strong Ukraine»	1,0	0,6	1,1*	1,7*
Political Party «Right Sector»	3,8**	1,2**	2,9**	1,1**
Political Party «All-Ukrainian Agrarian Union «Spade»	1,4	1,8	0,5**	4,1**
Other parties	1,6	1,9	3,0**	1,9**
Crossed off all parties or spoiled bulletins	0,4	0,3	0,8*	0,3*
Do not remember their vote	0,1	0,3	0,2**	0,7**
Questionnaire incorrectly filled in	0,1	0,1	0,1	0,2

	Southern region		Eastern region	
	Cities, towns and urban settlements, N=1125	Villages, N=430	Cities, towns and urban settlements, N=3015	Villages, N=403
Party «Petro Poroshenko's Bloc»	21,1**	29,1**	17,1	19,0
Political Party «People's Front»	12,2	12,3	12,8	9,7
Political Party «Union «Self-Help»	12,4**	5,1**	13,4**	5,2**

Political Party «Opposition Bloc»	12,3	9,9	21,1	20,1
Oleh Liashko's Radical Party	4,9	4,2	4,3**	11,2**
Political Party «All-Ukrainian Union «Freedom»	4,7*	2,2*	4,2*	1,6*
Political Party «All-Ukrainian Union «Motherland»	4,0*	6,9*	5,7	7,8
Political Party «Civic Position (Anatolii Hrytsenko)»	3,2	3,9	3,6	1,5
Communist Party of Ukraine	7,2**	4,0**	5,2	6,0
Serhii Tihipko's Party «Strong Ukraine»	7,2	9,0	4,1	4,4
Political Party «Right Sector»	3,4	0,5	2,6	1,1
Political Party «All-Ukrainian Agrarian Union «Spade»	1,5**	5,5**	0,7**	4,8**
Other parties	4,8	4,2	4,0	2,6
Crossed off all parties or spoiled bulletins	1,0	1,7	0,6**	2,5**
Do not remember their vote	0,1	1,0	0,4**	2,3**
Questionnaire incorrectly filled in	0,0	0,5	0,1	0,0

	Donbas	
	Cities, towns and urban settlements, N=1257	Villages, N=329
Party «Petro Poroshenko's Bloc»	14,1	10,4
Political Party «People's Front»	8,4	7,5
Political Party «Union «Self-Help»	7,7**	2,5**
Political Party «Opposition Bloc»	28,2**	19,6**
Oleh Liashko's Radical Party	4,9**	8,6**
Political Party «All-Ukrainian Union «Freedom»	2,5	1,8
Political Party «All-Ukrainian Union «Motherland»	2,0	2,5
Political Party «Civic Position (Anatolii Hrytsenko)»	2,2	2,1
Communist Party of Ukraine	9,1	12,1
Serhii Tihipko's Party «Strong Ukraine»	5,5	6,1
Political Party «Right Sector»	2,0**	8,9**
Political Party «All-Ukrainian Agrarian Union «Spade»	0,7	0,0
Other parties	8,2	7,1
Crossed off all parties or spoiled bulletins	2,7	3,9
Do not remember their vote	1,5**	4,6**
Questionnaire incorrectly filled in	0,3	2,1

* The difference is statistically important at the level $p < 0.05$

** The difference is statistically important at the level $p < 0.01$

Regarding the differences in electoral preferences of representatives of different age groups, there is a possibility to determine the higher level of the electoral support of Party «Petro Poroshenko's Bloc» in older age groups comparing to young voters. With the age growing the electoral support of the Communist Party of Ukraine, Political Party «Opposition Bloc», Political Party «All-Ukrainian Union «Motherland», Political Party «All-Ukrainian Union «Freedom», Political Party «Civic Position (Anatolii Hrytsenko)» was growing. The younger the respondents, the more often they've voted for Political Party «Union «Self-Help» and Political Party «Right Sector» (see Table 4).

Table 4. «Please mark for which political party did you just vote at the Parliamentary elections of Ukraine?», responses depending on the age of respondents, %

	18–29 y.o., N=2613	30–39 y.o., N=3197	40–49 y.o., N=3285	50–59 y.o., N=3641	60 y.o. and older, N=4458
Party «Petro Poroshenko's Bloc»	19,9	21,9	23,2	24,9	24,0
Political Party «People's Front»	21,7	21,0	20,4	20,4	22,1
Political Party «Union «Self-Help»	19,1	18,9	15,9	11,1	6,0
Political Party «Opposition Bloc»	5,3	5,5	6,6	8,3	10,0
Oleh Liashko's Radical Party	7,6	5,0	5,3	6,5	7,0
Political Party «All-Ukrainian Union «Freedom»	4,3	5,2	6,6	7,0	7,1
Political Party «All-Ukrainian Union «Motherland»	3,3	4,5	5,4	6,2	6,6
Political Party «Civic Position (Anatolii Hrytsenko)»	2,7	2,8	3,3	4,1	3,7
Communist Party of Ukraine	0,6	1,6	1,8	2,3	5,8
Serhii Tihipko's Party «Strong Ukraine»	2,9	2,9	3,1	1,9	2,3
Political Party «Right Sector»	4,2	3,4	2,6	2,1	0,8
Political Party «All-Ukrainian Agrarian Union «Spade»	1,7	1,7	1,5	2,1	1,1
Other parties	5,0	3,7	3,1	2,2	2,0
Crossed off all parties or spoiled bulletins	1,0	1,3	0,8	0,5	0,5
Do not remember their vote	0,6	0,3	0,3	0,4	0,7
Questionnaire incorrectly filled in	0,1	0,2	0,0	0,1	0,2

Women voted for Political Party «People's Front», Political Party «Opposition Bloc» and Political Party «All-Ukrainian Union «Motherland» more often than men,

and men voted more for Political Party «Union «Self-Help», Oleh Liashko's Radical Party, Political Party «All-Ukrainian Union «Freedom», Political Party «Civic Position (Anatolii Hrytsenko)» and Political Party «Right Sector» (see Table 5).

Table 5. «Please mark for which political party did you just vote at the Parliamentary elections of Ukraine?», responses depending on the gender of respondents, %

	Men, N=7913	Women N=9229
Party «Petro Poroshenko's Bloc»	23,1	22,9
Political Party «People's Front»	18,6**	23,3**
Political Party «Union «Self-Help»	14,1*	13,0*
Political Party «Opposition Bloc»	6,2**	8,4**
Oleh Liashko's Radical Party	6,8**	5,8**
Political Party «All-Ukrainian Union «Freedom»	7,9**	4,7**
Political Party «All-Ukrainian Union «Motherland»	4,9**	5,8**
Political Party «Civic Position (Anatolii Hrytsenko)»	3,7*	3,1*
Communist Party of Ukraine	2,9	2,5
Serhii Tihipko's Party «Strong Ukraine»	2,6	2,5
Political Party «Right Sector»	2,9**	2,0**
Political Party «All-Ukrainian Agrarian Union «Spade»	1,6	1,7
Other parties	3,0	3,0
Crossed off all parties or spoiled bulletins	0,8	0,7
Do not remember their vote	0,5	0,5
Questionnaire incorrectly filled in	0,2	0,1

* The difference is statistically important at the level $p < 0.05$

** The difference is statistically important at the level $p < 0.01$

Regarding the differences in the electoral behavior depending on the level of education of voters, the results of the exit poll provide the grounds for saying that the support of Political Party «People's Front», Oleh Liashko's Radical Party, Communist Party of Ukraine, Political Party «All-Ukrainian Agrarian Union «Spade» is decreasing when the educational level of respondents is growing (see Table 6). At the same time the intention to vote for Political Party «Union «Self-Help», Political Party «All-Ukrainian Union «Freedom», Political Party «Civic Position (Anatolii Hrytsenko)», Political Party «Right Sector», on the contrary, becomes higher when the educational level of voters is higher.

Table 6. «Please mark for which political party did you just vote at the Parliamentary elections of Ukraine?», responses depending on the level of education of respondents, %

	Incomplete secondary education, N=914	Secondary education, N=2960	Vocational secondary education, N=5675	Higher or incomplete higher education, N=7492
Party «Petro Poroshenko's Bloc»	20,6	23,1	24,1	22,3
Political Party «People's Front»	25,5	23,9	22,8	18,2
Political Party «Union «Self-Help»	5,8	7,7	10,1	19,6
Political Party «Opposition Bloc»	6,7	8,3	7,7	7,1
Oleh Liashko's Radical Party	11,3	10,3	6,9	3,4
Political Party «All-Ukrainian Union «Freedom»	4,7	5,4	6,2	6,7
Political Party «All-Ukrainian Union «Motherland»	6,2	5,3	5,8	4,9
Political Party «Civic Position (Anatolii Hrytsenko)»	1,9	2,6	3,1	4,1
Communist Party of Ukraine	4,9	3,0	2,6	2,3
Serhii Tihipko's Party «Strong Ukraine»	2,2	2,0	2,7	2,8
Political Party «Right Sector»	1,1	1,6	2,0	3,3
Political Party «All-Ukrainian Agrarian Union «Spade»	2,5	2,0	1,9	1,2
Other parties	3,1	2,9	2,8	3,2
Crossed off all parties or spoiled bulletins	0,9	0,7	0,9	0,6
Do not remember their vote	2,2	1,0	0,3	0,2
Questionnaire incorrectly filled in	0,3	0,2	0,1	0,1

In general, summing up the connection between voting for political parties during elections and socio-demographic characteristics of voters, based on the coefficients analysis of Cramer's V correlation, which characterizes the level of correlation connection, we can state that the support by voters of «Petro Poroshenko's Bloc», «People's Front», «Opposition Bloc», Communist Party of Ukraine, Serhii Tihipko's Party «Strong Ukraine» is in the closest correlation with the region of residence (see Table 7). To a greater extent out of all political forces the electoral support of the Political Party «Opposition Bloc» correlates with the region of residence (the value of Cramer's correlation coefficient makes up 0,325).

Regarding the support of Political Party «All-Ukrainian Union «Freedom» the role played by the region can be compared to the role played by gender of respondents,

and in the support of Political Party «All-Ukrainian Union «Motherland» it's also the age that matters. The voting for the Political Party «Union «Self-Help» is mainly connected with the level of education and the age of voters, voting for Oleh Liashko's Radical Party is related to the level of education, voting for Political Party «Right Sector» is connected with the age of respondents, and voting for Political Party «All-Ukrainian Agrarian Union «Spade» is related to the type of settlement.

Table 7. Levels of connection between the distribution of votes for political forces and socio-demographic characteristics of voters (Cramer's V)*

	Socio-demographic characteristics:				
	Region of residence	Type of settlement	Age	Gender	Educational
Party «Petro Poroshenko's Bloc»	0,096	0,035	0,040	0,003	0,023
Political Party «People's Front»	0,187	0,083	0,018	0,058	0,065
Political Party «Union «Self-Help»	0,072	0,119	0,152	0,016	0,158
Political Party «Opposition Bloc»	0,325	0,076	0,070	0,040	0,018
Oleh Liashko's Radical Party	0,046	0,079	0,039	0,021	0,117
Political Party «All-Ukrainian Union «Freedom»	0,078	0,028	0,044	0,065	0,025
Political Party «All-Ukrainian Union «Motherland»	0,042	0,028	0,051	0,020	0,020
Political Party «Civic Position (Anatolii Hrytsenko)»	0,020	0,023	0,029	0,019	0,038
Communist Party of Ukraine	0,161	0,034	0,116	0,013	0,037
Serhii Tihipko's Party «Strong Ukraine»	0,144	0,004	0,030	0,002	0,019
Political Party «Right Sector»	0,025	0,050	0,077	0,028	0,052
Political Party «All-Ukrainian Agrarian Union «Spade»	0,038	0,091	0,028	0,004	0,031
Other parties	0,078	0,027	0,062	0,000	0,011
Crossed off all parties or spoiled bulletins	0,064	0,002	0,037	0,009	0,020

* Coefficients marked in Bold are statistically important at the level $p < 0,001$; marked in *Italic Bold* are coefficients statistically important at the level $p < 0,01$; marked in *Italic* are coefficients statistically important at the level $p < 0,05$, all other coefficients are statistically unimportant at the level $p > 0,05$.

The differences in the level of support of political parties by the representatives of different socio-demographic groups cause the differences in electorate characteristics of these political forces (see Table 8). First of all there is a need to note significant differences in the «regional» structure of electorate. Thus, among the voters for Political Party «People's Front» there are 81% of inhabitants of the Western and Central regions, among voters for Political Party «All-Ukrainian Union «Freedom» their number makes up 80,2%, among voters for Political Party «Union «Self-Help» their number makes up 73,2%, among voters for Party «Petro Poroshenko's Bloc» – 72,2%, among voters for Oleh Liashko's Radical Party their number makes up 71,6%, among voters for Political Party «Civic Position (Anatolii Hrytsenko)» – 68%, among voters for Political Party «All-Ukrainian Union «Motherland» their number makes up 66,7%, among voters for Political Party «All-Ukrainian Agrarian Union «Spade» – 65,9%, among voters for Political Party «Right Sector» their number makes up 64,3%; at the same time 84,8% of voters for Political Party «Opposition Bloc» are inhabitants of the Southern and Eastern regions and Donbas, as well as 76,3% of voters for the Communist Party of Ukraine and 71,5% of voters for Serhii Tihipko's Party «Strong Ukraine».

The biggest part of the urban population is amongst the electorate of Political Party «Right Sector» (79,7%), Political Party «Union «Self-Help» (79,1%), Political Party «Opposition Bloc» (77,5%), Communist Party of Ukraine (74,3%); the majority of rural inhabitants is amongst the electorate of Political Party «All-Ukrainian Agrarian Union «Spade» (68,1%) and Oleh Liashko's Radical Party (49,8%).

Communist Party of Ukraine has the oldest electorate – 54,8% among those who voted for this political force are people aged 60 years old and older (this number is bigger than during the previous Parliamentary elections of 2012 – 40,1%). Political Party «Right Sector» has the youngest electorate (53,1% of those who voted for this political force are aged up to 40 years old) as well as voters for Political Party «Union «Self-Help» (48,4%).

As it is known the majority of Ukrainian voters are women. They were also the majority of voters of Political Party «Opposition Bloc», Political Party «People's Front», Political Party «All-Ukrainian Union «Motherland», Political Party «All-Ukrainian Agrarian Union «Spade», Party «Petro Poroshenko's Bloc», Political Party «Union «Self-Help». Men are the main electorate of Political Party «Right Sector» and Political Party «All-Ukrainian Union «Freedom». The shares of men and women in the structure of electorate of Serhii Tihipko's Party «Strong Ukraine», Communist Party of Ukraine, Oleh Liashko's Radical Party, and Political Party «Civic Position (Anatolii Hrytsenko)» do not have differences at the statistically important level.

The highest level of education belongs to the electorate of the Political Party «Union «Self-Help», Political Party «Right Sector» and Political Party «Civic Position (Anatolii Hrytsenko)» – accordingly 62,9%, 59% and 52,7% of voters of these political forces have higher or incomplete higher education. The lowest level of education – only 23,8% of voters having higher or incomplete higher education – has the electorate of Oleh Liashko's Radical Party.

Table 8. Socio-demographic structure of political parties electorate at 2014 Parliamentary elections, %

	Regions:					Type of settlement:		Age groups:				
	Western	Central	Southern	Eastern	Donbas	Cities, towns and urban settlements	Villages	18–29 y.o.	30–39 y.o.	40–49 y.o.	50–59 y.o.	60 y.o. and older
Party «Petro Poroshenko's Bloc», N=3956	24,7	47,5	10,6	14,9	2,3	61,6	38,4	13,5	17,6	19,3	22,8	26,7
Political Party «People's Front», N=3544	38,1	42,9	5,9	11,5	1,6	57,0	43,0	16,1	18,4	18,5	20,3	26,8
Political Party «Union «Self-Help», N=2356	30,7	42,5	7,3	17,6	1,8	79,1	20,9	22,2	26,2	22,6	17,5	11,5
Political Party «Opposition Bloc», N=1533	2,4	12,9	15,5	55,3	14,0	77,5	22,5	11,2	13,7	17,0	23,7	34,4
Oleh Liashko's Radical Party, N=1109	22,5	49,1	7,5	17,0	3,9	50,2	49,8	18,9	14,7	16,2	21,7	28,5
Political Party «All-Ukrainian Union «Freedom», N=1069	32,4	47,8	6,2	12,1	1,5	69,8	30,2	10,8	15,7	20,2	23,8	29,5
Political Party «All-Ukrainian Union «Motherland», N=895	21,1	45,6	9,5	22,2	1,6	59,0	41,0	9,6	15,7	19,0	24,2	31,5
Political Party «Civic Position (Anatolii Hrytsenko)», N=578	29,1	38,9	10,3	19,1	2,6	70,5	29,5	12,3	15,4	18,8	25,5	28,0
Communist Party of Ukraine, N=546	2,6	21,2	22,3	38,9	15,1	74,3	25,7	3,5	10,8	12,7	18,2	54,8
Serhii Tihipko's Party «Strong Ukraine», N=479	7,8	20,6	30,7	31,6	9,2	65,9	34,1	17,4	21,1	23,3	15,2	23,0
Political Party «Right Sector», N=447	26,1	38,2	9,6	19,0	7,1	79,7	20,3	27,1	26,0	20,1	18,4	8,4
Political Party «All-Ukrainian Agrarian Union «Spade», N=264	23,8	42,1	17,2	15,8	1,1	31,9	68,1	16,6	19,8	17,8	27,8	18,0

Table 8. Socio-demographic structure of political parties electorate at 2014 Parliamentary elections, %

	Gender:		Level of Education:			
	Men	Women	Incomplete secondary education	Secondary education	Vocational secondary education	Higher or incomplete higher education
Party «Petro Poroshenko's Bloc», N=3956	46,6	53,4	5,1	18,0	34,7	42,3
Political Party «People's Front», N=3544	40,7	59,3	6,8	20,1	35,6	37,5
Political Party «Union «Self-Help», N=2356	48,3	51,7	2,4	10,2	24,5	62,9
Political Party «Opposition Bloc», N=1533	39,2	60,8	5,1	19,7	33,9	41,3
Oleh Liasenko's Radical Party, N=1109	50,4	49,6	10,2	29,4	36,6	23,8
Political Party «All-Ukrainian Union «Freedom», N=1069	58,8	41,2	4,3	15,5	33,0	47,2
Political Party «All-Ukrainian Union «Motherland», N=895	42,1	57,9	6,6	17,8	35,8	39,8
Political Party «Civic Position (Anatolii Hrytsenko)», N=578	51,3	48,7	3,1	13,8	30,3	52,7
Communist Party of Ukraine, N=546	50,2	49,8	10,4	19,9	32,0	37,7
Serhii Tihipko's Party «Strong Ukraine», N=479	46,9	53,1	4,9	13,9	34,6	46,6
Political Party «Right Sector», N=447	55,3	44,7	2,5	11,5	27,0	59,0
Political Party «All-Ukrainian Agrarian Union «Spade», N=264	44,7	55,3	8,4	21,4	38,0	32,2

Section 4

Iryna BEKESHKINA

TOP PRIORITIES FOR THE COUNTRY:
OPINION OF DIFFERENT PARTIES'
ELECTORATES

For the first time in exit poll history the question, which, it seemed, had nothing to do directly with electoral choice was included into the exit poll at 2014 parliamentary elections – the question on top priorities for Ukraine. Of course, there are a lot of important tasks, however pre-election surveys showed three groups of priority problems: economic issues, fight against corruption and warfare in Donbas region. During the exit poll it was interesting to get to know, firstly, which of these three important problems is considered by voters to be the most important, and secondly, are there any differences in priorities among the voters of different political parties.

The table below shows that in conditions of war the main priority for the citizens is peace, and even economic problems and «own pockets» recede into the background. It is quite surprising that fight against corruption is considered to be more important than economic problems. However, it proves the consistency of public opinion as it is impossible to achieve economic success not having overcome the corruption.

Table 1. What of mentioned below is a top priority for the country? (%)

Solving economic problems	19,5
Achieve peace, strengthen defense capacity of the country	46,3
Fight against corruption and authorities purging/lustration	25,3
Other	8,8

Table 2. Top priorities by voters of different parties*(%, only the parties that received not less than 2% of votes)*

	Solving economic problems	Achieve peace, reinforcing defense capacity of the country	Fighting corruption and authorities purging/ lustration	Other
Oleh Liashko's Radical Party	16,9	46,6	28,5	8,0
Political Party «Opposition Block»	35,4	43,6	10,1	10,9
Political Party «People's Front»	17,7	51,7	24,0	6,6
Political Party «All-Ukrainian Union «Freedom»	10,2	38,9	42,7	8,2
Communist party of Ukraine	36,0	35,2	10,9	18,0
Political Party «Union «Self-Help»	16,2	35,2	39,5	9,1
Political Party «Right Sector»	8,1	40,1	43,1	8,6
Party «Petro Poroshenko's Block»	16,7	54,6	21,1	7,6
Serhii Tihipko's Party «Strong Ukraine»	45,2	39,0	9,3	6,4
Political Party «All-Ukrainian Union «Motherland»	18,3	48,8	25,0	7,9
Political Party «Civic Position (Anatolii Hrytsenko)»	14,6	49,1	27,4	8,9

Survey results given in Table 2 show that voters of the majority of political forces consider issues of «war and peace» to be the most important. Received results also disprove the thesis, which was quite spread during the election campaign: that there are parties of «war» (with the priority of the warfare in Donbas) and parties of «peace» (with economic issues as priorities). This delimitative line was used to distinguish between Political Party «People's Front» and Party «Petro Poroshenko's Block» and their voter bases. Actually, as we can see, electorates of these political forces are extremely similar, at least in determining top priorities – first of all there is a need to achieve peace and strengthen defense capacity of the country.

Voters of two political forces – Political Party «All-Ukrainian Union «Freedom» and Political Party «Union «Self-Help» – agree that fight against corruption and purging/lustration of authorities is the top priority for the country.

Voters of Serhii Tihipko's Party «Strong Ukraine» (top priority) and Political Party «Opposition Block» (35% of voters) pay much more attention to solving economic issues than voters of other parties. Both these parties are «heirs» of the Party of Regions, which voters were always more pragmatically oriented on material problems, especially in Donbas. We should also mention that the exit poll was conducted at the liberated territories of Donbas, where the issue of the economic restoration is of the greatest importance today.

In general, on top of the electoral, the significant difference in opinions regarding the top priorities is observed in different regions of Ukraine (Table 3).

Table 3. What of mentioned below is a top priority for the country? (%)

	West*	Center	South	East	Donbas	Ukraine in whole
Solving economic problems	13,1	18,5	25,0	24,6	32,7	19,5
Achieve peace, strengthen defense capacity of the country	52,6	46,8	43,6	38,6	45,1	46,3
Fight against corruption and authorities purging/ lustration	27,6	22,5	20,9	23,7	10,5	25,3
Other	6,8	7,1	10,4	13,6	11,7	8,8

* **Western region** – Zakarpacie, Volyn, Rivne, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Ternopil, Chernivtsi provinces (oblasts);

Central region – Zhytomyr, Vinnitsa, Kyiv, Kirovohrad, Cherkasy, Poltava, Sumy, Cherkasiv, Khmelnytsky provinces and the city of Kyiv;

Southern region – Odesa, Mykolaiv, Kherson provinces;

Eastern region – Zaporizhia, Dnipropetrovsk, Kharkiv provinces;

Donbas – Donetsk and Luhansk provinces.

Among other differences we can specify that women (predictably) pointed out the achievement of peace and strengthening the defense capacity of the country as a top priority more often than men.

However, altogether there is a need to underline that the society has united in understanding top priorities that the country faces today: first of all, there is a need to achieve peace, then fight corruption and reform authorities, which later will provide the possibility to solve economic problems.

Iryna BEKESHKINA

PARTY ELECTIONS IN UKRAINE: DRASTIC CHANGES

Usually, each of our books dedicated to exit poll analysis is concluded by the comparison of election results with previous elections. Exit polls as opposed to the pre-election surveys do not have an option «it is difficult to say» regarding the electoral choice, that is why it is possible to quite certainly describe the electorate of each party using results of the exit poll, which has a big sampling. There is a possibility to compare these voter bases with previous elections and analyze change dynamics of party support by voters. That is why exit poll data are in a way the historical evidence of party system development in Ukraine.

Our last publication dedicated to Parliamentary election 2012 results analysis was concluded by the words: «Examination of the dynamics of party voting during the Parliamentary elections in Ukraine shows that party-political structure of the Ukrainian society is far from the steady stability and, thus, unexpected surprises are awaiting for us, especially knowing that the next elections will take place after the Presidential elections, after which the political structure, leadership, and the preferences of electorate will certainly be changed»¹.

However the reality has overcome all, even the boldest hypothesis regarding the possible changes in party-political structure. Petro Poroshenko, who entered the Parliament as a majority deputy in 2012 after several years of off-Parliament life, won in the first round at the pre-term Presidential elections. In October 2013 according to the data of sociological survey he had only 2% in a rating of presidential candidates.

Party system also faced drastic changes. In 2012 we made a conclusion on the instability of Ukrainian party system based on the fact that two out of five winners of 2007 elections – «Our Ukraine – People's Self-Defense» and Volodymyr Lytvyn's Bloc – did not make it through to the new Verkhovna Rada; and two newcomers – «Vitaly Klichko's UDAR» that appeared right before the elections and All-Ukrainian Union «Svoboda», which, on the contrary, have unsuccessfully participated twice in previous elections – got to the Parliament instead.

¹ Iryna Bekeshkina. Party elections in Ukraine: stability and changes. – National Exit Poll: Parliamentary Elections' 2012. – K., Ilko Kucheriv Democratic Initiatives Foundation, 2013, p.54.

Nevertheless, the changes of party-political landscape that happened these days can not be compared with former changes that took place between elections of 2007 and 2012. It can be said with good reason that this time the old party system has totally collapsed. In general, only 9 out of 29 parties that participated in Parliamentary elections 2014 were participants of previous elections in 2012.

In two years, out of parties, which won the Parliamentary elections of 2012, only one managed to overcome the electoral threshold – «Motherland». There is a need to mention that during election of 2012 this party received 25,54% of the votes and in 2014 it barely overcame the voting threshold, scoring 5,68%. The winner of 2012 Parliamentary elections, the Party of Regions, which received then over 30% of the votes, decided not to participate in 2014 election at all, as according to the pre-election polls it could score only 2%.

The party that became a surprise at 2012 Parliamentary elections – «Vitaly Klichko's UDAR» (created right before elections it managed to move into the third place receiving 13,96%) did not participate in 2014 elections independently, joining Party «Petro Poroshenko's Bloc».

Two other parties that were a part of Verkhovna Rada of the previous convocation – the Communist Party of Ukraine and All-Ukrainian Union «Svoboda» have participated in the elections, but failed to overcome the voting threshold.

At that the Communist Party was the only one, which was a part of Verkhovna Rada of all previous convocations during the independence of Ukraine. Truth be told, with each election it received less and less votes: at the first Parliamentary elections in 1998 it was an unconditional leader receiving 24,4% of the votes, showing almost the same result in 2002 (20,01%) but possessing the second place; in 2006 it barely managed to overcome 3% electoral threshold (3,66%), improved a bit its result in 2007 (5,39%), however the issue of political future of this party was not taken off the agenda as the age of its main voter base was over 50. However, at 2012 Parliamentary elections the Communist Party enjoyed the real renaissance having received 13,18% of the votes. Two years later – at 2014 election – the Communist Party was left outside the Parliament scoring only 3,88%. There are several reasons of this party losing ratings, but the main is the loss of their main electoral base, because the Communist Party received the biggest support in Crimea and Donbas regions.

All-Ukrainian Union «Svoboda» almost made it to the Parliament, receiving 4,71%, though at the previous elections it showed the result unexpected for all (including the party itself) – 10,44%.

Thus, we can state: only one party from the previous convocation, «Motherland», entered the current Parliament barely overcoming the voting threshold.

The parties that celebrated the victory were never a part of the Parliament, moreover, four out of five never participated in Parliamentary elections, and two were created right before elections: «Petro Poroshenko Bloc» and «Opposition Bloc». As a matter of fact, the «Opposition Bloc» was created out of the Party of Regions remnants, embracing the significant part of its former members, but losing the major part of its former voters. Political Party «Union «Self-Help» existed earlier,

but as a regional party supported in the Western Ukraine and was a part of local authorities there (although it entered Kiev City Council in 2014). Oleh Liashko's Radical Party unsuccessfully participated in previous Parliamentary elections, receiving only 1,08% of the votes.

Thus, we can state that the succession and continuity of Ukrainian political system was actually discontinued at the Parliamentary elections of 2014. Thus, for the first time in our book based on the exit poll results we can not analyze the changes in parties' voter base as the party structure has changed and almost all of them (except for one, «Motherland») got to the Parliament for the first time.

However, based on the after-election poll² we can analyze, which parties in 2014 obtained the electorate of the parties that won 2012 elections.

From the Party of Regions, which for more than a decade was the main political force for voters of the Southern and Eastern regions of the country and actually monopolized the power in Donbas, the majority of voters (40%) was picked up by its «heir», the «Opposition Bloc». But the significant part of the voters – 25% – also voted for «Petro Poroshenko Bloc». Even in Donetsk province, which earlier almost completely was the province of the Party of Regions, in two of its districts – 45th and 53rd – «Petro Poroshenko Bloc» was the leader in election, at that 53rd district is the hometown of Victor Yanukovitch. Over the one third of voters (37%) who earlier voted for the Party of Regions, did not participate in elections at all, and the significant part did not have such an opportunity as at the territories occupied by separatists, of course, the elections were not organized.

Only 12% of «Motherland» party supporters remained faithful at the elections of 2014; the main part of those who voted for this party two years ago, supported «Petro Poroshenko Bloc» (41%) and Political Party «People's Front» (23%) at 2014 election.

Former voters of «Vitaly Klichko's UDAR» quite logically mainly supported «Petro Poroshenko Bloc» (52%), but the part of them voted for Political Party «Union «Self-Help» (20%) and Political Party «People's Front» (17%).

Voters of the Communist Party appeared to be more stable: 60% of them remained faithful to their former choice, but the part of them voted for the newly created party «Opposition Bloc». However, the main part of the basic electorate of the Communists is at the occupied territories where elections did not take place.

«Svoboda» party became a «donor» for several new political forces: «Petro Poroshenko Bloc» (27%), Political Party «People's Front» (19%), Political Party «Union «Self-Help» (17%) and only 20% of the former electorate confirmed their permanent choice.

² The survey was conducted by Ilko Kucheriv Democratic Initiatives Foundation and the Sociologic service of Razumkov's Center on December 19-24, 2014. 2008 respondents were polled, aged from 18 and older in all regions of Ukraine, except for Crimea. The theoretical sampling error is 2,3%. The polling was implemented in frames of the project of the Civic sociological consortium due to the financial support of Matra program of the Kingdom of the Netherlands Embassy in Ukraine and the European Union.

Thus, the party-political system has changed almost completely after the Parliamentary elections 2014. The country has changed, its citizens have changed and they wanted the new politics.

At that the voting for new political forces was focused mainly on the personalities at the head of these parties or famous people in the party lists. This was understandable as these new parties were created around leaders and not around their political programs.

So it was quite difficult for voters to make their choices. That is why the elections of 2014 differed from all previous elections by the time of making their choice – the significant part of voters made the decision during the last day before election or even at the voting station (Table1).

Table 1. **When did you make your voting choice? (%)**

Time of making voting choice	Exit poll-1998	Exit poll-2002	Exit poll-2006	Exit poll-2007	Exit poll-2012	Exit poll-2014
I was a supporter of this party/bloc long before elections	42	50	62	69	56	39
More than a month before elections	23	24	21	16	21	27
During the last month before elections	11	11	6	4,5	6	13
During the last week before elections	11	7	4	3	5	9
During the last day before elections	5	3	2	2	4	5
Made my choice at the voting station	6	4	2	2,5	4	5
IT IS DIFFICULT TO SAY/ I DO NOT KNOW	2	1	2	3	4	3

As it is seen from the shown table, the stable choice of the political force at 2014 elections was the lowest, and 10% of voters made their choice during the last day. This situation can be compared only to the election of 1998; however these were the first elections according to party lists.

The difficulty of making the choice affected the percentage of the «lost» votes – those given to the political forces that did not overcome the electoral threshold. During 2012 elections the «ineffective voting» was the lowest in the whole history of the Parliamentary elections – only 6,78% of the votes were given to parties that did not overcome the electoral threshold and the difference between parties was huge: All-Ukrainian Union «Svoboda», which possessed the fifth place among election winners received 10,44% of the votes, and Nataliia Korolevska's Party «Ukraiina – Vpered!» scored only 1,68%. This proves the availability of quite concise political structure and support of parties that made it to the Parliament by

significant number of votes. Indeed, each of the Parliamentary parties had its own determination and differences from other parties (the only exception was «Vitaly Klichko's UDAR», but it was formed right before the election).

At 2014 Parliamentary elections there was a lot more of the «ineffective voting» – 31,52% of voters gave their choice to the parties that did not overcome 5% threshold, and the difference between «Motherland» party that was the last among the winners, receiving 5,68%, and All-Ukrainian Union «Svoboda», which was the next with 4,71% of the votes, is less than 1%. The next following parties were quite close, during electoral campaign they seemed to overcome the electoral threshold (thus, had enough support of the voters), but then they were not very successful in voting technologies: Communist Party of Ukraine (3,88%), Serhiy Tihipko's Party «Strong Ukraine» (3,11%), Anatoly Hrytsenko Party «Gromadyanska Pozitsia» (3,10%).

Therefore, today we again face the task of developing the party-political structure. Because the structure that was gradually formed, changed slightly from election to election, has totally collapsed these days, and the new structure, with ideology parties that clearly differ from each other, with stable electoral core, was not created yet. It is quite possible that the following elections will bring as many new unexpected surprises as 2014 Parliamentary election did.

Will the political forces that came to power be carrying out the party building? – is still an open question. But the formation of the real democratic party system is an urgent part of the European integration of Ukraine.