



Centar za
sigurnosne studije - BiH
Centre for
Security Studies - BH

***SEMINAR ON
SECURITY POLICY FOR
BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA
SARAJEVO, 16 – 17 JULY 2001***

CONTENTS

1. BACKGROUND PAPER ON SECURITY POLICY FOR BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA

1.	INTRODUCTION.	2
1.1	Post-Dayton Bosnia-Herzegovina	3
2.	THE CONCEPT OF NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY.	5
2.1	The Three Dimensions of National Security Policy	6
2.2	Applicability to the Case of Bosnia-Herzegovina	8
2.2.1.	External Security Dimension	8
2.2.2.	Internal Security Dimension	11
2.2.3.	Protection of National Values	13
3.	INTERNATIONAL PROCESSES & NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY.	16
3.1	Stability Pact for Southeast Europe	17
3.2	Confidence and Security Building Measures	18
4.	BOSNIA'S CONSTITUTION AND NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY	19
5.	SECURITY POLICIES OF THE ENTITIES	20
5.1	Security Policies	21
5.2	Military Aspects	23
6.	FACTORS INFLUENCING THE POSSIBILITY OF ESTABLISHING A NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY	25
6.1	Rational Actor Model	25
6.2	Governmental Politics	26
6.3	Economic Factors and Social Opinion	29
7.	EFFORTS OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY	30

7.1	Peace Implementation Council	31
7.2	Confidence and Security Building Measures	32
7.3	Sub-Regional Arms Control	33
8.	ESTABLISHMENT OF A NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY FOR BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA	34
	BIBLIOGRAPHY.	36
2.	OPENING SESSION	
2.1	DR. BISERA TURKOVIĆ (CSS)	39
2.2	MR. BERIZ BELKIĆ (PRESIDENCY OF BIH).	42
2.3	AMBASSADOR MATTHIAS SONN (OHR)	44
2.4	AMBASSADOR DIETER VOLTMAN (OSCE)	45
3.	FIRST SESSION	
1.1	GENERAL CARLO JEAN (CeMiSS)	49
1.2	DR. TAYLOR SEYBOLT (SIPRI)	52
1.3	DR. FREDERICK BONKOVSKY (UNIVERSITY VIENNA)	58
4.	SECOND SESSION	
4.1	GENERAL IVAN NAGULOV (PRESIDENCY OF BiH)	65
4.2	MR. ZSOLT RABAI (NATO)	67
4.3	MR. DONALD B. KURSCH (STABILITY PACT)	72
5.	THIRD SESSION	
5.1	DR. NIKOLA ŠPIRIĆ (HOUSE OF PEOPLES BiH)	77
5.2	GENERAL HANS-JÜRGEN RENNECK (SFOR)	78
5.3	COLONEL CHRISTIAAN JACOBS	

	(BELGIAN DELEGATION TO OSCE)	81
5.4	PROF DR HEINZ VETSCHERA					
	(UNIVERSITY OF VIENNA)	89
5.5	MR. IVAN VELIMIR STARČEVIĆ					
	(CROATIA EMBASSY IN BiH)	98
6.	FOURTH SESSION					
6.1	DR. ISTVAN GYARMATI (IEWS)	105
6.2	BRIGADIER GENERAL VINCENT COEUREROY					
	(UN IPTF)	106
6.1	GENERAL BOŠKO GVOZDEN (MoD RS)	109
6.2	MR. FERID BULJUBAŠIĆ (MoD FBiH)	113
6.3	MINISTER MUHAMED BEŠIĆ (MiA FBiH)	116
7.	CONCLUSION					
7.1	DR. ISTVAN GYARMATI (IEWS)	120
8.	APPENDIX I					
8.1	SECURITY POLICY CONCEPT FOR BiH	125
	APPENDIX II					
8.2	LIST OF PARTICIPANTS..	128

1. INTRODUCTION

Significant progress has been achieved since the signing the Dayton Peace Agreement. Today, peace and stability prevail throughout Bosnia-Herzegovina; co-operation between Bosnia's three constituent communities - Bosniacs, Croats and Serbs - has been increasing; Bosnia's war-damaged infrastructure has to a large extent been repaired; many of Bosnia's refugees have returned to the homes they had occupied prior to the war, and; the country's economy has been steadily returning back on course. Much, however, remains to be done in Bosnia and Herzegovina in order to secure a peaceful and stable future for the country. One of the most pressing tasks that stand ahead is the establishment of a state security policy for the country.

The establishment of a state security policy for Bosnia and Herzegovina is necessary for a number of reasons. Firstly, it is important both as a means of identifying the issues that are of relevance to the State's security and as a means of defining the mechanisms through which those issues can be dealt with. As such, the policy is essential for securing the country's long-term stability and vitality. Secondly, the policy is needed to improve the effectiveness of the operations of the country's security forces. The absence to date of a firm basis on which Bosnia's multiple security forces could co-ordinate their work on common problems has resulted in inefficiencies and organisational ineffectiveness. For example, Bosnia's police forces have been unable to address issues such as the growing problem of organised crime due to an absence of a framework that would allow them to undertake a co-ordinated approach on the issue. Each police force has therefore been forced to tackle the issue alone, with a noticeable lack of success. Thirdly, a state security policy is needed in order to increase efficiency in the financing of the country's security forces. Since the signing of the Dayton agreement, the country has seen disproportionately high amounts of funds spent on its security forces. A state security policy will help correct the problem. It will define the country's strategic security needs and interests and thereby enable the rationalisation of the size and distribution of the country's security forces. As a result, more money will become available for other priorities such as social sector development. Fourthly, the establishment of a state security is necessary to help Bosnia and Herzegovina move forward from its post-war period. Mistrust, stemming from the 1992-1995 war in Bosnia, still prevails between the country's three communities, hindering progress in a number of areas. It is fuelled by a sense of vulnerability on each side, stemming from (mis-)perceptions of insecurity. The existence of

the policy will have a congenial effect on relations between the three groups by highlighting their *common* long-term interests. It will also help improve relations and co-operation between the groups by providing a common, forward-looking point of reference to which all three ethnic communities can work towards. Fifthly, as was pointed out by Mr. Wolfgang Petritsch, the High Representative in Bosnia-Herzegovina at a meeting of the Stability Pact Table on Security Issues in February 2000, Bosnia-Herzegovina needs a viable and comprehensive security policy based on the concept of balance and mutual confidence between its three communities as a means of developing and sustaining a modern democratic framework.¹ 'From an external perspective, a credible security policy is one of the "door openers" for the future integration of Bosnia-Herzegovina into European structures'.² The establishment of a common security policy is made all the more necessary by the need for Bosnia and Herzegovina to move beyond the process of state consolidation in order to commence with the process of Euro-Atlantic integration.

1.1 Post-Dayton Bosnia-Herzegovina

As has already been mentioned, today peace prevails throughout Bosnia-Herzegovina. The attainment of that peace may be gratefully attributed to the Dayton Peace Accords. However, as has been noted on numerous occasions, the peace that prevails within the country today resembles more of an uneasy truce rather than a true, common commitment for a better future.

To a certain degree, the existence and prolongation of that uneasy truce has been made possible by the nature of the arrangement set up by the Dayton Peace Accords. The Dayton Agreement was built upon the status quo that had existed among the Serb, Croat and Bosnian Government forces in the Bosnian theatre in late 1995. Specifically, the Accords established two entities within Bosnia-Herzegovina. The Entities' borders are in most part the former front lines.

Each Entity has its own executive, legislature, judicial system, police force and so on. Importantly, the Entities also have their own armed forces.

¹Wolfgang Petritsch, "Opening Remarks by High Representative Wolfgang Petritsch at the meeting of the Stability Pact Table on Security Issues" (Statement presented at the meeting of the Stability Pact Working Table on Security Issues on February 15-16, 2000 in Sarajevo, Bosnia-Herzegovina) Office of the High Representative, Sarajevo

² *Ibid.*

At the national level, there are only a few joint institutions. The joint institutions are comprised of representatives of all Bosnia's three communities and amongst others include a three-member State Presidency, the national Parliament, a Council of Ministers, six ministries and the State's Constitutional Court and Central Bank. The central government is weak, with most powers falling under the jurisdiction of the Entity governments.

By establishing such an arrangement, the Dayton Accords effectively managed to bring peace to Bosnia and Herzegovina by institutionalising the status quo that was present in the Bosnian theatre at the time. In doing so, however, it also created a political arrangement that enabled the continued existence and pursuit of the nationalist interests that had fuelled the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina, albeit largely within a political framework.

While the lack of dialogue and co-operation between the two entities immediately after the signing of the Dayton Peace Accords can be explained by the hostilities and mistrust that had existed between the Serbs on the one hand and the Bosniac-Croat alliance on the other during the war with the time it has been largely overcome.

While the situation in the joint institutions at the national level was seemingly more promising, it was compromised by problems of a similar nature. Although the State's joint institutions have been characterised by relatively high and steadily growing levels of engagement between the representatives of the country's three main communities, the internal configuration of the State's joint institutions has made it very difficult for the role currently played by ethnicity to be overcome. Specifically, the Dayton arrangement provided that the joint State institutions generally be comprised of an equal number of people from each ethnic community. The equal division of positions according to ethnic origin was incorporated by the Dayton Agreement as a mechanism designed to protect the interests of each community in Bosnia. However, the allocation of positions according to ethnicity, rather than some other over-arching criteria, has seen continuing prominence given to ethnicity in post-Dayton Bosnian politics.

That vulnerability however, has come at a particularly large cost to policy effectiveness. As a result, policy effectiveness in post-Dayton Bosnia has been usually sacrificed or overlooked for the sake of the pursuit of vested ethno-nationalist interests.

2. THE CONCEPT OF NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY

National security policy is a concept with no single, universally accepted definition³. The lack of a universal definition stems from the fact that the concept does not lend itself to neat and precise formulation.⁴ The definition of national security policy has tended to change over time and from country to country, varying according to the particular issues and circumstances confronting the state at a given point in time. Consequently, numerous interpretations of national security policy have been offered by various authors. Luciani for example defines national security policy as "...the ability to withstand aggression from abroad".⁵ Michael Louw on the other hand expands the definition to also take into account the state's internal dimension. National security policy, Louw states, is "[traditional defence policy and also] the non-military actions of a state to ensure its total capacity to survive as a political Entity in order to exert influence and to carry out its internal and international objectives"⁶. The Canadian National Defence College meanwhile offers an even broader definition of national security policy, defining national security policy as government policy designed to ensure "the preservation of a life acceptable to the...people and compatible with the needs and legitimate aspirations of others. It includes freedom from military attack or coercion, freedom from internal subversion and freedom from the erosion of the political, economic and social values that are essential to the quality of life".⁷

Other authors also attempt to define national security policy. The definitions of national security policy that are presented however differ from one another to varying degrees. Nevertheless, they seemingly all revolve around three common themes; the provision of external security; the provision of internal security; and the protection of national values. Each of those themes may conveniently be treated as a constitutive dimension of national security policy.

³ A. Wolfers characterizes the concept as an "ambiguous symbol". At one point he argues that "it may not have any precise meaning at all", see Arnold Wolfers, *Discord and Collaboration* (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1962) 150

⁴ Charles Shultze, 'The economic content of national security policy', *Foreign Affairs*, 51:3 (1973): 529-530

⁵ Luciani, "The economic content of security", *Journal of Public Policy*, 8:2 (1989): 151

⁶ Louw, *National Security* (Pretoria: University of Pretoria, 1978), i

⁷ Canadian Defense College, Course Documents quoted in Barry Buzan, *People States and Fear* (Hertfordshire: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1991), 16

2.1 The Three Dimensions of State Security Policy

External Security Dimension

External security is interpreted differently by the various writers. In general it is viewed as consisting of three aspects. The first of those aspects is *economic security*, defined as the absence or prevention of direct threats from abroad to the state's economic power. The precise meaning of 'economic power' has been a point of contention among various authors. Some authors have argued that the definition of economic power must be kept narrow to the bare requisites that are necessary for the state to establish and maintain a military defence in case of foreign attack. They assert that any broadening of the definition beyond that would mean that many acts in today's world (such as for example the oil price hikes of the 1970s) could be construed as being threats to national security. Others meanwhile have argued, perhaps more reasonably, that economic security in the given context goes beyond merely securing the minimal economic power necessary to launch and sustain a military defence in case of foreign attack. They claim that economic security also incorporates the notion of maintaining, if not enhancing, the necessary levels of economic strength and vitality needed for the preservation of a standard of living acceptable to the people.⁸

The second aspect of external security is *political security*, which is considered as the absence or prevention of direct threats from abroad to the state's political power. Essentially, the aspect deals with the protection and enhancement of the state's capacity to influence political outcomes and pursue its interests in the international arena through political and diplomatic means.

The third aspect of external security is *military security*. Military security, as presented in the literature, essentially involves the prevention of external military threats to state security and the maintenance of the capacity to counter potential military attacks from abroad if the need arises.

Internal Security Dimension

⁸ The second definition will be used for the purposes of this paper.

The second dimension of national security policy is internal security. The internal security dimension of national security policy is interpreted as primarily involving the maintenance of an absence, or the capacity to effectively address, internal threats to the state's political authority, threats to public security and general attempts at subversion or other acts that affect, or have the potential to affect the state's capacity to effectively function and survive. Writers such as Buzan have also included environmental security in their interpretation of internal security - an element likely to grow in importance as both the scarcity of, and the demand for, natural resources increases.

State Values

The third theme that is incorporated into discussions of national security policy by numerous authors are policies designed to protect and preserve national or "acquired" values. Essentially, those involve the state's social, economic and political core values that help define and identify the state and its society. Such core values may, for example, include pluralism, free-market capitalism, democracy and so on. The broadest definition of national values is once again provided by the Canadian National Defence College which incorporates the concept in its definition as; "...the preservation of a way of life acceptable...to the people and compatible with the legitimate aspirations of others".⁹

In all discussions of national security policy, the principal unit of analysis and the sole bearer of responsibility over national security policy is the state. The state's universal legitimacy stems from its role as the provider of a framework for social and political order and its status as the highest level of authority within the international system. The anarchy that characterises the international system further reinforces the centrality of the state by increasing the focus of the state as the natural source and provider of security.

While the above-elaborated definition of state security policy could be construed as being relatively broad, it shall be used for the purposes of this paper for a number of reasons. Firstly, as previously noted, no precise, universally accepted definition of state security policy currently exists. The above definition however, manages to account for most of the different interpretations of state security policy that are present in the literature. Secondly, in light of the different interpretations that exist, using a definition that is only limited in terms of only

⁹ Canadian Defense College, *Op.Cit.*

one of the above 'dimensions' or 'aspects' would expose any analysis to arguments of being incomplete and only partial. Thirdly, the post-Cold War world has seen the level of importance given to non-military forms of security within state security policy increase. Any definition that would serve as a basis for analysing the possibility of establishing a state security policy for Bosnia and Herzegovina today should therefore reflect those changes. Nonetheless, the continuing centrality of the military security aspect within state security policy must also be recognised. Hence, while the above definition of state security policy will be used in this paper, particular attention will be given to military aspects of security.

Before proceeding, it should be noted that differences both within states and amongst states in the international system render the broad applicability of the concept across all states impossible. As Buzan points out, "the specific meaning of security will be nearly as diverse and the conditions and situation of the specific state to which it applies"¹⁰. Therefore, an examination of the above definition of state security policy in terms of its application to Bosnia-Herzegovina is in order.

2.2 Applicability of the State Security Policy to the Case of Bosnia-Herzegovina

Applying the concept of state security policy as defined above to the case of Bosnia is an undertaking that will, given the current state of affairs in Bosnia-Herzegovina need some form of re-definition.

2.2.1. External Security Dimension

Economic Security

One of the main problems encountered in attempts to apply the external security dimension of state security policy (or any of the other two dimensions for that matter) to Bosnia-Herzegovina is that the fundamentals necessary for the application of the different aspects are either absent or are countered by the realities on the ground. The application of the economic security aspect is a case in point. One of the main impediments to the application of the economic security aspect of state security policy lies in the current state of the Bosnian economy. Namely, it can be stated that one of the main criteria necessary for the maintenance

¹⁰ Barry Buzan, *People States and Fear* (Hertfordshire: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1991), 69

of economic power, as conceptualised by the external security aspect, is the initial existence of such power, if only based within the state concerned.

Although Bosnia's economy has made great strides in recent years towards recovery, the effects of the 1992-1995 war are still largely felt. By the end of the war, Bosnia-Herzegovina had lost 23% of its pre-war population; GDP and per capita income had dropped by three quarters, production by more than 90%; more than 1.2 million of its inhabitants – of which a large proportion was an active part of the labour market - had fled abroad¹¹ and 70% of its industrial plant had been demolished¹². Following the signing of the Dayton Agreement, the international community initiated a \$5.1 billion 'emergency programme' for the revival of Bosnia's economy¹³. The programme has to a large degree directly contributed the economic improvements exhibited over the last four years. However, the large declines in industrial capacity, living standards and the significant 'brain-drain' experienced by the economy has meant the recent economic improvements in Bosnia and Herzegovina have in many cases been sufficient to make up for only a fraction of the economy's war-related losses.

Given the fragile state of Bosnia's economy and its lack of any significant economic power, directly applying the economic security aspect without providing some form of re-definition of its aims would render the concept irrelevant, if not contradictory to the desired objectives being pursued. Any re-definition would need to take into account the fledgling state of the country's economy, together with the need for its further expansion and consolidation as a means of improving the living standards of its citizens. To the extent that the aims of the economic security aspect are broadened in a manner that incorporates the pursuit of those needs, the aspect would be applicable and highly relevant for Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Political Security

The applicability of the political security aspect as defined above is also challenged by the realities in post-Dayton Bosnia. As a small developing state, Bosnia-Herzegovina is unable to claim much political power on the international stage. Its political power in the international

¹¹ European Commission Communication to the Council and European Parliament, *External Relations: Stabilization and Association Process for Countries of Southeast Europe - Developments in the Countries of the Regional Approach since 1996*, May 26, 1999, http://europa.eu.int/comm/dgla/see/com_99_235/6.htm, 2, accessed February 21, 2000

¹² Jane M.O. Sharp, 'Dayton Report Card', *International Security*, 22:3 (Winter 1997/1998): 128

¹³ Bojicic, Kaldor, "The 'Abnormal' Economy of Bosnia-Herzegovina" in *Scramble for the Balkans: Nationalism, Globalism and the Political Economy of Reconstruction*, ed. Carl-Ulrik Schierup (London: Macmillan Press, 1999), 108

arena is also compromised by two other factors. One is the country's overwhelming political dependence on members of the international community for assistance on a whole range of matters. That overwhelming dependence primarily stems from the difficulties in the implementation of the Dayton Peace Agreement and the country's need for swift and effective reform and institution building to ensure long-term peace and stability.

The second factor which for a long time was undermining the country's ability to effectively pursue its interests and influence outcomes on the international political stage was the failure on the part of the respective leaderships of Bosnia's three constituent communities to act in unity. That failure to act in unity and the dividedness at the political level effectively deprived the State's joint institutions of the strength necessary to optimize their operations and to project and successfully pursue their interests on the international stage. The internal disunity over common approaches also undermined the creditability of the joint State institutions in pursuing given goals. Consequently, the State's capacity to maximize its political power was further diminished. While the growing level of cooperation between the leaderships of Bosnia's three communities has helped diminish the significance of the latter factor, periodical disunity over matters of importance still hinders the ability of the country to reach its full potential on the international political stage. Given that the aims of the political security aspect are defined as being the enhancement of the state's capacity to influence political outcomes and pursue its interests in the international arena, the existence of the above two factors in effect undermine the principal goals of the political security aspect. Hence, although the political security aspect may be applied to today's Bosnia-Herzegovina from a definitional and conceptual viewpoint, the very purpose of its application is challenged from within, by problems pertaining to disunity and dependence.

Military Security

As with the economic security aspect of the external security dimension of national security policy, the realities in the field in Bosnia make the application of the military aspect also difficult to realise. One of the main impediments to the application of the military aspect is presented by the relatively hostile relations, mistrust and lack of co-operation that prevail amongst Bosnia's two official (three unofficial) armed forces¹⁴. The tensions and mistrust

¹⁴ The two official armed forces of Bosnia-Herzegovina are the Army of Republika Srpska and the Army of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina. The Army of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina was officially established following the signing of the Washington Agreement that ended the conflict between the Bosnian Government forces

between the armed forces originate from their roles during the war in Bosnia, with each armed force having openly fought the other during the three-year period. The presence of those tensions and mistrust seriously hinders the applicability of the military security aspect to Bosnia by questioning the possibility of a united pursuit of the aspect's goals.

Another factor that hinders the applicability of the of the military security aspect and which is closely related to the presence of those tensions is the continued presence of ethno-nationalist aspirations and sentiment within the forces. The presence of nationalism poses a serious challenge to the establishment of a consensus between the armed forces on their common goals and perceptions. Given the presence of multiple armed forces in Bosnia, the existence of such a consensus will be of essence in securing co-operation and providing a common basis for the application and pursuit of external military security. It will also be important for improving relations between the forces by providing a forward-looking point of reference.

Overcoming the differences between the armed forces in their current perceptions and interests will certainly be a difficult task. The differences lie at the heart of today's security problem in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Until the problem is addressed, the application of the military security aspect will be largely unattainable.

2.2.2. Internal Security Dimension

State Authority

The general conditions necessary for the application of the internal security dimension in Bosnia and Herzegovina have improved dramatically since the war. The most significant improvements have occurred in regards to threats to state authority. The achievements in that area were made possible by the Dayton Peace Accords, albeit in a somewhat paradoxical manner. By creating the current political framework within Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Dayton Peace Agreement managed to largely address the threats to the State's authority. Moreover, with the establishment of Entity-based police and security forces, the responsibility for the provision of internal security was delegated to those bodies. The move effectively saw

and the Croatian Defense Council (HVO). The Agreement stipulated that the two would merge into one armed force, the Army of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Nevertheless, there has been great reluctance by the HVO to merge. As a result, the HVO today exists effectively as a third, semi-independent armed force in Bosnia.

the creation of a capacity to maintain an absence of threats to formal authority. That capacity has gradually been increasing over the past few years as the new bodies and institutions consolidate their power

Public Security

The provision of public security in Bosnia and Herzegovina has also dramatically improved. Following the conclusion of the war, the configuration of the bodies responsible for the maintenance of internal security and the pervasiveness of local, political and ethno-nationalist interests in Bosnia and Herzegovina saw acute problems in the provision of public security in the country, particularly in respect to “minority group” returnees.¹⁵ The problem stemmed from the fact that most police in Bosnia and Herzegovina ‘were former paramilitaries who switched uniforms but retained their weapons and remained answerable to local warlords. Indeed, a UN report suggested that the local police either condoned or inflicted 70 percent of all human rights abuses committed in Bosnia during 1996’.¹⁶

The work of the United Nations’ International Police Task Force (IPTF) in Bosnia and Herzegovina, however, has managed to considerably improve the provision of public security. The Task Force, established under Annex 11 of the Dayton Peace Accords with a vague mandate and no timetable, largely deals with monitoring and training the respective police forces in the country.¹⁷ Although it was not before 1997 that the Task Force was put into action, it quickly started showing results. By mid-1997 for example, ‘the IPTF was beginning to make some headway in reforming the federation police: trying to end the bifurcation on ethnic lines, introducing new common uniforms, downsizing toward the goal of 10,000 officers from the immediate post-war level of 34,000, screening out the worst criminal element, and removing the most offensive weapons from police stockpiles.’¹⁸ Although the Task Force still operates in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the overall provision of public security has improved dramatically.

State Subversion

¹⁵ The term “minority group” returnees refers to returnees who belong to an ethnic minority community in the place where they are returning. The term has been adopted in Bosnia by international organizations such as the UNHCR and will be used in the given context in the rest of the paper.

¹⁶ Sharp, ‘Dayton Report Card’, 118

¹⁷ Major General Klaus Fruhhaber in *Bosnia-Herzegovina; Beyond Dayton*, Ed. Martin Sopta (Zagreb: Croatian Center for Strategic Studies, 1997) 149

¹⁸ Schear quoted in Sharp, ‘Dayton Report Card’, 134

The most serious problem in regards to the application of the internal security dimension for a long time has been the problem pertaining to state subversion.

Recent developments in both Bosnia and Herzegovina and the immediate region however provide optimism that such problems will no longer present threats to the State's internal security. The collapse of Slobodan Milosevic's government and his subsequent departure to the ICTY in The Hague, together with the political changes in Croatia following the death of Franjo Tudjman have provided hope that the internal security situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina will normalise substantially. Last election results represent the further development in politics scene to date.

The overall improvements in Bosnia and Herzegovina in terms of law enforcement agencies' ability to uphold state authority and provide effective public security, together with the diminished threat of subversion, have rendered the internal security dimension applicable to Bosnia and Herzegovina. That applicability will be only further enhanced as the current trends in the country continue to move in the positive in the positive direction seen to date.

2.2.3. *State Values*

Political and Economic Values

The situation pertaining to national values can at best be described as being ambiguous. The collapse of communism and the command system economy has seen the socialist economic and political values espoused by the State during the time of the former Yugoslavia undermined. Meanwhile, the transition process that Bosnia-Herzegovina recently embarked upon has not yet seen the full adoption of democratic and free-market capitalist values as truly national economic and political values. The situation partly reflects the unfinished state of the transition process that is indeed still under way in Bosnia. However, it also reflects the fact that both time and exposure to democracy and the free market system is necessary if the two are to be reflected in the State's economic and political values. Only when the system and its benefits are experienced and fully appreciated will it be entirely possible for their values to be fully accepted and incorporated into the State's national and political values. At best, it could be said that Bosnia's new economic and political values are still in a phase of evolution and

that neither democracy nor free-market capitalism had the time or the exposure necessary to become sufficiently entrenched.

Nevertheless, despite the developing state of Bosnia's economic and political values, there is scope for the application of those values as part of the national values dimension, provided some definitional changes are made to the dimension's goals. To the extent that the goals of the national values dimension are broadened beyond the mere protection and preservation of national or "acquired" values to also include the protection of the conditions necessary for the further development of those values, the dimension will be applicable to Bosnia. Redefining the dimension's goals in such a way will also positively influence the democratic and free market reform processes within the country by placing emphasis on the principal tenants that are essential for the existence each respective system.

Social Values

Before the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the country's social values were primarily founded on its multi-ethnicity, multi-religiousness and tolerance. society was, as Rieff describes, a

"...society committed to multiculturalism (in the real and earned rather than the American and prescriptive sense of that much overused term) and tolerance, and of an understanding of national identity as deriving from shared citizenship rather than ethnic identity as we in the west so assiduously proclaim."¹⁹

Although those values managed to survive they are seriously weakened or undermined. The rise of ethnic nationalism that was propelled from the top down seriously undermined trust and confidence among the various ethnic communities within parts of Bosnia and Herzegovina that had kept the existence of those values strong. With the ensuing violence the country's social values were seriously affected. The degree to which those values were affected varies from region to region. Therefore, time will be necessary for those values to become fully re-established throughout the country as a whole.

¹⁹ Rieff , *Slaughterhouse: Bosnia and the Failure of the West* (London: Vintage) 1995, 11

The speed with which they are re-established will arguably depend on the intensity the international involvement takes in Bosnia and Herzegovina in helping fully implement the remaining parts of the civilian aspect of the Dayton Peace Accords. The civilian aspects of the Accords effectively deal with issues that are of crucial importance for the re-establishment of those social values, such as for example, refugee returns, equal rights for citizens and so on. Nevertheless, increasing progress towards the re-establishment of Bosnia's pre-war social values is gradually being made.

Thus, although Bosnia-Herzegovina's social values are still in the process of being re-established, the very presence of that process and the gradual success it has been having provides optimism that the state's pre-war social values will take hold throughout the country to re-emerge as truly *national* social values. Moreover, the fact that the presence and re-establishment of those values enjoys great support among a large portion of Bosnia's society²⁰ is a factor that is likely to further facilitate that process.

Despite the progress that has still to be made in re-establishing Bosnia's pre-war social values, there is scope for their incorporation as part of the national values dimension. That scope is provided by both the continuing presence of those values throughout much of the country and by the commitments made in the Dayton Peace Accords by the representatives of all three communities to see those values re-established throughout Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Overall, given the current state of affairs in Bosnia-Herzegovina, providing for the *direct* application of the concept of national security policy as defined above is a difficult task. Nevertheless, as shown above, in most cases the concept can be applied to Bosnia-Herzegovina. Where necessary, slight re-modifications of the dimensions' goals may have to be made to accommodate the specific situation currently present in Bosnia and Herzegovina. In other cases however, the prevailing situation and concurrent trends provide for the direct application of the concept.

3. INTERNATIONAL PROCESSES AND NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY

²⁰ *This Week in Bosnia-Herzegovina*, January 26, 2000, <http://www.applicom.com/twibih/twib000126.html>, accessed January 29, 2000.

International integrational processes are increasingly presenting Bosnia-Herzegovina with the need to establish a national security policy. The processes, ranging from regional CSBMs to the European Union's Association Agreement and joining to the Partnership for Peace (PfP), are exerting the pressure in two ways. Firstly, the processes are increasingly demanding a more consistent, committed and coherent approach on the part of Bosnia as they, and Bosnia's role within them, progress. Bosnia and its institutions cannot hope to adopt such an approach without a clear definition of the country's near, medium and long-term state interests. Knowing what one wants and why is crucial in adopting an appropriate long-term approach. The establishment of a state security policy is therefore necessary to define those interests. A definition of the interests will enable issues that are of importance within the processes in which Bosnia and Herzegovina is involved to be identified and a consistent and appropriate policy to be adopted and followed by the country's institutions.

International integrational processes are also demanding Bosnia and Herzegovina to meet its requirements and obligations in a more efficient and effective manner than that seen to date. The issue of meeting particular requirements and international obligations has often fallen victim in Bosnia and Herzegovina to ethnic considerations. A national security policy will correct the problem by defining Bosnia's involvement within international processes in the context of its national interests. Obligations that flow from those processes will thereby be viewed less as abstract requirements by decision-makers and Bosnia's institutions and more as something that is essential for meeting the country's long-term national interests. At other times, Bosnia's efficiency and effectiveness has suffered due to its institutions' lack of mandate to deal with particular issues – especially issues related to military forms of security. The problem has further added pressure for a state security policy to be established which will allow the country's national bodies to deal with such matters while respecting Bosnia's internal political and constitutional arrangement.

Secondly, the very nature of the integrational processes demands a greater degree of integration to take place in Bosnia and Herzegovina itself if it is to integrate into the broader region. A state security policy would represent a step towards that direction by providing a basis for the joint pursuit of common interests within the country. It would represent the first

step towards meeting the requirements for membership of some of the other processes Bosnia seeks to join, such as NATO's Partnership for Peace programme (PfP).²¹

Bosnia and Herzegovina will have to address the demands with which it is confronted if it is to succeed and make the most from what the processes in which it is involved have to offer. Doing so will be all the more important if the country is to commence with other processes it seeks to join. The processes are important for Bosnia and Herzegovina. As one commentator observed, Bosnia will have to make the most out of them if it is to avoid the risk of being swept aside into the backyards of poverty, political irrelevance and decline.²²

3.1 Stability Pact for Southeast Europe

The Stability Pact for Southeast Europe is another process that is adding pressure, in a similar way, for Bosnia to establish a national security policy. The Stability Pact was established in 1999 to assist the countries in Southeast Europe²³ make progress in the areas of human rights and democratization; economic development and reconstruction; security, as well as regional cooperation. The initiative also establishes benchmarks in other areas, such as for example on fighting corruption and organized crime, in order to provide the necessary fundamentals for countries to be able to achieve that progress.

The Stability Pact process provides a unique opportunity for participating states to pursue necessary reforms, with the assistance of the international community. The assistance provided to help meet that end is significant. In March 2000, for example, Euro 2.4 billion was allocated by the international community for that year alone to help Southeast European states with those reforms. In October 2001 new donor conference has been planned.

Given that the Stability Pact essentially focuses on issues that are of relevance for all three dimensions of national security policy, the process also provides an important opportunity for

²¹NATO and Western officials have stated that if Bosnia is to join NATO's Partnership for Peace program, it will need to unify its armed forces into a single force. The establishment of a national security policy would represent the first step towards that end. See Reuters, "NATO Chief Opens New Peacekeeping Base in Bosnia", *Central Europe Online*, July 20, 2000, <http://www.cetraleurope.com/news.php3?id=180487>, accessed July 31, 2000; "American Ambassador Thomas Miller visits 'Circle 99'; Bosnia-Herzegovina has only reached the half-way mark", *Dnevni Avaz*, Sarajevo, July 10, 2000, 4

²² Col. Papenkort, "Keynote Remarks" in *Bosnia after SFOR?; Conference Proceedings* (Vienna: Center for Democracy in Vienna, 1998) 142

²³ with the exception of Serbia, which has been excluded from participating while the Government of President Milosevic remains in power in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.

participating states, including Bosnia and Herzegovina, to enhance both their individual and collective security. However, ensuring that the process provides meaningful benefit to Bosnia and Herzegovina in that regard is, again, difficult without a state security policy to define the country's interests and thereby make it possible to identify the most effective ways in which to achieve those goals.

3.2 Confidence and Security Building Measures (CSBMs)

Another process highlighting the need for a state security policy for Bosnia and Herzegovina is the implementation of the 1999 OSCE Vienna Document on Confidence and Security Building Measures. The pressure on Bosnia and Herzegovina to adopt a state security policy has been made apparent by country's inability to fulfil its commitments that stem from the Vienna Document, as well as its inability to exercise the rights and privileges to which it is entitled to under the Document. The obligations it has had particular difficulty in fulfilling were those stemming from the provisions pertaining to the exchange of military information. The provisions provide that, amongst others, each participating state will provide information on their defence policy, military doctrine, force planning, military budgets and previous military expenditures.²⁴ The difficulty experienced by Bosnia and Herzegovina in meeting those obligations has stemmed from the fact that the country was not been able to provide such information as a state. The Entities' reluctance to co-operate to date essentially reflects the failure within Bosnia and Herzegovina to 'see Entity security in terms of national security and to understand that what contributes to the enhancement of national security – in what ever form – also contributes to the enhancement of the Entities' security'.²⁵ Indeed, with the absence of a national security policy that would formalise that link, securing Entity co-operation in regards to such matters will remain a demanding task. In the meantime, external pressure on Bosnia and Herzegovina to fulfil its obligations will continue, adding increased impetus for a national security policy to be established as a means of overcoming such problems.

The absence of a state security policy has also seen Bosnia and Herzegovina unable to exercise the rights and privileges it derives from participating in the OSCE CSBMs - such as,

²⁴ See "1994 Vienna Document of the Negotiations on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures" (Vienna: Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, 1994) 9-11

²⁵ Author's interview with Dr. Bisera Turkovic, Ambassador of Bosnia-Herzegovina to the OSCE, Vienna, January 25, 2000

for example, conducting military inspections of other participating states to verify their compliance with agreed measures. Its inability to do so has essentially been the result of a lack of an institutional mandate that would enable matters pertaining to national security to be dealt with at the state level. Consequently, while other participating states have been able to exercise their rights in regards to Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bosnia as a state has been unable to do the same in return.²⁶

Both the pressures on Bosnia and Herzegovina for integration and the continuation of the current processes in which it is involved will continue exerting pressure on the country to establish a state security policy. If the country is to make the most from benefits the processes have to offer, it will need to establish the policy as soon as possible.

4. BOSNIA'S CONSTITUTION AND STATE SECURITY POLICY

The following section will focus on the Constitution of Bosnia-Herzegovina to examine whether the establishment of a state security policy is possible from a legal and constitutional standpoint. The Constitution of Bosnia-Herzegovina does not contain any provisions or references pertaining to the possible establishment or even existence of a state security policy. While the absence of such provisions allows ambiguity, the lack of such references can be viewed as constituting an absence of any limitations for the establishment of the policy. The constitution does not contain any provisions that would prevent or limit such interpretations. Hence, the possibility for establishing a state security policy for Bosnia-Herzegovina exists implicitly.

That implicit constitutional possibility however, raises another issue. Namely, the mandates of existing state institutions will have to be adjusted to enable them to assume the responsibilities associated with the establishment of a state security policy. The question that therefore arises is whether such changes would be constitutionally possible.

To that end, two provisions exist within Bosnia's Constitution that are of relevance. The two provisions are contained in Article III of the Constitution under Point 5 (a) and Point 5 (b), respectively. Point 5 (a) states that additional State institutions may be established in Bosnia-

²⁶ see Carlo Jean, Personal Representative of the OSCE Chairman in Office, "*Report on the Implementation of Articles II and IV of Annex 1-B Dayton Peace Accords*" (Statement presented at the meeting of the Stability Pact Working Table on Security Issues in Sarajevo on February 15, 2000), Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe, 1

Herzegovina "as necessary" to preserve Bosnia's "state sovereignty, territorial integrity, political independence and international personality". The article thereby effectively provides the possibility of establishing a new state body or institution in Bosnia and Herzegovina as a means of addressing the lack of institutional capacity and mandate to deal with the development, coordination and pursuit of a state security policy.

The constitution also provides a second means of addressing that lack of institutional mandate and capacity in Article III, 5 (b). Point 5 (b) states that "within six months of the entry into force of this Constitution, the Entities shall begin negotiations with a view to including in the responsibilities of the institutions of Bosnia and Herzegovina other matters..." Given the absence of any timeframe that would limit such "negotiations" taking place after the Constitution's entry into force, as well as the broad meaning of "other matters", the provision provides a possibility for the responsibilities of existing state institutions to be broadened to also incorporate responsibilities associated with state security policy. Hence, a constitutional basis exists through which the responsibilities associated with a state security policy may be delegated to existing state institutions.

Bosnia's constitution therefore provides for the establishment of a state security policy and for possible institutional changes that may be required as a result. The question remains whether the establishment of a state security policy is possible given the current political and military situation in Bosnia.

5. SECURITY POLICIES OF THE ENTITIES

In order to understand fully the security policies of the Entities, it is necessary to briefly examine the relationship between those policies and the broader political and military picture in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Today, stability prevails throughout Bosnia-Herzegovina. The peace brought to Bosnia and Herzegovina by the Dayton Accords has been consolidated to a point where there is only a 'very limited prospect of a return to fighting across Bosnia anytime in the foreseeable future'.²⁷ Nonetheless, the peace that prevails today is marred by tensions between the country's two Entities. The tensions are largely both a product and

²⁷ James Gow, "Strategic Questions and Security Policy: Knowing What We Want" in *Bosnia-Herzegovina: Beyond Dayton*, Ed. Martin Sopta (Zagreb: Croatian Center for Strategic Studies, 1997) 49

reflection of the Entities' security policies. Addressing that situation will therefore be of essential importance if an effective national security policy is to be established.

5.1 Security Policies

The security policies of the Entities are similar despite the full autonomy the two enjoy in setting their policies. One of the most striking features of the Entities' policies is their overwhelming emphasis on the military aspect of security and their lack of emphasis on the national values dimension. Both Entities have also sought, within the parameters provided to them by Bosnia's Constitution, to improve their external security dimensions. The following section will first explore the external security and national values dimensions of the Entities' security policies. It will then move on to analyse the military security aspects of their security policies.

External Security and National Values Dimensions

The external security dimension has been an important, but limited part of the Entities' security policies. Although the Entities have sought to develop relations with sovereign states, their ability to do so has been constrained by Bosnia's Constitution. The constitution provides that the Entities can only establish parallel relationships with neighbouring states (Croatia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY))²⁸. In order to establish relations with any other states or organisations, they must receive the approval of Bosnia's State Parliament. Both the Entity of Republic Srpska and the Federation have made extensive use of their rights to develop relations with Bosnia's neighbours in a bid to enhance their external security. The Entities, however, cannot independently develop relations with any other states. Hence, although the external security dimension does form part of the Entities' security policies, they have been limited in the degree to which they can pursue it.

The state values dimension, meanwhile, has been largely left out of the Entities' security policies. The absence of that dimension is partly a reflection of the changing and unconsolidated nature of Bosnia's economic and political values in light of its ongoing

²⁸ so long as those relations are "consistent with the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Bosnia-Herzegovina". See Article III, 2(a)-2(c), "Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina" in *Dayton Peace Accords: General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina* (Office of Public Communication, U.S. Department of State, 1995)

27

transition process. At the same time, it can also, at least in part, be seen as a result of a strategic avoidance by the Entities to place emphasis on social values. As mentioned in section two, many of Bosnia's social values were undermined or seriously weakened by the nature of the ethno-nationalist objectives that were pursued during the conflict. The Dayton Peace Agreement attempts to address that problem by providing a number of measures designed to help re-establish those values throughout the country. To that end, the Dayton Agreement also provides that the two Entities in Bosnia-Herzegovina are to be multi-ethnic in character. However, the establishment of that characteristic and the re-establishment of the values associated with it have largely been opposed by the dominant political circles within the Entities. The opposition has stemmed from the view that the re-establishment of those values would be both contrary to the purpose of the war and threatening to the gains that were achieved by it.²⁹ As a result, there has been a great tendency to avoid any emphasis on the Entities' social values as enshrined in the Dayton Agreement. At the same time, the international community's presence and engagement in Bosnia-Herzegovina has constrained the ability of local political leaders to expressly challenge or renounce those values. Hence, unwilling to see the re-establishment of the social values as set by the Dayton Accords and unable to openly reject them, the main political groupings in both Entities have adopted a policy of passive resistance towards their re-establishment.³⁰ Consequently, the Entities have largely steered away from placing emphasis on the social values aspect. Accordingly, they have also avoided incorporating those values into their security policies.

5.2 Military Aspects

The main feature of both Entities' security policies has been the military security aspect. The degree of emphasis given to that aspect in each Entity's security policy, and the manner in which it has been pursued, however, has been a serious source of tension in Bosnia. The pursuit of the aspect by one Entity has often been perceived as threatening by the other Entity, which in turn has sought to increase its own military security in response. Consequently, the

²⁹ The aims that were pursued in Bosnia during the war are perhaps best described by Gerald Knaus of the International Crisis Group who points out that: '[the war in Bosnia] was a war directed against civilians to create homogenous ethnically pure states and this ethnic cleansing was almost grotesquely successful'. See Gerald Knaus, "Keynote Remarks" in *Bosnia after SFOR?; Conference Proceedings* (Vienna: Center for Democracy in Vienna, 1998) 16

³⁰ An example of the way in which the main political groupings pursue that policy of passive resistance and an explanation of the different interests being pursued is explained by Sharp in the case of refugee returns. See Bojicic and Kaldor, *Op. Cit.*, 113

military aspects of the Entities' policies, and the hostile nature in which they are pursued, greatly represent and epitomise the existing security problem in Bosnia.

The problem with the military security aspect of the Entities' security policies essentially lies with their hostile nature and focus. Namely, to date the aspects have been almost exclusively focused on the other Entity. The high levels of mistrust between the two Entities explain the given focus. Consequently, the force structure and defence posture of the Entities' two armed forces have, until recently, been built around the possibility of a renewed war between the two.³¹ At the same time, both Entities have maintained large portions of budgetary outlays on military expenditure. In 1998 for example, the defence expenditures of the Entity of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Entity of Republika Srpska stood at 39% and 18% of each Entity's respective budget.³²

In pursuing the military security aspect, the Entity of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina has also reformed its armed forces' military doctrine by copying the military doctrine of the United States' armed forces and adapting it, where necessary, to its particular conditions and needs; such as for example, size, position, resources and so on.³³ The Entity of Republika Srpska meanwhile has continued to base its military doctrine on that of the former JNA³⁴.

Overall, the Entities have pursued the military aspects of their security policies in a manner that has both reflected and fuelled the tensions between the two. In pursuing the military security aspect, each Entity has viewed the incremental increase in its military size and expenditure as justified in light of the other Entity's respective increase in its own size and expenditure. Indeed, it was a case in which as Singh notes, one player's increase in security led to an overall decrease in security.³⁵

³¹ Robert Barry, "Force Structure and Defense Doctrine" in *Democratic Control: Seminar on the Democratic Control of Security Policy and the Armed Forces, Proceedings*, ed. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Special Representative of the OSCE CiO for Article II and IV (Sarajevo, 1999)

³² Robert Barry, "Force Structure and Defense Doctrine" in *Democratic Control: Seminar on the Democratic Control of Security Policy and the Armed Forces, Proceedings*, (Ed. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Special Representative of the OSCE CiO for Article II and IV), Sarajevo, 1999

³³ Drekovic, *Concepts of Defense Policy for Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Democratic Control the Security Policy of the Armed Force of Bosnia and Herzegovina* (Background Paper) Sarajevo, 1999, 18

³⁴ Indeed, military officers from the Entity of Republika Srpska still receive their training from the JNA, see Dedic, "Interview with the Minister of Defence of the Entity of Republika Srpska"

³⁵ Singh, *The Politics of Security; Defining Security in the Post-Cold War Era* (Cambridge: Macmillan Press, 1999) 223

Recent developments in Bosnia and Herzegovina, however, indicate that a turn around in policy, if not attitudes, is taking place. The two Entities announced that they have agreed to reduce their armed forces by 30%. The announcement was followed by a statement from the Bosnian Presidency in February 2000 that a further 30% reduction in the size of the armed forces of both Entities will take place within the immediate future, with further reductions likely.³⁶ The reductions mark a significant step towards achieving greater levels of confidence between the two Entities. They offer hope that the Entities are slowly moving towards a less hostile and confrontational equilibrium in pursuing their military security concepts.

Another indicator that points to the changing security environment is the continuing decrease in the presence of NATO troops in Bosnia. From a high of some 60,000 troops, the level of NATO troops present in Bosnia today has fallen dramatically – to some 20,000 troops stationed throughout the country. In particular, this shows that the security environment is stabilising, which thus points to the beginning of normalisation of relations within the country, and towards perhaps a more co-operative and outward looking approach by the Entities.

The above developments are encouraging, however, there is still a need for caution. Although a change in the way the Entities pursue the military aspects of their security policies seems to be taking place, a co-operative or complimentary approach on the matter has yet to be developed between the two if the security problem in Bosnia-Herzegovina is to be truly overcome. At the same time, if the military security aspect of the national security policy is to become applicable to Bosnia, the establishment of such an approach will have to be also accompanied by the attainment of a consensus between the armed forces in Bosnia on their common goals and perceptions.

6. FACTORS INFLUENCING THE POSSIBILITY OF ESTABLISHING A STATE SECURITY POLICY

There are a number of social, political and economic factors in Bosnia-Herzegovina that are exerting, or have the potential to exert, an influence on the possibility of establishing a state

³⁶ Alija Izetbegovic, "Statement by President A. Izetbegovic at the meeting of the Working Table on Security Issues of the Stability Pact", (Statement presented at the meeting of the Stability Pact Working Table on Security Issues on February 15-16, 2000 in Sarajevo, Bosnia-Herzegovina), Presidency of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Sarajevo, February 15-16, 2000

security policy for the country. Some of those factors include societal support for the establishment of such a policy, regional factors and the prevailing levels of political will as determined by political interests. The latter factor however, undoubtedly bears the greatest influence.

6.1 Model I: Rational Actor Model

The Rational Actor Model considers political happenings as being ‘more or less the purposive acts of unified governments’.³⁷ Governments in the model are treated as rational actors that seek to achieve strategic objectives. The model therefore gives particular attention to the goals and objectives of governments in explaining particular acts. This section will make use of the model by examining the possibility of establishing a state security policy for Bosnia and Herzegovina in terms of the interests of the Entity governments in Bosnia. Where necessary, it will also consider the individual interests of the political leaderships of Bosnia’s ethnic communities.

The resistance towards establishing a state security policy for Bosnia can largely be attributed to the continuing pursuit by the different political leaderships of the ethnic interests that had been prevalent throughout the 1992-1995 conflict. Indeed most of the problems confronting the international community in its endeavours in the country are characterised by that problem. The words of General Carlo Jean, former Personal Representative of the OSCE Chairman in Office for the Implementation of Article II and Article IV of the Dayton Peace Accords, uttered in 1997, still hold true today; “now in Bosnia and Herzegovina, peace is the continuation of war with other means”.³⁸

In particular, the problem pertaining to state security policy may be viewed in terms of a general resistance by ethnic political groups within both Entities to see the adoption of proposals that would see the strengthening of the notion of the state in Bosnia. That resistance has perhaps most illustratively been manifested with the implementation of the Dayton Accords themselves. As Woollacott noted in 1997, ‘those parts of Dayton that work to give

³⁷*Ibid.*, p.4

³⁸ Carlo Jean, “Introductory Remarks” in *Seminar on Security Studies: Proceedings Sarajevo 25-27 June, 1997*, (Sarajevo, 1997)

Bosnia some of the aspects of a single state are precisely the parts that have been most resisted'.³⁹ To this day, Woollacott's observations are still valid.

Although he Bosnia's State Presidency called for "increased action at the political level" to examine the possibility of establishing a state security policy for the country as soon as possible.⁴⁰ Nothing much has been done. However with the changes in Bosnia and Herzegovina there have been signs of a shift in the leadership's position.

6.2 Governmental Politics Model

The Governmental Politics Model goes beyond the previous two models to consider acts as the result of bargaining games among players in government. Government is not seen a unitary actor, as in Model I. It is viewed as being comprised of many players with multiple, differing and competing objectives. The focus of attention within the model are the players whose actions and interests impact the issue in question; the factors that shape players' perceptions and stands; and the performance of the players.⁴¹ The following section will examine the key players within each Entity and analyse their likely bearing on the possibility of establishing a state security policy for Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Republika Srpska

There are a number of key players in Republika Srpska that will have an important role in determining the likelihood of a state security policy for Bosnia and Herzegovina being established. They include the Entity's current Minister of Defence, the Minister of Interior Affairs and the Republika Srpska's Prime Minister.

The current Minister of Defence in Republika Srpska, Slobodan Bilic, will likely support the establishment of a state security policy. The former Minister, Manojlo Milovanovic, worked

³⁹ Woollacott, 'There's no fighting in Bosnia, but it's a pretty lousy peace', *Guardian*, December 27, 1997, 19

⁴⁰ Presidency of Bosnia-Herzegovina, *Summary of the Session of the Presidency of Bosnia-Herzegovina*, Sarajevo, March 17, 2000

⁴¹ Graham Allison, Philip Zelikow, *Op. Cit.*, p.6

on improving relations between Bosnia's armed forces and its MoDs, while developing a friendly relationship with the General of the Armed Forces Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina.⁴² As already mentioned, the MoD under his leadership took a strong and supportive stance in regards to the establishment of a state security policy for Bosnia.⁴³

Bilic's input on the issue will be of high importance in that he is also seen as representing the interests of the Entity's armed forces within the government. He also bears considerable authority and respect within the military.

The Republika Srpska Minister of Interior is another individual who is likely to bear a considerable influence on the possibility of establishing a state security policy for Bosnia and Herzegovina. Former Minister Novic favours the policy's establishment. The policy would provide the Ministry with an ability to better combat the problem of crime in Republika Srpska – an issue over which his government has come under increased criticism, including from members of its own coalition.⁴⁴ Politically, Novic was seen as a moderate and is unlikely to object to the establishment of a state security policy on ethnic or ideological grounds.⁴⁵ During his tenure, he worked together with his Federation counterpart Mehmed Zilic, to establish greater levels of co-operation within Bosnia and Herzegovina in the field of security. As mentioned earlier, their efforts have revolved around the creation of a single security space within the country that would provide for more effective and co-ordinated action in the struggle against organised crime. A state security policy would help greatly compliment those efforts.

The Prime Minister of Republika Srpska, Mladen Ivanic, however, will likely bear the greatest influence on the issue. His bearing on the matter will be, if not supportive, then at least acquiescent. Although Ivanic has since his election in 2000 steered a moderate, pro-Western course, there remains much disagreement. It is unclear how much scope Ivanic will have in openly expressing his support for the policy to be established. In order to avoid a

⁴² Dedic, "Interview with the Minister of Defence of the Entity of Republika Srpska"

⁴³ Author's interview with Col. Bosko Gvozden, Ministry of Defense of the Entity of Republika Srpska, Vienna, June 19, 2000

⁴⁴ See BBC Monitoring Service, "BBC Monitoring International Reports: Former Bosnian Serb Coalition Party Leader Denies Split In Her Party", April 18, 2000 <http://Search.Ft.Com/Search/Multi/Globalarchive.Jsp?Query=Dodik&Docid=000418008036&Searchcat=1&Offset=20&Query=Dodik&Resultsshown=20&Resultstorequest=100>, accessed June 2, 2000

⁴⁵ Novic has been termed by members of his own government as being "politically neutral", see Dedic "Interview with the Minister of Defence of the Entity of Republika Srpska"

coalition split, Ivanic will have to play a more cautious role in terms of satisfying his coalition partners. It is uncertain to what degree that could imply a change of direction in the coalition's policies to date given the change of parties and party leaderships.

Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina

In the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, the current Minister of Defence and the Entity's Prime Minister will play a significant role in the determination of the Entity's stance concerning the issue. Minister Anic, the current Minister of Defence, has become a leading figure on defence and security issues within the Entity to date. Given his approval of the MoD's current policy on the issue, he will almost certainly favour the establishment of the policy himself. The fact that he is therefore a relatively new figure in the Entity's politics gives him the freedom to manoeuvre vis-à-vis other political figures in that he is not associated with the HDZ's policies of 1992-1995. Moreover, having joined the NHI in Bosnia, Anic enjoys great levels of political trust among his Bosniacs colleagues. His role as the Minister of Defence within the Federation also gives him considerable authority over the HVO. The respect that Anic commands within those organisations means that he will likely be able to secure support within them on the issue of establishing a national security policy for Bosnia. Indeed, the very fact that Anic has already given his approval for the establishment of a state security policy indicates that the necessary support for the initiative within the Croatian component.

The Prime Minister of the Federation, Alija Behmen is another individual that will have a bearing on the initiative to establish a state security policy. As Prime Minister of the Federation, his support for the initiative will be necessary in order to ensure the Entity's participation in the establishment and pursuit of the policy, where necessary. Behmen will no doubt strongly favour the establishment of a state security policy as a means of strengthening the concept of the state in Bosnia and Herzegovina. He is viewed as a highly pragmatic individual with an ability to skilfully persuade his political opponents. His pragmatism and skills will therefore be useful in addressing any possible opposition towards the initiative within his government.

The establishment of a state security policy would enable government's operational costs to decrease through a re-evaluation of expenditures on security and defence. It would also enable

a re-diversion of government funds towards social development and economic programmes which are increasingly gaining the attention of voters.

The Members of Presidency have for some time favored the establishment of a state security policy for the country, seeing it as a necessity for further euro integration processes. In May 2000 they had tasked Council of Ministers to develop the concept of Security policy.

6.3 Economic Factors and Social Views

Societal opinion in Bosnia and Herzegovina also has a potential to bear an effect on the possibility of a state security policy being established and should be examined here. To date however, social opinion across all three communities has remained rather the issue. The absence of any strong opinions in either direction can be seen as growing focus by the population at large on issues of greater relevance for their immediate well-being.

It also shows that the effect of ethnocentrism and ethnonationalism has been gradually waning. With social concern increasingly focused on more pressing issues of greater immediate relevance such as jobs and regular wages, the issue of establishing a state security policy for Bosnia and Herzegovina has not received much attention within society. The benign social response may arguably be taken as being positive to the extent that it signifies a lack of any major public opposition towards the initiative. If the prospect of the policy being established however is to be fully supported by the public at large, greater efforts will have to be made at promoting, in a non-partisan way, an awareness of the needs for a state security policy for the country as well as an awareness of what such a policy would consist of and entail.

The absence of any major opposition *does* provide for the possibility of an agreement being reached at the political level for a state security policy to be established. Nonetheless, longer-term factors that could bear an influence on social sentiment must also be taken into account. One of the more significant longer-term factors that should be considered are changes in the prevailing economic conditions. As has been noted by observers of developments throughout the former Yugoslavia to date, economic hardships have proven to nurture ethno-nationalist

sentiment and the feeling of being endangered.⁴⁶ A potential for the improving economic situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina will help enfranchise more liberal political and ideological views within society.

While the status of the economy has the potential to affect societal views and thus social support for the establishment of a state security policy, it also has the potential to bear an important effect on the possibility of establishing a state security policy in itself. The very establishment of such a policy will become more relevant as Bosnia's economy recovers and improves, if only due to the necessity for the maintenance and pursuit of the country's economic security. Business groups throughout the country have already become increasingly vocal in their demands for greater levels of engagement to be taken by the State and the Entities to help provide conditions that would be of relevance for the economic security aspect in Bosnia.⁴⁷ Keeping in mind that Bosnia's economic conditions have been improving and will likely continue to do so, social support for the establishment of the policy will be maintained at existing levels, if not increased.

7. EFFORTS OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY

The international community has until now invested significant efforts in trying to increase trust and confidence in the area of security within Bosnia-Herzegovina. Those efforts have been instrumental in providing for some of the necessary conditions for the establishment of a state security policy. This section will examine some of the main efforts that have been made to that end in Bosnia and Herzegovina to date.

7.1 *Peace Implementation Council*

One important channel through which the international community has attempted to address issues that represent obstacles to the establishment of a state security policy is through the Steering Board of the Peace Implementation Council (PIC). The PIC Steering Board, through its monthly meetings, is the key international managing body for Bosnia, discussing policy

⁴⁶ Woodward, *Balkan Tragedy: Chaos and Dissolution After the Cold War*, (Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1995) 293

⁴⁷ see CDV p. 79

developments in detail and providing political guidance to the United Nation's High Representative in Bosnia.⁴⁸

Since 1995, the Council has issued a number of communiqués, containing directives to the High Representative in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the country's political leaders, aimed towards improving the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The PIC's directives have ranged from calling for greater levels of co-operation between local authorities in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the IPTF⁴⁹ to requesting reductions in military expenditures.⁵⁰

By providing concrete steps to be undertaken to address issues that hinder the pace of progress in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the PIC has sought to facilitate the creation of a political and security environment within Bosnia and Herzegovina that is conducive to the formation of trust. That trust will be extremely important for a consensus to be established between the Entities on their common goals, perceptions and interests. Corollary, it is also vital if the obstacles pertaining to the pursuit of the military security aspect of national security policy are to be fully overcome.

Two important endeavours, that have been at the heart of international efforts and that had a significantly positive effect on the overall of security situation in Bosnia, should be highlighted here. The two specifically have been the implementation and strengthening of confidence and security building measures (CSBMs) and the attainment of sub-regional arms control (SRAC).

7.2 Confidence and Security Building Measures (CSBMs)

The implementation of CSBMs within Bosnia-Herzegovina was agreed upon as part of the Dayton Peace Accords and was pursued by the international community as part of the agreement's implementation process.⁵¹ The measures, designed to enhance mutual confidence

⁴⁸Chandler, *Bosnia: Faking Democracy After Dayton* (Sterling: Pluto Press, 1999) 36

⁴⁹ see Peace Implementation Council, *Bonn Peace Implementation Conference 1997*; 'Bosnia and Herzegovina 1998: Self-Sustaining Structures', Office of the High Representative, December 1997 <http://www.ohr.int/docu/d971210a.htm>, accessed December 14, 1999

⁵⁰ See Peace Implementation Council, *Communiqué: Political Declaration from Ministerial Meeting of the Peace Implementation Council Steering Board*, Office of the High Representative, May 1997 <http://www.ohr.int/docu/d970530a.htm>, accessed December 8, 2000

⁵¹ The implementation of CSBMs *within* Bosnia is not to be confused with the implementation of CSBMs among OSCE member states which was discussed in section 3.

and reduce the risk of conflict, drew fully upon the 1994 Vienna Document of the Negotiations on Confidence and Security Building Measures of the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE). The responsibility for overseeing the implementation of those measures was assigned to the OSCE. However, unlike with the OSCE experience with the implementation of regional CSBMs (which involves the participation of the Organisation's participating states), the implementation of the CSBMs for Bosnia and Herzegovina was different in that no other states were involved in the process. Rather, the participants were Bosnia's two Entities and the State's central government.

The implementation of the CSBMs has managed to considerably lessen the military tensions in Bosnia and Herzegovina, thereby helping secure the current military situation in the country. Although the current military situation is far less than perfect, it is an improvement on that seen only three years ago when the prospects of a renewed war were very real. The CSBMs success lies in the degree of military transparency and predictability they provide. By obliging the Entities and their armed forces to comply with a series of measures and restrictions on diverse issues (ranging from the locations of military exercises to the exchange of data on weapons holdings), the CSBMs provide each armed force in Bosnia and Herzegovina a great deal of insight into the operations and capacities of the other force. In doing so, the measures reduce tensions in two ways. Firstly, they reduce the possibility of a surprise attack taking place on any armed force by the other. And secondly, they favour the victim in case of a surprise attack does take place.

7.3 *Sub-Regional Arms Control (SRAC)*

The other focus of the international community's efforts at increasing confidence within Bosnia-Herzegovina has revolved around the establishment of an agreement on SRAC. The agreement involves both Bosnia's Entities (at a sub-state level) as well as the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina (at an international level). The measures negotiated under the SRAC Agreement are primarily designed to ensure that both the Entities and Bosnia-Herzegovina as a state (together with the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and Croatia) have "balanced and stable defence force levels at the lowest numbers

consistent with each participant's respective security".⁵² By establishing balanced defence force levels in both Bosnia-Herzegovina and the region based on the lowest level of armaments, the agreement will help further decrease the level of mistrust within the country. The agreements reached thus far have for example established quotas on the holdings of tanks, artillery, armoured combat vehicles, combat aircraft and attack helicopters that each armed force may possess.

The Agreement represents a major step forward in creating the right conditions for the establishment of trust in Bosnia-Herzegovina by effectively the levels of transparency and predictability between the armed forces of both the Entities and Bosnia's neighbours. By formally equalising the relative military capacities and armament holdings of each armed force, the agreement also goes a long way in decreasing the Entities' mutual sense of vulnerability.

Overall, the efforts made and measures implemented by the international community thus far have directly contributed to the improvement of the security situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina. They have put into place measures that provide for an environment in which trust between the Entities and their armed forces can begin to be established. Trust will be essential if a consensus on the future is to be attained between all sides in Bosnia.

Efforts are also being made to help foster the very creation of that trust. The World Bank for example started up to help the Entities in Bosnia make a turnaround in the way they have pursued their military security aspects by financing programs designed to cushion the social impact of that change. The World Bank will specifically provide the Bosnian government with a Euro 26 million loan, subsidised by international donations, to facilitate the reductions in the size of the Entities' armed forces. The funds will be used to finance programmes to reintegrate former military soldiers into the labour market.⁵³

As Sharp points out, the need for such involvement is characteristic of post-war rebuilding operations:

⁵² "Agreement on Sub-Regional Arms Control", June 14, 1996, Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe, INF/98/96, 1

⁵³ See Special Coordinator of the Stability Pact for Southeast Europe, "Assistance for the Reduction of the Armed Forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina", *Report of the Special Coordinator for the Regional Funding Conference for South East Europe*, (Brussels, March 2000) 229

In the long run, Bosnians will have to conduct their own affairs, but just as individuals suffering from severe trauma are not expected to heal themselves, neither can war-torn and collapsed states recuperate without careful nurturing over many years. We know from other post-war rebuilding operations that former belligerents need help from the outside to build bridges before serious reconciliation can begin.⁵⁴

The results of the efforts made to date are nevertheless encouraging. They have managed to greatly reduce tensions and mistrust between the Entities and their armed forces. They have also enable the Entities to take their first major step towards regressing their mutually confrontational policies. Both those achievements are indispensable if Bosnia and its armed forces are to reach a consensus on their common vision and interest – something that is essential for the establishment of a truly effective state security policy. To that end, international efforts such as those seen to date will likely continue.

8. Establishment of a state Security Policy for Bosnia- Herzegovina

Overall, the possibility of establishing a state security policy in Bosnia is positive. The situation in the country has, since the signing of the Dayton Agreement, improved to such an extent that it allows for the application of the concept of state security policy almost in its entirety.

Nonetheless, for a truly effective state security policy to exist in Bosnia, the current military relations in the country will need to be improved. A consensus will need to be reached by all the country's ethnic communities on their common vision and interests.

The international community's efforts in Bosnia and Herzegovina to date have helped create the necessary environment in which a discussion on common goals and visions can take place. Ethno-nationalist sentiment is increasingly losing ground among the population at large to considerations about employment, living standards and the future. Those changes have also been accompanied by growing levels of inter-community trust. Mistrust between the Entities and their armed forces has also greatly diminished, as each Entity's decision to reduce its

⁵⁴ Sharp, 'Dayton Report Card', p.113

armed forces demonstrates. The developments indicate that the establishment of a consensus and a state security policy can take place.

Indeed, as shown in Section Six, the necessary will and interests to establish the policy do exist in Bosnia. The growing electoral support for Ivanic's moderate policies and the prevailing conditions within Republika Srpska have enabled the Bosnian Serb leadership to take a favourable leaning towards establishing a state security policy. Meanwhile, the recent changes in Croatia and the FRY, and the pressure for more moderate political stances in the Federation have seen the Bosnian Croats themselves take a favourable and pragmatic position on the issue. Same is applicable on Bosniacs. At the same time, the pressure on Bosnia and Herzegovina for regional integration is presenting all the parties with the need to establish the policy sooner, rather than later.

The establishment of a state security policy for Bosnia and Herzegovina therefore *is* possible. And given the combination of existing pressures, political interests and social and economic factors, the establishment of a state security policy for Bosnia and Herzegovina can be expected sooner than many sceptics would lead to believe.

SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY

Agreement on Sub-Regional Arms Control, (OSCE Document no.: INF/98/96), June 14, 1996

“Americki Ambasador Tomas Miler gost ‘Krug 99’; BiH je Tek na Polivini Puta” [American Ambassador Thomas Miller guests at ‘Circle 99’; Bosnia-Herzegovina has only reached the half-way mark], *Dnevni Avaz*, Sarajevo, July 10, 2000, p.4

BBC Monitoring Service, “BBC Monitoring International Reports: Former Bosnian Serb Coalition Party Leader Denies Split In Her Party”, United Kingdom, April 18, 2000
<http://search.ft.com/Search/Multi/Globalarchive.Jsp?Query=Dodik&Docid=000418008036&Searchcat=1&Offset=20&Query=Dodik&Resultsshow=20&Resultstorequest=100>

Bojicic Vesna and Kaldor Mary, “The ‘Abnormal’ Economy of Bosnia-Herzegovina” in *Scramble for the Balkans: Nationalism, Globalism and the Political Economy of Reconstruction*, (Ed. Carl-Ulrik Schierup), Macmillan Press, London, 1999

Buzan Barry, *People States and Fear*, Harvester Wheatsheaf, Hertfordshire, 1991

Chandler David, *Bosnia: Faking Democracy After Dayton*, Pluto Press, Sterling, 1999

Croatian Center for Strategic Studies, *Bosnia-Herzegovina; Beyond Dayton*, (Ed. Martin Sopta), Zagreb, 1997

“Dayton Peace Accords: General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina”, November 15, 1995 (Office of Public Communication, U.S. Department of State, 1995)

Democratic Control: Seminar on the Democratic Control of Security Policy and the Armed Forces, Proceedings, (Ed. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Special Representative of the OSCE CiO for Article II and IV), Sarajevo, 1999

Dedic Mirha, ‘Interview with the Minister of Defense of the Entity of Republika Srpska: “If they try arresting me by force, I will resist – It should be done decently such as with the Talic Arrest”’, *Slobodna Bosna*, No. 178, April 13, 2000

Drekovic, *Concepts of Defense Policy for Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Democratic Control the Security Policy of the Armed Force of Bosnia and Herzegovina*, Background Paper, Sarajevo, 1999

European Commission Communication to the Council and European Parliament, *External Relations: Stabilization and Association Process for Countries of Southeast Europe - Developments in the Countries of the Regional Approach since 1996*, May 26, 1999
http://europa.eu.int/comm/dgla/see/com_99_235/6.htm

Izetbegovic Alija, ‘Statement by President A. Izetbegovic at the meeting of the Working Table on Security Issues of the Stability Pact’, Sarajevo, February 15-16, 2000

Jean Carlo, Personal Representative of the OSCE Chairman in Office, *Report on the Implementation of Articles II and IV of Annex 1-B Dayton Peace Accords*, Sarajevo, February 15, 2000

Louw Michael H. H., *National Security*, University of Pretoria, Pretoria, 1978

Luciani Giacomo, 'The economic content of security', *Journal of Public Policy*, 8:2, 1989

Petrish Wolfgang, 'Opening Remarks at the Meeting of the Stability Pact Table on Security Issues', Sarajevo, February 15, 2000

Peace Implementation Council, *Communiqué: Political Declaration from Ministerial Meeting of the Peace Implementation Council Steering Board*, OHR <http://www.ohr.int/docu/d970530a.htm>, Sintra, 30 May, 1997

Presidency of Bosnia-Herzegovina, *Summary of the Session of the Presidency of Bosnia-Herzegovina*, Sarajevo, March 17, 2000

Rieff David, *Slaughterhouse: Bosnia and the Failure of the West*, Vintage, London, 1995

Sharp Jane M.O., 'Bosnia: Begin again', *The Bulletin of Atomic Scientists*, Vol. 53, No.2 March/April 1997, <http://www.bullatombci.org/issues/1997/ma97/ma97sharp.html>

Sharp Jane M.O., 'Dayton Report Card', *International Security*, 22:3, Winter 1997/1998

Special Coordinator of the Stability Pact for Southeast Europe, 'Assistance for the Reduction of the Armed Forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina', *Report of the Special Coordinator for the Regional Funding Conference for South East Europe*, Brussels, March 10, 2000, p. 229

Singh Naidoo, *The Politics of Security; Defining Security in the Post-Cold War Era*, Macmillan Press, 1999, p.223

Woodward Susan L., *Balkan Tragedy: Chaos and Dissolution After the Cold War*, The Brookings Institution, Washington, 1995

Woollacott Martin, 'There's no fighting in Bosnia, but it's a pretty lousy peace', *Guardian*, December 27, 1997, p.19

1994 Vienna Document of the Negotiations on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures, Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, Vienna, 1994

OPENING SESSION

Dr Bisera Turković (CSS)
Member of the Presidency Beriz Belkić (Presidency of BiH)
Ambassador Matthias Sonn (OHR)
Ambassador Dieter Voltman (OSCE)

Ambassador Dr. Bisera Turkovic

Executive Director of the Centre for Security Studies BiH

Dear Guests, Excellencies, members of government, representatives of political parties, members of armed forces, valued experts, allow me to thank you for your response and participation in today's seminar.

This seminar is organized alongside the financial assistance of the Governments of Norway, Italy, Germany, and the Office of the Personal Representative of the Chairman in Office for Articles II and IV, Annex 1B of the Dayton Peace Agreement.

I would also like to express my gratitude to the speakers for their time and endeavours to enrich us with their knowledge and experience.

Together with us is a small but distinguished group of students from the Faculty of Criminal Justice, studying security disciplines, who have with absolute enthusiasm taken part in the technical preparation of this seminar.

Now please allow me to say a few words about the Centre for Security Studies.

The Centre for Security Studies is a non-governmental organization, which is engaged in issues of security in Bosnia and Herzegovina as well as the entire region of South East Europe. The task of the Centre is the stimulation of dialogue in the field of security, the promotion of democratic structures and processes, foreign and security policy in Bosnia and Herzegovina as well as within the region of South East Europe, through public advocacy and educational research projects.

The Centre is located in Sarajevo and is committed towards the reestablishment of a common regional strategy in the fight against crime, corruption, money laundering, illegal migration and trade in human beings, as well as promoting democratic control of the armed forces, police and security services.

Today's seminar is the first public activity of this Centre in this form.

What is the objective of today's seminar?

All of you present here know that Bosnia and Herzegovina stands before the task of the development and harmonization of a security policy for Bosnia and Herzegovina.

It is necessary that we clearly define where we would like to be in the future and consequently which actions and steps need to be undertaken in order to arrive where we want to be.

The first question is where are we now?

In this current moment, we have a conciliated defence policy and we are entering into a phase when it is necessary that we also negotiate a security policy. Consequently, the Defence Policy is only one part of the security policy, which is a much wider concept.

If we know where we are now, the following questions would be where are we going and what do we want?

The collective opinion of the Bosnian public, institutions and political commitment is the full integration of Bosnia and Herzegovina into the European environment. All of you recently heard that the Presidency has signed a Letter of Intent concerning joining the Partnership for Peace. Today with us is the honorable Member of the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Mr. Beriz Belkic, who will possibly inform us about this detail.

However, knowing that it is not controversial that we wish to be like other states, as well as all remaining nations in Europe, leaves us with the key question as to how we shall reach our objective?

In order to understand the real range of Bosnia and Herzegovina, it is necessary to have in mind the basic characteristics of the process of joining the Partnership for Peace, as well as the key characteristics of the process of membership to the European Union.

One of the requirements for membership to the Partnership for Peace is certainly also the adoption of a security policy. The contemporary definition of security policy supercedes the concept of security policy that historically was present. Security Policy today is not limited to the security/military field, but rather implies democratic and parliamentary supervision of the military, command and control of the military on a state level, alongside the full transparency of financial and budgetary planning, and common standards of equipping and training armed forces. This also encompasses the field of foreign policy, the economy and ecology, considering that those problems influence the long-term planning of the health and survival of country. As a conceptual category security takes into its primary focus not only the survival of the state but also the welfare of its citizens.

Ideological confrontation and the Cold War are now history, but national confrontation and economic and political problems remain - not only in Bosnia and Herzegovina, but this is something which also concerns all countries of the world. In the time of global economics and all other types of integration, the isolation of one country exists as a threat to security, not only for itself but also for its environment.

As a conceptual category, international security explicitly accepts the security dilemma and further the knowledge that the security of one country is directly connected to the security of other states.

The integration processes are exceptionally important for Bosnia and Herzegovina insofar as we do not wish to remain citizens of a country of poverty, and a country that is confronted with political isolation. Consequently, this is the reason that we shall through this seminar, alongside the assistance of our appreciated and highly respected guests, endeavour to receive greater knowledge about security policy.

The format of this seminar is such that in the first session, after the presentation of the highly respected political representatives of this country, we have an academic approach to security policy in which we shall receive theoretical knowledge - what security policy is in reality and what security policy today embraces.

In the second session, we shall receive an institutional approach, concerning how security policy is envisaged from the side of representatives of NATO and the Stability Pact for South East Europe.

In the third session, we shall hear examples from other European countries as to the development of their own security policies and what this implies.

In the final session, we shall receive an overview of the Bosnian position, problems and manner with which we can resolve them.

I hope that we shall at the end of this seminar collectively leave with some more knowledge and that this shall assist us in the task which stands before us - a task which stands before the Council of Ministers of Bosnia and Herzegovina as well as before the Parliament of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which shall in legislative procedures come to the position to adopt that security policy.

Mr. Beriz Belkic

Member of the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina

Dear Ladies and Gentleman: I am truly delighted to have been invited to contribute in the opening of this important event. I am delighted out of a few reasons. Before all else I believe that the seminar is organized at the right time, at the time when Bosnia and Herzegovina, indeed its institutions, have a few highly important issues to resolve. One of those issues is that the security policy of Bosnia and Herzegovina is to be established and maintained. I see as great importance, that this issue is of high priority for the citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina, through open discussion with the inclusion of a high number of competent people. I can see here that there are a number of people who in a competent manner could contribute in helping the authorities of Bosnia and Herzegovina to successfully complete this task. I am pleased to see here today delegates from the parliament of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and members of the legislative body who will at the end have the final word on this document.

Ms. Turkovic has already mentioned a few things that the Presidency has already completed. We are fully aware of our responsibilities, as we have succeeded in implementing a Defense Policy for Bosnia and Herzegovina and we are one step closer towards a security policy, which I believe that in the near future we will set in concrete and reach an agreement on. The presidency had requested that the Council of Ministries intensify its work on producing this document, so that within a short period of time we can be ready for a serious debate in the Parliament of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Additionally, the Presidency not long ago had issued an official statement, where it stated an expression of political will that Bosnia and Herzegovina is ready to apply for admission to Partnership for Peace. Naturally, it would not be a bad idea to remind ourselves what this means and what path we must cross to be admitted into an association such as Partnership for Peace. We are aware of those requirements, whenever we have expressed an ambition to be admitted into any one of the European integrative associations, usually these requirements are always re-iterated. It would not be bad to remind ourselves that this is one of the most important requirements in adopting about a security and defense policy for Bosnia and Herzegovina. Furthermore, it is very important to strengthen democratic over the armed forces, as well as on the state level of Bosnia and Herzegovina, to secure control and command on a state level, to secure financial transparency on a state level, and to strengthen common doctrines and standards for preparing and training entity based armed forces. Naturally to continue all of these transitional affairs in the field of the economy, to develop relationships with neighbours, implement the principles of the Dayton Agreement and to use all those positive possibilities which it offers; it is expected that there should be intensive co-operation with the International Tribunal for War Criminals in the Hague.

Furthermore, this is the responsibility of all the institutions in Bosnia and Herzegovina that on this issue they work more intensively. I believe that this is in the interest of all citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and it is also one of the requirements for us to fulfill one of our ambitions in being welcomed into European associations, and before all else to the Council of Europe and Partnership for Peace, and as viewed as our final goal, admission to the European Union and NATO.

We in the Presidency appreciate that the work on this task, agreement on the security policy, is one of the priorities of tasks also for the starting point of building civil society on general principles, the rule of law, market economy, and all else that we aim for.

I do not make so bold as to state what this document should include, but it is obvious that the idea of security policy is absolutely transformed, to an absolutely different model than of one we recognize living in the system in which we have lived, including this transitional period. I hope that we will identify those relevant criteria and principles and adapt it to this document in which will be discussed today. I am satisfied that we are going to hear suggestions and thoughts which will serve to help those people who are responsible to set this document.

I would like to congratulate the organizer, the Centre for Security Studies, and I give my word of support and I welcome all other non-governmental organizations and associations to engage themselves to help us to resolve this exceptionally important issue in a rational and transparent manner.

Thank you all so much, I wish you a successful task

Ambassador Matthias Sonn, *Deputy High Representative,
Office of the High Representative*

Thank you Madam Chairman, and I should like to start by thanking the organiser, and in particular you Bisera in the timely initiative to organise this conference. I should like to congratulate you for this start for the Centre for Security Studies, and wish the Centre a fortunate hand in its business in the future.

This seminar provides a much needed forum in which we can informally discuss not only security policy in general but possible perspectives for a security policy for Bosnia and Herzegovina in particular.

As it is well known for most of you here, in May last year the Peace Implementation Council requested the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina to identify a state-level institution responsible for drafting a common security policy for Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Presidency issued a decision on the 22 August last year, directing the Council of Ministers to develop this common security policy.

The previous Council of Ministers – of which you were a member – developed and endorsed a framework document that outlined the general contents and structure of a future common security policy document. Further development of the framework document has since then been frozen, in May this year the Presidency adopted the common defence policy paper – President Belkić already touched upon this – although the defence policy paper is an important document it is only a part, it can only form a part, or an annex, of a security policy concept. A common security policy paper for Bosnia and Herzegovina should be a broader level policy document, addressing the breadth of challenges to the long-term stability and security around, in, and to Bosnia and Herzegovina.

As the framework document already outlined, this could include issues such as economic stability, organised crime, illegal migration or the environment. The Office of the High Representative very much supports this broad concept of security policy and stands ready to assist and advise the Council of Ministers on any security policy aspects.

The work of the working group will not only be important for state of Bosnia and Herzegovina but will have a clear relevance for the whole region. We therefore call upon the Council of Ministers, again, to appoint a working group responsible for coordinating the drafting of a common security policy for the country as soon as possible.

At this point please allow me to introduce my expert colleagues, Allan Poston and Johannes Viereck would you please get up; these are the two OHR experts – one from our Military Cell, the other from our Political Department – who are here to answer questions and to take part in the discussion, which may arise during the course of the seminar.

Finally, and to conclude Bisera, as you, Mrs. Chairman, were kind enough to apologise to the foreigners here for speaking the local language, I think it certainly would be only appropriate if I in turn apologise to those amongst us from Bosnia and Herzegovina for not speaking their language. Thank you very much.

Ambassador Dieter Voltman,
Deputy Chief of Mission,
Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe

Thank you very much Madam Chairman, Mr. President, Excellencies, Ladies and Gentleman.

It is indeed a great pleasure and honour for me to say a few words on the occasion of the opening of such an important seminar.

First of all, of course, I also have to apologise for speaking English and not the local language. Maybe a little anecdote, in the OSCE – for which I represent – we have a requirement in staffing policy that there has to be a native speaking; native speaker means English of course and not the local language.

I would, first of all, compliment Dr. Bisera Turkovic for her invaluable initiative in founding this Centre for Security Studies, an NGO, which I hope will play a leading role in promoting and sustaining democratic structures and processes in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and in the region; and thus contributing to a stable security environment which is so urgently needed in this country and in the region.

I do not want to repeat your excellent speech and your excellent outline of what security policy really is. Security is a much wider, much more expanded term than was used in the past, and meaning much more than defence. Let me just mention how important it is to address by the security policy not only defence and military issues, military threats, but as well, non-military risks - all the collective issues that may undermine the stability of a society, of a country, of a region; such as for instance, large scale corruption which is undermining societies completely; such as organised crime, or for instance high tech crime – computer crime; massive illegal migration and as well economic imbalances, unfair trade practices, environmental dangers and the like. Let me just say that the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) – which I represent – has stressed and is pursuing, very proactively, this type of security in a very wide and extensive sense; it is not only promoting confidence building and stabilising measures in the military field, but as you know, in particular, focusing also on fields like democratisation, human rights protection, economic and environmental issues.

Ladies and Gentleman, it is not only in Bosnia and Herzegovina, but particularly in this country, that the differences between security and defence are not always fully understood; that is very comprehensible, given the manner in which the modern state of Bosnia and Herzegovina came into being, the peoples attention, and indeed the focus of the leadership, has been almost entirely directed towards defence. The tragic war of yours did not result from the failure of a defence policy but from the failure of a security policy – as I think at least.

What is a defence policy? A national defence policy is the articulation of the national will to first secure the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the state; secondly, to define the means and parameters of how this can be achieved; and thirdly, to authorise these means. This policy, once defined, is usually expressed in the form of a national law on defence and in a national defence doctrine. A defence policy is building on a nation, the constitution and the institutions of a state, and upon the internationally confirmed boundaries of the state. Of

course, if there is no distinct national identity, if the constitution and the joint institutions of the state are weak and lower ranking in the hierarchy according to public perception, then the constitutive parts and peoples of the state then the state's defence policy is indeed at a loss.

As we have said now a number of times, there is of course much more than this restrictive national aspect of defence and security policy. There is, thanks to god, beyond the national security policy, regional and global aspects of security policies; and modern national defence policy usually involve a commitment to collective regional and global architectures. This is why Partnership for Peace is such an important factor of political and military thinking in the state of Bosnia and Herzegovina and its entities nowadays.

Let me shortly dwell on three aspects of security policy now in the wide sense, which have not been mentioned here. I would like to highlight them because I think that they are of particular relevance at this particular time. During the course of the discussion here today, and in the future, these are the social-economic aspects, the aspect of the rule of law, and cultural aspects of security policy; and that is to say in the national, sub-regional, regional, global defence aspects of security policy.

First, the economic aspect is, for instance, the reason why the OSCE places so much emphasis on affordable armed forces. It is an absolute truism about budget expenditure, that each Mark can be spent only once. If you spend it on defence, it cannot be spent on economic investment, nor on education, nor on health. Equilibrium, or social coherence, this fundamental prerequisite of a democratic environment demands a balanced expenditure against the key national priorities; at the ballot box the people must decide on their true priorities – armed forces or the economy, education or health.

Second, the rule of law – international and national, underpins the concept of security. There is no security, neither individually nor collectively, if the law is not being applied efficiently, consistently, impartially or humanely. Where the individual does not feel protected by the rule of law, he or she will seek security from dubious collective sources, or fall prey to so-called charismatic demagogues. Tragically, in this country the lack of that security feeling was to give rise to a storm of collective violence, which swept away the remaining rule of law leaving only war to be the arbitrator in the conflict.

Culture: in multiethnic and multicultural societies we cannot neglect the importance of culture as a key component of security policy. Okay, in so-called monoethnic states, culture maybe of lesser importance for security; however, throughout the European Union, for instance, the economies are increasingly importing labour force from a wide-cross section of cultural diversity, thus the European States have no other choice but accepting multiculturalism. Multiculturalism does not at all mean mutual assimilation, but means much more than tolerance - it means knowing about each other, learning from each other, and whole-heartedly accepting cultural diversity as a part of one's own identity.

The people of Bosnia and Herzegovina realise too well that cultural difference is at the heart of their cultural difficulties. It is for this very reason that cultural core operation for the beginning becomes a key part of this country's security policy.

To conclude, let me wish you very much success for your work together here. I hope that this seminar will help to awaken within the participants, particularly those participants from Bosnia and Herzegovina, the desire to complete the very important work that remains to bring security to your people. A fulsome debate with participants from the electorate is a prerequisite for success. Please make sure that political parties place security policy at the top of their agenda, it is then the task of political parties and political leaders to inform the people.

Thank you very much Madam Chairman.

FIRST SESSION

NEW CONCEPTS OF SECURITY POLICY

General Carlo Jean (CeMiSS)

Dr Taylor Seybolt (SIPRI)

Dr Frederic Bonkovsky (University of Vienna)

General Carlo Jean,

Italian Military Centre for Strategic Studies, CeMiSS

*Former Personal Representative of CiO for Article II and IV
of Annex 1B of the Dayton Peace Agreement*

First of all, I want to thank Ambassador Turkovic and to congratulate her for this very interesting experience. Apart from what has been said by the distinguished guests in the opening session of this seminar, I wanted to underline how much it is important to have a security studies centre in Bosnia and Herzegovina for European integration, and for integration into international institutions; because now in the world there is a large network of security studies centres, working very closely together, acting as a think-tank for our politicians, diplomats, military and so on - to elaborate new ideas about security.

What I wanted to say to you has been said in the opening session: security is not defence, there is a broad concept of security – internal and external aspects of security that are linked together, and so on and so forth.

What I want to underline before giving the floor to our distinguished guests, Dr. Taylor Seybolt of SIPRI in Stockholm – one of the best known institutes for peace research, security studies and peace research is very, very similar – and to Professor Bonkovsky from Vienna University –he is a very well known international expert of security studies, and works also for the National Defense University of the United States - is to take the idea that has been presented by Ambassador Voltman: the problem of culture – which in fact is the problem of identity.

Undoubtedly, in this period of growing globalisation - of growing interdependence - what is important is the safeguarding of the identity of the groups. There is a problem of increasing globalisation, but also there is the problem of growing fragmentation; and all of the security systems have to take into account their balance with these two problems. I suppose that the key for Bosnia and Herzegovina is that it is extremely important not to make an experiment of a new idea and concept of security and so on; because security as a concept from a theoretical point of view is completely detached from reality and differs from country to country. It differs from country to country because security is not an objective concept, it is a subjective concept, a political one; it depends upon the vision of the future of the citizens of a country.

In my opinion, and in particular, in Bosnia and Herzegovina, there are internal threat perceptions that influence the approach to security; but there are very many common interests that, in my opinion, will create, and have the potential to create, an identity for Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Which are these interests, these common interests of all the people, all the parties, that exist in Bosnia and Herzegovina? First of all, to avoid another conflict; secondly, to be integrated in Europe; third, to improve the welfare state of the citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina – to improve the socio-economic situation of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

In my opinion, what is this broad approach to security – what it has to take into account – is the particular reality in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and also in our theoretical approach it could be useful to share some experiences of what is the meaning of the concept of security in the international organizations now; but to be ‘Bosnianised’, because if it is not linked to the local

reality, to the vision of the future of the people, to the interests of the people, it is only a theory - completely detached from reality.

What is the problem in Bosnia and Herzegovina? First of all, undoubtedly, after the terrible conflict like what happened in the first part of the 1990s, the threat perception, the misunderstanding, the suspicions, between people and reality exist.

The CEPS institute in Brussels, which is a think-tank for the European Union, made an opinion poll in Bosnia and Herzegovina in June 2000, and the results were shocking: forty-four per cent of the Bosniac people were persuaded that the Serbs or Croats will attack Bosniacs again; second, only three per cent of Bosniacs perceived an attack likely by the FRY against Bosnia and Herzegovina. The same situation exists in the Bosnian Croat and Bosnian Serb components; they were persuaded that the Bosniac component is organizing itself to prepare to take revenge for what happened during the war. So, what I wanted to say is that the threat perception is completely different from the threat perception of other countries. Generally, in other countries, the threat perception is against some external threat; in Bosnia and Herzegovina this is related to internal threats.

How to overcome this situation ? Overcoming this situation in the framework of the agreement that is basically an agreement which is not renegotiable, that is the Dayton Peace Agreement, taking into account that it is not a gospel, but is a framework – a framework, a process, a long-term process, to build Bosnia and Herzegovina according to the interests and will of its people; of its representatives; of its political parties and so on.

Undoubtedly, there are no other alternatives but to make an effort in the socio-economic development and in cultural dialogue between the different peoples of Bosnia and Herzegovina. To maintain other forces for the return of threats is very good but it is not serious.

On the contrary, to participate as a respectable partner in the international community, European Union, and NATO framework – Partnership for Peace, Bosnia and Herzegovina has to prepare it self to actively participate in different activities of the international community; and there are very good signals in this regard, for instance, the preparation to observe for the United Nations in East Timor – this is, in my opinion, a very good thing. This underlines the presence and the existence of Bosnia and Herzegovina in the international community, and is a very positive approach to the international personality and identity of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Undoubtedly, there are quite many other threats that are minor threats but not military - not threats of conflict. There is a possibility of corruption, criminality, and so on. There is also a certain possibility - the potential – of certain terrorist action, of a national, anarchic nature, that could rise from the dissatisfaction of the young people of Bosnia and Herzegovina who do not see their future. One of the main threats to the future of Bosnia and Herzegovina is the fact that quite many of the most brilliant, most educated young people leave the country. There are two hundred and fifty thousand, after Dayton, young Bosnian people who left the country. This might be good for Western Europe, for my country, for Germany, because it is a very good work force, and they are very brilliant young people; also their lives in their countries are better, which is very good for us because they pay for our pension, but it is not

good for Bosnia and Herzegovina – there is no future for the country if the situation continues like this.

Undoubtedly, there is not a magic wand to solve this problem. It is a long-term process, but I am an optimist after three and a half years of experience of Bosnia and Herzegovina, in which I have met very brilliant, very responsible people – people that are extremely clear in their minds what are the interests of all in Bosnia and Herzegovina and insist on the aspect of convergence between the people of Bosnia and Herzegovina, instead of the aspect of divergence.

And now, I apologise, but believe me, I love this country, and this country deserves better than the destiny which has happened to it. I suppose that the threat perception can be overcome – could be overcome; especially with economic development, and with the creation of the conditions of economic developments. As Ambassador Voltman expressed before, one of the conditions is to reduce the general costs of administration; that is not only a problem of Bosnia and Herzegovina, but also a problem of the international organizations – governmental and non-governmental – acting in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

To invest on the real part of the economy, to give a workplace to your young people, and to take complete advantage of the effort made also by some foundations, some NGOs – for instance, the Soros Foundation spent about twelve or thirteen million dollars in Bosnia and Herzegovina for the education of people; but where are those people – they stay in our countries unfortunately because they cannot find appropriate work in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

The main task of the politicians, is to provide security in Bosnia and Herzegovina; there is no problem at this moment, as there is SFOR, there is the International Police Task Force, as these adequate measures are more than enough. It is a waste of money to maintain an over-dimensional military structure without, on the contrary, what is useful for Bosnia and Herzegovina is the ability to engage in international solidarity operations – like East Timor, in Somalia, etc.

I hope, and I am very optimistic with the new political climate in Bosnia and Herzegovina, that these difficulties will be overcome.

Thank you so much; and now the floor is given to Dr. Taylor Seybolt of SIPRI, Stockholm.

Dr. Taylor B. Seybolt

Stockholm International Peace Research Institute – SIPRI

I would like to begin by thanking Ambassador Turkovic for inviting me to speak today. After looking at the agenda and the participants, I expect this to be a very interesting and useful day. I also want to thank Ambassador Eliasson from Sweden for his help in bringing me here and for his hospitality.

My job here is to help you think about new concepts of security policy from an academic perspective. I will give a very broad overview of issues to consider when formulating and implementing a security policy. I am going to make a number of statements in answer to questions that I will pose. Please take my answers as examples – realistic examples, but just examples.

It is not for me to tell you what your security policy should be. That is your job. I offer my answers only as a way to illustrate *how* to answer the questions.

What I have to say might strike you as very simple, even simplistic. But that does not mean the main message I have for you is unimportant. The main message is this: to develop a security policy, like any other policy, you must clearly separate the problem into its parts. Only then can you ask how the parts ought to fit together in to a dynamic policy. Hard questions demand clear thinking.

What has changed in the area of security policy? There are three categories of changes that deserve attention: political, normative and institutional. First, the political landscape has changed. For nearly half a century the international system of states was dominated by a bipolar competition between ideologically opposed alliances. Today we have a more diverse and uncertain international structure. Some people call it unipolar; some call it multipolar; some of us do not know what to call it. The world is safer in the sense that we are less likely to witness a great power war and the likely end of the world as we know it. However, it is no safer for many states that suffer from internal conflict, as you know all too well.

In the old world, Bosnia-Herzegovina was part of a larger Yugoslavia that worked hard to maintain its independence from the capitalist West and the communist East. Now B-H is an independent country; one that has suffered the ravages of war and violence; one that finds itself in an unstable neighbourhood, where the threat of violent conflict is all too real. But this country is also one that holds the promise, not of remaining separate from the West, but of becoming integrated into it.

The normative landscape has also changed. It used to be that the term ‘security’ referred only to the security of the state – its territorial and political integrity. Security is now defined in much broader terms – not just *state* security, but *human* security. This change has come about, in part, because of events that took place in this very city. The human costs of war were, and are, too great to ignore.

The relationship between state sovereignty and individual rights is in the process of changing and small states sometimes are subject to interference if outsiders feel that individual human rights are being too wantonly disregarded. Why is this point important? Because states are now held accountable for the well being of their populations to a much greater extent than

they used to be. That means that the way in which a state maintains its *internal* security is a topic of international attention and concern.

The third category of change is that the institutional landscape has changed. The United Nations is an important player on the international stage. The European Union has developed economically and politically far beyond what many people thought likely several years ago. The roles of the EU and the OSCE are the topic of the next session, so I will only note here that they are important players in some of the questions I will turn to next.

If the over-arching political, normative and institutional framework has changed, what has *not* changed? The questions you must address to develop a security policy have not changed. The dynamics of implementing a security policy have not changed. The other thing that has not changed is the obvious but important point that security is a political objective. As General Jean pointed out in his remarks, providing security for the state is subjective. The policy you develop depends on your vision of the future. Security can be achieved by the combination of political, military, legal, economic means (or tools). Figuring out how to combine those tools is the hard work you have in front of you.

There are three fundamental questions you must answer. First, a country's security strategy is the plan by which it aims to create security for itself. If this is the case, then what is the nature of B-H's preferred strategy? Is it defensive or offensive? We can answer this one right away. It is defensive, unless I am terribly mistaken. Most states most of the time take this position, although history is full of examples where leaders believed offence and aggression were the right answer – as we all know.

Second, if the overall strategy is defence, then we have to ask, defence against what? What are the threats? A subset of that question is what is the nature of each threat? Threats can be military, political and social; they can be internal and external; they can be distant or imminent.

Third, in light of the sources of threat and the limits of your resources, how do you achieve your preferred strategic stance? That is, how do you cause defensive security for the state of Bosnia-Herzegovina and its people? Since the answer to the first question is simple, I will focus on the questions of threats and responses.

What are the sources of threat that Bosnia-Herzegovina faces? What can be done about them? I will divide these into external and internal threats. As I said before, these are examples. They do not cover the full spectrum.

There are at least four external threats. First, aggressive neighbours, by whom I mean neighbouring states, not armed groups within them. The nature of this threat is military, and distant. It is certainly not impossible to imagine foreign aggression, but the countries of the Balkans are war weary and the governments have other priorities.

Second, unstable neighbours are a threat. The nature of this threat is political, social and immediate. Instability in a neighbouring state is a threat to Bosnia-Herzegovina because the effects of violence spill over borders. If fighting breaks out in the FRY, for example, B-H will receive refugees, which could very well destabilize this country.

Third, uncontrolled state borders that allow people and goods to in and out of the state without anyone keeping track of them. This threat is primarily economic and social. It is not only imminent, but also on-going.

Fourth, rebels in a neighbouring state, combined with uncontrolled borders. The threat is military and imminent. The Albanian rebels in the Presevo Valley and in Macedonia are an obvious example of this problem. This problem can operate in two directions. Either a rebel group at that targets B-H has its bases in a neighbouring state; or rebels that target a neighbouring government, have their bases in B-H. Rebels crossing international borders are a problem either way.

Let us accept for argument's sake that these are the external threats Bosnia-Herzegovina faces. What do you do? When thinking about how to address threats to security, it is helpful to distinguish between security *objectives* and *methods* for achieving the objectives.

The objectives of your state security policy, in this scenario would be to (a) secure your borders; (b) build and maintain good relations with neighbours; and (c) promote stability in your neighbourhood. These are 'win-win' policies, at least in theory, for B-H and its neighbours. They make each state more secure and they make it harder for non-state armed groups to operate. But unfortunately it is not quite so simple, as I will demonstrate at the end of this talk.

The methods you can use to achieve these objectives are political, military and economic. Political methods include such things as confidence-building measures, alliances, institutional ties and police such as the State Border Police that have recently come into being. Military methods include an army and air force strong enough to guard borders and to deter aggression; healthy civilian-military relations, particularly subordination of the military to civilian command. It is also very important not to use the military internally, except as a last resort to fight active rebels. Economic methods include public budgeting for military and police forces, strong trade relations.

Let me turn now to internal threats. Internal threats are a bigger concern and are harder to deal with for a state like B-H. This is not at all surprising for a newly independent country emerging from a terrible and complex war. All of them fall under the general threat of disintegration of the state. There are at least four obvious ones.

First, you face the possibility of political breakdown within your government, leading to political paralysis, popular discontent and political crisis. The nature of this threat is political. I will let you decide if the threat is imminent or distant.

Second, there is the possibility of armed rebellion, where aim is to overthrow the government within the existing borders of the state. This threat is military, political and imminent.

Third, is the threat of separatism, where the aim of an armed group is to break a piece of territory away from the state. This is a political, military, social threat that I would say is somewhat likely.

The fourth internal threat is paramilitary violence and ethnic expulsion. This is a military and social threat, but it is not as political as the other dangers because paramilitary violence by

itself does not usually include a plan to set up a new political system. I would describe this as an imminent threat also.

If these are the kinds of internal threats you face, then your objectives should be to prevent political breakdown; prevent the rise of armed rebel groups; and prevent ethnic violence. There are legal, political, military and economic methods to use in various combinations. Legal methods include, first and foremost, the rule of law. Part of the rule of law is a strong and honest police force. Another part of it is rights given to individuals, *not* to groups. This is a contentious point in some circles, but there is no question that establishing rights based on divisions between groups is asking for trouble. Respect for individual rights should be enough to protect cultural and social differences between groups.

Political methods include alliances between parties; alliances between the united government and outsiders, who will help if need be; and representative democratic government.

Economic methods for preventing internal threats from getting out of control include attracting foreign investment by doing things such as streamlining the multitude of regulations that exist at the sub-state level now. Also it is important to devise policies that provide opportunities for everyone, especially those people who are in danger of being permanently marginalized.

Finally, there are military methods, which are appropriate for internal security in very rare occasions of armed rebellion that can not be politically resolved. The state has to be ready to fight: it is a last resort, but something that can not always be avoided.

These are the *kinds of threats* B-H faces, some of the *objectives* to meet those threats and some of the *methods* for achieving the objectives. It is tempting to think that developing and implementing a security policy is just a matter of mixing and matching the various considerations. For example, if you fear threat of aggression from outside, your objective is to secure Bosnia-Herzegovina's borders, and the means to accomplish this is building a strong military. But, it is not so simple. Such an action could make B-H less secure. This is where the dynamics of security policy come in. I want to focus on two dynamics in particular. The security dilemma is about unintended competition.

A strategy game called Stag Hunt is about cooperation in an uncertain environment.

Simply stated, the security dilemma is this: the actions one state takes to defend itself provoke a reaction from another state that make the first state *less* secure than it was before, rather than more secure. Let me review that idea with a hypothetical example. Sweden feels vulnerable to the threat of external aggression, so it takes measures to defend itself, such as reorganizing its army to be more mobile. Sweden sees this as an entirely defensive move, but from across the border, in Norway, things look different. Norway sees this move and considers it to be threatening. It does not know for certain the intentions of the Swedish government and so, to be on the safe side, it takes measures to meet a possible future aggression by Sweden, such as rejuvenating its civil defence infrastructure. Sweden, not realizing that Norway perceived its military activities as a threat, sees the action of Norway as confirmation of its original suspicion that the Norwegian government has aggressive intentions. The result is that by trying to make themselves more secure, both states have increased the level of suspicion and tension between them. They did not increase their security and they might have lessened it.

The security dilemma is a simple but powerful concept. Anything that B-H does to improve its security will bring a reaction of some kind from each one of its neighbours. If you are not careful, you will make your country less secure, rather than more secure.

Fortunately, there is there a way out of this. Fear, distrust and the ease of discerning another state's capabilities but the difficulty of discerning its intentions drive the security dilemma dynamic. Two states that trust each other's intentions do not fall into this spiral. (That is what makes the example I just gave so ridiculous. Sweden *is* in the process of reorganizing its military and making it more mobile, but Norway does not feel threatened by that.)

Even when two sates do not trust each other, they are not doomed to enter a conflict spiral. If they are aware of the danger posed by the security dilemma, they can take confidence-building measures to try to avoid it. Confidence-building measures can come in many forms, such as government-to-government talks, joint inspections of each other's military facilities, etc. There is a big role here for third parties – other states or international organizations and institutions – as verifiers, guarantors, and mediators.

The security dilemma does not just operate externally. Within a state it operates between ethnic groups (or groups defined in any other way). As one group takes measures to protect itself from a perceived threat, the other ethnic groups in the area might feel threatened and take some sort of action of their own. This is a very real problem in B-H. In the situation of an internal security dilemma, the *state* must act as the third party that the interrupts the spiral dynamic.

The dynamic of cooperation in an uncertain environment I will illustrate with an example drawn from the academic discipline of game theory. Stag Hunt is a cooperation game. For cooperation to work, the players have to understand each other, know what to expect of each other and have the same overall goal. In this game, every one wins together, or one player wins a small victory at the expense of achieving a larger goal.

Imagine three people lost in the woods. They have gone several days without food and have decided to try to catch one of the deer they have seen in the course of their wandering. The deer are big, so they will provide plenty of food for all three people for several days. But the deer are also fast, so the three have to work as a team to succeed. They agree to close in a deer from three sides and trap it. As they come close to a deer, one of the three sees a rabbit at his feet. He begins to have doubts. He knows he could catch the rabbit and have a meal. He is not sure they will catch the deer. If he chases the rabbit (in other words, if he defects from the agreed plan) the deer will surely escape. He faces a choice between a certain but short-term success that will antagonize his companions and an uncertain but likely long-term success that will strengthen the bond between all three of them.

This game is useful to keep in mind when thinking about how to address internal threats to the security of B-H. Again we see that developing and implementing a security policy is not just a matter of putting together threats, objectives and means. All the parties concerned must understand each other and have the same overall goal, even if they do not agree on all the lower level issues. An old saying from the American Revolution comes to mind: 'United we stand; divided we fall.'

You must devise and implement policies that are acceptable to everyone who has the ability to 'defect'. The situation in Macedonia again provides a good example, although an extreme

one. The two main parties that comprise the government must cooperate with each other when dealing with the rebels. If the minority party defects, the rebels will 'get away', like the stag, and war will probably follow.

The cooperation concept applies to external security concerns as well. A stable neighbourhood for B-H will come through the individual efforts of each state and through the *collective* efforts of states together.

In closing, I want to emphasize that developing a state security policy is a hard process. Bosnia-Herzegovina is very lucky to have a number of foreign governments and institutions that are eager to help it. Other countries coming out of war, such as Sierra Leone or Congo do not enjoy anywhere near the same level of international support. Do not squander the opportunity. Someday SFOR will leave and the OSCE will need to use its resources on other priorities. By then, you must have a coherent security policy.

The basic building blocks for developing and implementing such a policy are to ask, What are the threats B-H faces? What objectives must we achieve to meet those threats? What means are at our disposal to achieve those objectives? While you debate these questions, be aware of the security dilemma and do not fall into an unintended spiral of confrontation. Also be aware of the need for cooperation in achieving a difficult task and resist the temptation to chase the rabbit.

Dr. Frederick Bonkovsky,
University of Vienna and Webster University -Vienna

INTRODUCTION

To be secure means to be protected from dangers and threats. Recent years have brought increased insecurity in many regions. More people and new dangers bring security threats.

In the twentieth century, security policy often meant mainly national military security. Nuclear deterrence in mid century and the control of such energetic polities as Germany, Japan, the Soviet Union and the United States were at the center of international security policy. The United Nations was led by a Security Council which had a worldwide mandate for peace and security. In the Northern Hemisphere, the post 1975 Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe developed into the post 1992 Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe through which fifty five members provide greater security and well being to an area 'from Vancouver to Vladivostok.'

In 1991 optimism abounded. Soviet collapse appeared to lessen the nuclear threat and cancel the danger of large-scale high tech conventional war. In a few months, however, Yugoslavia disintegrated. For the next decade its people experienced terrible tragedy and insecurity. After horrors, tragic losses, and errors the international community responded with ground personnel and 'peacekeepers' and 'monitors' in Bosnia, Kosovo, and Macedonia and in other regions.

These forms of security policy are part of the Westphalia (western) international system, which has been dominant since 1648. Probably the most dramatic and fundamental thinking on security policy came from the first great English political theorist, Thomas Hobbes, who published his 'The Leviathan' in 1651; two years after the Puritan revolution beheaded King Charles.

Born in 1588, the year of the Spanish Armada at London, Hobbes said he and fear were twins. During the English Civil Wars, (1640 ff.) his life was at constant risk as were the lives of many of his compatriots. "Every man is capable of killing every man.' In such an anarchical society, human life is 'solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short.' There can be no arts, no commerce, and no regular agriculture—for insecurity makes their outcome unsure and uncertain.

Hobbes' proposal was a powerful, unitary political system—a Leviathan—with a monopoly on coercion. Such a state would protect people against domestic and foreign foes. To achieve this effective political system, persons would surrender their natural rights to self-defense.

By the twentieth century, it was generally believed that effective, modern states had achieved Hobbes' chief purpose of protecting their citizens against domestic anarchy. Civil society was well developed. Security concerns in 1910 thus centered on foreign threats. World Wars I and II became the paradigmatic events for first half-century security policy. These were followed by super power politics and by nuclear deterrence and great power management of global politics.

NEW SECURITY ISSUES IN 2001

Bosnia and the Balkans, like other regions, continue to face security threats from armed violence. These threats are now quite well defined. International peacekeepers are present. Political and civil society institutions are being built inter alia in Bosnia, in Kosovo, in Macedonia, in Belgrade, and in Zagreb. Similarly in the former Soviet Union, the institutions of society and state require careful and very thoughtful attention.

Various new security issues need to be considered. The first is ECONOMIC WELLBEING AND GLOBALIZATION. Globalization has become a rallying cry for worldwide economic concerns. Some benefit from increasingly integrated international markets and currency flows. Thus United States President Bill Clinton praised globalization in the late 1990's arguing that global markets could bring products and productivity to many. Elites do benefit from globalization—whether through the internet or through investment opportunities. As the world's largest economy, dominant communications center, and most powerful polity, the U.S. has major stakes in globalization

But globalization also brings spread of economic exploitation and economic crime. Workers can be exploited on a worldwide basis. Transnational enslavement and trafficking of women and children seem a significant danger in some regions. Local cultures may be negatively impacted, even devastated, by international communications and worldwide cultural patterns. In highly integrated economies, whole communities are threatened by loss of jobs. Unemployment seems endemic among various groups. Young people in Western Europe have difficulty getting jobs and some groups and areas have 30% or greater unemployment. In Eastern Europe and in developing areas of Africa and Asia, the situation is even worse. In various countries, entire generations are lost to productivity and experience rejection.

As we think about security for our children and families, economic insecurity is a serious threat. Seventy years ago economic insecurity contributed to social catastrophe and Fascist and Stalinist regimes.

Today, political leaders may be tempted to disguise economic problems by appeals to ethnic rhetoric or even by violence, which distracts even while it destroys life and property.

No government can claim to provide security for its citizens unless it gives high priority to economic wellbeing. This is particularly challenging in the globalization era since key decisions may be made thousands of kilometers away and on a scale or in categories which local leaders may find hard to understand.

Some polities, such as Hungary now and South Korea earlier, appear to make a fairly good transition--albeit at significant social costs. In both, there is worker exploitation and high level corruption as economic development occurs. Both also have succeeded in tying their economies to powerful outside forces and gaining international investment.

Recognizing these factors, other transition economies seek to join the European community, for example. This can have the advantage of giving authority to western democratic and free market norms in the applicant communities. But local traditions and patterns are certainly challenged.

In any case, leaders need new capacities of international understanding to understand and seek to address the challenges of economic security in the twenty-first century. This is a special challenge for those who were reared in communist educational systems, which consciously excluded understanding of free market dynamics. A whole generation of citizens must receive training and competence to participate in contemporary economic, political, cultural and communications life.

One of the great challenges for our young people and our educational systems is how to prepare for a life of gainful employment. From the United States and elsewhere we know that populations that have no serious hope of gainful employment can present a serious domestic security risk. The United States knows, through statistics, that young men who have no gainful employment commit much of our domestic crime. A good way to help a community against potential criminality is to provide gainful employment – but that is very difficult.

CORRUPTION AND THE RULE OF LAW

The security provided by a good rule of law is closely related to economic wellbeing. In contrast, corruption threatens well being and social integrity. Much recent economic and cultural collapse in Asia, Russia, etc. is related to the absence of effective legal and normative systems. Without such systems property and life may be arbitrarily threatened and harmed. Corruption threatens local populations but also devastates international investment. At its worst, corruption makes of a polity an international pariah and it robs and so seriously harms the people, the land, and the culture.

W. Miller and colleagues in 2001 described and empirically analyzed “A Culture of Corruption?” (Central European University Press, 2001) in such representative countries as Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Ukraine. There are gradations of corruption with Ukraine presenting very difficult challenges. In general, corruption exists because it is permitted and likely encouraged by senior officials and leaders. No citizenry likes or affirms corruption--even when they may tolerate it for a time (as in the instance of corruption in health care.)

Corruption thus threatens the polity. Security against corruption must be first the work of leaders and elites. At some points, societies are threatened by international criminality. Law enforcement agencies are beginning to cooperate against such threats. But criminal violence and threats are difficult for citizens to resist. Security and rule of law must become a high priority community agenda.

In universities, hospitals, schools, local businesses, local police, local courts, local bureaucracies, etc. security can be centrally the work of local elites like the people who read these words. Corrupt professors or physicians violate their own professional standards and commitments. Do you want as a surgeon for self or family a person trained in a corrupt system where exams are 'passed' by pay-offs rather than by knowledge and skill?

The problems also impact the entire society. Corrupt professors, physicians, police, judges, and bureaucrats argue that their wages are too low and that bribes are a form of just recompense. Workers reply that these elites at least receive regular if modest wages and avoid high unemployment rates. All are offended by the (ill-gotten)wealth of criminals and corrupt entrepreneurs and cronies but feel powerless to take corrective action.

So security against corruption must be addressed at various levels--the societal, the professional, and the elite personal. One must begin to recognize one's own corruption and draw personal and collegial lines. For example, a professor (like the author) can acknowledge corruption in grading. Grade inflation is widespread. Some schools give admittance and then graduate persons of limited competence and limited achievement. As a school officer, one participates in doubtful practices.

But one must draw a line at accepting (or worse, requiring) 200 EURO attached to an exam or to an application. If people are unable to feed their families, let there be a public collection and a public discussion about how salaries may be augmented. In communist days, there were 'teachers' days' when families and children were encouraged publicly and openly to bring gifts to the school. Such public events may be corrupted, of course. But they provide a beginning alternative to endemic 'hidden' corruption and extortion. And it may well be that communities really do want to affirm and give gifts to professionals who serve well with low remuneration. A honest rule of law among courts and police is needed for our families to be secure. One shudders to think about a pretty or hotheaded family member stopped by corrupt officials for an ostensible wrong left turn. This is particularly problematic when the family member is a younger person--or an excitable character. The issues are compounded when traveling in a foreign country (or sometimes in a neighboring region.)

How do you instruct your spouse or child? When stopped and asked for auto papers include should one include a 50 or 200 EURO note? Or be prepared to offer the Marks after a short negotiation? Always pay requested 'fines' on the spot in hard currency even if one suspects that the payment will go to the officer rather than to the governmental treasury?

How do we make our families secure against a corrupt legal system? We must demand of each other in our societies that our police, courts, and other officials not be corrupt. If they are corrupt then they threaten all of us and they make insecure our children and our grandchildren.

We have to expect and act that our legislatures will not be deeply corrupt. Sometimes it is difficult to know exactly what corruption. Legislators and officers are expected to represent and serve the voters and the constituents. What is fair representation, and what is corrupt representation?

Clearly, the rule of law and non-corrupt law is an important contemporary security policy issue.

And what of our businesses? There exists important international disagreement about the validity of bribes to governmental officials. Many find misguided the United States laws against bribing international business partners. Others note, however, that corruption in customs or in transfer adds significant costs and delays. Thus 'normal' bureaucratic corruption does calculable harm to an economy and so harms ALL.

HEALTH SECURITY

Think about your children and grandchildren--and about your own health. The world has changed since the sexual revolution of the 1960's and 1970's. Today when we sow the wind, we may literally reap the whirlwind. For many communities today HIV and AIDS have

become a security threat. AIDS can be treated with modern drugs, which cost thousands of dollars per month. But there is no known cure.

Hepatitis is a danger. Drug resistant tuberculosis is easily spread. Many people die daily because they have no safe drinking water.

Incurable HIV devastates much of Africa. In some populations, the infection rate is as high as thirty or even forty percent of persons between 18 and 30. HIV-AIDS is spreading rapidly in some communities in Ukraine and threatens from there to move westward. Chinese authorities in 2001 acknowledged a 60% HIV infection increase among needle sharers in certain regions.

So, an important issue is how to provide health-care education and the kind of general health-care that will address these threats to our children and our grandchildren. In many regions, HIV-AIDS is a far more real and awful security threat than were nuclear weapons. Societal policy is necessary because HIV is quintessentially a social disease and a major threat to society.

One of the questions that I often ask on international organizations exams is this: according to the World Health Organisation, what is the minimum number of unprotected needle exchanges or sexual intercourse that is necessary to spread HIV? A series of answer choices include thirteen, eleven, seven, five, three, and one. Some people guess eleven, some will circle seven. The correct answer is one. One unprotected needle exchange, one unprotected act of sexual intercourse can spread the lethal HIV virus. Our children and our grandchildren need to know that; and we need to remember it so we do not bring something home that will harm our families.

Nuclear weapons fear may no longer be the key source of our insecurity. But this source has been replaced by many other dangers and snares.

Most of us studied issues of security in the Westphalia international system, which began in 1648. There chief threats to security were movements and people like Napoleon, Hitler and Stalin. We now live in the post-communist, transitional and global period, in which there are more kinds of domestic threats, as well as the break-up of society into anarchy as we have experienced.

Security means to be protected from the fears, the dangers and the threats that are around us. Some may say "I'm not very good at, or not very interested in military security. "

What we all have to be good at is recognizing the fears and the dangers to our fellow citizens and our communities. Then seek corrections and amelioration. You do not have to have a university degree in international relations to be able to talk to your neighbours and find out what makes them insecure. It is precisely the addressing of those fears and insecurities that we are asked to do when we make our security policy.

Another way to test this is when you wake up at four o'clock in the morning - what is it that you are afraid of? If you can devise a security policy that begins to address what you are afraid of when you awake in dread, then you have begun to address some real issues of security policy.

Hobbes said that life is solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short – one of the great lines of English literature: the life of humans – solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short. In response to that kind of security concern, people responded by gathering into groups that would make them secure against each other. Some revert to the family. In the 1971 film, “The Godfather”, Don Corleone – played by Marlon Brando – makes his family secure against various threats. Don Corleone buys judges and Don Corleone kills the opposition for his family.

The defense policy threats of the Westphalia system may no longer be the most pressing of security issues. We are called to think about other threats – dangers to the lives of your fellow citizens. These are represented by things like unemployment; by the spread of HIV; by the dangers of legal corruption – whether in courts, police, or in the parliaments. These are serious threats which we can certainly understand. These new security issues threaten the lives of our children and our grandchildren.

SECOND SESSION

**INSTITUTIONAL APPROACHES TO
SECURITY POLICY**

General Ivan Nagulov (Presidency of BiH)
Zsolt Rabai (NATO)
Donald B. Kursch (Stability Pact)

General Ivan Nagulov

*Military Adviser to the Croat Member of the Presidency
The Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina*

I sincerely greet all of you and especially I thank Mrs. Turkovic who offered the chance to me to chair this session today. I view this, above all, as an acceptance and affirmation of the Standing Committee on Military Matters, especially its Secretariat, for which I have been intensively working. Indeed, I am one of the persons who has been engaged in the work of the Standing Committee on Military Matters, and especially within the Secretariat.

I think that I shall not say something which shall be understood as perhaps pathetic but I think that the appearance of this Centre is undoubtedly welcome, indeed it is the ideal moment, above all together with aspects of our work in the Secretariat and the Standing Committee for Military Matters.

I say this for the reason that these are issues which arise daily in the work of our session, on which we prepare the sessions of the Standing Committee on Military Matters, which is the coordinating body of the BiH Presidency, the Dayton body which means above all, has the role to coordinate the Government, Entity Ministries of Defence and Armies, and the activities of the Ministry of Defence and Armies of the Entities.

However, much time has passed from when we came into the phase where we can say not without exaggeration, that the Standing Committee on Military Matters, especially above all its Secretariat, turned public attention to itself – from the moment of the adoption of the Defence Policy which is an exceptionally significant document, and according to my opinion, a key part and a key segment of the future security policy of Bosnia and Herzegovina. There still remains much work, problems and various manoeuvres that one side prevents something good for the other side, and that in this environment something good is made. However, I am optimistic and I believe that the Security Policy shall see the light of day.

Another factor because of which I would say that the appearance of the Centre for Security Studies is an exceptionally timely is due to the fact that soon the Secretariat shall prepare for the Standing Committee for Military Matters activities; which you know, recently our leaders from the day to day approach to the Partnership for Peace, especially after the adoption of the Statement of Acceptance of the Presidency and previous statements of the Standing Committee on Military Matters about the readiness to join Partnership for Peace – or to be stated precisely, the Statement on the Commencement of the Process of Advancement to Partnership for Peace. This means after this range of various, I would say difficult decisions, a step-by-step approach to advance to this, and as a soldier, I can say in these moments is ideal.

I expect that we shall in cooperation, which has to be as of this moment starting with this Centre, to succeed to come more easily to some solutions, and I hope that that cooperation shall be useful and that we shall succeed to help one another in establishing the ideas of the manner of work of those institutions.

I am pleased to see that the Secretariat is the most represented here, and it is important as they are really very talented young people who are also chosen and work according to European standards – or if you want NATO standards, and under its patronage maturing. I am

exceptionally proud that I am a part of this team and that I now have an opportunity to chair one of the sessions of today's seminar.

Another thing that I would like to point out, the arrival of Lord Robertson with the complete Council of NATO, consequently in full contents, means, and I recently stated this in one newspaper, however much this sounds abstract, that this is a definite historical moment. I do not recall something similar, at least of this character, but also his arrival and consequently the previous statement in which we really invested maximum effort – naturally alongside the help of the international community, especially OHR and people from OHR. Consequently, the words, which at that time Lord Robertson with his colleagues and the Ambassadors that were present, directed to us, left on me and as far as I know, on my colleagues, a very encouraging impression. Without consideration to the fact that the future tasks are difficult and that some people imagine to be unachievable, I think that there is nothing that we are not in the position to accomplish – although they are very dangerous to place in a complete framework and to search for acceptable, absolute concrete models. Consequently, it is important to be careful. However, that is only a real idea and the possibility exists if we have the personnel and institutions like those that can help in the discovery of solutions – which is a fact. It is very bad to expect some short answers, when, in whichever manner, as that immediately leads to some kind of conflict, naturally verbal above all, when only we have just solved the worst. It is important to be careful, to take into consideration the reality of today's Bosnia and Herzegovina; and to be brave, sincere and honest, and to wrestle with problems which these candidacy produce; this gesture of the Council of NATO which practically gives to us the chance which we have on some manner patiently and very carefully waited and finally received.

Finally, I would like to say with the activities of this Centre, which are stated in the publication which we received and our complimentary programme and plan of activities, I really expect fruitful and long-lasting cooperation and I think that will connect us with also others who are engaged in the same business, and that together we can come to some objectives which would not be to far nor inconceivable.

That is all from me and naturally if there is any questions I will gladly answer. Perhaps I unintentionally offended somebody or stated something carelessly but I did not personally prepare something, because I am speaking sincerely, in some way from the heart although that is not clever, and it is better to consult with the mind than the heart but I am that kind of person.

I shall now pass the floor to Zsolt Rabai, Coordinator of NATO for the West Balkans and ask him to present the topic he has prepared for us.

Mr. Zsolt Rabai

Coordinator for the Western Balkans
NATO

NATO's new security approach

The new security challenges

After the end of the cold war the security environment in Europe has changed dramatically. The old threat of a major nuclear confrontation or World War III or a massive ground attack and invasion against any of the member states has disappeared. Following the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact many politicians and security experts have even questioned the *raison d'être* of the Alliance. However Europe quickly realized that the old situation of "high risk-high security" has been replaced by a new situation of "low risk-low security". Although the new security challenges, as ethnic and religious rivalries, territorial disputes, inadequate or failed reforms, violation of human rights, collapse of political orders, dissolution of states, organized crime, mass movement of refugees etc. had rather local character their impact spread much beyond their territorial borders. They put on risk not only the fragile security situation in their immediate neighborhood but through the international media they had a huge impact on the American and European public opinion and challenged the basic values of the European democracies as well.

On the other hand a lot of old threats – as proliferation of WMD, terrorism etc. - remained and became much more unpredictable. The same technologies that make us feel more secure empower small actors to pose a threat to our states like never before. With the spread of technology we could be facing mass destruction threats not just from so called rogue states, but from other actors as well. Allied countries had to recognize that new threats, of very different kinds, have already crossed a threshold that could make them the focus of serious concern.

Although most of the post communist countries have chosen a democratic way of development and shared common values with the western democracies, the tragedy following the collapse of Yugoslavia was a brutal reminder that the project of Europe is not yet finished. It made it clear that parts of Europe still remain strangers to the principles of democracy and ethnic tolerance.

All these factors led to the recognition that there was a need to maintain NATO as a cornerstone of the European security system, but also to transform the organization to be able to meet the challenges of the present post cold war situation. Allied countries worked out a new strategic concept in 1991 and accepted its amended version in 1999 at the Washington summit. While keeping Article 5. of the North Atlantic Treaty – that is collective defense - as the focus of the strategy, the new motivation for NATO became the defense against instability.

With the new concept NATO has become an open organization. NATO's new strategic concept – for the first time in the history of the Alliance – has become a public document. As a difference from the old NATO concepts there is no enemy defined in the new one. This strategic document has been not only the bible of the Alliance, but also served as a very

efficient tool of confidence building vis a vis the non-member countries. It served as a subject of discussion at the first meetings with Russia in PJC.

With the new Strategic Concept allied countries have accepted a new, broader approach to security. This new security concept takes into consideration not only the defense side of security, but the political, economic, social, environmental aspects as well. Not only the different aspects of the alliance's activities but also the membership criteria reflect well this changed approach.

With the New Strategic Concept the organization has been engaged to accomplish new tasks: crisis management, peace enforcement and peace keeping. The change of the dimension of the old tasks (collective defense) and the appearance of the new ones required the development of new capabilities. The Defense Capabilities Initiative launched at the Washington summit aims to develop appropriate capabilities for accomplishing new tasks such as deployability and mobility, sustainability, survivability, effective engagement, command, control and information systems, interoperability etc.

The development of the European Security and Defense Identity has responded to a double requirement. On one hand the EU has already reached a level of integration, where it has to deal with security and defense issues. On the other hand for a long time the US has been calling for a stronger European role. Both in the EU and NATO preparations have been made to allow Europe to act as a coherent security actor and to play a security role which is in proportion with its economic strength. In the framework of ESDI the Alliance is working on the practical arrangements for the concept of using separable but not separate NATO assets and capabilities for EU led operations. Close cooperation with the EU should make it easier to avoid unnecessary duplication when the EU builds its own security and defense structure. We do not need a separate European army, but we do need to adapt our forces to the new requirements. NATO's new command structure allows for European led operations, defense planning takes the European requirements into account. DCI should assure the development of appropriate European capabilities to cope with crisis management situations when NATO is not engaged as a whole. For Kosovo, Europe could only manage to deploy 2% of the soldiers that it has on paper. Therefore we do not only need to create institutions, but also capabilities.

At this point I would like to emphasize that ESDI is not about Europe going alone, but about Europe doing more. The transatlantic link will still remain a major pillar of the European security system.

The new situation also required new methods for assuring security in the Euro Atlantic area. This new way of working was to create an atmosphere and concrete conditions for cooperative security and partnership, where all nations on this continent feel part of the whole, each nation, irrespective of its size, location and security traditions make its contribution to our common security. Among the new circumstances this seems to be the most efficient way to maintain the security in Europe and to create an adequate situation for accomplishing the European project.

NATO has developed political and military ties across the continent. In Partnership for Peace already 26 nations are engaging with the 19 allies in military cooperation, defense planning, joint peace support operations, civil emergency planning etc. In the Euro Atlantic Partnership Council the same nations consult and cooperate on political level. The fact that the "Balkan

Powderkeg” which at the beginning of the 20th century provoked two world wars and now, at the beginning of the 21st century have seen the nations of the Euro Atlantic community – including Russia – acting together for peace and for preserving the shared values shows that establishing wider European partnership was a good decision.

NATO is doing more than just offering partnership in order to abolish the physical and psychological dividing lines in Europe. Enlargement of the Alliance was perhaps the most visible demonstration since the Berlin Wall came down that Europe is no longer divided. NATO enlargement by Czech Republic, Poland and Hungary has been a good decision. It largely contributed to the stabilization and security of Central Europe. NATO enlargement is an ongoing process. NATO leaders made it clear that the doors of the Alliance remain open. They have launched in 1999 in Washington the so-called Membership Action Plan to bring the aspirants closer to the Alliance and prepare them for possible future membership. The next NATO regular summit meeting in year 2002 in Prague will decide about further concrete invitations.

Ongoing NATO enlargement itself already reflects considerable changes in NATO’s new strategic concept. The membership criteria witness about the Alliance’s new approach to security. Although the invitation of the new countries will be mainly a political decision on the basis of Article 10 of the North Atlantic Treaty, the countries to be invited has to fulfil the political, economic, legal, security and defense aspects of the membership criteria. That means that the elements of the so-called soft security have gained considerable ground against the old absolutism of hard security. But new members must also be able to contribute militarily and Article 5 remains important!

An important question of the European Security is how Russia can settle herself in this new Europe. Russia is a part of Europe. Russia is too important to be left to her own fate. Russia’s successful transition is in our interest. NATO is interested to engage Russia. Although we had a good start with the signing of the NATO Russia Founding Act and the establishment of the Permanent Joint Council we need more than Russia’s grudging recognition of NATO’s actions. We need genuine cooperation across the full spectrum of issues of common concern as managing regional crisis, preventing the spread of weapons of mass destruction etc.

We consider it as a big step forward that in 1996 Russia joined the NATO led peacekeeping operation here in Bosnia Herzegovina. First time after the World War II. NATO troops and Russian military worked together for reestablishing peace. This cooperation had not only political importance, but largely contributed to the success of the operation on field.

There are a couple of issues, where we have had disagreements with Russia. During the Kosovo air strikes our relationship cooled off. We have different approach to NATO enlargement etc. But we have to be realistic. We have to be realistic by recognizing that NATO Russia relationship is not a love story, and we have to be realistic by recognizing that we need a true partnership with Russia.

The crisis in Southeast Europe, especially in case of Bosnia Herzegovina and Kosovo clearly demonstrated that the equation “territorial integrity equals security” might have been valid in the cold war, but is no longer applicable today. A regional conflict spinning out of control, a refugee crisis destabilizing wider regions or an economic downturn leading to major political crisis can affect our security in many ways even without touching upon our territorial integrity. What has happened in this part of Europe, the ethnic cleansing, the massive

violation of human rights, the mass deportations clearly challenged the democratic values the Alliance is standing for. Due to the respectful work of the international media our public opinion was deeply under the influence of the tragedy and barbarity in the immediate neighborhood.

In Bosnia NATO Allies had understood the broader meaning of security. NATO not only contributed to ending the war, but also after the signing of the peace agreement, the alliance also took on a major responsibility to implement it. The NATO led Implementation Force was a model of a new, broader approach to security. The cooperation with other institutions and non-governmental organizations went smoothly. NATO and its partners achieved to rally all the major powers, including Russia behind a common political strategy and even into a common military operation. NATO demonstrated that its commitment to a cooperative security order is indeed a genuine one. This involvement demonstrated that crisis management can influence Euro Atlantic dynamics for the better, and the vision of cooperative and peaceful Europe could be realized.

Mr. Milosevic cynically challenged the emerging new security system in Europe and the democratic values in the case of Kosovo. At the end no other tool remained for stopping violence and enforcing the realization of UNSCR 1244 than the air strikes. Developments of the last few months are encouraging. The man who was the focal point of so much tragedy is gone. The election of Mr. Kostunica as President of Yugoslavia paves the way to increased stability and security in the region. We highly appreciate the wise and courageous step of the new Yugoslav administration to transfer Milosevic to Hague to the International Criminal Tribunal. The new Yugoslav government has shown it has learned a lesson that Milosevic never did that brute military force does not produce lasting solutions. After the return of the Yugoslav armed forces to Ground Safety Zone the international community has had positive experiences with the activity of the Yugoslav authorities. However we still urge them to move fast to put in place confidence building measures.

Now it is the extremists of the Albanian community in Macedonia who have to learn that no violence is accepted by the international community. On the other hand the Macedonian government should find the right balance, not to over react militarily to the conflict with the armed Albanian extremists and at the same time actively work on the political remedies on the rightful complains of the Albanian minority in the country.

There can be no military solution to the conflict – only a political solution can provide lasting peace and stability in the country and the region. The European Union and NATO each remain ready to assist the government of Macedonia in the implementation of a settlement, including through EU financial assistance and the deployment of NATO military force to assist the disarmament of the ethnic Albanian fighters.

NATO is strongly committed to security, stability, peace, democracy and respect of human rights. The alliance will continue to pursue these objectives vigorously, primarily through the NATO led peace keeping operations in Bosnia Herzegovina and in Kosovo, but also through NATO's assistance and efforts in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. We emphasize our determination to achieve regional reconciliation through political engagement, partnership, confidence building measures, a lasting solution to the problem of refugees and displaced persons, and full cooperation with the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia.

NATO welcomes the progress toward strengthening state level institutions in Bosnia Herzegovina, especially the Council of Ministers. We are particularly encouraged by the establishment and growth of State Border Service, which should assist in controlling smuggling and illegal human trafficking, and provide for enhanced revenue collection to support the state level government. Common defense policy and the restructuring of the entity armed forces through the Standing Committee of Military Matters are key elements of Bosnia Herzegovina's stability and security. Common foreign and security policy was always - during the history - a basic attribute of a state. It strengthens the internal cohesion of the constitutional elements. And do take into consideration the main trends of the European integration. Multiethnicity becomes a natural feature of the future European armed forces. Political leaders in Bosnia and Herzegovina have to be able to cope with the challenge of multiethnicity in the country's security policy and structure. In the present situation a well chosen transparent and public security strategy would also in large extent increase the confidence with the neighboring countries and would serve as a good basis for partnership and cooperation thus increasing the security and stability of the region.

The development of the Common Assessment Paper on Regional Security Challenges and Opportunities worked out by the active support of NATO can make a lasting contribution to the evolution of regional cooperation and promote reforms of the security sector.

This paper states that a "comprehensive approach to security and stability encompassing all their aspects- political, military, economic, human, social, environmental, information, and others – is developing." I would add: It has to be developed as soon as possible. It is of vital importance for Bosnia Herzegovina as well.

Mr. Donald B. Kursch, *Deputy Special Coordinator
Stability Pact for South East Europe*

Your Excellencies, ladies and gentlemen. Thank you very much for including me in this seminar to explain the work and priorities of the Stability Pact and our efforts to enhance security in SE Europe. We are now exactly two years old, having effectively begun our operations in the summer of 1999 following the Stability Pact Summit in Sarajevo attended by more than 40 heads of state and government. In retrospect, I fear that this event, which I attended, was somewhat problematic since the arrival of the leaders of the Western world in Bosnia and the proliferation of elegant political statements that emanated from that meeting created expectations in the region that we could not possibly fulfill. In many cases, disappointment gave way to disillusion and for since we obviously could not do everything we were accused of doing nothing.

In fact, I think we can demonstrate a record of steady, solid accomplishment, including the March 2000 donors conference for the region that produced over 2.4 billion Euro in pledges and 244 projects. One year later 82% of these projects had begun. Last month in Brussels we were able to oversee the signing of two agreements concluded under our auspices both involving Bosnia-Herzegovina. One is a detailed action plan endorsed by Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Yugoslavia to support refugee returns and help resettle displaced persons. The second agreement was a commitment by seven countries of South Eastern Europe to conclude a network of bilateral trade agreements with each other by 2002.

While neither of these agreements deals directly with security, these clear-cut instances show how the Stability Pact is helping to create a framework for promoting regional cooperation rather than confrontation. Changing the overall environment in this direction is fundamental to reassure the citizens of the region that they are living in a more secure environment and that it is reasonable to expect continuing improvement.

Of course, the greatest change of all has been the revolution in Yugoslavia that drove Milosevic from power and brought our friends in the democratic opposition to office. This change, together with the changes in Croatia of early last year, enabled us to tackle some of the most difficult problems of the past. Milosevic's recent delivery to The Hague is a very important historic development in this regard. This was a very tough decision to make and we trust that it will encourage all the relevant authorities to bring to justice other notorious criminal suspects from the war who are still at large. The vigorous continuation of this process will certainly make citizens of the region, with the exception of the criminals themselves, feel more secure.

The Work of Working Table III

Following these general remarks I would like to focus on the Stability Pact's specific initiatives in the area of defense and security. As you may know, we are set up on an OSCE model based on three working tables: one for democracy and human rights, the second for economic development and the third for security. To make matters somewhat more complicated the security table, or Working Table III, is divided into two sub-sections: one for justice and home affairs: the second for defense and security issues. The security working table, like our other working tables has a permanent chair, Kim Traavik of Norway, whose government has also helped to fund this conference. Under our formula countries of the

region serve as co-chairs, rotating every six months and hosting the working table meeting that takes place during their co-chairmanship. This system has enabled us to bring the Stability Pact to the region and provide additional opportunities for regional input into the process.

Hungary has just become the co-chair of Working Table III taking over from Croatia, which was co-chair during the first part of the year. Bosnia-Herzegovina was co-chair during the first half of 2000, as Amb. Turkovic will well remember. Specific efforts we are making to foster regional cooperation in the under Working Table III sector include the Stability Pact's Organized Crime Initiative (SPOC) and the Anti-Corruption Initiative (SPIC), a program to combat human trafficking, police training and an asylum and migration initiative introduced by Sweden during its just concluded EU Presidency. In a NATO context we are promoting regional contacts and planning through the South East Europe Group or SEEGROUP.

One program that has been received very well throughout the region is the Disaster Preparedness Initiative or DPPI.

Greater regional cooperation, particularly in the security sector would appear to have special relevance for BiH. Building up on-going, operational relationships with neighbors should also translate into great cooperation between entities within the country. As you know better than I do, this is a key goal for the international community here. Allow me to offer one example of this. When our DPPI team visited Bosnia-Herzegovina this spring to assess disaster readiness, we were told that this was the first time that the two entity institutions responsible for civil emergencies had actually come together to discuss their common goals and challenges. DPPI has highlighted the reality to all the countries of the region that natural disasters do not recognize political frontiers and that action plans for cross border cooperation must be in place if there is to be an effective response to unforeseen catastrophes.

Other programs have set a standard and, in turn, have been reinforced by the regional role that they have played. The World Bank Program to retrain redundant military personnel, a so-called quick start project that was the first of its kind in the region, set a standard for other programs we now have running in both Romania and Bulgaria. A program for Croatia will soon get underway.

The Stability Pact and NATO

The Stability Pact and NATO have formed a useful and operational partnership. Our collaboration helps reinforce our respective goals for the region. We have established a broad ranging pattern of cooperation with NATO that also includes SEEI and civil emergency planning. The Stability Pact has also served as a bridge between NATO and organizations such as the World Bank as both organizations do not maintain institutional ties with one another. We are also in a position to reach out in directions and to places where NATO may have greater difficulty, such as Yugoslavia, which is not yet a partner in NATO's activities.

One of the Stability Pact's greatest assets is our quick reaction capability and flexibility. We envision ourselves as a speedboat in the midst of ocean liners. Our ability to move quickly and build "coalitions of the willing" has enabled us to develop initiatives that go beyond NATO's institutional mandates. DPPI is one example of this capability. NATO's relationship with Bosnia-Herzegovina is still being defined and therefore some of our cooperative

activities with NATO will not apply here. However, it may be useful for us to get your ideas on how it could improve our role in this area with you.

Allow me to use this opportunity to express my enthusiastic endorsement of NATO's Partnership for Peace Program or PFP. This is an excellent program that has served countries in transition well. Although I appreciate that there are special obstacles to overcome in Bosnia-Herzegovina before PFP membership is possible, entry into PFP should be a top medium-term policy goal for this country.

Defense Reform

Defense reform is a most important part of security sector reform.

We want to highlight the needs that will extend beyond defense ministries when the military sectors in SE Europe face an inevitable reform process.

Programs such as the retraining of redundant military personnel, supported in Bosnia-Herzegovina by the World Bank are excellent examples of the potential existing in this area. To complement the retraining initiative, earlier this year we began working with NATO international staff to launch a process of assistance to SEE nations for the conversion of their military assets, particularly military bases, to civilian uses. Focussing on one or two bases on the verge of closing or having just closed, the pilot project we are developing will work with international experts to assess existing plans for closure and make recommendations with a view toward creating workable national strategies for military asset conversion. As with the redundant military personnel projects, we are starting to work closely with the international financial institutions to engage them and obtain their eventual financial support. Base closure and military asset conversion are excellent examples of the potential for our collaboration in transforming a difficult and painful process into an economic development opportunity.

A notable example of regional ownership and leadership has been the effort we have supported by Bulgaria and the UK to establish a regular system for the sharing of military planning and budgeting. The Bulgarian government has now established a center of excellence for this purpose at the Sofia Defense College. We will continue to support this project in our contacts and dialogue with donors.

RACVIAC

The Regional Arms Control and Verification Assistance Center in Croatia is a very successful Stability Pact project. It has organized various conferences and training programs that have been directed towards all the countries of the region. I believe that this institute can cooperate with RACVIAC in the further development of this project.

Small Arms and Light Weapons

The scourge of proliferating small arms and light weapons continue to plague efforts to improve security in SEE. A UN Conference in New York continues this week to examine the issue on a global scale and raise international awareness of the problem. Using the momentum of the New York dialogue the Stability Pact is working on a regional implementation plan to direct needed regional attention to steps that can be taken now to stem arms flow while also seeking to frame donor support activities. This effort is of obvious relevance in Bosnia and we

welcome your ideas and input. Again this is an area where a concerted regional effort will reinforce internal cooperation and collaboration.

Conclusions

I hope that my remarks have been able to give you a clearer picture of what the Stability Pact is and what we can and cannot do. We are not a bank but we are a clear link to the donor community. And much like an American college fund-raising campaign we can solicit the international community to make pledges on behalf of the region and then follow-up to make sure that these pledges are honored. In the period leading up to the Regional Conference in Bucharest on October 25-26 we will be once again urging donors to demonstrate their continued support for the region and provide resources to support work in our priority areas. The defense and security areas I have outlined above should be important beneficiaries of this process.

We are also committed to keep the regional process moving forward. In a speech that Commissioner Chris Patten made in Brussels last week he clearly reinforced the special mandate of the Stability Pact to support regional cooperation and the regional process. We recognize the very strong aspirations of the individual countries of the region to move closer to the EU, NATO and other institutions. We share these aspirations, support them and wish to serve as your advocate. At the same time, all countries must realize that regional cooperation is not a substitute for closer ties with Euro and Euro-Atlantic institutions. Indeed they must be a prerequisite. The cooperation between of the countries of Central Europe--Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary--who are high on the EU's list of potential new members should provide a useful example in this respect.

For us to be successful we need the full and active engagement of the region. The region must give us input and a strong sense of its most critical collective priorities. The emergence of independent institutions such as this Centre for Security Studies is a very encouraging sign. We hope that you will become an important actor as we further develop our partnership with the region.

THIRD SESSION

APPLIED MODELS OF SECURITY POLICY

Dr. Nikola Špirić (Parliamentary Assembly of BiH)

General Hans-Jürgen Rennack (SFOR)

Colonel Christiaan Jacobs (Belgian Delegation to OSCE)

Prof. Dr. Heinz Vetschera (University of Vienna)

Mr. Ivan Velimir Starčević (Croatian Embassy in BiH)

Dr. Nikola Špirić, *Deputy Chairman*
House of Peoples of Bosnia and Herzegovina

After the sessions in which we spoke about new concepts of security policy and the institutional framework of security policy; after the many interesting theoretical ideas of our distinguished colleagues who had the honour to speak at this seminar; after practical examples; after one wonderful explanation about new concepts of security policy, finishing with the new concept of NATO security policy - which implies a kind a security policy that has the means to manage crises and crises regions, and which is in the position to control and enforce peace in specific critical situations, we have come to this third session in which we shall have the pleasure to hear an explanation of different models of security policy in Germany, Belgium and Croatia.

With this in mind, I have the pleasure to chair this third session, and I would like to say that without consideration to how others could be dissatisfied with the current achieved measures of security and defence in Bosnia and Herzegovina, I am disposed to those people who think that this is an area in which the accomplishments have shown the largest progress in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

If we return to only a few years previously, and that is not to mention five years back, from that position it would seem to us impossible to hold this kind of gathering. This shows that we are on a good path and that the political establishment in Bosnia and Herzegovina has matured through measures in which there are now no prohibited themes; and I think that it is time to move on and that the concept of security policy in Bosnia and Herzegovina shall be a concept in which it shall be possible to achieve the largest possible consensus. Naturally, this would have been possible to achieve earlier, I reiterate my personal point of view, if the political factors that envisage BiH in a such a way that suits them were not still too strong, and did act in accordance within the framework of the Dayton agreement, Constitution BiH and positive legal projects.

I hope that we in Bosnia and Herzegovina can speak about the security policy in a wider sense, and it is especially necessary that we build a model of security policy that is required; and that the tragedy and misfortune that we have passed through will not be a developmental factor nor a model of consideration of the future security policy.

We shall need the help of our friends from Europe and the world for the entire concept of our security policy; also even assistance on the internal model would be most welcome. Of course, that is my modest view on that which has been accomplished and what lies ahead of us.

Now, I have the honour and pleasure to invite General Hans-Jurgen Rennack to present to us the German model of Security Policy.

Brigadier General Hans-Jürgen Rennack,
SFOR

Presenting the German Model of Security Policy

Mr. Chairman, Ladies and Gentleman,

I was asked to give a very short brief on the German Defence Policy and the reorientation of the German Army. I am not going much into detail, but I am quite happy to answer any questions in the question period afterwards, or even in the break following.

When I start by saying that the security situation at the beginning of this century calls for a foresighted and comprehensive security policy, I imagine nearly everybody would and could support that statement; and when I continue in saying security today is longer threatened predominantly by military potentials, but is challenged to an increasing extent by political, economic, social, cultural or ecological factors, I again assume that most of the people would and could support that statement. When I conclude, therefore, that security nowadays neither can be ensured by a mainly military approach, nor by military measures alone, again nearly everybody would support this statement. So rather, it is important to support peace by contributing to political and social stability and economic development; but the question remains, not just in supporting theoretical statements, but these defence policy basics must be reflected in the actual defence policy, down to the structure and missions of the armed forces.

So, the German Defence and Security Policy overall is governed by values and principles which are embedded in the Charter of the United Nations, in basic OSCE documents, and of course, in the German Constitution.

Germany's national interest is the preservation of the freedom, security and the welfare of its citizens, as well in the integrity of its territory; and is closely connected with our interests in a peaceful and lasting order in Europe, and for the nations of the World. The German Defence and Security Policy therefore is integrated into the multinational framework of European security organizations and the United Nations. Above all, it is aimed at the improvement of the Euro Atlantic community, and the promotion of European integration, the strengthening of Europe's capability to act, the extension of co-operation and partnership, and the promotion of regional stabilization and cooperation.

German Security Policy recognizes the primary responsibility of the United Nations' Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and security, and the Security Council's crucial role in contributing to security and stability in the Euro Atlantic area.

For Germany, NATO remains the foundation of common defence and the primary political framework for the participation of German forces in crisis operations and peace missions. In the future, the German Armed Forces will also make substantial contributions to operations of the European Union if NATO as a whole is not engaged. Moreover, Germany in the future will continue to contribute to United Nations and OSCE peace missions.

In the light of the present and future security environment, the following wide spectrum of basic tasks will face the German Armed Forces – that is the defence of the German territorial and the Allies' territory. Under the new conditions prevailing in Europe, national defence will

most likely mean for Germany, collective defence. In operations within the scope of conflict prevention and crisis management, in partnership and co-operation measures, and humanitarian aid and rescue operations – these tasks require an extended capability profile, and according to this new profile, the future armed forces must be mobile, flexibly employable as well as survivable, and self-sustaining even over prolonged periods of time; be able to ensure the successful execution of national, allied and European missions, as well as operations in coalitions; to assist in restoring the social order and infrastructure in crisis zones; and be capable of augmentation as required by the situation.

Taking into account these factors and policies mentioned above, the German Armed Forces have started a fundamental reorientation process. Basic parameters for this reorientation are of course, the Constitution Mission, our principles of Security Policy, and our present international commitments.

The new capability profile of the German Armed Forces is also geared to NATO's Defence Capabilities Initiative (DCI) – which has identified areas where weaknesses and shortcomings of the Alliance' Armed Forces must be remedied; and the European Headline Goal (EHG) of the European Union – which defines binding objectives for the build-up of efficient European readiness forces.

The new profile of capabilities consists of the following decisive interlinked categories: command and control; strategic reconnaissance and intelligence; mobility – including strategic deployability; effective management; sustainability and logistics; and survivability.

The future overall strength of the German Armed Forces will be 285,000 personnel – this will be about one quarter below the present strength; the standing forces will comprise of 260,000 soldiers; an additional 22,000 personnel will be undergoing training at any given time; while approximately 2,500 slots will be available for reserve duty training.

The standing forces – those are the 260,000 – consist of readiness forces and the basic military organization. The number of readiness forces will almost triple over the next years to overall 150,000; and in future the readiness forces will be supplemented by approximately 110,000 military personnel assigned to the new basic military organization – which is a central service organization for the armed forces performing on a joint-service basis all cross-sections functions of command and control, reconnaissance, support and training.

National and collective defence continues to be the core mission of the German Armed Forces; in the future too, this can only be ensured through universal conscription. However, looking at the individual conscript, it always implies a major disruption of a civilian life; therefore, military service will be limited in time, which is necessary to guarantee external security. Taking this into consideration, it was decided to reduce the duration for conscripts in military service from ten to nine months, as of the year 2002. The option to extend the basic military service on a voluntary basis up to twenty-three months remains unchanged.

Another important innovation within the German Armed Forces is the fact that, since January of this year, women who volunteer are no longer limited to the medical service, but may serve in any branch or service they choose.

The key innovation of the command and control organization is the fact that it will be streamlined – that means that the Chief of Staff's position will be considerably strengthened by assigning him additional responsibilities for the planning and control of operations.

An operational council within the Ministry of Defence, chaired by the Chief of Staff of the Bundeswehr, will support the Commander-in-Chief in planning, preparing and controlling of operations; and at a strategic level, German Armed Forces' missions abroad will be planned, controlled and commanded by a joint operational command – which was started in July and will be effective by January next year.

The equipment held by the Armed Forces will be further modernized; particularly, priority will be given to presently non-existent capabilities – such as strategic sea and air lift; strategic reconnaissance, as well as enhancing the interoperability of command and control systems and means. The number of heavy weapons systems will be reduced, while the standoff and precision capabilities will be improved.

These are the overall key aspects of the German Armed Forces' reorientation; we believe that this reorientation will better meet the future security challenges and operation scenarios; and in particular, the requirement of multinational co-operation and multinational integration of national forces.

Multinationality at the same time is an expression of international solidarity and common basic convictions. Multinational co-operation will make better and more effective use of existing, but always limited forces – this results in an increase military capabilities, low risks, an extended operational spectrum, as well as an improvement of the economic efficiency. It does not force a nation to give up its national identity, it rather takes advantage of the great variety of ideas, experience and resources of all partner nations; and overall, multinationality in Europe also contributes to the development of European integration.

From our point of view, the benefit of multinationality is the large lesson that German has learnt from the past – which eventually led to the reunification of Germany as a country; and this principle of multinationality remains the guideline of the future, and largely has influenced the concept for the reorientation of the German Armed Forces.

Ladies and Gentleman, as a final comment, let me sum up in one sentence the that the German Armed Forces are not undergoing a new restructuring process, but they are undergoing a deep reorientation – this has begun early this year, it will take some time, and eventually will be implemented – by our guess – in around 2006. Thank you for your attention.

Colonel Christiaan Jacobs, *Military Advisor*

Belgian Delegation to the OSCE in Vienna

Personally pleasure to come back to BaH after 6 years. Indeed, from December 94 until July 95 I was in Mostar as the Special Representative of the UN Force Commander with the EU Administration of the city and UN Adviser to Hans Koschnick.

I believe that such initiatives like this one are very important for a new state that has to define its own security and defence policy.

I would like to start this presentation on the Belgian Security and Defence Policy with a short analysis of the changes in our security environment.

I will then consider the actual challenges we are facing, and based on our objectives, I will highlight the main axes of our security and defence strategy.

Changes

After its independence in 1830, Belgium has, for more than one hundred years, attempted to found its security on the concept of neutrality. Initially, it was imposed and guaranteed by the main European powers if that time. Between the two World Wars, this neutrality became a deliberate choice.

Neutrality however, did not prevent our country of being involved into the two major European conflicts of the last century. It became obvious that, if war should break out again in Western Europe, Belgium would, without any doubt, share the fate of its neighbours.

Consequently, our reaction was to conclude an alliance with these neighbours, the Brussels Treaty of 1948, titled, "The Treaty on Cooperation in Economic, Social, Cultural and Legal Collective Defence Matters", that gave birth to the Western European Union (WEU) afterwards, and also the first step towards the European Union and the Council of Europe.

One year later, Belgium was also a founding member of a new alliance called NATO.

NATO secured in the second half of the past century the necessary stability to develop the political, economic and social environment we enjoy today.

Since then, Belgium has committed itself, without any reserve, to its alliances, and the successive governments never hesitated to renew this commitment.

In 1989, after so many years of stability through military balance between the two blocks, we have entered a **new era**, which can be characterized by 3 words: **uncertainty**, **complexity** and **contradiction**:

Uncertainty, because events impose upon us their own dynamics, and they often do not permit sound analysis and timely decisions.

Complexity, because the collapse of the previous world order gave birth to multiple centers of power, and because the threat of a generalized conflict has faded away, while local conflicts increased in intensity and in frequency.

Contradiction, because order and stability has progressed in certain parts of the world, while intolerance, racism and fanaticism has cropped up in other regions.

Contradiction also, because supranational integration-processes continue while, in the same countries, nationalistic reflexes and selfishness manifest themselves with an increased vigour.

Challenges

In this new security environment, the challenges are becoming of a much wider nature. They include now:

- Increased competition over strategic areas and resources;
- Actions of rogue states;
- International terrorism and organized crime;
- Migrations and refugees;
- Drug trafficking;
- Advanced military technology and information warfare;
- The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction;

Therefore, a broad approach to security has become necessary. In terms of the reasons to a conflict, the whole spectrum of political, economic, social, historical, philosophical and ideological causes must be taken into account.

In terms of the solution to be given, not only the military dimension, but also the diplomatic and economic actions must be utilized and co-coordinated, both in the prevention and in the peace-building phases.

At the doorstep of the 21st century, with multinational interdependence and worldwide communications, it is also very important to look at the long-term aspects of our decisions, as they may influence the security situation for many decades. And this not only in the particular region affected, but very often in a much wider geographical area, sometimes even worldwide.

This necessary global approach is for a smaller country like ours, the best argument to continue participation in the alliance and also to place much hope in the emerging European developments in defence and security matters.

Risk areas

It is obvious that there is no longer a direct military threat to Belgium, but looking to the world map from an European perspective, a number of risk areas, in and around Europe, can be identified.

The first risk area for us is the **Balkan region**, as illustrated for the last ten years by the Yugoslav crisis. This region has been at the crossroads of the ancient empires, and also at the crossroads of three religions and their culture. It is a perfect example to illustrate the need for a broad approach to security problems. We see that ethnic quarrels, national and sub-national rivalries have reappeared in the open, only a few hundred kilometers from our doors.

The **former Soviet Union** is a vast and complex territory, now split up in several states, most of them being confronted to different degrees with an unsure political, economic and social future. They constitute a second zone of potential instability.

Nationalistic, economic, ethnical and cultural tensions lead to disputes and smaller conflicts are occurring in several places. The considerable military capabilities still in presence, including nuclear assets, remain a major concern. Fortunately, most of the emerging states chose the path of democracy and of co-operation with NATO through the Partnership for Peace programme.

A **third zone of uncertainty** runs along the southern flank of the European continent, from North Africa, through the Arabian peninsula, to the region of the Persian Gulf. It constitutes the major separation line between the former colonial powers and the once colonized countries, and between Christianity and Islam.

As potential risks, we can mention for example the struggle for regional hegemony, the fundamentalist states and groupings, and terrorist actions. This region is of vital interest for the economic well-being of the western nations. The difficulties in implementing the peace process in the Middle East also influences our internal security.

The **African continent** in general and Central Africa in particular remains a big concern too. The present Belgian Government has expressed its intention of shaping a renewed policy towards Africa and to encourage the European partners to do so.

It is an area of chronic instability, where political and ethnical difficulties, together with tremendous economic problems have created a fertile soil for all kinds of extremisms.

The refugee problem adds to a further increase of the instability. If not handled in a proper way, it may affect in the long-term the security on the European continent. Furthermore, the lack of interest in black Africa may lead to more humanitarian disasters.

Finally, we are faced with a global phenomenon – the **proliferation** of weapons of mass destruction and their vectors, as well as materials, technologies and the know-how to manufacture them. Now that the nuclear apocalypse between east and west has become most improbable, proliferation, if not controlled will increase the number of centers of power capable of resorting to these arms in the pursuit of their own interests. New regional cold war situations may arise while also terrorist organizations might threaten us.

To be exhaustive, I will mention **Eastern Asia and China**. We monitor the political, economic and social developments with great interest, because they can significantly

influence the well-being of our people, but it is not a part of the world where Belgium (nor the EU) can expect to have a significant direct input in the security matters.

Objectives

On the basis of this short analysis, the objectives of the Belgian security and defence diplomacy can be defined as follows:

The first objective is to contribute to peace by helping to reach more overall stability, which is the first condition to security. This means that we have to contribute to more cohesion and coherence inside and around Europe, more particularly by preventing the creation of new fraction lines in, around and outside Europe.

The second objective is to defend the vital interests of our nation (including the protection of the lives of our citizens living abroad – Africa) and our allies, including human rights and the values of democracy, wherever they may be threatened. In other words, we must eliminate the huge economic and social differences which are breeding grounds for increased tensions, migration pressures, or fundamentalism.

Strategy

To achieve these objectives, Belgium pursues a security strategy articulated along the following five axes:

- Firstly, a reinforcement of the European identity in security matters, through the deepening of the European Union and the progressive creation of a true political entity that defines a common foreign and security policy, including the organization of the structures and the necessary means;
- Secondly, the preservation of the transatlantic link, through a true partnership in NATO, in order to deter the use of force on the European continent;
- Thirdly, an enlargement of the co-operation with countries of Europe and Africa on a bilateral or multilateral basis;
- Fourthly, the support of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), and more specifically, the arms control issue, which is a cornerstone of security and stability;
- And finally, the support of the reinforcement of the role of the United Nations to maintain international security and peace.

Europe

In 1948 European countries created the Western European Union to deal with collective defence, but from 1949 onwards NATO has been the reference for security issues. In June 1992, the WEU defined the so-called Petersburg Tasks, including humanitarian and peacekeeping operations.

In the mean time, Europe was building itself and the Treaty of Maastricht made an important place for those aspects, referring to the same “Petersburg Tasks”

The Treaty of Amsterdam went a step further and expressed as an end goal the creation of a common European defence and security policy.

The lack of efficiency of the European response in times of crises, as witnessed in former-Yugoslavia and in central Africa, have demonstrated the need for a much more coherent vision among the European nations. At the summit of Cologne in June 1999, it was decided that the EU needed the capacity and the means, allowing her to execute the Petersberg Tasks autonomously.

At Helsinki and later in Nice, in December 2000, a catalogue of required forces was established.

The next step will consist in addressing the shortfalls, mainly strategic items like intelligence gathering, air and sea-lift, C3IS (Command – Ctl – Comms & Info systems) and others.

Belgian contribution

In line with this approach, Belgium has integrated since many years the major part of its armed forces into multi-national European structures.

Concerning the army, the first mechanized division, with an integrated company of the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, is committed to the Eurocorps, and this of course without abandoning our engagements to NATO. Our Paratrooper brigade and some combat support units (Recce Bn & ATk Heli Bn) are part of the multi-national division (center) of the Ace Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC)

With regard to the Naval Forces, the co-operation with the Netherlands, which already exists since 1948, has been reinforced. An integrated operational staff, the Benelux Admiralty, is in charge of the readiness of the naval units assigned to it, as well as of the co-ordination and execution of commonly decided operations. The Navy co-operates also with the French and German colleagues.

On the Air Force side, the Dutch and Belgian Air Forces and the Army of Luxembourg have created a deployable Air Task Force, on a modular operational approach. This common enterprise has proven its efficiency by being deployed in Italy for over 3 years now, and took part in the Kosovo air campaign “Allied Force” at the third rank among the contributing nations. A similar agreement has been signed with Portugal. The co-operation with the Netherlands is also very effective on other fields (transport, air refueling,...)

We are convinced that such initiatives definitely promote the development of the capabilities of the EU and will reinforce the European security and defence identity and the European pillar within NATO; therefore, also strengthening the transatlantic community.

As a matter of fact, if Europe has its own instruments to deal with crisis prevention and crisis management, the transatlantic relationship will not be overstretched with security matters which do not affect the vital interests of our North American partners.
NATO

The transatlantic link must be maintained and even reinforced because it is of vital importance to European stability and security. NATO, with its unique political and military capabilities, remains the major tool of deterrence against the use of violence within or against Europe, not only for its members but also for their European neighbours.

Concerning the progressive enlargement of NATO, a gradual and pragmatic approach is needed in order to avoid the creation of new dividing lines. Each step forward must preserve the objectives of maintaining internal cohesion and strength, while at the same time contributing towards increased stability and security.

Enhanced Partnership for Peace has also a central role to play in this process. Partnership for Peace aims at bringing the partners closer to NATO and its shared values, but introducing partners in consultation and planning processes, by improving interoperability, but it also prepares possible future members to deal not only with the benefits but also with the responsibilities of membership.

There is in our eyes no competition between ESDI and ESDP. Both are building the same capacities and rest on the same will to assume the security of the region. NATO is and must remain a forum of consultation between Europe and North America about security and defence. This link has to be maintained, recognizing the role of NATO for collective defence but having respect for the emergence of the European defence policy, normal development of its political identity.

Bilateral Relations

Besides the privileged relations with our NATO and (W)EU allies, we have also an active policy of military contact on a bilateral basis, mainly with a number of European and African states.

There are North African and Mediterranean states like Morocco and Tunisia and from our history in Central Africa, we possess an unique experience of that continent, which we want to share with both Africans and the international community. We think we have a mission to accomplish in the prevention of conflicts and in the enhancement of internal security on the black continent.

Therefore, our armed forces together with other nations and in full African partnership, contribute in the enhancement of African peacekeeping capabilities. We are also participating in peacekeeping operations or trainings, humanitarian missions and we would like to support some countries by developing more general technical and instruction assistance.

Finally, we also have contacts with what one could call the rest of the world, but obviously less elaborated. There is the Far East and we have also links to South America and in particular with Argentina.

OSCE

The work done in Vienna and all achievements of the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) also deserve our support.

As the main goal of the OSCE is to enhance security in its region, this organization is very important for the definition of security standards and for the development of a range of arrangements in the areas of preventive diplomacy, full respect of human rights and democratic principles, transparency and confidence building measures and arms control.

But, unlike NATO, it has neither the cohesion nor the necessary means to guarantee stability or to restore peace.

Within the OSCE framework, we attach a great importance to the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) and to the Vienna document, which will remain the cornerstones of European security and stability. Through our initiatives and our verification agency, we promote, as much as possible, a co-operative approach with all the parties involved.

United Nations

Finally, we fully support the efforts of the United Nations as unique organization on the world scene to maintain peace and international security.

Furthermore, we also endorse the enhancement of the peacekeeping capacity and the military planning capacity of the United Nations, and we provided the UN with a database of our forces and mean that, pending a national decision, might be made available for peacekeeping operations.

Since 1989, Belgium has engaged its armed forces in more than 20 UN operations in former-Yugoslavia, Somalia, Rwanda, Haiti, Cambodia, and others. At this moment, we have few commitments to on-going UN operations because of our substantial contributions in the Balkan area. We have military observers and others in six missions, including the Force Commander in Western Sahara. About 10% of the losses in operations in the UN ever had to deploy are Belgian Blue Helmets. We have the feeling that this indicates that we have taken a fair part in peacekeeping engagements. Therefore, we welcome the Brahimi Report that emphasizes almost the same conclusions as our Parliament did after the investigation about the Rwanda case.

Concerning the UN stand-by and rapid deployment forces, Belgium is fully aware of the need for a swift and effective response capacity by the international community, but we think that only a common political will, based on shared values and shared interests, can guarantee quick decisions and execution.

Therefore, the UN should make an appeal to well-organised and trained multi-national organizations whenever possible rather than duplicate available and well functioning structures.

Conclusion

As a conclusion of this presentation on the Belgian Defence and Security Policy, I would recapitulate that:

- Belgium is in peace since more than 50 years, thanks to its membership to alliances;
- Belgium advocates the construction of a united Europe;
- Belgium contributes to stability and peace, through its effective support of the international security organizations, and by multi-lateral and bilateral co-operation.

Structure of Belgian Armed Forces

The force structures of a country must of course be coherent with all the above stated. (capabilities required):

- Credible contribution to our alliances
- NEO (Non combatant Evacuation Operations)

AUSTRIA'S SECURITY POLICY- Foundations, Perceptions and Responses

The Historical Background of Austria's Security Policy – From Occupation to Independence

Austria's security policy has grown out of the traumatic experiences Austria has made in the 20th century. Austria was a main actor in World War I. Later, in 1938, Austria was occupied by Germany and subsequently incorporated into the Third Reich.

Allied planning in World War II approached Austria in a twofold way. On the one hand, Austria's independence should be re-established. On the other hand, the allies envisaged a four-partite military occupation by the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union, the USA and France for Austria similar to Germany. Liberation from German occupation in 1945 meant thus allied occupation for Austria. In contrast to Germany, however, Austria could establish a central government and held democratic elections as early as 1945.

This fact proved decisive for Austria. Negotiations for a State Treaty with the Allied powers to end occupation were initiated in 1946, along with negotiations for peace treaties between the Allied powers and Italy, Bulgaria, Hungary, Rumania and Finland. These peace treaties could be concluded in February 1947, but in 1948, the outbreak of the Cold War interrupted negotiations for the Austrian State Treaty. Austria could at least avoid Germany's fate of division into an 'Eastern' and a 'Western' state, but both East and West had reasons to stay in Austria. The West feared that Austria might seek accommodation with the East at the expense of her western orientation. The East feared that Austria might join NATO, being a western democracy. Thus, both sides continued their established military presence in Austria.

New chances emerged with a reorientation of Soviet foreign policy after 1953. At the Berlin Conference in 1954 the Soviet Union proposed a clause to the State Treaty prohibiting Austria to join military alliances. Both the Western powers and Austria rejected the idea of imposed neutralization. However, in early 1955 Austria offered to unilaterally declare permanent neutrality in exchange for the Soviet Union's consent to the State Treaty. The 'package deal' was sealed in Moscow on April, 15, 1955 ('Moscow Memorandum'). On May, 15, 1955, the State Treaty was signed in Vienna between Austria and the four allied powers, re-establishing Austria's full independence. After the last foreign soldier had left Austria, permanent neutrality was declared in a Federal Constitutional Law on October, 26, 1955.

Two facts derive for Austria's security policy from the origins of her independence. First, independence was gained by offering permanent neutrality. On the legal side, Austria's neutrality rests on a unilateral legislative act. It has not been enshrined in the State Treaty and has neither been guaranteed by the signatory powers, nor would it allow interpretation by one or the other signatory power. On the political side, Austria's neutrality is rooted in the Cold War. East and West had 'neutralized' Austria during their joint occupation, denying each other dominance over Austria. Both sides left Austria only after their security demands had been met. For the West it was Austria's uncompromised commitment to democracy, limiting neutrality to military self-reliance. For the East, it was Austria's status of permanent neutrality, preventing her from joining NATO. However, Austria's strict neutrality in military

and security matters on the one hand and her uncompromised adherence to western democracy on the other hand may have been perceived as a 'split identity' by both sides, leading to residual mistrust against Austria, that she could betray her position. Austria's neutrality thus perpetuated the status of a 'gray area' which Austria had been from 1945 to 1955.

The latent threats to Austria's independence originating in the Allied occupation were therefore perpetuated, too. As the declaration of neutrality had been a precondition to re-establish Austria's independence, maintaining and protecting her neutrality was thus identified to a high degree as maintaining and protecting Austria's independence, too.

2) The Development of Austria's Security Policy from 1955 until present

Austria's security policy from regaining independence in 1955 until the end of the East-West confrontation was shaped by three major factors, namely Austria's strategic location, her status of permanent neutrality, and the experiences with security threats.

2.1) Austria's Strategic Location

Austria is located in an area of traditional strategic significance. The valley of river Danube has throughout history been a major communication line as well as invasion route in the East-West direction for more than a millennium. Main routes from Central Europe both to the Italian peninsula and to the Balkans cross the Alps on Austrian soil.

Austria's strategic significance explains the former allies reluctance to withdraw from Austria. It also explained their continuing strategic interest in Austria in the years following their withdrawal. Austria had borders with NATO member Federal Republic of Germany and then WTO members Czechoslovakia to the north and Hungary to the east, non-aligned Yugoslavia to the south-east, NATO member Italy to the south and neutral Switzerland (plus Liechtenstein) to the West. Thus, during the continuing East-West confrontation Austria played a major role in geostrategic terms. She separated the Eastern from the Western alliance in Central Europe, as well as NATO's Southern and Central sectors.

2.2) The Status of Permanent Neutrality

The status of permanent neutrality had a major impact on Austria's security policy, and also on her threat perception. The Constitutional Law on Permanent Neutrality, still formally valid, defines neutrality both as an instrument of security policy, to 'secure independence and territorial integrity', and as an objective for security policy, obliging Austria to 'maintain and defend neutrality with all means at its disposal', including military force.

Austria's neutrality had traditionally been understood as military neutrality, aimed at remaining neutral in any future armed conflict. It has not entailed any 'neutralism' in ideological, economic or political issues, or 'equidistance'. Secondly, Austria's neutrality was understood as 'armed neutrality'. It derived from the legal obligation for any neutral to deny use of its territory to all belligerents. The task to defend neutrality was explicitly enshrined in the Constitutional Law on Neutrality. Austria established armed forces as soon as independence had been regained in 1955. In 1956, general conscription was introduced. A system of 'Comprehensive National Defense' was established in 1961, adding elements of psychological, economic and civil defense to the military. In 1975, Comprehensive National

Defense was enshrined as a mandatory principle in Austria's Federal Constitution, and order was given to elaborate a Defense Plan.

The concept of 'armed neutrality' has also had a direct impact on Austria's strategic concept of that time. It was shaped primarily to cope with the task to preserve neutrality during an armed conflict between others. Belligerents are most likely to attack a neutral if they may cross neutral territory in short time, undercutting the adversary's reaction time and catching him by surprise. Other requirements are to keep the losses as low as possible, and to break the neutral's resistance definitely without major deployments of troops for occupation of the neutral.

Corresponding calculations also determined Austria's strategic concept of area defense. It was devised to trade calculated losses of territory against the aggressor's losses in time and casualties, in order to deny the surprise effect against the aggressor's main adversary and to raise the costs. It envisaged to keep forces intact to pose a continuing threat against the enemy's rear and flanks, and to force the aggressor to saturate Austria with occupation forces, raising the costs beyond the benefits for the aggressor.

2.3) Security Challenges and Experiences since 1955

Even before the outbreak of the Yugoslav conflict in 1991, Austria had already experienced several challenges to her security. During the Hungarian uprising in 1956, there was an inherent danger that fighting between Hungarian and Soviet forces could also spread to Austria. When Soviet and other WTO forces invaded Czechoslovakia in 1968, the population did not offer armed resistance to the invasion. Yet, the danger of escalation was inherent, requiring military security operations on Austria's border to Czechoslovakia.

One year earlier, Austria had to cope with a crisis in Italy ('South Tyrol crisis'), where the German speaking minority conducted a small-scale guerilla war against Italian security forces due to Italy's delay in granting minority rights. Austria supported the minority's demands politically, but she sealed the borders to cut supplies for the guerillas from Austrian territory and to facilitate a political solution which then could be eventually found.

Finally, Austria experienced several terrorist threats in this period. Some were connected with the South-Tyrol crisis during the mid-sixties, as for example some bombings in 1966 by Italian radicals, or bombings against Italian targets in Austria by right-wing extremists. Others were spill-overs either from West German revolutionary leftist terrorism, or actions by Middle Eastern groups of Palestinian and Armenian origin. Major incidents were the abduction of a Vienna industrialist by a German group in 1977, the taking of hostages out of a train of Jewish emigrants from the Soviet Union in 1973, the raid on OPEC headquarters in 1975, the killing of a Vienna City Counselor and a raid on a synagogue in 1981 and an attack on Vienna airport in 1985 by Arab groups, as well as several assassinations of Turkish diplomats by Armenian groups during the same time. Domestic terrorism occurred, too, but was primarily limited to individual rather than organized acts and did never reach the violence of 'imported' terrorism.

The main challenge occurred, however, when the Yugoslav People's Army intervened against Slovenia's declaration of independence in June 1991. As much of the first fighting took place for border posts, there was an imminent threat that armed operations could spread to Austrian territory. The Austrian armed forces took positions and protected the border area against any

potential spillover. While there occurred several violations of Austrian airspace during that period, ground operations could be prevented from spilling over. It was, however, also the first occasion the C/OSCE emergency mechanisms were triggered in an unsuccessful attempt to prevent further escalation.

3) The Framework for Austria's Security Policy

Austria's security policy concept was laid down in the – still valid - National Defense Plan. It had been initiated together with the Federal Constitutional Law on Comprehensive National Defense as early as 1975 and was finally adopted by the government in 1983 and published in 1985. Despite the major changes in the strategic environment, it was not officially amended for more than a decade. Only recently, efforts have been undertaken by the new center-right government to establish a new framework for Austria's security and defense policy.

3.1) The Framework of the National Defense Plan

Due to the time of its elaboration, the National Defense Plan in many instances reflects the framework of its origin, still referring to the two antagonistic alliances. In conceptual terms, however, it shows a surprisingly flexibility which even in today's perspective of a completely different strategic situation gives it some validity.

With regard to the areas of interest it states that Central Europe will remain the decisive area for Austria's security, which is also true for today's security assessment. However, it also sees Austria's security influenced by events at the European rim and in the Middle East. The world-wide interdependence in security issues therefore would require that developments in extra-European regions would increasingly have to be taken into account for Austria's security policy considerations, too.

3.2) The Threat Perception in the National Defense Plan

Austria's threat perception was expressed in the pertinent chapter of the National Defense Plan. Even at the time it was elaborated, it differed widely from the threat perceptions of the alliances. Austria's threat perception rather had to identify what could threaten Austria's security, instead of who could threaten it.

The National Defense Plan defined as a threat to Austria 'everything which will endanger her population, the basic values of this state or permanent neutrality'. Therefore, Austria's security policy had to take into account a broad spectrum of threats against Austria's external and internal security.

Threats are, in this perspective, not limited to the military factor, as non-military forms of threat may challenge Austria's security policy, too. In the military sphere, the territorial integrity and the freedom of action of states had in the past been directly and frequently threatened by war. The employment of military means could not be excluded against Austria, either. However, the character of wars has changed. On the one side, it may escalate into unlimited war, seeing the world-wide use of nuclear weapons. On the other side, it merges with methods of guerilla-warfare and politically motivated terrorism. Therefore, the threat is no longer seen as limited to 'classical' war, but as all forms of violence. While the National Defense Plan thus in its operational part emphasized, in accordance with then prevailing

threat scenarios, conventional warfare, it nevertheless had from its origins taken into account the wider spectrum of possible threats.

Non-military forms of threat are also addressed in the National Defense Plan. They are seen as originating in the economic, social, ecological and also in the ideological-political sphere. They may emerge as a spill-over from developments abroad, or may be directed against Austria herself. Thus, for waging international conflicts the National Defense Plan perceived a wide spectrum of means and methods of their employment. One also has to consider factors like the urban concentration of the population, the establishment of industrial centers, the centralization of command and control, the internationalized economic interdependence, the dependence of developed societies on technology and wide-spread organization, all of which have made the modern state highly vulnerable.

In conclusion, the means and methods of modern conflict strategies enumerated in the National Defense Plan range from blackmailing negotiation techniques, methods of psychological warfare and ideological struggle, political isolation, economic pressure, subversion and terrorism to various options of the massive use of force. This assessment is still valid, despite a visible shift in the probability of their employment.

The National Defense Plan saw the potential threat as a permanent one because of Austria's security environment. Therefore it postulated that it should be continuously evaluated according to empirical data and in considering the given options in the non-military and the military sphere. The actual threat would depend on the concrete situations both world-wide and on the regional level, and on the intentions of potential adversaries. In this context, the National Defense Plan, with a clear view at that time of conventional conflicts, but also referring to other forms of conflict, states that conflicts could threaten the whole territory and would afflict all areas of the people and the state, and that the traditional distinction between the 'front' and the 'rear', between combatants and non-combatants has increasingly lost its significance.

Despite the fact that the strategic environment of Austria has drastically changed since the National Defense Plan had been adopted, its general part on potential threats thus provides a flexible framework which allows for a suprisingly flexible way to assess also new security challenges.

In addition to threats by external political factors, the concept of Comprehensive National Defense has further broadened the scope by including adverse economic developments (as for example the scarceness of resources) or natural events (as for example serious earthquakes and flooding) into the categories of 'threats'. The chemical disasters in Seveso in Italy and in Bhopal in India have shown that catastrophes may originate not only from natural but also from man-made sources. Then, the Chernobyl incident in 1986 demonstrated that industrial disasters may affect Austria's security, even if they take place in a relatively far distance. These incidents have also influenced Austria's threat perception on the official as well as the public opinion level, and have led to include similar incidents in the categories of future potential threats.

Austria's threat perception as expressed in the National Defense Plan thus even at an early stage covered a broad spectrum in which traditional armed conflict never played an exclusive role. The changes in Europe since 1989 have confirmed that the role of traditional war as a

major threat to Austria's security has even more decreased, while the role of other potential threats has increased.

4) Changes in the Framework and Future Challenges for European Security

The nineties have brought deep changes in the overall framework of European security, sometimes even with a revolutionary character. On the other hand, some elements have changed less than it would appear on the surface. Thus, new challenges emerge, while some earlier challenges would remain.

4.1) The Changes

On the political level, the most visible change is the breakdown of communist rule in the former Eastern European countries, as well as the break-up of the former Soviet Union, Yugoslavia, and Czechoslovakia. The communist regimes have never had acquired legitimacy in these countries. It required, however, the changes initiated in the Soviet Union itself under Gorbachev to allow the changes and to trigger the anti-Communist revolutions which were mostly peaceful and non-violent, with exception of Romania. Also, the attempted reactionary communist coup d'etat in Russia 1991 was overcome with a minimum of violence, while the later power struggle between the Parliament and President Yeltsin saw some use of force.

While the transformation from communist to post-communist rule could thus be achieved mostly peacefully, re-emerging nationalism both on the territory of the former Soviet Union and of former Yugoslavia caused severe violence. The cases of wars range from Slovenia, Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina to Moldova, the Caucasus, Chechnya and Tajikistan. These wars posed major challenges to the international community which for almost five years was unable, despite a declared will to do so, to take action to terminate the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

4.2) Remaining Factors

On the other hand, some threat factors which had been visible even before the mentioned changes have been less influenced by these changes. They concern mostly areas of potential instabilities in Europe's neighborhood. As much as the economic gap between Europe and Africa or Asia will widen, tensions may grow, too. In addition, the new self-assertiveness of religious or political fundamentalism in the Third World may in the future pose serious challenges to European security policy. Ironically, as ideology has vanished within Europe as a source of tensions, it may well grow as a source for tensions between Europe and her neighbors.

The same holds true for the military area. Some extra-European powers have significantly increased their military capabilities, both in the areas of conventional forces and with regard to weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems. Some of them possess ballistic missiles of the INF categories the superpowers have eliminated from their arsenals. Chemical weapons have already been used in the Iraq-Iran conflict, and some of the powers are close to producing, or even already possess, nuclear weapons. Thus, changes in European security are not only determined by events within Europe, but also by developments in Europe's geographic and strategic environment.

4.3) The Future Threat Situation

Both the changes and the impact of remaining factors will also influence the threat situation in Europe. The former dominating scenario of an armed East-West confrontation has vanished. However, European security may be increasingly threatened by challenges from individual states, or groups of states, or events within states. The wars in former Yugoslavia have been a strong reminder for the destructive potential even within such so-called "low-intensity conflicts".

In a similar way, conflicts with extra-European powers have to be taken into account. Here, too, the most probable form will be that of low-intensity conflicts, as for example terrorism and subversion, although one has to consider the increased capabilities for conventional warfare as well as growing capabilities in the area of ballistic missiles, chemical and even nuclear weapons.

5) Consequences for Austria's Future Security Policy

These developments allow for some tentative conclusions for changes in Austria's strategic future.

First, the changes in Europe have drastically changed Austria's strategic environment. With regard to mere geography, Austria will remain - due to her geographic location - at the crossroads of strategic relevance and will continue to play the role of a transit area between East and West, or North and South, or vice versa.

With regard to the geostrategic position, however, Austria no longer is "sandwiched" between two antagonistic alliances but finds herself now in a more comfortable position with most of her neighbours belonging to the same alliance. On the purely military side, the complete withdrawal of Soviet forces from Austria's immediate vicinity has significantly improved Austria's situation as it has eliminated the chances for an armed conflict employing forces capable of in-depth operations, and thereby threatening Austria's territorial integrity. Furthermore, NATO's enlargement has created a belt of alliance members around Austria, which by itself should enhance military stability in the area.

On the other hand, latent instabilities have become a growing concern for Austria more than for many other European states, because of Austria's proximity to areas of potential conflicts. This was true for the Yugoslav wars from 1991 until 1995, as well as with the Kosovo crisis and is also true for the ongoing situation in Macedonia. The implosion of Albania in 1997 as much as „frozen conflicts“ as the one in Transnistria, potential tensions in the Ukraine between her East and West and similar situations may be seen as signals that stability cannot always be taken as granted. While all these situation would have to be seen as a challenge for European security in general terms, many of them would have an even more direct impact on Austria's security.

Then, threats to Austria may emerge if Europe in general were threatened by extra-European powers. This has become even more accentuated with Austria's joining the European Union and participation in the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy, including a developing military component.

In any conflict between an extra-European powers and 'the Europeans', Austria could not avoid to be involved, despite her formally still "neutral" status. On the one hand, it were highly unlikely that any extra-European power would discriminate between EU members, if the conflict were to escalate to these proportions. On the other hand, the other EU members would have certainly no understanding for one member to 'opt out' rather than to cooperate. The methods employed against Europe in this scenario would most probably pertain to the 'subconventional' level, as for example terrorism. The means, however, could range from traditional bombings and shootings to the employment of means of mass destruction, as for example chemical or biological contamination, or perhaps even nuclear terrorism.

Finally, there is the area of both natural and man-made disasters. As much as the scenarios of military threat recede, disaster scenarios come to the fore as potential security threats. On the side of the armed forces, emphasis is given to the fact that they have both the knowledge and the equipment to cope with these challenges, too, be it in logistics, communications, medical and transport capabilities.

In sum, the changes in Europe have also changed the conditions for Austria's security policy. It is true that for the emotional threat perception in the public opinion an enemy image has broken down because of the changes in Europe, and that it has lost much of its orientation. As this enemy image has never been incorporated into Austria's threat perception on the national security policy level, however, the threat analysis as such was less afflicted by the changes in Austria's security environment. As even the earlier threat perception of the National Defense Plan had been based upon a rather generalized formula which already included a broad range of potential future threats, the developments have in real terms not led to a fundamental change but rather to a shift within already existing elements. Thus, the changes would rather pertain to the probability than the substance of future threats.

6) Security Policy Options

The changes have not let the Austrian perspectives on security policy options untouched. While it is true that the legal status of permanent neutrality by itself had nothing to do with the East-West confrontation of the past, the fact remains that the political foundations of Austria's neutrality were rooted in the Cold War. With the end of the bloc confrontation in Europe, Austria's neutrality has in practice lost its *raison d'être*.

These matters are, however, not just considerations of security policy but they are also linked to domestic political, ideological, and even psychological factors. With regard to domestic politics and ideology, the left wing of the political spectrum has maintained a certain anti-western bias. It had played a certain role also in delaying Austria's aspirations to join the European Union, and it took some efforts within the then ruling Socialist Party for the leadership to convince its left wing that joining the EU could not be equated to "yielding to capitalism".

Similar residual animosities play a role also with respect to NATO, despite the fact that many NATO members have Socialist governments. Thus, a Report on Austria's Security Policy Options undertaken by government experts during the past Socialist-Conservative coalition (which broke in 1999) could not be agreed upon, as the Socialist Party was not willing to concede including NATO membership as a possible option. Consequently, the left wing of the political spectrum (Socialists and Greens, the two current opposition Parties) shows a high profile in "maintaining neutrality".

On the other side, the conservative Peoples' Party (then the Junior and now the Senior Partner in the present coalition government), has clearly stated a preference to join NATO as soon as possible. The same is also true for the other partner in the current government, the National-Liberal (or, as it has frequently be named „Freedom“) Party. While thus the present Austrian government would definitely favor accession to NATO, it might have no real chances to take the pertinent steps, because overcoming the Constitutional Law on Permanent Neutrality and/or to ratify the Washington Treaty would require a two-third majority in parliament, and therefore at least some of the opposition Parties' votes, which at present appears highly unlikely.

Even more important than these ideological considerations, Austria's neutrality has gained an almost emotional positive connotation in public opinion, completely decoupled from its potential security function. It was frequently seen as part of Austria's identity after World War II. There was indeed some justification as during the East-West-confrontation, Austria's neutrality had been an asset within her foreign policy profile. It enabled Austria frequently to take a role as "honest broker" between East and West, and gave her a higher profile than the real power factors would have allowed for. However, the requirement for such "honest brokers" between power blocs has vanished with the end of the bloc confrontation. Whenever honest brokers are required to mediate in the current conflicts, this role has now been frequently taken by international institutions, as for example the OSCE, which act in a kind of "collective neutrality". Thus, neutrality has no longer even this particular function on the international level.

Nevertheless, large segments of public opinion are still wedded to the idea that neutrality would be an essential part of Austria's identity, and therefore inalienable. As one commentator once noted, "The less people know about neutrality, the more they are attached to it". There is thus a strong emotional attachment to neutrality in the public, with some ideological attachment in the opposition parties, which would be highly unlikely overcome in the near future

To sum up, Austria's future security policy options will depend on many external but also internal factors. While the security policy elite may be sooner in a position to identify potential future challenges as well as adequate answers to them, political decision-making will not take place in an empty space but will have to consider other factors of an ideological as well emotional nature, too.

Mr. Ivan Velimir Starcevic, *Plenipotentiary Minister Adviser*
Embassy of the Republic of Croatia
Sarajevo, Bosnia and Herzegovina

Elements of the Security Policy of the Republic of Croatia

It is impossible to substantially outline all aspects of the Security Policy of the Republic of Croatia in such a short period; but on this occasion I shall limit this so that I outline some of its elements, mainly those which seem to me to be relevant for the Security Policy of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and also for the combined security situation in the region.

After the parliamentary election of the 03 January last year in which Croatia received a coalition government, the objective is a strong pro-European orientation. Research of public opinion shows that a large number of the citizens of Croatia are strongly committed towards closer Euroatlantic integration. In favour of this exists a very clearly united government, a large majority of political parties across the whole of the political spectrum and by far the largest body of the general public. That which relates to the government itself, that kind of orientation is no dilemma. As also in every coalition government, there have come, and possibly in the future shall come, specific problems between coalition partners, but they by no means do have the kind of character that they would jeopardize that fundamental theme. Also, recent events in the Croatian political scene, which you probably followed, must be explained not as determination for or against cooperation with the Hague Tribunal, than as political debate about which kind of cooperation we want with Hague; and particular efforts to preserve the just character of the civil war, which would, I believe, be the aim of every other country that was forced in this manner to acquire its independence.

Allow me to pass from the theme that the disappearance of the bipolar structure of the world did not cancel nor reduce the need for the definition of security models; already we have come to the different consideration of security issues and the need of the restoration of new mechanisms of security. The non-appearance of danger from global conflict does not mean also the discontinuance of danger from armed conflict of different kinds, and perhaps it shall arise in the situation when the large powers do not control countries concentrated around them in political or military alliances. Bipolar structure means also a relatively high level of transparency of relations between countries and blocs, which makes easier the work of defining corresponding security models. For this reason, to plan the security policies of countries in an unambiguous sense was easier than today. Globally, two blocs of ideologically opposite confrontation countries today is transformed into a succession of actual or potential conflicts of lesser intensity, but potentially equally dangerous, which is difficult to predict and control. At the same time, today they appear also in entirely new security challenges and dangers – from cross-border connections of organized crime, towards ecological catastrophe, smuggling human beings, weapons and narcotics, the subversive activities of terrorist groups, etc. The redefinition of the security model on all and the new challenges make it necessary to find adequate responses.

It is our fundamental strategic commitment that in these new conditions, it is necessary to conceptualize the security policy in a manner in which combines global, regional and national approaches. We hold that the successful and efficacious security policy of some countries cannot be exclusively based upon state security, but internally must in a corresponding manner activate also institutions of civil society. While a classical concept is mainly executed

from the concept of national integrity, the new concept would, before all, need to be based upon respect for the equality and recognition of human rights. In this sense, it is necessary to combine activities in classical military questions and problems with those that influence the quality of living, as well as the protection of the environment, the prevention of refugee crisis, the fight against the illegal trade in weapons and drugs, etc. Exactly in the engagement of these kind of issues a national or regional approach shall prove unsatisfactory for the establishment of efficacious results; consequently, before all, it is necessary to solve these through wide multilateral mechanisms, including those also on a global level. Counting on the efficacious solution to those new challenges of the contemporary and the internal high-level sophisticated system of Euroatlantic integration, the ambition of the Republic of Croatia is as soon as possible to become a full and equal member.

The Security Policy of the Republic of Croatia in that sense is an integral and inseparable part of its entire internal and foreign policy. The founding elements of the Security Policy of the Republic of Croatia result from its fundamental foreign political commitment and at the same time compliment this commitment. Therefore, allow me to outline this plan. As a member of the United Nations, Croatia is fully ready to fulfill the obligations that arise from the Charter of the UN or Declaration of Human Rights. Croatia particularly respects the existing borders and expresses its determination that all conflicts are solved through peaceful means, protecting ourselves from threats or use of power. As a member of the OSCE, Croatia respects all of the obligations of the Helsinki Act, Paris Charter for New Europe, Vienna Document on Confidence and Security Building Measures, and also all documents which have followed. The long-term foreign political aim of the country is membership in the European Union and NATO. After the reinstatement of the new Croatian government the process of the conclusion of the Agreement on Stabilization and Association was completed, which was completed in January this year, and is expected to be signed some time soon. Last year Croatia became a member of Partnership for Peace and actively engages in its activities. Relating to NATO, Croatia has entered into "intensive dialogue" with her, and cooperates in the work of the Vilnius Group, and at the end of the year expects to enter in the Membership Action Plan.

Croatia actively participates in the activities of the Stability Pact, as well as the preparations and implementation of corresponding documents in accordance with Articles IV and V, Annex 1B of the Dayton Peace Agreement. The Croatian commitment is primarily that military cooperation on a large scale contributes to overcoming mistrust between earlier conflicting sides, promoting transparency in military issues, reducing military expenditure, disarmament and sale of military effects, strengthening democratic control over armed forces, strengthening bilateral and multilateral cooperation – not only in military and related issues but also in all remaining areas. Therefore, Croatia shall, in the coming period, bestow great attention on the conscientious fulfillment of its obligations in accordance with these documents, expecting also the same from other sides.

Concerning regional cooperation, sometimes criticism can be heard that Croatia is not sufficiently active and resists, but that is not accurate. In the spirit of Treaties or with observers, Croatia cooperates in all regional mechanisms. We do not have anything against regional cooperation, under the consideration that it is based upon clear criteria, nor in that sense brings into question the worth, commitment and foreign political objectives of any member state. In other words, that which we want and expect from regional cooperation is a "clean slate" and that it serves the interests of all countries that are in the form of that united cooperation; that it would not be enforced against the will of one of those. Consequently,

regional cooperation should not be felt as a burden and not one country is allowed to experience this as a limiting factor in its relations towards its foreign political objectives. Considering that more or less all countries from the region have proclaimed a wish to join European institutions as a founding foreign political objective, Croatia especially does not want that the chance to join those institutions individually from those depends upon other countries. That is why we frequently say that the accession of the countries in the region should not be allowed to develop according the principle of “convoy” but rather according to the principle of “regatta”; where all start at the same time and in the same match all have the same chance, and then all depends exclusively upon individual performance and results.

Consequently, we have nothing against regional cooperation, only we are against the kind of regional cooperation that would mean being dependent upon the results of other countries in the approach to Euroatlantic institutions. The principle starting point of foreign policy in regional cooperation needs to be built upon mutual bilateral relations with all neighbouring countries and countries from the region, but that they consider the creation of new regional or similar multilateral mechanisms and only those measures which correspond to the previously mentioned criteria need to be encouraged. The possible role of multilateral regional documents we see in that which offers a base for the assembly of a network of bilateral agreements between the countries of South-East Europe, because it is the best manner possible to express all specific concrete bilateral relations between individual countries and to achieve the necessary and desired accuracy in the regulation of issues that are in their interest. At the same time, it is necessary to avoid the unnecessary general regulation of individual issues, and before all, whichever kind of possibility of the repeated resurrection of political connections between new risen countries in South-East Europe.

The foundation of the previously mentioned conceptual approach of the Republic of Croatia in the framework of its own security policy gives the largest attention towards relations with neighbours, which supplies us with the core of this speech. In this we start from the hypothesis that the security of a country shall be largest when these measures are affirmed by neighbouring countries in democratic institutions – most simply stated, the likelihood of the commencement of armed conflict or other kinds of security problems are much less in countries in which function democratic institutions rather than those in which those kinds of institutions do not function. That does not mean that from those kind of countries there cannot come some kind of danger towards the security of other countries in the region - that kind of viewpoint would be too idealistic and would not take into consideration the reality of the contemporary world. However, it is inversely proportional with the functioning of democratic institutions and their ability to practicably solve all societal conflict. It is our basic position that the greater the democracy in every country and especially in the region, the less of a security threat exists to Croatia. Therefore, it can be freely stated that the full functioning of democratic institutions is in the interest of all those countries, but it is indirectly also in the interest of the Republic of Croatia. Consequently, the Republic of Croatia follows these process in its neighbourhood with special attention, welcoming every step towards a democratic and civil atmosphere, and expressing its concern towards possible moves in the opposite direction. The Republic of Croatia shall not meddle in the political processes of its neighbouring countries, but shall carefully follow them. The Republic of Croatia shall communicate their viewpoint of the processes and their implications; and shall make all necessary measures possible towards international law and obligations so that those processes would have a positive influence on the entire regional security situation, as well as the security of the Republic of Croatia - so as to limit any eventual negative influence.

In the recent period unfortunately Macedonia has also been associated with territorial crisis, this together with others also currently present the largest threats to security in the region. Croatia hopes that a peaceful solution for Macedonia shall be found, and in this sense shall support all of the peaceful endeavours of the international community.

Concerning the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, according to our opinion, the situation is still not such that we can relax and not to take events into consideration anymore. In Belgrade, official positive processes have started, which have culminated in the extradition of Milosevic to the Hague Tribunal. With this event, the largest perpetrator has been placed where he deserves, and before one year only the greatest optimist could have foreseen this. We view this as a triumph of the international world order and is proof that the Balkan territory is not totally lost concerning democratic processes - as many considered until recently. Similarly, as with the earlier stated commitment, Croatia certainly welcomes every democratic step in neighbouring countries, which also furthers our own interests. There are also other democratic changes in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, which here, because of the lack of time, we shall not in detail be able to mention. However, at the same time there is also resistance to that course and the conflict of old and new forces continues, although, according to our opinion, the future historical perspective is on the side of the new. We carefully follow these events, believing that the onetime "black hole" of Europe shall gradually transform into a country with which we shall be in the position to establish and hold good-neighbourly relations and to efficaciously solve a number of open and bilateral issues - naturally to mutual interest. Equally, we shall carefully follow events in Montenegro and in Kosovo, which shall in the coming period undoubtedly present challenges for all planners of security policy in the region. That which nevertheless concerns Croatia is the final solution of the issue of Prevlaka, which for us has the largest security bearing.

In the continuing speech, I shall speak about how Croatia sees events in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and about our bilateral relations.

This country is our first neighbour, with whom we have close to a thousand kilometres of borders, and with all which this fact signifies, we also consider to be a central reference point of our Security Policy. In this sense, it is equally interesting for us how the internal processes in her proceed, as well as the further development of bilateral relations. From the other side, we also recognize that Bosnia and Herzegovina has two neighbours - us and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.

Bosnia and Herzegovina, for the first time a year ago, has a government which is not formed from national political parties, rather than from the coalition of the Alliance for Change. That government shall encounter a number of obstacles in its work, but it shall nevertheless stride forward. Although before this perhaps also they shall not achieve some spectacular results, the overall climate in the country has changed for the better to the most unrecognizable, about which, I believe, can testify the representatives of the international community who live and work here. I believe that right now the country and its political powers find themselves at a turning point, on which they have to begin to take control of their fate and decide about the future of the country - and the international community should no longer do this for them. From objects of change, Bosnia and Herzegovina must finally become a subject of change. We wish them in these endeavours every luck and we are ready to give maximum assistance. Currently, the country stands before three large and perhaps ominous political projects, which could on a large scale prescribe their future. These projects are significant constitutional change - to implement the decision of the Constitutional Court about the equality of all three

peoples on the entire state territory; to change the law about the Council of Ministers in relation to its transformation to government; and the adoption of an election law. Although these are undoubtedly tasks which would present large challenges to already well established democracies, let alone for Bosnia and Herzegovina, we hope and believe that the State bodies of Bosnia and Herzegovina shall realize these exceptionally significant tasks in the shortest time possible - with which would make possible membership of the country to the Council of Europe and confirm its undoubted European identity.

The political system of Bosnia and Herzegovina represents a peculiar "mixture" of democratic civic institutions and institutions designed for the protection of national interests, conceptualized with the Dayton Agreement, which is, as is frequently heard, unique in the world; but which was, we believe, perhaps also the only possibility to end the terrible bloody war in this country. The Dayton system does not need to be idealized. Starting from the fact that at one time its solutions were exemplary and once compared societal relations, it is necessary to continuously follow in which measures as an institutional framework correspond to the changes of societal relations to which in Bosnia and Herzegovina surely are coming, also after all as well in every other country. Not one institutional framework can be held eternally, every one at some stage comes into conflict with the development of societal relations and at that time would need to change. However, the fundamental question is when and how? Our answer is that the relevant political powers in the country must consent to this, and this must be done in accordance with the procedures that allow for a change in the state system. In the meantime, the Dayton system must react creatively and flexibly, and following from this, it is on this basis that the Bosnian institutions need to be built. All of this it is not prohibited to make possible, but in practice it proves useful and acceptable for all peoples and political groups of the country if this affirms further development of relations, and does not cement those from the past.

The new Croatian government proclaimed also a new policy towards Bosnia and Herzegovina, which is in the entirety of its foreign policy perhaps also the largest turning point to relations in policy of the earlier government. That policy consists of non-intervention in internal affairs, strict respect for the territorial integrity and independence of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the further development of good relations on the basis of absolute equality. This time we consider seriously those limits for which various sides have accused us of infringing upon. The irony is larger as those accusations sometimes come from the side of those who belong to the Croatian nation in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Consequently, before the interference was "too much" and now it is "not enough". We defined the basic elements of our policy towards Bosnia and Herzegovina, but we are still working on its substance and definition. Certainly, we shall support Bosnia and Herzegovina's statehood and to lessen the proportion of bilateral relations with entities. In support for a common defence policy and the unification of military forces on a state level, we have reduced earlier military assistance to the Croatian component of the Federation Army, and we have redirected support exclusively for civil projects. We have made a significant reversal in support to institutions of civil society in Bosnia and Herzegovina, which we shall endeavour also to materialize corresponding financial support. We have turned around the "new list" also in the policy of returnees, and the Croatian government previously adopted the decision that shall significantly finance the reconstruction of houses for Croatian returnees in the Republika Srpska, so this would set in motion the cycle of mutual return. We have arranged measures and activities with the competent organs of Bosnia and Herzegovina which shall efficaciously prevent illegal migration from Bosnia and Herzegovina towards the Republic of Croatia and to countries of the European Union, and we support every measure of Bosnia and

Herzegovina which contributes to this; above all, we positively support the establishment of the State Border Service and the placing of all borders under their control. We support the faster approach of Bosnia and Herzegovina to the Council of Europe and Partnership for Peace and we are prepared to offer all assistance that would help to realize this.

I believe that it is necessary to say something in short about our standpoint towards the "Croatian question" in Bosnia and Herzegovina. I want to reiterate clearly that Croatia did not and shall not withdraw the offering of assistance to the Croatia people in Bosnia and Herzegovina, which after all, represents also its obligation. The Croatia people in Bosnia and Herzegovina have to have an equal status as well as the remaining two constituent peoples, for them they do not need more nor less equality. Consequently, for this we shall be uncompromising. At the same time, we shall not interfere in the political or party political relations of our compatriots in Bosnia and Herzegovina; the responsibility lies with the political representatives that they chose. Speaking in favour for the development and affirmation of the civil and non-governmental sector in the country, we shall support the solutions of all issues of Bosnian Croats in the state institutions of that country, and in this manner the mechanisms foreseen in the documents and above all, the Constitution. We shall not support any kind of projects that would result in the self-isolation of the Croatian people in Bosnia and Herzegovina nor on the negation of the constitutional order of the country.

What could be offered at the end towards a statement of summary? Some of the elements of the security model of the Republic of Croatia could be specified as the following: a) a perspective of accession towards Euroatlantic integration, and in particular the European Union and NATO, and the equal engagement in the security models of those countries; b) strict support of all international documents which concern regional and entire security; c) active good relations with countries of the region, which limit the risk of the spread of security risks; d) acceptance of individual and human rights as various key-points of the security policy and permanent activity towards the sensitivity of all corresponding state organs for new forms of jeopardizing the security of the individual; e) international cooperation on all levels towards the combat of security threats which are of a transborder character; f) the activation of civil society towards the combat of security threats; g) permanent activity towards the spread of transparency of processes which are relevant for the definition of an efficacious security policy.

In this speech, we have endeavoured to outline all those elements of the Security Policy of the Republic of Croatia that are relevant for the Security Policy of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Both countries in this context are connected and their security policies are complementary. With this they can and have to cooperate bilaterally and mutually, fitting into the entire architecture of European security.

FOURTH SESSION

A SECURITY POLICY FOR BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA

Dr Istvan Gyarmati (Institute for East West Studies)
Brigadier General Vincent Coeurderoy (UN IPTF)
General Boško Gvozden (Ministry of Defence RS)
Mr Ferid Buljubašić (Ministry of Defence FBiH)
Minister Muhamed Bešić (MIA FBiH)

Dr. Istvan Gyarmati,

Institute for East-West Studies, New York

Now we come to the final session, which is always the most difficult one because people are tired; sometimes it is the most interesting one as well because it gives us a chance to draw some conclusions.

Having had a look at the list of speakers, I am pretty sure that we will have some interesting thoughts and ideas during this last session.

So, I do not want to delay the presentations too long; therefore, without any further ado, I would like to ask Brigadier General Coeurderoy to give his statement.

Brigadier General Vincent Coeurderoy,
UN IPTF Commissioner

Excellencies, Chairman of the Centre for Security Studies in BiH, Distinguished guests, Ladies and gentlemen: On behalf of Jacques Paul Klein, Special Representative of the United Nations Secretary General in BiH, it is an honour and a privilege to address this seminar on security policy today. On this occasion marking my first appearance before this body, I would like to take this opportunity to speak to you today about the United Nations Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (UNMIBH) – and to provide you with my considered views on the future of this country.

I believe we have to come to a crossroads where serious thinking and national dialogue is required. There are two options for the future of Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH).

The first option is a marked progression towards domestic accommodation, tolerance and European integration. The second option, is a future of volatility with an unraveling of all progress to date – leaving BiH an isolated failed State teetering on the bottom rung of development with little to no foreign investment and haunted by Balkan ghosts of the past.

I believe that there is a fundamental desire amongst the citizens to build a future in Europe and to become part of the winds of democratic change and stability. How can they not when immediate neighbours in Croatia and FRY have made such adjustments. For the first time, we see politically ripe circumstances promoting respect for the inviolability of sovereign and territorial rights and regional cooperation as equals.

Democratization of this region has an immediate impact on BiH. The reduction or deflection of international aid is a becoming reality. Considerable political fatigue, compassion fatigue and donor fatigue is setting in. It is time to move from Yugo to Euro – from mono-ethnic partisan politics towards domestic accommodation, intra-regional co-operation and extra-regional integration.

It is our common duty to finish what we started – we first must fully implement Dayton to provide the basis which to achieve sustainable stability, security and integration with the new Europe.

The recent Security Council Resolution 1357, passed on 21 June, “reiterates that the primary responsibility for the further successful implementation of the Peace Agreement lies with the authorities in Bosnia and Herzegovina themselves...”

The reality is that in any international post-conflict presence, the international community can provide an environment to foster peace and the modalities by which it can be achieved – but it cannot create tolerance and reconciliation. That is the responsibility of the people of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Allow me to turn now to the specific work of the United Nations Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (UNMIBH) and more specifically on the work of the International Police Task Force.

Our objectives have always been clear – to assist with the construction of a democratic, professional police force. This means establishing a police force that is responsive to the public they serve and protect and law enforcement institutions that are transparent and accountable. Without law and order, there can be no stability, and without stability, there can be no prosperity.

UNMIBH is a dynamic, focused and results orientated mission. Our internal Mandate Implementation Plan (MIP) is a comprehensive blueprint of some 57 projects that address individual police officers, police organizational structures and the relationship between police and society at large.

About one third of the projects have been completed, one third are ongoing, and the remainder will be launched in the next six months. When the MIP is completed, each of the approximately 20,000 local police officers and 1,700 State Border Service Officers will have been vetted, trained and basically equipped. They will further be working in professional and accountable police structures. This is possibly the largest programme of police reform and restructuring that has ever been undertaken.

To give you an idea of our specific projects UNMIBH has:

- Encouraged the return of police officers to former places of employment and residence. Two and half years ago, the police forces were mono-ethnic. Today, through the two police academies and the voluntary redeployment programmes, there are almost 1000 minority police. Of this number, approximately 400 have moved from the Federation to the RS.
- Deployed the State Border Service comprising 1,060 personnel along 62 per cent of the approximate 1600-kilometer border of BiH. As the first multi-ethnic state level service to protect BiH borders, the SBS is fundamental to state identity, territorial integrity and international persona. When fully deployed and properly equipped, the SBS will contribute significantly to revenue generation. The long-term sustainability of the SBS will be reliant on continued support including due consideration during the re-balancing of budgets for joint institutions.

We have further:

- Established the integrated multi-ethnic Brcko District Police;
- Brokered a trilateral arrangement (BiH, Croatia and FRY) on combating illegal migration and organized crime;
- Brokered an additional bilateral arrangement between BiH and FRY on the use of the SBS Suhodol training facility for FRY border services;
- Established an INTERPOL National Central Bureau in Sarajevo;
- Launched a Federation Court Police project; and

- Trained and deployed the first BiH United Nations multi-ethnic CIVPOL contingent to East Timor and the first group of United Nations Military Observers to the United Nations Mission in Ethiopia/Eritrea.

UNMIBH is also involved in the development of a BiH multi-ethnic composite peacekeeping unit to participate in international peacekeeping and security under the United Nations flag.

The processes of police reform and restructuring are well on their way. The BiH Authorities have demonstrated your commitments to inter-entity co-operation and regional co-operation through arrangements that UNMIBH has brokered. However, looking over the next six months, UNMIBH has identified several priorities that must be implemented.

Recently in New York, members of the Security Council gave particular overwhelming support for the speedy establishment of the post of Director of Police in law enforcement structures. This project is most critical to the creation of an apolitical, professional police force.

A multi-ethnic police force is an essential confidence-building measure for returnees and an important application of minority rights. The clearest sign of a multi-ethnic, functioning police force is the presence of minority police officers in mid and senior positions in law enforcement institutions. The fact that minority returns have doubled and that most returnees experience no security problems, is evidence of improved police performance and public acceptance. To maximize the benefits of this programme, minority police officers must also be in senior positions. This is not a unique situation for BiH.

Finally, I would like to raise the issue of police salaries. The ability for an individual police officer to identify his or her work as a means of building a future is severely hampered as long as their salaries remain less than a 'living wage', with frequent delays in payment. Individual police officers have the good will and receive professional standardized training. They deserve to have their important public service recognized through the payment of regular and appropriate salaries.

I believe the strength of character of the people of this country can be harnessed to build a future in which all people feel secure and proud. This is a long-term process. It will begin with tolerance, respect, and accompanied by intra-regional accommodation, leading to extra-regional integration.

Thank you and you have my very best wishes for a democratic, prosperous and safe economic future.

General Bosko Gvozden

Ministry of Defence of the Republika Srpska

Thank you very much, Dr. Gyarmati.

Ladies and Gentlemen, allow me first to greet you all in the name of the Minister of Defense of the Republika Srpska, Mr. Slobodan Bilic, in who's name, I am attending this seminar, and obviously on behalf of myself. I hope that the results of this seminar are found to be beneficial in the realization of our further work. I am aware and I appreciate our fatigue and the lack of popularity of a presentation at the end of the seminar, but I will try to attract your attention on a few elements that are of high importance in reaching a goal during this seminar.

I have personally engaged in the preparation of the Defence Policy of Bosnia and Herzegovina, in the creation of these documents; therefore, I have a detailed understanding on this matter, by working with others who have contributed on this matter and I know that it was difficult to derive a final document, as is like this document, which has been adopted by the Presidency on the 11th May 2001 - which has been given in procedure with the Council of Ministers and Parliamentary Assembly that it may be fully verified.

I had suggested at one of the official places where there was a discussion on the restructuring of the armed forces in Bosnia and Herzegovina, that was a Joint Committee, that I thought that it was not logical that the defence sector, therefore the defense policy, to be advanced as a general part of the security policy of Bosnia and Herzegovina. It is my firm opinion and I want to publically present here, the idea that no-one can expect that military structures would be the most democratic structures in a state, even if they are so portrayed in the vision of Bosnia and Herzegovina as it is today.

Therefore, the security policy for Bosnia and Herzegovina must equally build in all of its segments so that it gives equally larger and better results. I am delighted and I can also inform you that my position was positively accepted and has received satisfaction through the form of an official stance by representatives of OHR at the Standing Committee on Military Matters - which was not long ago held and at the same time was taken as an official stand by OHR to activate the Council of Ministers in creating a working group for the setting of a security policy for Bosnia and Herzegovina.

As far as I understand today's efforts, it confirms my thought that we should work simultaneously, everyone in his or her own domain, starting by creating an overall security policy for Bosnia and Herzegovina. How much this is a complicated process and complex situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina is best illustrated to us by the first step in the creation of a security policy, and the fact that the body which should develop this cannot being its work. I hope that the Council of Ministers will be capable, and so I say, can work on this difficult task as well as many other tasks that are in the normal description of their work.

Theory and practice in international relations have shown conditions, principles and goals in building a security policy. I could together with my colleagues, surely discuss quite a lot about this, but I consider that it is not the aim of the seminar to maintain only a theoretical approach from our side, which we are in the position to convey. This morning and during the day we heard theoretical hypotheses on this issue, I agree with Dr. Seybolt and Dr. Vetschera that these authorities, and together with Dr. General Jean, a year long colleague in the field of

implementing the Dayton Peace Agreement, in the manner in which should be done. Now the question is what is possible in Bosnia and Herzegovina and consequently which steps should be taken. Of all the problems that have been outlined in the creation of a Security Policy, I give priority to those questions that firstly need to be resolved, especially internal problems. I think that this is a central issue although this concerns the general security policy.

When we worked on the Defence Policy we first wanted to identify who was the enemy, we cannot see it that way, as did the honorable representative of Croatia who said, "Do not view the Republic Of Croatia nor the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia as an aggressor". When then is the problem, the problem lies in us and we cannot avoid to analyze this even during this most important stage in the creation of a security policy.

How much of a great problem this is we can see in a few examples. One problem that is certainly very exploitable is the exploitation of good neighbourly relations or the creation of parallel or special links – how one may arouse himself – with the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and with the Republic of Croatia. We can use one or another expression to see if it can be understood opposite to its current meaning, as a threat to one of the ethnic communities in Bosnia and Herzegovina. You can see how one usual, not quite common factor, can express complex problems and varying considerations and meanings in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

The second example, on this seminar today, and I do not like to deepen that issue, was the cause of the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina. You have already seen that we cannot agree upon this issue. We must place this question aside, for some other time when we will be able to discuss this. If we commence on this, this seminar could not be held, as there exist completely different explanations. Even also with the banal usage of the phrase "civil war", we cannot even agree. On these two questions, I wanted to show you the complexity of these issues.

I consider that the development of democratic institutions and democratic procedures is an important foundation for further advancement. Maybe that sounds a little strange when a General speaks on this issue but that is how I really think. In what way can we develop democratic institutions as a basis for the development of the security policy? Can you see that if we want to reduce the military potential and reduce the size of personnel, and some people also advocate demilitarization, we must find a new mechanism – a democratic mechanism – that not one people, nation nor others which live here feel threatened. Therefore, through a democratic path we must find protection for which all three constitutive peoples shall agree. I think that this is the foundation of a security policy for Bosnia and Herzegovina.

That democratic approach is located; all other problems would very simply be solved. The first attempt that was on offer was the election law, and we see how it had passed, not voted on, it passed as if it had to wait on a station to await a second chance. Consequently, it did not pass, and automatically it reflects as to how and whether the army can be transformed. It cannot as long as one does not follow the other. That is normally my personal opinion on this issue.

The General Framework Peace Agreement in Bosnia and Herzegovina, or the Dayton Paris Peace Agreement, gives a sufficiently large framework that within it all of the problems that we have can start to be resolved. Surely that with every part not everyone will be pleased when it is reached, but I think that this is the path with which we can continue in the creation

of a general security policy for Bosnia and Herzegovina, and its full application in all of its segments.

I would like to say a few words about the Partnership for Peace. The position of Republika Srpska is clear that we have nothing against, nor have we ever been against it and that is the decision of the members of Presidency that Bosnia and Herzegovina is included in European structures and the Partnership for Peace.

I have had the honour to attend the exercises for country members of the Partnership for Peace in Germany, in Alenbah, and with those expert military participants there were not any kind of problems. Therefore, it is a clear political question as to whether there can or cannot be a manner in which to participate. As much as I am concerned, the signing of the Dayton Peace Agreement, which can be termed as the General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina, is also the same as the general framework agreement for membership in the Partnership for Peace. Therefore, from the day that agreement was signed, I am a member of the Partnership for Peace. Maybe this is not exactly the case but is in reality the essence for finding a method to realize it. Naturally, I consider the Partnership for Peace, as it can be understood in our language when speaking of partnership, to mean a possibility of modification, harmonization, and the adaptation of common work through the various forms that are on offer.

I wish to mention two words on the mission of UN and the position of Republika Srpska, especially the Ministry of Defense of the Republika Srpska in relation to that part. I am delighted to hear such kind words about our officers and military observers who participate with great success as part of the Missions in Ethiopia and Eritrea, and about my colleagues from the Ministry of Internal Affairs who in East Timor also conduct their jobs with perfection. These are examples of great steps in the framework of the UN Mission. It is also possible to take further steps in that field, but it is logical and normal to expect that we do not misuse these large organizations, as they represent stability and security. We should be careful in order not to have a neglectful approach that will have an affect on reducing their true meaning. I consider that the United Nations and its missionaries is not in the position to form a joint military, rather than it is ours to agree about the manner and formation of military units, the starting point of something which has to further continue through the United Nations. I have spoken of this openly at many meetings and here on this seminar.

The last from this field, a regional approach, is something that is our intention in all attendances and the working of all institutions of the Republika Srpska in the area of defence. Primarily, I am thinking of the Stability Pact and all that is understood as with our active involvement in Round Table III and in conducting the project on Stability.

Finally, may be it would of interest, for those people who are helping on behalf of the international community, to share some ideas that Bosnia and Herzegovina it is not only a consumer in international relations, and these experiences can be a lesson for other countries. As to whether this will be hidden or transparent we will have to wait and see. As with the experiences acquired concerning the Convertible Mark, I also see that the connection with the Euro will be successfully conducted. The experiences that are linked to the political system and internal matters of Bosnia and Herzegovina, as well as the people of BiH are said to be very similar to that in Europe.

We recently heard General Rennack present a speech about the restructuring of armed forces in Germany, where the idea of a multinational structure of Europe comes from Germany as the main founding idea of its work. However, the French have the very open idea that not even a national approach inside Europe interferes with the creation of a European community of nations. The same is so in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The largest nation in Europe, Germany, thinks that they can solve problems in this manner, and if France had a population of 85 million, possibly they would think otherwise. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, the largest ethnic groups are Bosniacs, who advocate multiethnicity without any borders. The Serbian people are less numbered and must try some democratic way to be protected as people in the country.

At the end, allow me to read the thoughts of Zivka Radisica the member of Presidency BiH, in relation to the defence policy and position of Bosnia and Herzegovina. " The destiny and defence policy of Bosnia and Herzegovina will rely on the readiness of both Serbs, Bosniacs and Croats to build a state society of equal citizens, constitutive peoples and equal entities. In Bosnia and Herzegovina there is no large or small peoples, nor bad or good, nor more or less genocidal, nor winners or gridders, there exists equal people who through democratic dialogue and equality must build the future of BiH and not by majorization or outvoting. Her destiny will rely on the readiness and effectiveness of international community's factors that the people and entities of BiH are offered democratic dialogue based on equality and the search for permanent solutions, which are the expressions of a common interest. The future of Bosnia and Herzegovina is in the hands of its people and legally appointed representatives and in the international community to be present as an equal partner."

I honestly think that it is a stable and just solution in the issue of the internal matters of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The key to a permanent solution is surely also the large assistance of the European community of nations.

Thank you very much.

Mr. Ferid Buljbasic, *Deputy Minister*
Ministry of Defence of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Dear Mr. Chairman, Ladies and Gentleman.

I am delighted and overwhelmed to greet you all on this important meeting today. I would like to complement the organizers of this seminar for identifying important issues to be discussed on this seminar in relation to security policy for Bosnia and Herzegovina. Allow me to include myself in this debate, so that I may express my view on a few important elements.

Bosnia and Herzegovina is another post communist country of South East Europe in a transitional period, in the process of setting the documentation on security and defence, we must overcome the current mentality from the past political, social and economic system. As from the difference of a large number of other countries that are currently in transition, Bosnia and Herzegovina has a terrible war experience and a complicated governmental structure. In adopting a Security Policy as an important document on a state level it has its strong basis in the Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina and in the decisions of the Peace Implementation Council for Bosnia and Herzegovina, highlighted and expressed in declarations from Madrid and Brussels.

Bosnia and Herzegovina has identified at which point it has arrived, with the overall implementation of all aspects of a peaceful agreement, and also the importance of the adoption of such a document, which will show the movement of our country in implementing democratic standards, and overall reforms in society.

I would like to remind in short on a fact that in 1999, there was the adoption of basic recommendations for the definition of a security policy for Bosnia and Herzegovina. Activities taken on preparing this document had been started as an initiative for the preparation of the Stability Pact Summit in Sarajevo, with the aim to offer support in defining security in our region. That document was prepared by the Minister of Defence of the Republika Srpska, and by the Minister and Deputy Minister of Defence of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which was accepted by the Standing Committee on Military Matters and adopted by the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Since the implementation of the document, actions were taken in the direction that the Council of Ministries of Bosnia and Herzegovina should develop a Security Policy for Bosnia and Herzegovina, and under the auspices of the Standing Committee for Military matters, a defence policy was produced for Bosnia and Herzegovina. Unfortunately, it still has not resulted in a Security Policy for Bosnia and Herzegovina.

In the procedure of setting this document besides the Council of Ministers of Bosnia and Herzegovina, there must be a session in Parliament of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which would result in the adoption of the document. This approach is in accordance with the OSCE code of conduct in aspect of Security; meanwhile, the slowness on their production and the extensive overall procedure, proposes an entity but also lower level of governing body organization, which identifies a large halt on overall re-integration of Bosnia and Herzegovina as a whole. That also has an effect on Bosnia and Herzegovina on preventing it to become a modern and stable democratic European country which will never again require the assistance of the international community, but will allow Bosnia and Herzegovina to independently work towards building peace, collaborating in prosperity with the entire South East European

region and becoming a member of the European Union. That is why the setting of this document is a true test of political orientation for all forces in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and encircling this is the consequence of providing for all segments of the Dayton Peace Agreement, but it also requires the understanding of principles set by the Peace Implementation Council in Bosnia and Herzegovina, in the continuation of its work.

The Security Policy of Bosnia and Herzegovina must sustain common highest standards of erecting and maintaining human rights, individual and united interests of the constitutive people and all citizens and their equality within the entire space of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Only with democratization from within towards the highest standards of achieving modern civilization with all its rights and responsibilities, Bosnia and Herzegovina will be able to direct itself towards encompassing the need for integration. The transparent wish for integration in Euroatlantic, regional, European and world economic, political, security and other associations must be a practice in realization to capture and promote standards and principles, which understands the integration process.

This implies the indispensability of the state functions without which it would be impossible to achieve the role of equal international subjects. Without these necessary functions it is impossible to expand positive awareness of patriotism of all citizens Bosnia and Herzegovina, towards its government and its protection of integrity. That human potential is the foundation of all security policies in the developing world it also presents the highest resource of our country.

The final creation and adoption of this document on behalf of the Parliament of Bosnia and Herzegovina would be a clear signal to the whole world, which is carefully watching ongoing events in Bosnia and Herzegovina, that our country has taken steps towards self-sustaining development. Before or after this type of signal in the name of future generations of Bosnia and Herzegovina, should be sent.

It has been shown that by means of war, it is impossible in the 21st Century to resolve any kind of problem, but that only disliking leads to further complications. Meanwhile it is evident that the prosperity, freedom and democracy is our goal during this time. The goal cannot be eliminated it has its own reproductive strength which is seen in Bosnia and Herzegovina. If the youth of Bosnia and Herzegovina do not have these conditions available in their own country, they will search for it else where in other parts of the world. These are reminders of the current situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina, which it cannot be in forever relying on others to maintain peace. The takeover of responsibilities with prosperous development on its own hand aims at not only on a moral responsibility of governing bodies in Bosnia and Herzegovina, but the development as in the face of history, can legitimize people who wish well for themselves, their children, and its surroundings.

The acceptance of security policy is a path to finding an answer that Bosnia and Herzegovina through its case has given as a paradigm of restraint, multiculturalism and affirmation of those peoples who have brought forward that the citizens of this country were an adjective of good people. That goodwill must be re-affirmed, as well as to re-affirm the talent and working abilities of the citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina, presuming that there is sustainable peace and prosperity in our own country.

I apologise as a public official in the Ministry of Defence and I call upon these values, which need to be reaffirmed and repeatedly pointed out from clear reason that after so much evil, the

people of Bosnia and Herzegovina deserve all of the good deeds which have happened to them, because of which we exist and we are here. The models for this re-affirmation should lay the foundation of the security policy that will not be unitary, nor particular, nor plagiarized from other states, rather than simply Bosnian with all of specifications that today this implies.

Finally that I may conclude my short speech with the advice that the work on the document of Security Policy should as soon as possible come up with solutions which are evidence of the progress of the peace process, and true wishes that a just and long lasting peace may evolve in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Mr. Muhamed Besic, Minister

Ministry of Internal Affairs of Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina

Ladies and Gentlemen:

I am overwhelmingly delighted to have been invited to attend and to take part in this workshop on a very useful, and for our perspective, an outstanding table of experts. Ahead of the Centre lies a light of perceptiveness, the Centre for Security Studies in Sarajevo at the beginning of its tasks, has obtained the strength and ability to bring together eminent names, as well as experts from abroad who are involved in research on security, in order that we may discuss the issue of security policy in Bosnia and Herzegovina, as an important question not only for our government but for the entire region. On that I congratulate them and I wish them all the best on their future projects.

In my short speech, I will give attention to the meaning of educational institutions of internal affairs on a state level, as per my knowledge, an important element for the building and the functioning of a coherent, perceptive and effective security policy of Bosnia and Herzegovina. I interpret this as the security policy of Bosnia and Herzegovina and not security policy in Bosnia and Herzegovina, as is the topic of our discussion today. This is not a linguistic phrase, but before all else, it is based upon a fine distinction between those understandings - the wish to have numerous security policies in one country, from those that discuss the building of a united strategy for security in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and how an institution should follow through with the implementation of that strategy.

The way I understand things, the protection of the integrity of one normal, present modern democratic country, in which Bosnia and Herzegovina no doubt is working towards, it is inseparable of it is integrative institutions which act on the basis of a concretely united strategy.

If we have a vision of that security, in the narrowest thought, as seen from a political ground level, it is understood the overall measurement and activities in protecting ourselves from threat to political independents, territorial integrity and the sovereignty of one country - which represents a linking of security - as its upholding right to exist, which also represents internal security. The appropriate question is then, which institution is it which is planning, formulating and realizing all these measures and the undertaking of the concrete operational activities on the protection and maintenance of security in Bosnia and Herzegovina? That is on the protection of its governing, upholding right of existence. If you allow me to be provocative I do not recognize that that kind of institution exists in Bosnia and Herzegovina today.

It is a well-known fact that with the Dayton Peace Agreement, it is for our country an important question which is being avoided, although the right to educating governing bodies such as the Ministry of Internal Affairs, which exists in Annex 4 of the Dayton Agreement - the Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Namely, Article III, Point 1g, of the Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina, decidedly states that in the exclusive competency of the institutions of Bosnia and Herzegovina falls the undertaking of international and interentity criminal-legal regulations and co-operation with Interpol. The upholding of these laws and the establishment of co-operation with Interpol can be seen in the framework of a united institution on a state level.

However, here we are six years after Dayton we still do not have that institution in Bosnia and Herzegovina, which should in an organized and properly planned way, openly consider and promote the overall measures and activities towards the plan of establishing international and interentity criminal-legal regulations, which shall also contribute to a thoughtful and realized strategy on security policy in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Why is this so and is there a chance that this situation can change?

On the first part of this question, the answer can be viewed as if we have in vision the goals that the institution must reach for the security of the state. They before all else relate to the prevention against those criminal activities that disturb the security of the state. An adequate institution must work on the uncovering and preparation of those criminal activities, to refine their approach in capturing the law breakers on these matters, here we relate to terrorism and international terrorism with the aim to destroy the upholding rights and regulations of an existing governing body. In every state today there exists institutions that contribute to achieving these goals by the inclusion of armed forces, an army that protects its link to security. In Bosnia and Herzegovina until now, there has never been these kind of institutions and they do not exist even today. However, Dayton enables us to create these institutions and we must use this political climate internally and in the region in order that we realize the Dayton Peace Agreement in this segment.

Furthermore, those who are against Dayton have found a way to obstruct this issue and until now they have been successful. Therefore, the successful starting of the State Border Service, had approved relevant factors that by the strengthening of state institutions in accordance with Dayton, we can realize at a required progress also this immensely difficult situation in the state to change for the better.

The answer on the second part of the question I have already mentioned. The last events in our neighbourhood, as well as the implementation of new governing bodies in Bosnia and Herzegovina, gives us a chance to change the current situation, and to interrupt the practice of building and strengthening institutions and completing the efforts on security at a level of entity.

A united security strategy for Bosnia and Herzegovina is required both internally as well as externally. We are the witnesses to the initiative for regional linkages, with the aim to strengthen forces in the fight against crime, illegal migration, trade of white goods, drug trafficking, international terrorism etc. I personally am a member of the Council of Ministers on a regional level, which is in co-operation with the Ministry of Internal Affairs in Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Yugoslavia. Do we see the absurdity? In that Council, Croatia is represented by one government minister, but in Bosnia and Herzegovina there are two Entity based Ministers?! Already that difference shows that Bosnia and Herzegovina, as a government, is different to its neighbours. We must aim for future representation to be identical to that of the representation of other normal governing bodies. This is one illustration, which I have deliberately extracted how I would express the need for the creation of a united institution on a state level, which will represent us in the world.

With this opportunity I would like express that the UN Mission and IPTF is quite intense and the commencement of work has been initiated on this topic. The state Ministry for Civil Affairs and Communication has been issued with a task to prepare a legal project for the implementation of an agency for protection and investigation for Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Furthermore, that all things should be in its correct place by the differentiation of the nominated structure of this agency, it should be in perspective that it is required that the agency in its own right, accepts the State Border Service and the Central National Bureau for Interpol in Bosnia and Herzegovina. During that time in its surroundings there should be a situated and united security / information state service for Bosnia and Herzegovina. At least then we could talk about an institutionalized framework for the realization of overall measures and activities on the protection and maintenance of security in Bosnia and Herzegovina and realizing a united concrete security policy strategy for Bosnia and Herzegovina.

I hope that we will not wait for the next six years to identify this highly required institutional framework which will enlarge the security and protection of every citizen and the state of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which should be the insurer for that protection. The beginning and end of every security strategy should be relied on the citizens and individuals. The complete protection at a base level of citizens right to freedom is a nucleus from which all other forms of security must be widened and expanded. We cannot talk about a security policy at a state level if there is no individual security. Is there that kind of security in Bosnia and Herzegovina today? How much of that security did Murat Badic have when he came to Banja Luka being stoned during his visit to the mosque? How much security did a sixteen year old Meliha Duric in Vlasenica? How much security does each returnee have when he returns to his home?

Even in normal standard countries that enjoy their sovereignty through the full capacity of a conceptual governmental sovereignty, there cannot exist or be a picture, which will hide oppression against civilians and their human rights. The international community is answerable to in countries such as this to intervene and secure individual's freedom and to protect their rights. That is the guarantee of a united co-operative security in the world. Then why does this occur in certain parts of Bosnia and Herzegovina, on the basis of warrant, which it has?

Furthermore, the creation of state institutions, in this environment, will secure the protection for all its citizens in all areas of Bosnia and Herzegovina without consideration to their ethnicity, religion, political identity or other differences. Included in that, a common strategic foundation of security policy needs also to be strengthened.

Thank you.

CONCLUSIONS

Dr. Istvan Gyarmati (IEWS)

Ambassador Dr. Istvan Gyarmati,

Institute for East-West Studies, New York, USA

Let me try to summarize a few of my thoughts, and then summarize the discussion from these last two days.

I would start with where we finished: is there a need or a possibility to have a security policy for Bosnia and Herzegovina in light of all of the changes, which are not yet final in this region. I would say that there is a need for a security policy for Bosnia and Herzegovina, either way, and if the region is unstable then you need a security policy even more. It might be a more flexible security policy, or it might be changing, adapting to the situations; it might include more contingencies, but no state can afford not to have a security policy in a changing world. If the situation is going to be stabilized in this neighbourhood then that is why you need a security policy – to respond to the new situation, and to be able to take advantage of a stabilizing environment.

In order to have a security policy for Bosnia and Herzegovina, I think that you have to, avoid two extremes: the one extremism – I experienced it several times, not only here – that our western colleagues, who have good will, including my own colleagues, come to this country, or another country, and suggest that you should have a security policy just like in western Europe – basically ignoring the realities, because it can be the objective to have a security policy like the one in western Europe; I think that there is a long way for this country to arrive there, not only because of the internal situation and I pick my Belgian friend (Colonel Christiaan Jacobs) who gave a presentation here. Compared to Bosnia and Herzegovina, Belgium is a relatively safe environment; so it is rather too easy to have a nice friendly security policy for Belgium. I think, it is a bit more difficult here. The other extremism, which I think must be avoided, is to base your security policy on your experience of the last years, and to respond to threats, which you had to encounter in the last years, because the situation has changed. It has not yet reached the level of security and stability of Western Europe, but it has changed. So, to have a security policy, which only responds to the challenges of the early 1990's, would be equally, or even more, devastating.

I would also caution against two other extremes: it is very important to take a gradual approach, to take one step at a time, and to start with the first step – that might sound as a common place, but it is very important; that being said, it should not be an excuse for doing nothing. In many cases, arguments that it is too complicated, it's very difficult, that it's a long time, are nothing but an excuse to do nothing. So again, I think that you have to, we have to, strike a balance between these two extremes.

There is a new security situation in Europe and it starts to emerge also in this region, but it's the security which is comprehensive, cooperative, collective and indivisible; and you have a chance now to respond to a situation where security is comprehensive – which means that it is much more than military, and increasingly non-military; although in this region it is still also very military. It's cooperative, which means that you can achieve security through cooperation rather than confrontation. It's collective, that means you can achieve security together with others, and it's indivisible, that means that the security of this country or any one country cannot be increased and strengthened to the detriment of others, because it is immediately provoking responses and starts a spiral of violence which is very difficult to stop.

Of course, for Bosnia, they're a few very specific questions: do you need a security policy for entities, or do you need a security policy on the state level, and the answer is very easy, if you want a security policy for the entities, this implies that you see the entities that they need a security policy against each other; if you have a security policy on the state, although you have a security policy for the entities, there are state level security interests which you want to observe. It has no bearing in reality on many other issues which are difficult to solve between entities and state level, other than it creates a better environment for solving these problems, and I think working on a security policy for the state of Bosnia and Herzegovina could be very hard, also to create a positive environment and the positive dynamics to solve other problems.

The quoting of the Dayton Agreement, which says that defence is an entity reality, is an excuse not to do something because we are not talking in this respect about defence but about security, and a security policy is, I am sure, only possible for this country on the state level.

What are the basic elements of the security policy, and I think that it is not a matter of science, but is pretty easy to elaborate once the political will is there – and I will come back to this. You first have to assess the other external threats to this country, It brings us back to the question, at what level, because if you look at the entity level you might perceive that one entity is a threat to the other – which is not true. If you take it on the state level, you will discover there are no real external threats to this country; none of the two neighbours has the intention, nor the capability to threaten this country militarily. So, external threats are limited. There are other internal threats, yes, but that is not a military matter. I think that we should start thinking in non-military terms about internal security. If you militarize internal security, this leads to disaster. Therefore, security policy can respond to external, possible potential, eventual, external threats by military means, and forget about the military when you come to internal problems.

There are a few things which I think are essential in a security concept; and without singling out any one, I just want to run through a few: armed forces must be seen as a democratic institution of a democratic country – it does not mean that armed forces should be democratic, they are always very undemocratic; but the armed forces as an institution, are an institution of democracy. If you look at the armed forces against this background, then they need to be a different armed force. You have to establish political and civilian control over the armed forces, not only in laws but also in institutions and practice.

The security policy, in this case, includes a lot of cooperative elements with others; with neighbours, with the region, with international organizations; and I have to say that one of the speakers is absolutely right in saying that joining or not joining the PfP is a political decision; but the implications of joining the PfP are very serious for the military. You cannot join the PfP with armed forces, which do not meet the standards of the PfP – even if you take a political decision, you have to go through a reform of the armed forces – as a prerequisite and a consequence of joining the PfP.

There will be, of course, a few limits – constraints - on the size and structure of your forces. Of course, in the best of all worlds, armed forces reflect needs; but in the real world, they also respond to budgetary possibilities; and it's much better, and I can tell you that I have this experience in my own country, it's much better to preempt politicians cutting military forces all across the board without a concept – coming up with a concept which still keeps the armed forces at a level and structure which is usable, rather than waiting until the Minister of

Finance makes the final decision about force size and force structure – but that will happen very soon if you are not able to come up with a concept.

What are the tasks of the forces: I think they are very, very simple; you have to defend your borders against any eventual threat – but the threats are really non-military, so defending the borders means, and this is, by this country, a very good example, is border guards, police, customs – first of all. Military is only a contingency, which probably will never happen. We have to defend the territorial integrity - of course, we have to ask the territorial integrity of the state, not of the entity. R-regardless of whom Dayton gives the prerogatives over defence, the letter and the spirit of Dayton is that armed forces have to defend the integrity of the state, and the sovereignty of the state; and you will have to enter into cooperation again, and use the possibilities of cooperation. It is an extremely good start that you have military observers and some policemen in UN operations, but I think the possibilities are much greater than that. The first unit of Bosnia and Herzegovina which will depart in a peace-keeping operation somewhere else will be an extremely important and good message to the world that this country has made much more progress than it has made before. And of course you need an army which is able respond to natural disasters, which is not a military task, but it is only the military that can do it; and that is also important because that makes the military very popular – even in the eyes of the Finance Minister, which is not very easy.

We have heard a lot of praise to this seminar, and I agree with them, although I would suggest – with all due respect – that more time should be allocated to the discussion, and shorter presentations are appropriate. I also would like to add that contributions from the floor should be also shorter. But I think that it is also very important that you provide a forum for discussion. I think that the time has come in Bosnia and Herzegovina to discuss these things openly; and I have experienced here as well that it is now possible – it has not been possible for a long time – but now it is possible.

But, I think there is more necessary than this, and we worked with Madame Turkovic on a more conceptual, non-paper, as the Chairperson's conclusion or summary of the deliberations of this meeting. I don't want to present it as a draft national security strategy for the country, but it is a summary, I think, of the discussion, which we hope could be used for further discussions to move forward towards a more structured and more official discussion. And if my young colleague (organizer) can make the PowerPoint presentation work, then I would like to run through this very quickly. We would suggest that since this is the first such document for Bosnia and Herzegovina that we set up in the introduction the basic parameters of a security policy. Whatever you call it, you can call it a national security strategy or national security policy it's essential that you determine what you expect this document to fulfill, which is that it should give an answer to basic questions of the protection of the state, interests and priorities of the citizens; it has to be comprehensive, all-encompassing, in its approach; because if you limit it to the military then it will not be a security policy – that will be the next step, a national military strategy on this basis. Then you can define, and I think you should, the aim of integrating your security into a broader European security, probably also a broader regional security structure, if any in the future.

The security environment is, of course, the starting point, and that's very important to register what are the achievements of the security environment; why it is better than five or ten years ago, and what are the still outstanding problems. I think that you have to run through the achievements like the end of the cold war, which produced some difficulties for this region, but it is still a positive development; the end of ideological confrontation – the possibilities to

prevent new ideologies to confront each other, etc. And also, there are the needs of the international community to include regional and national security structures into an all-encompassing security structure.

Threats and risks – are the very essential part of a national security strategy, and they should encompass both internal and external risks, threats and challenges to security, which this country, and also others, will have to face in the future. Of course, when you analyze risks, it always leads at a later stage to responses to the risks. So, you will have to structure your risk assessment in accordance to the responses that you will be able and ready to give.

What are the basic principles, the foundations, the values of a national security policy ? What do you intend to protect ? What do you intend to achieve in the national security strategy or policy, which is again much beyond traditional military risks, challenges and foundations – basic principles and values of a democratic society in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

What are the interests that you base your security policy upon ? What interests do you want to defend and promote by the means of your security policy ?

A security policy has some layers, some different levels, and again, both internally and externally, which need to be determined in a national security policy, these are a few of them, and if you discover a few that are missing you can add them of course. (refers to PowerPoint presentation)

Priorities and aims, which bring to the operational part of a national security – we will distribute this paper after, so that you have the conclusions. What are the priorities, what are the priorities that you set for your state to promote and achieve, and what are the aims, the objectives, to be achieved – short-term, long-term, etc.

What are the components of a security policy, and of course foreign policy is a very important part of external security, especially now that much more emphasis can be put, and should be put, on political, diplomatic and economic means than military means; but, of course, then you come to defence, which is part of the security policy, and you will be able, and it will be necessary, to define within what military frameworks and what kind of forces, force structures, force size, doctrines, you want to operate when you defend and promote your interests.

Then a new aspect of security, economic and, of course, financial policy, both internal and external – you will discover soon that it's maybe the most important part of security for many reasons without a functioning economy, no foreign, no defence policy will be possible.

Then you come to internal security of course, which is not a military matter, but there are a quite a few, threats to internal security in this country, which should be dealt with by police, internal security services; and a very new part, and unfortunately very important part is the environment, the social health-care, social peace is part of national security. What kinds of means do you have to protect the environment, to protect the social health-care, welfare of the people.

Information policy – some people would use this word, but I would hesitate to use this – how do you promote your image in the world, and it is part of the security policy because if the image of the country is worse than the reality, then you have to make a lot of efforts to

improve it. Of course, you cannot sell on existing achievements – not too much – but you will have to face situations where the world not recognize immediately, not automatically, achievements what you have achieved.

Now there are some specific parts, which hopefully will not last long, but still are part of the security of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which you do not find in many other countries' security policies, but are relevant and essential, which are return of refugees, reconstruction.

What is the institutional framework within which this security policy can be elaborated and implemented ? What is the role of different institutions – parliaments, governments, public, entities and the state, defence ministries ? There are many questions, which are open, which need to be determined when you want to come to the implementation of your security policy. So we thought that this would be a short outline of what a national security strategy could look like, what it could include, and we will distribute this paper to you as a private conclusion of Madame Turkovic and myself, hoping that it would promote a public debate on national security strategy or security policy for the country.

In conclusion, I just want to mention that I am pretty sure that those from outside the country, who have participated in this meeting, found this extremely encouraging as an open discussion, and we would like to come back to participate in further discussions. We hope that the Centre for Security Studies will continue to organize these meetings, perhaps also in forms of smaller workshops, devoted to one or another part of the national security policy, but that should not be, again, used as an excuse not to promote this on a official level. This has only a real meaning if it helps to make progress towards a real, organized, institutional debate on security policy which must, in the foreseeable future, result, I think, in the adoption of a state security policy for Bosnia and Herzegovina.

I frankly do not find any major obstacles, other than the lack of political will towards this objective, and I can also just add that we from outside can help, but we cannot make it happen; it's only the peoples and citizens of this country who can make it happen, who can convince hesitant politicians who do not recognize or do not want to recognize what is the real interest of the people – to make progress towards these objectives.

I thank you very much. I thank Madame Turkovic for the organization. I thank our guests who came from distant countries; but first of all I want to thank you for your participation – in advance maybe – for your further involvement in this work; and I hope that we can count on your support also in the future; and I really want to wish you a lot of success in this work; and I hope that in the foreseeable future we can come back and celebrate the adoption of a security policy for Bosnia and Herzegovina. Thank you very much.

APPENDIX I

Security Policy Concept for Bosnia and Herzegovina

1. Introduction

- The Security Policy is required to provide answers to questions concerning the protection of the interests and priorities of the citizens, peoples and society of BiH from foreign and internal threats whichever kind, and to provide for political, economic and military measures in that sense.
- The Security Policy has to be all-encompassing in its approach in order to cut the origins of conflict and instability
- The aim of the inclusion in a collective system of European security is to ensure peace, stability, prosperity and the free development of BiH, and to give these factors a regional and European contribution.

2. Security environment

- Ideological confrontation and the cold war have passed, but national, religious and territorial confrontation and economic and political problems still remain.
- Global economic and other types of integration are now predominant; but isolation continues to pose a threat to security
- Aspects of regional, European, transatlantic and global security should be included
- The International democratic community works towards the implementation of a system of collective security but it is still not efficiently and entirely established

3. Evaluation of threats and risks to security

- Violent change to the internal organisation of BiH
- Expansion of militant ethnic and religious extremism
- Changes of a collective system of security, aspirations to the building of a new state
- organised crime, trade of human beings, weapons, drugs, terrorism and expansion of weapons of mass destruction
- collapse of the economic system, social problems and mass unrest

4. Fundamental values

- the protection of life, constitutional rights and freedoms, and the personal security of citizens
- independence and territorial integrity, the equality of all states and peoples
- democracy and political rights
- civil and human rights
- rights of peoples, religious and ethnic groups, and minorities
- material well-being and prosperity
- moral and family values

5. **Fundamental interests**

- economic, political and military integration, and the strengthening of confidence and security
- development of democracy, market economy, social justice, political system and stability
- protection of constitutional order

6. **Principles of a security policy**

- foundations: constitution, legislation, international treaties and declarations
- there are no territorial pretensions; not one state is considered as an enemy
- non-violent resolution of conflict and a defensive defence policy
- loyal and mutually beneficial relations with other states on the foundation of equality and partnership
- transparency of all public affairs

7. **Priorities and objectives of a security policy**

- the protection of BiH and all its peoples and citizens, the advancement of democratisation and the economy
- the development of security relations and integration with other countries, a proactive foreign policy
- the prevention of conflict, the creation of cooperative security and safe-guarding of world peace
- strategic participation in the global economy

8. **Elements of security policy:**

Foreign policy

- the improvement of the international position, and access to a collective system of security and defence
- the inclusion and active role in international organisations, the region and the prevention of crisis and conflict

Defence policy

- political-military framework
- objectives
- strategic principles
- structure, organisation and the purpose of armed forces in BiH
- organisation of command and supervision

Economic and financial policy (foreign and internal)

- reform of the existing economy, and the development of a market economy
- foreign economic relations and the attraction of foreign investment
- the increase of confidence in the economic and financial system

Internal security policy

- fight against organised crime and corruption
- migration and asylum
- multi-ethnic relations
- the control of borders
- the reform and improvement of the police system
- the reform and improvement of the judiciary and the rule of law

The protection of the environment and social / health care

- the protection of the environment, the prevention of ecological degradation and the rational use of natural resources
- social welfare and health care
- protection against epidemics

Intelligence policy

- Sometimes this is defined within the scope of an internal security policy
- intelligence and counter-intelligence services work in accordance with the law and under the control of regulation

The return of refugees, reconciliation and human rights

- These are not usually defined within a security policy but in BiH they are significant factors of security

9. Organisation and functioning of a system of security

- the roles, tasks and authority of the BiH Presidency, Council of Ministers, Parliament and entity parliament and government within the functioning of a system of security

APPENDIX II

LIST OF PARTICIPANTS SEMINAR ON SECURITY POLICY

1. Mr. Kemal Ademović, Director
Agency for Investigation and Documentation
2. Ms. Jasminka Ajanović, Director of Legal Department
Ministry of European Integration, Bosnia and Herzegovina
3. Mr. Ismet Avdić, Delegate
Parliament of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina
4. Mr. Ibrahim Bakić, Rector
Faculty of Criminal Science
5. Mr. Samir Bašić, Coordinator
OSCE Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina
6. Mr. Beriz Belkić, Member of the Presidency
Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina
7. Mr. Muhamed Bešić, Minister
Ministry of Internal Affairs of Bosnia and Herzegovina
8. Mr. Željko Bilbija, Delegate
Parliament of Bosnia and Herzegovina
9. Mr. Borislav Bojić, Delegate
National Assembly of the Republika Srpska
10. Dr. Frederick Bonkovsky, Professor
University of Vienna
11. Mr. Osman Brka, Delegate
Parliament of Bosnia and Herzegovina
12. Mr. Josip Brkić, Department Manager
Ministry of European Integration

13. Mr. Omer Branković, Delegate
National Assembly of the Republika Srpska
14. Mr. Ferid Buljubašić, Deputy Minister
Ministry of Defence of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina
15. Dr. Sead Buturović, Delegate
Parliament of Bosnia and Herzegovina
16. Brigadier General Vincent Coeurderoy, Commissioner
UN IPTF
17. Mr. Nerzuk Ćurak, Assistant
Faculty of Political Science
18. General Rasim Delić,
Former Commandant of the Joint Army of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina
19. Ambassador Nils Eliasson,
Embassy of the Kingdom of Sweden, Sarajevo, Bosnia and Herzegovina
20. Mr. Jeff Fitzgerald, Political Analyst and Researcher
Centre for Security Studies, Sarajevo, Bosnia and Herzegovina
21. Colonel Tomislav Gadže, Deputy Chief
Verification Centre, Ministry of Defence of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina
22. Lieutenant Dušan Gavran, Member of Secretariat
Standing Committee on Military Matters
23. Mr. Vladimiro Giananti, Coordination Officer
Verification Centre, OSCE
24. General Boško Gvozden, Assistant for Mutual Military Cooperation
Ministry of Defence of the Republika Srpska
25. Dr. Istvan Gyarmati,
Institute for East West Studies, New York, USA
26. Ms. Zara Halilović, Departmental Manager
Ministry of European Integration, Bosnia and Herzegovina
27. Mr. Denis Hadžović, General Secretary
Centre for Security Studies, Sarajevo, Bosnia and Herzegovina
28. Mr. Avdo Hebib, Delegate
Parliament of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina
29. Ms. Dženana Hodžić, Chief of Translation Team
Ministry of European Integration, Bosnia and Herzegovina

30. Mr. Jan-Petter Holtadahl
Office of the High Representative
31. Mr. Haris Hrle, Ministerial Adviser
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Bosnia and Herzegovina
32. Mr. Humo Emir, Professor
University of Mostar
33. Mr. Jerko Ivanković, Deputy
House of Peoples, Bosnia and Herzegovina
34. Colonel Christiaan Jacobs, Military Adviser
Belgian Delegation to the OSCE, Vienna, Austria
35. General Carlo Jean
Military Centre for Strategic Studies, Italy
36. Mr. Amel Kadić, Technical Assistant
Centre for Security Studies, Sarajevo, Bosnia and Herzegovina
37. General Vahid Karavelić,
Joint Command of the Army of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina
38. Mr. Ivo Komšić, Delegate
Parliament of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina
39. Ms. Daria Krstičević, Ministerial Adviser
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Bosnia and Herzegovina
40. Mr. Armin Kržalić, Technical Assistant
Centre for Security Studies, Sarajevo, Bosnia and Herzegovina
41. Mr. Donald B. Kursch, Deputy Special Coordinator
Pakt stabilnosti za jugoistočnu Evropu
42. Ambassador Vojko Kuzman,
Embassy of the Republic of Croatia, Sarajevo, Bosnia and Herzegovina
43. Brigadier General Alain Lamballe, Director
Office of Regional Stabilisation, OSCE, Bosnia and Herzegovina
44. Mr. Markusz Laszlo,
Embassy of the Republic of Hungary, Sarajevo, Bosnia and Herzegovina
45. Mr. Miro Lazović, General Secretary
Social Democrat Party of Bosnia and Herzegovina
46. Mr. Đorđe Latinović, Delegate
Parliament of Bosnia and Herzegovina

47. Mr. Branislav Lolić, Delegate
Parliament of Bosnia and Herzegovina
48. Ms. Sanja Ljubičić, Assistant
Faculty of Political Science
49. Ms. Lucija Ljubić, First Secretary
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Bosnia and Herzegovina
50. Mr. Abdulrahman Malkić, Deputy
Parliament of Bosnia and Herzegovina
51. Mr. Branko Mandić,
Ministry of Internal Affairs, Republika Srpska
52. Mr. Damir Mašić, Deputy
Parliament of Bosnia and Herzegovina
53. Mr. Sergej Morozov
Embassy of the Russian Federation, Sarajevo, Bosnia and Herzegovina
54. Ms. Sonja Moser-Starach, Special Representative
European Union Delegation to Bosnia and Herzegovina
55. General Ivan Nagulov, Military Adviser to the Presidency
Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina
56. Mr. Marko Pavić, Delegate
National Assembly of the Republika Srpska
57. Ambassador Hans Jochen Peters
Embassy of the Federal Republic of Germany, Sarajevo, Bosnia and Herzegovina
58. Major Alan Poston, Military Cell
Office of the High Representative
59. Mr. Zsolt Rabai, Coordinator for the West Balkans
NATO
60. Mr. Elvir Radeljaš, Technical Assistant
Centre for Security Studies, Sarajevo, Bosnia and Herzegovina
61. Mr. Anel Ramić, Technical Assistant
Centre for Security Studies, Sarajevo, Bosnia and Herzegovina
62. Brigadier General Hans-Jurgen Rennack
SFOR
63. Brigadier Haso Ribo, Chief of Verification Centre
Ministry of Defence of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina

64. Colonel Pero Šainović
Military Command of the Republika Srpska
65. Dr. Taylor Seybolt, Project Leader
SIPRI Institute Stockholm
66. Mr. Nijaz Skenderagić, Presidency Member
Social Democratic Party of Bosnia and Herzegovina
67. Ambassador Matthias Sonn, Deputy High Representative
Office of the High Representative
68. Mr. Dragi Stanimirović, Delegate
Parliament of Bosnia and Herzegovina
69. Mr. Ivan Velimir Starčević, Minister Plenipotentiary
Embassy of the Republic of Croatia, Sarajevo, Bosnia and Herzegovina
70. Mr. Niko Sušac, Delegate
Parliament of Bosnia and Herzegovina
71. Mr. Zoran Šainović, Member of the Secretariat
Standing Committee on Military Matters
72. Mr. Pero Šakota,
Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Republika Srpska
73. Mr. Sabrija Šerifović, Assistant Minister
Ministry of European Integration, Bosnia and Herzegovina
74. General Stjepan Šiber, Delegate
Parliament of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina
75. Dr. Nikola Špirić, Deputy Chairman
Parliament of Bosnia and Herzegovina
76. Mr. Alija Tihić, Director
Committee for Civil Protection of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina
77. Mr. Ali Turković, Student
Webster University
78. Dr. Bisera Turković, Executive Director
Centre for Security Studies, Sarajevo, Bosnia and Herzegovina
79. Mr. Duško Vejnović, Director
Centre for Strategic Studies, Banja Luka
80. Dr. Heinz Vetschera, Professor
University of Vienna

81 Mr. Johannes Viereck, Political Adviser
Office of the High Representative

82. General Sulejman Vranj
Joint Commander Military of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina

83. Mr. Munir Zahiragić
Ministry of Defence of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina

84. Colonel Enes Zukanović, Member of the Secretariat
Standing Committee on Military Matters