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POLITICAL EFFECTS OF ELECTORAL SYSTEMS: SIMULATION WITH THE CASE OF KOSOVO

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STIFTUNG**

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Abbreviations and acronyms

AAK	Aliance for the Future of Kosovo
AKR	New Kosovo Alliance
CEC	Central Elections Comission
FER	"Fryma e Re" Party
KDTP	Turkish Democratic Party of Kosovo
LDD	Democratic League of Dardania
LDK	Democratic League of Kosovo
PDK	Democratic Party of Kosovo
SMP	Single Member District
UNMIK	United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo
AV	Alternative Vote
STV	Single Transferable Vote
VV	"Self-Determination" Movement

Introduction

Since 2001, when the drafting of Constitutional Framework for Provisional Institutions of Self-Government began, there has been an ongoing debate regarding the electoral system in Kosovo. However, local actors have had little impact on this debate. It can be said that this debate among the political elites and civil society in Kosovo has been limited within the framework set by international actors, who from the beginning were determined in favour of the proportional system (PR) with the over-representation of minority communities through reserved seats. On the other side, the debate among internationals about the type of the electoral system in Kosovo during 2000-2001 has been substantial and included the analysis of the appropriateness of other electoral systems, especially of the Single Member Plurality (SMP) system. However, the local political actors were not included in this debate, since it was conducted exclusively among the internationals.[1]

Definition

In order to rationalize the debate on electoral system in Kosovo, first we must explain the difference between the electoral system and electoral regulations. According to Gallagher and Mitchell, electoral system determines how to vote in the elections and how the votes turn into seats in the parliament.[2] According to this definition, the electoral system determines the composition of parliament or of a representative body elected by the vote of the people. Consequently, on one hand, this composition determines indirectly the composition of the executive, and makes the decisions and political processes more predictable. On the other hand, the electoral regulations specify the details of the electoral process, including the administration of the elections, the right to vote, access to candidates (vote for one or more candidates, open or closed lists, etc.), the transparency of vote counting, monitoring, etc.[3]

The debate on electoral reform is dominated by discussions of the electoral legislation, which in fact is not a reform but a modification of the electoral system or change of the electoral law. Consequently, in Kosovo, a proper and comprehensive debate on the electoral system reform has never been held.

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[1] Arben Qirezi: Intervention and Consociationalism: The Role of External Dimension in Shaping Post-war Kosovo 1999-2012, unpublished Ph.D. Thesis, National University of Ireland Galway, Galway 2014.

[2] Michael Gallagher, Paul Mitchell: Introduction to Electoral Systems, in: Michael Gallagher and Paul Mitchell (eds.): The Politics of Electoral Systems, New York 2008, p. 3.

[3] Ibid

Aim of the study

For three years now, there has been a debate in Kosovo regarding the electoral system reform. Due to the repeated irregularities of the electoral process, the debate has been focused mainly on electoral law issues, but an informed debate about which electoral system would be more appropriate for Kosovo on its path of transition to a stable democratic society has been lacking. In fact, the debate is limited in what kind of proportional representation system (PR) Kosovo should have: open or closed lists, one electoral district or more, the electoral threshold, and representation of minority communities. All these issues have political implications, but the public opinion, civil society and in most cases those who are involved in decision-making do not have a clear picture of these impacts and what consequences the controversial amendments of the electoral system of Kosovo have. Therefore, this debate has not occurred in the context of which is the goal of the electoral system reform.

The idea is to analyse a number of electoral systems by simulating, where possible, scenarios of electoral systems in Kosovo, taking into account the current political actors. Thereby the debate would be in the context of the desired or undesired effects of the electoral system reform in the political process of Kosovo. This study aims to inform stakeholders regarding the political effects of different electoral systems in order to induce a substantial debate about the electoral system, as well as to influence the information of decision-makers to formulate their electoral system preferences. At the same time, it is important that Kosovo's public opinion knows the motives behind the political parties' preferences for a respective electoral system in Kosovo.

Considering that the biggest and most un-explored differences so far are between SMP and PR systems, this study will focus on the political effects of these differences and then will describe generally the political consequences of SMP, the Alternative Vote system (VA), as well as the Single Transferable vote (STV) as a type of proportional system.

Single member plurality (SMP)[4]

The reason for the discussion of the political implications of this system is because the two biggest political parties in Kosovo, LDK and PDK, were in favor of this system during the discussions on the Constitutional Framework for Provisional Self-Government in Kosovo.[5] The SMP system is used by over 45 countries in the world. Otherwise, SMP is used by the majority of voters in the world, but only bacause of the large population of India. On the other hand, propotional systems dominate the trend in the application of electoral systems in the world.[6]

The main characteristic of the SMP is its simplicity. Voters should mark one candidate in the list of the candidates for parliament. The mandates are allocated according to the electoral districts and the mandate is won by the candidate who has the most votes in comparison to other candidates, not necessarily an absolute majority of votes. The biggest criticism of this system is that the members of

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[4] Henceforward the accronym SMP will be used.

[5] Andrew J. Taylor: Electoral Systems and the Promotion of "Consociationalism" in a Multiethnic Society. The Kosovo Assembly Elections of 2001, in: Electoral Studies, 24 (2005), p. 443.

[6] David M. Farrell: Electoral Systems: A Comparative Introduction, New York 2001.

parliament are not elected by the absolute majority of the votes, and a large number of votes get lost. Another characteristic is that SMP produces stable government and government policies are predictable. Also, SMP usually brings overrepresentation of the biggest party and facilitates the creation of the parliamentary majority. Consequently, coalitions are rare, unlike the proportional system in which the government is formed after the elections based on the negotiations between the political parties. Furthermore, another characteristic, perhaps the most important, is that, with SMP, voters in electoral districts are represented directly by the winning candidates, which makes the representation of citizens clearer as they know to whom they can address their requirements.

As an illustration, the following table presents the results of the elections in Great Britain according to the SMP system, by comparing the results of the SMP based on the percentage of won votes and percentage of won seats for three biggest parties in four elections that were held in the period 1983-1997. The table shows what could be seen even from a simulation of the transition from the proportional to the SMP in the case of Kosovo. SMP favors big parties and those with electoral base in certain gerographic regions, and disfavors smaller parties and those whose vote is widespread throughout the territory of Kosovo, but which do not have any regional base.

Table 1: Comparison of percentage of votes and parliamentary seats in the Great Britain during the elections in the years 1983-1997[7]

Election years	Conservative Party			Labour Party			Liberal-Democrativ Party		
	Votes %	Mandates %	Difference %	Votes %	Mandates %	Difference %	Votes %	Mandates %	Difference %
1983	42.4	61.1	+18.7	27.6	32.2	+4.6	25.4	3.5	-21.9
1987	42.3	57.8	+15.5	30.8	35.2	+4.4	22.6	3.4	-19.2
1992	41.9	51.6	+9.7	34.4	41.6	+7.2	17.8	3.1	-14.7
1997	30.7	25	-5.7	43.2	63.4	+20.2	16.8	7	-9.8

The following table presents some of the advantages and disadvantages of SMP according to theory. Also, in the previous table can be seen some of the typical phenomena caused by this system. Thus, for example, in 7 out of 8 cases, the two major parties, the Conservative and the Labour Parties, had an overrepresentation compared to the percentage of the won votes. This overrepresentation ranged from 4.4% to 20.2%. In all cases, the overrepresentation, which ranged between 9.7% to 20.2%, was larger for the party that won the elections, which brought it the abosloute majority based only on the relative majority of votes. On the other side, the Liberal Democratic Party in the four cases has been underrepresented compared to the percentage of the won votes. This underrepresentation ranged from 9.8% in the 1997 elections to 21.9% in the 1983 elections.

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[7] Ibid, p. 27.

Table 2: Advantages and disadvantages of the single member plurality system (SMP)

SMP system	
ADVANTAGES	**DISADVANTAGES**
Simplicity	Disproportion in the representation
Direct representation of voters in districts	Majority of votes are lost-go in vain
Stable government	Opportunities for political dialogue are reduced
Policy predictability	More ideology is ingrained and political tensions can be higher
Limits the political scene to big parties and those with geographic concentration	Damages small parties and reduces the political options

The above tables will be compared with the simulations of SMP in the case of Kosovo according to the results of the parliamentary elections of year 2010 in order to hypothesize which and how many of the observed phenomena mentioned in table 1 and 2 would appear.

SMP simulation in the case of Kosovo according to the 2010 election results

Data from the Central Election Commission (CEC), which are built on the current system with a proportional single electoral district, makes realistic simulation results impossible for the entire territory of Kosovo for three reasons: 1) Creation of electoral districts in municipalities based on their division according to the current voting centers do not give the same number of voters per electoral district; 2) Transfer of proportional election results into SMP system results do not demonstrate real results because in the proportional system it is voted for party (in the case of Kosovo the preferential votes within the party list are given as well); 3) Simulation of SMP system in the situation where there are guaranteed seats and where there is a big number of political parties makes such a calculation even more problematic.[8]

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[8] To build electoral districts, the CEK document "Results of subjects according to polling stations" was used: http://www.kqz-ks.org/Uploads/Documents/rezultatet_e_subjekteve_sipas_vendvotimeve_bbxnbzawtq.pdf
Data in this study are inconsistent witht the data on the number of votes of political parties shown in another CEK document, "Results of subjects according to municipalities": http://www.kqz-ks.org/Uploads/Documents/rezultatet_e_subjekteve_sipas_komunave_stadbxhmxb.pdf Thus, possible inconsistencies in this study are a consequence of the inconsistencies found in the CEK published documents.

Therefore, in this case, a partial simulation of the election results in some municipalities will be presented, in order to conclude which would be the political effects if SMP system in Kosovo were applied, by dividing the electoral districts that reflect the 120 parliamentary seats in the Kosovo Assembly. In fact, the purpose of this simulation is to present an overview of the political processes that could occur, without prejudging the parties that will be taken into consioderation. There are some limitations to the simulation of SMP in Kosovo, which render this analysis into a hypothetical application. The main reasons for this are:

-   The 2010 elections were held under a proportional system and the votes were given firstly to parties and then the voters had the opportunity to express their preferences for candidates on party lists;
-   There could be differences between the vote for the parties in the proportional and the vote for candidates in the SMP;
-   The behavior of the parties/candidates and the voters can change depending on the electoral system;
-   Creation of electoral districts is done by merging the current voting centers which do not guarantee proportion of the number of voters per electoral district.

When the simulation of the election results was done, in order to simulate the application of SMP, the following principles were applied:

-   In order to divide the number of electoral districts according to the core principle, which is that each municipality has at least one electoral district, first 10 electoral districts were created in municipalities with less than 1% of the voters. After that, the remaining number of 110 electoral districts were distributed among other municipalities according to the percentage of voters per municipality in relation to the total number of voters in Kosovo and 110 parliamentary seats, using the lists of voters for the local elections of 2013, which resulted with unequal number of voters per electoral district;

-   Municipalities with smaller number of voters, or municipalities with a majority of voters from minority communities that have their own municipalities, have advantages in elections. The disadvantage of this method is that geographically spread communities such as Roma, Ashkali and Egyptians would be in an unfavorable position, just as Bosniaks and Gorani, who, despite their concentrated in some areas, do not have municipalities based on their ethnicity. This method would be in favor of Albanians and Kosovo Serbs, but not in favor of other minorities. To other minorities, it would be a break of trust since the electoral system in Kosovo is used as an instrument of peace and and not of democratization, whereby the first one is a prerequisite for the second one; and

-   Municipal borders were used as the basis for the creation of electoral districts, which favors voters of smaller municipalities, because in all districts of the municipalities with more than one district the number of voters is bigger than the number of voters in districts of the municipalities that are a single electoral district. However, this effects the creation of an imbalance between municipalities in terms of the number of voters per Member of Parliament.

Considering the disadvantages created by these principles, in the other municipalities the allocation of electoral districts was done based on the voters percentage. Since each district elects one Member of Parliament, then the number of Members of Parliament for a municipality is proportional to the number of voters, but slightly modified, taking into account the engineering (affirmative Gerrymandering) which aims to represent each municipality and ethnic community. In this regard, SMP could apply the creation of electoral districts in such a way that the number of voters per district would be equal to the entire territory of Kosovo, including locations outside the administrative boundaries of municipalities with smaller number of voters. This would, however, have a negative affect on the representation of smaller ethnic communities.

Accordingly, the number of voters in the municipalities where the simulation is applied is divided based on the number of registered voters for the 2013 local elections, which is the most recent updated list of the voters throughout the territory of Kosovo, including the voters in the municipalities with Serbian majority community. Municipalities that are on the half of the decimal point or beyond it, have one more electoral district.[9] This is the reason behind the lack of the proportionality of voters' number and electoral districts in all municipalities. Given that this proposal is based on electoral engineering to enable the representation of small municipalities, such a disproportion is inevitable, as presented in the following table.[10]

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[9] E.g. if a municipality has 2.49% of voters, three electoral districts belong to it. If a municipality has 3.1% of voters, but the total number of its voters exceeds the previous municipality for 8,000 voters, three electoral districts belong to it as well.

[10] Table consists the data of CEC of registered voters for the 2013 elections. Updates of voter lists were not taken into consideration due to practical reasons.

Table 3: Division of electoral districts by the number of voters after the creation of 10 electoral districts in small municipalities[11]

Municipality	Voter number by lists of 2013 local elections	The overall percentage of voters	Voters percentage for 110 parliamentary seats	Number of electoral districts
Decan	40173	2.27%	2.49	3
Dragash	39466	2.23%	2.45	2
F. Kosova	32136	1.82%	2	2
Ferizaj	101164	5.73%	6	6
Gjakova	107890	6.11%	6.7	7
Gjilan	95530	5.41%	5.9	6
Gllogovc	50079	2.83%	3.1	4
Gracanica	19216	1.08%	1.18	1
H. Elezit	8501	0.48%	/	1
Istog	46277	2.62%	2.8	3
Junik	5542	0.31%	/	1
Kacanik	32338	1.83%	2	2
Kamenica	37307	2.11%	2	2
Klina	44503	2.52%	2.7	3
Kllokot	3414	0.19%	/	1
Leposaviq	19567	1.10%	1	1
Lipjan	55505	3.14%	3.45	4
Malisheva	48094	2.72%	2.9	3
Mamusha	3587	0.20%	/	1
Mitrovica. J	72800	4.12%	4.5	5
N. Berda	9269	0.52%	/	1
Obiliq	23456	1.30%	1.4	1
Partesh	4342	0.24%	/	1
Peja	104477	5.92%	6.5	7
Podujeva	80987	4.58%	5	5
Prishtina	174048	9.80%	10.78	11
Prizren	157764	8.90%	9.8	10
Rahovec	54214	3.00%	3.3	4
Ranillug	5532	0.31%	/	1
Shterpca	13866	0.78%	/	1
Shtime	24507	1.32%	1.45	2
Skenderaj	52587	2.90%	3.2	4
Suhareka	62291	3.50%	3.8	4
Vitia	46726	2.60%	2.9	3
Vushtrria	68331	3.80%	4.2	5
Z. Potok	8979	0.50%	/	1
Zvecan	10012	0.56%	/	1

[11] The source of the number of voters in municipalities in the first column is the CEC Statistics for 2013 municipal elections. Accessed on 25 December 2013 at: http://www.kqz-ks.org/Uploads/Documents/3%20-%20MAssembly%20-%20Statistics%20by%20Municipality%20-%20excluded%20Zvecan_cjtlgjvqng.pdf

Lost votes presented in the following tables (4, 5, 6, 7) do not represent all the lost votes, but only the votes of parliamentary parties that in the simulation have won at least one parliamentary seat. So, the total number of lost votes in 2010 would be bigger, but even if SMP would have been applied in reality, the number of political parties that would compete would be conditionally smaller. Such a presentation in SMP system would not be realistic based on proportional elections, because the number of political parties competing in the proportional system is bigger. It should be noted that due to the lack of consequent updating of voters' lists and because of population movement within and outside Kosovo, in some municipalities, the number of voters appear bigger than the number of registered residents. Thus the exact number of voters is questionable. However, the simulation in this study could only rely on the official data provided by CEC for the 2013 local elections, in which northern Mitrovica is missing.

SMP simulation results in the case of Kosovo

Data analysis from the municipalities show some findings which will be presented based on the results generated by the 2010 elections. As a multi-ethnic municipality, Prizren shows interesting trends in the relation to voters and political parties.

Table 4: Simulation results of SMP system in Prizren based on 2010 election results[12]

	KDTP	AKR	VAKAT	LDK	VV	AAK	PDK	The winner	Lost votes of the parliamentary parties per electoral district and in total
Electoral district 1	765	236	81	**1218**	770	262	1155	LDK	3269
Electoral district 2	1645	575	254	**2170**	1158	660	1877	LDK	6169
Electoral district 3	1151	356	216	1473	955	530	**1492**	PDK	4681
Electoral district 4	224	303	300	1105	644	465	**2197**	PDK	3041
Electoral district 5	2	61	0	2488	460	892	**3209**	PDK	3903
Electoral district 6	0	47	25	794	244	570	**2206**	PDK	1680
Electoral district 7	0	79	**1988**	833	194	276	1147	VAKAT	2529
Electoral district 8	381	173	648	1028	380	752	**1191**	PDK	3362
Electoral district 9	118	74	692	1042	324	497	**1401**	PDK	2747
Lost votes per party	4286	1904	2216	8763	5129	4904	4179	**17072** won votes	31381

If we use the 2010 election results to simulate SMP system, it results that the minority parties could win, if they are concentrated as a majority in one single electoral district, e.g. as happens with VAKAT party in the electoral district 7 in Prizren. On the other hand, despite their significant number, all votes of KDTP would be lost because they fail to have a relative majority in any of the electoral districts. This would suggest that in the case of SMP's application, voters of KDTP and VAKAT should support a party that can ensure the majority in the locations where their ethnic parties would not likely gain the relative majority. This shows that the ethnic principle, which is the main motivator for voters in the proportional system, would fade in favor of a more integrated

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[12] Table no. 3, 4, 5, 6 are based on data from the CEC to the 2010 general elections: CEC, 2010. General election in 2010, Subject results according to the polls. Accessed on 25 December 2013 at: http://www.kqz-ks.org/Uploads/Documents/rezultatet_e_subjekteve_sipas_vendvotimeve_bbxnbzawtq.pdf

political approach, because even the majority parties would need to pay more attention to minority citizens in order to take advantage of their votes. Generated results also show that voting in elections under the proportional system is ethnic and also, most parties do not try to appeal to voters from other communities. Otherwise, Prizren shows a trend of vote division between the two major parties, PDK and LDK.

On the other hand, Peja and Gjakova are two examples that demonstrate the advantages of smaller parties that have strong regional base in SMP system. Thus, AAK, which has 11.4% of the votes in the entire territory of Kosovo, would manage to win 7 seats in Peja and 3 seats in Gjakova.
In the calculation, the mandates in other cities where AAK has managed to dominate in 2010 elections are not included. So, according to an estimate calculation, taking into account the regional concentration in western Kosovo, AAK in SMP system would manage to increase the number of parliamentary seats compared to the results obtained under a proportional system in 2010.

Table 5: Simulation results of SMP system in Peja based on 2010 election results

	AKR	LDK	VV	AAK	PDK	The winner	Lost votes per electoral district and in total
Electoral district 1	540	1067	876	**1339**	327	AAK	2810
Electoral district 2	483	905	771	**1184**	517	AAK	2676
Electoral district 3	588	1350	1090	**1511**	517	AAK	3545
Electoral district 4	248	1045	550	**1386**	976	AAK	2719
Electoral district 5	110	1543	481	**3436**	1600	AAK	3734
Electoral district 6	78	968	406	**1477**	489	AAK	2829
Electoral district 7	216	1558	704	**1965**	863	AAK	3341
Lost votes per party (except of AAK)	2263	8436	4878		5289	**12298**	21654

Same trend also presents the simulation of results of AKR, which, although with 7.29% of the total number of votes, could reach 4 parliamentary seats, thanks to the election results in 4 out of 7 electoral districts of Gjakova where it has achieved significant results in the 2010 elections.

Table 6: Simulation results of SMP system in Gjakova based on 2010 election results 2010

	AKR	LDK	VV	AAK	PDK	The winner	Lost votes of the parliamentary parties per electoral district and in total
Electoral district 1	**2264**	594	930	991	443	AKR	2958
Electoral district 2	**1980**	492	818	723	467	AKR	2500
Electoral district 3	**2772**	699	920	1048	528	AKR	3195
Electoral district 4	**1330**	632	722	1215	467	AKR	3036
Electoral district 5	99	1234	421	**1235**	839	AAK	2593
Electoral district 6	145	857	297	**2617**	640	AAK	1939
Electoral district 7	109	716	283	**2053**	643	AAK	1751
Lost votes per party	353	5224	4391	3977	4027	**14251**	17972

On the other hand, the simulation also shows that parties with widespread vote, but without any significant electoral base, according to the SMP system would lose their parliamentary seats. For example, as presented in Table 5, according to the simulation presented in this study based on the results of 2010, VV would manage to win only two parliamentary seats in Gjilan, and would lose 86.7% of votes in the rest of the territory of Kosovo, or 12 parliamentary seats, which were won with the proportional system.

Tabela 7: Simulation results of SMP system in Gjilan based on 2010 election results

	AKR	LDK	VV	AAK	PDK	The winner	Lost votes per electoral district and in total
Electoral district 1	595	1377	1546	396	**1575**	PDK	3914
Electoral district 2	635	1305	**1711**	362	1372	VV	3674
Electoral district 3	739	1496	**1850**	519	1638	VV	4392
Electoral district 4	808	1444	1759	494	**1909**	PDK	4505
Electoral district 5	435	1881	1322	480	**2402**	PDK	4118
Electoral district 6	399	1175	1101	316	**1958**	PDK	2991
Lost votes per party	3611	8678	5782	2567	3010	**11405**	23594

In total, according to the estimated results presented in Table 6, the actual simulation in some way reflects what happens in Great Britain. So, SMP provides the domination of the largest party, but

also creates a more powerful opposition because it aggregates the vote in a smaller number of political parties. This happens even in situations when the electoral engineering is applied to ensure the representation of smaller municipalities as well as the representation of the Serb community.

The following table presents the general results derived from the simulation of SMP based on the method explained in the beginning of this section. In the first column, the current distribution of seats in the Assembly is presented, including the reserved seats for minority communities and the threshold of 5%. In the second column, the results of the proportional allocation of parliamentary seats are presented without the reserved seats, but excluding the parties that have not reached the threshold to enter Parliament in 2010 (FER and LDD). The fourth column calculates the SMP simulation results based on the election results according to the polling stations by which the electoral districts were created. The fifth column presents the difference between the proportional vote and parliamentary seats if SMP is applied, and the last column presents the average votes needed per chosen candidate for each political party to win parliamentary seats with SMP system. Minority communities are counted as such, with the purpose of aggregating of their votes. In this way, votes of all parties to the Serb community were united, as well as the votes of Bosniaks and Gorani.

Table 8: Comparison of the overall results of the simulation of SMP's according to the results of 2010 elections

Parties	Percentage of the total votes	Actual division of the parliamentary seats	Scenario of proportional division without the reserved seats according to the Sainte-Laguë method	Scenario of division of the seats according to the SMP system	Impact of SMP in proportionality of the representation	Average number of votes per party per candidate according to the SMP system
PDK	32.11%	34	41	57	+16	3935
LDK	24.69%	27	32	31	-1	5553
VV	12.69%	14	15	2	-13	44326
Serbs	4.35%	13	6	9	+3	3003
KKR	7.29%	8	9	4	-5	12737
AAK	11.04%	12	13	15	+2	5142
Bosniak and Gorani	1.56%	5	2	2	0	5547
Turks	1.22%	3	1	1	0	1099
RAE	0.75%	4	1	0	-1	NA
Totali		**120**	**120**	**120**	/	/

The simulation above shows that the majoritarian system creates significant advantages for larger parties. This advantage is particularly noticeable for the party that has the most votes. Geographical concentration of some parties in the 2010 elections makes the SMP results not create the common effects that this system creates in countries that traditionally use it, which have smaller number of parties. For example, if only one Kosovo Serb party would run, it would have more parliamentary

seats with SMP than with pure proportional system, without the reserved seats. On the other hand, AAK would have more parliamentary seats than VV, although VV has an overall larger number of votes. The reason for this is that VV in 2010 did not have a regional base which would enable the dominance in numerous electoral districts, but its vote was distributed throughout the territory of Kosovo.

However, this overview does not reflect a real situation because the 2010 elections were held under a proportional system and with the reserved seats in parliament, with a large number of parties competing, and that has had an impact on how the voters voted. It is noticeable that the simulation of the transformation of results of the proportional system into SMP can provide the trend indicators, but the results remain questionable, unlike the simulation of the transformation results of SMP into proportional would provide approximate results. However, it should be highlighted that the purpose of this simulation is to indicate which would be the potential political effects of the SMP application in the case of Kosovo based on approximate results.

Nevertheless, it should be emphasized that the SMP system would have major consequences for Kosovo's political scene. Firstly, some minorities, especially Roma, Ashkali and Egyptians, which are dispersed in various parts of Kosovo, would have to integrate within the majority parties according to their interest, or a representation by the percentage of the population would have to be guaranteed for them. Secondly, Kosovo Serbs, concentrated in municipalities with Serb majority, would continue to have a representation that is more or less equivalent to the guaranteed seats. However, their policymaking would not necessarily have integral curves, because the political competition would be limited to municipalities with Serbian majority.

Concerning the Serbs living in the municipalities without Serb majority, and the non-Serbs living in Serb majority municipalities, but also other minorities in Kosovo; they could play a significant role in determining the winners in the elections, thus attracting a moderate approach by the political parties for the rights of minority communities.

However, the following main findings remain from the application of SMP in Kosovo:

- In the current circumstances, the transition to SMP would generate a significant increase of seats in parliament for the party with the most of votes, but this would not have immediate change effects in the political scene. These effects could perhaps be seen in a longer term and depending on the quality of political parties' candidates. Since in the SMP system it is directly voted for the candidate, political parties should be selective to run with the figures that would have greater impact on voters choice because one of the consequences of SMP could be the fading of the partisan loyalties expressed in proportional system;

- Transition to the SMP would not be the best choice, because Kosovo has already established a tradition of the proportionality. Such radical change of the electoral system could cause unpredictable political traumata. It would be an interruption of a a political evolution which is determined by the proportional system;

- According to this simulation that has applied the principle 'One municipality one district', minority communities in general would be degraded, except for Serbs who would ensure the

current quota of guaranteed seats. The problem would still remain how to ensure community representation for other non-Serb minorities.

Alternative Vote

Alternative vote was used for the first time in Australia in the late nineteenth century and is used in several Oceanian countries. It is a complicated majoritarian system and resembles the STV proportional system, which will be discussed in the next section. However, the alternative vote is highly recommended for multi-ethnic countries. According to Horowitz[13], the alternative vote enables the moderation of ethnic leaders, because it pushes them to seek the votes of other ethnic groups. This principle would be hardly applicable in Kosovo, because the number of minorities is very small, but it is an appropriate electoral system for places where ethnic groups are approximately equal in terms of demographics. Otherwise, this system is called the preferential voting system, because it is voted for the first preference, the second, etc. This may have the consequence that the candidate, who in the first round of votes counting has the most of votes, but lacks a majority of 50% + 1 vote, fails to be elected in the parliament because of the lack of the necessary number of preferential votes as second preference, third etc. The table below presents some advantages and disadvantages of the alternative vote, given the experience of other countries.

Table 9: Advantages and disadvantages of the Alternative Vote (AV)

Alternative Vote	
ADVANTAGES	**DISADVANTAGES**
Enables the choice among many candidates and allows preferences	Enables agreements between parties/candidates and tactical voting, not always driven by moderation
Direct representation	A considerable number of initial votes may be lost
Has a moderating effect	The number of minorities in Kosovo is too small for this system

A very interesting case happened in the Australian Parliament in a district with six candidates, in which the candidate with the most votes in the first round of counting was not elected because in the preferential votes the second candidate, who was eventually elected to the parliament, dominated.

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[13] Donald L. Horowitz: Making Moderation Pay: The Comparative Politics of Ethnic Conflict Management, in: Joseph V. Montville (ed.): Conflict and Peacemaking in Multiethnic Societies, Lexington 1991, p. 451-476.

Table 10: The results of the elections with the Alternative vote (Preferential) for the Australian Parliament in Division Hinkler in Queensland in 1998[14]

Candidate	First count	Preference division	Second count	Preference division	Third count	Preference division	Fourth count	Preference division	Fifth count	
A	26471	45	26516	223	26739	807	27546	8,877	36423	Elected candidate
B	29021	39	29060	353	29413	987	30400	5533	35933	First candidate in the first round
C	1139	48	1187	Excluded						
D	13739	61	13800	169	13969	441	14410	Excluded		
E	1677	116	1793	442	2235	Excluded				
F	309	Excluded								

Proportional systems variations

Kosovo currently uses the proportional system with a single electoral district and with the formula of conversion of votes into parliamentary seats Sainte-Laguë.[15] In addition, parties representing ethnic minorities do not have a threshold, unlike the parties that do not declare that they represent the minorities, and for which the threshold of 5% is applied. This is not unusual and is applied in many democratic countries. Proportional system with one district and with a Sainte-Laguë calculation is the most favorable for minorities and small parties. It aims to maximize proportionality and to encourage the entrance of new political options, as well as to maximize minority representation.

There have been other studies which discussed the application of one or more districts and their impact on proportionality representation in Kosovo.[16] Therefore, this study will not focus on the propotional system with many electoral districts, but will analyse the proportional system of single transferable vote (STV) as an option for Kosovo.

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[14] David M. Farrell: Electoral Systems: A Comparative Introduction, New York 2001, p. 58.

[15] Except of the proportional system, Kosovo has 20 parliamentary reserved seats for the parties representing the minorities which are divided between them according to the proportional vote. So Kosovo holds two elections simultaneously: A proportional system elections for 100 parliamentary seats, and every ethnic group holds elections for the reserved seats.

[16] See Electoral districts, Democracy for Development D4D, 2011. Accessed on 25 December 2013 at: http://d4d-ks.org/assets/2011-12-13-OrganizimiiZonave-zgjedhore.pdf

Single Transferable Vote (STV)

There are two types of proportional systems: lists systems and individual candidates (STV). This type of proportional system is used very rarely, although political science literature considers it as one of the best proportional systems.[17] In fact, this type of proportional system is used only in countries that have been ruled by the Great Britain and have chosen a form of proportional election system. Other basic characteristic that the practice shows is that the STV is used in countries with a smaller population size. STV is used in Australia (for the Senate), the Republic of Ireland, Malta and Northern Ireland.

What distinguishes STV from other proportional systems? Unlike the proportional subsystems with closed lists, here the voters can vote for more than one candidate, even for candidates of different parties, by rating them according to their preference: first preference, second preference, third preference, and so on. In the Republic of Ireland, for example, the optional preferential is applied, in which voters can choose from one or more preferences, whereas in Australia, the mandatory preferential is applied, in which voters must vote for more than one candidate and, in some areas, they have to rank their preferences among all candidates.

Allocation of the seats according to STV is done through the Droop quota, which is based on the number of votes and number of the candidates to be elected.[18] Farrell explains the quote by using the number of voters 1000: Droop Quota = {Total number of votes / Total number of seats +1} + 1. For example, if we would have a district of 1000 voters and 5 candidates to be elected, then, Droop quota would be this: 1 + (1.000 / 5 +1) = <u>167</u>.

To illustrate how STV functions, we will take the example given by Gallagher and Mitchell.[19] Voters can vote for one or more preference in the candidates lists from different parties by rating their preferences with numbers 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, depending on the number of preferences, or they can vote only their first preference, depending on whether the electoral law obliges the voting for several preferences or not. This principle functions in the same way as the preferential voting in the VA system, which is explained above.

In the counting of votes in STV the quota based on the above formula is applied. For example, in the 1987 elections in Ireland, in the Cork electoral district, there were 33404 valid votes in which voters chose 3 out of 5 candidates that competed in the elections. Droop quota is calculated by dividing the number of valid votes with the number of seats plus 1. Since the competition is for 3 seats, the total number of valid votes is divided by the number 4 and number 1 is added: 33404 / 4 = 8351 + 1 = 8352. According to this division, it appears that Droop quota was 8352 votes, which means that this is the votes' threshold that the selected candidates must reach.

In the first round of counting, only the first preferences are counted. If any of the candidates reaches the determined quota, he is elected. If not, then in the second round the second preferences are counted. In case any of the candidates do not have the sufficient votes to continue the

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[17] John McGarry, Brendan O'Leary: Consociational Theory, Northern Ireland's Conflict, and its Agreement 2. What Critics of Consociation Can Learn from Northern Ireland, in: Government & Opposition, 41(2), 2006, p. 249-277.

[18] David M. Farrell: Electoral Systems: A Comparative Introduction, New York 2001.

[19] Michael Gallagher, Paul Mitchell: Introduction to Electoral Systems, in: Michael Gallagher and Paul Mitchell (eds.): The Politics of Electoral Systems, New York 2008, p. 594-595

competition, he/she is eliminated and his/her second preferences are counted. If from these preferences, a candidate reaches or exceeds quota of 8352 votes, the candidate is elected, whereas his/her excess is transferred to other candidates according to the preferences expressed by the voters until the other candidate reaches the quota and so on until all candidates reach the determined quota. So, in STV, the excess of votes of the selected candidates are counted, and the remaining votes of eliminated candidates are counted as well. An illustration of the case can be seen in Table 11.

Table 11: Presentation of votes calculation from the modification of the table from the 1987 election in the district of Cork in Ireland[20]

Valid votes: 33404

Droop Quota: 8352 [because 33404/3+1 = 8351, added 1]

	Fist preferences	Eleminatio n of the independe nt candidate	Calculcation of the second preferences of the eleminated independent candidate	Second round: results of the votes transfer according to the second preference of the independent candidate	Surplus votes of the popular candidate and future transferred preferences	Third round: transfer of surplus votes of the popular candidate
Socialist	7057	_	1292	8349	130	**8479 elected**
Popular	7431	_	1087	**8518 elected**	- 166	8352
Liberal	7777	_	566	8343	12	**8355 elected**
Independent	3796	-3796	**eliminated**	_	_	_
Environmentalist	7343	_	564	7907	24	7931
Non-transferable votes of independent candidate	_	_	287	287	_	287
Total	3340 4	_	_	33404	_	33404

Table 11 shows one of the ways in which the transferred votes from the second preferences are calculated. The calculation of these preferences "varies from country to country."[21]

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[20] Adopted from: Michael Galagher, Paul Mitchel: Introduction to Electoral Systems, in: Michael Galagher, Paul Mitchel (ed.): The Politics of Electoral Systems, New York 2008, p. 595.
[21] Ibid.

Some of advantages and disadvantages of STV are presented below. The main disadvantage of STV for Kosovo is the lack of capacity and democratic culture, especially when it comes to fair counting of votes. On the other hand, the advantages in terms of political impact would be major due to the disaggregation of voters' preferences among different political parties, which would impact significantly in reducing political tensions in Kosovo.

Table 12: Advantages and disadvantages of STV proportional system

STV System	
ADVANTAGES	**DISADVANTAGES**
Direct vote for the candidate	Voting process is complex
Direct representation of voters and gives a chance to all parties	Counting is complex
Has moderating effects in multiethnic countries	There can be arragments among parties for tactical voting
As a result of tactical voting, may facilitate easier coalition formation	STV generates PR, but may conuse policies

Conclusion

Since Kosovo is at a crossroad in terms of the decision to have an electoral system, with a few choices among many electoral systems, this study does not aim to recommend a particular electoral system. In fact, the aim of the study is to inform stakeholders and the interested public with the variety of options that can be discussed further, without prejudging the advantages or disadvantages of any of the electoral systems. Below is a summary of the conclusions for each electoral system presented in this study.

SMP: In principle, this system would be convenient for Kosovo, but in practice it could cause problems for the accommodation of political scene. SMP has been the main required system of political parties in Kosovo in 2001 during the discussions on the Constitutional Framework for Provisional Self-Government in Kosovo and there was a dose of international support for this system.[22] Why would SMP be convenient in principle and less convenient in practice? In principle, Kosovo has a suitable demographic structure for SMP system. However, this system could be applied by paying attention to the representation of ethnic groups, either through reserved parliamentary seats, or through the application of territorial adjustment of a certain number of electoral districts that will enable the representation of ethnic groups, and small municipalities as well. On the one hand, the rights of minorities do not necessarily depend on overrepresentation if the Constitution and legislation, as well as the functioning of the balancing mechanisms, guarantee minority rights under existing international agreements and a proportional representation. On the other hand, in practice, it seems more difficult. Kosovan political scene has evolved into a completely different electoral system. Such a big change could cause political and social dissent in Kosovo. The only option with which this electoral system could be applied is a consensus on a new political and legal framework.

Two rounds majority system: This system has been successfully applied in elections for mayors. It is not convenient for parliamentary elections, but can be applied to presidential elections. The reason for this is that the two rounds majority system has a very expensive financial cost, takes a long time and it could lead to the political parties and the government focusing more on elections rather than practical government issues.

Alternative vote: This electoral system is attractive regarding the enlargement of policy options for voters based on their preferences. Unlike SMP, in which the candidate with the most votes is elected, alternative vote gives big chances to the second preferences of voters, because it necessarily requires 50% +1 vote to be elected, which is hardly reachable in SMP. In ethnic relations, this system would not be practical for Kosovo because of the small number of minorities and for this reason, the lack of incentives of majority parties to address their offers to the minorities. In this context, a preferential-majority system could generate changes according to the second preferences, but also tactical voting by loyal voters of political parties in their vote preference.

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[22] Interviews with two international and local representatives in the discussion on the Constitutional Framework for Provisional Self-Government Institutions in 2001 in: Arben Qirezi: Intervention and Consociationalism: The Role of External Dimension in Shaping Post-war Kosovo 1999-2012, unpublished Ph.D. Thesis, National University of Ireland Galway, Galway 2014.

Proportional system with single transferable vote (STV): Same as in the preferential-majority votes, the STV is based on voter preferences, the difference being the distribution of mandates, because it is about multi-mandates areas, is done proportionally according to the required quota and does not need 50% +1 vote to be elected. As such, STV is attractive in the sense of moving the preferences from one party to another, which incentivizes moderation. However, the main problem for its application in Kosovo is the very complicated process of vote counting, for which Kosovo is not completely ready at this time.

Annex

Figure 1: Proportional vote according to the 2010 election results without reserved seats


Figure 2: Current parliamentary mandates with the reserved seats

Figure 3: Propotional division of parliamentary mandates without the reserved seats

Number of proportional seats without reserved seats in a 120 seat contest

Legend:
- PDK
- LDK
- VV
- Kosovo Serbs
- KKR
- AAK
- Bosniak and Gorani
- Kosovo Turks
- RAE

Figure 4: Simulation of division of parliamentary mandates according to SMP system based on votes for party (not candidates) in 2010

Number of simulated SMP seats

Legend:
- PDK
- LDK
- VV
- Kosovo Serbs
- KKR
- AAK
- Bosniak and Gorani
- Kosovo Turks
- RAE