ECMI

ISSUE BRIEF

EUROPEAN CENTRE
FOR
MINORITY ISSUES

National Minorities in the 21st Century Europe: new discourses, new narratives?

Tove H. Malloy

ECMI Brief # 24
December 2010

The European Centre for Minority Issues (ECMI) is a non-partisan institution founded in 1996 by the Governments of the Kingdom of Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany, and the German State of Schleswig-Holstein. ECMI was established in Flensburg, at the heart of the Danish-German border region, in order to draw from the encouraging example of peaceful coexistence between minorities and majorities achieved here. ECMI's aim is to promote interdisciplinary research on issues related to minorities and majorities in a European perspective and to contribute to the improvement of interethnic relations in those parts of Western and Eastern Europe where ethnopolitical tension and conflict prevail. ECMI Briefs are written either by the staff of ECMI or by outside authors commissioned by the Centre. As ECMI does not propagate opinions of its own, the views expressed in any of its publications are the sole responsibility of the author concerned.

ECMI Brief # 24
European Centre for Minority Issues (ECMI)
Director: Dr. Tove H. Malloy

National minorities in the 21st century Europe: new discourses, new narratives?

For centuries national minorities in Europe have lived in the shadow of the historical events of the 19th and the 20th centuries. Whether for humanitarian reasons or to protect the identity of national minorities, major European treaties settling inter-state wars have had to address minority issues to secure the peace. For this reason, national minorities have frequently been seen not only as obstacles to nation and state building but also as anomalies in international relations.[1] At times labelled as troublemakers and war mongers, national minorities have seldom been afforded ethical standing in the writing of Europe's history.[2] While the settlement after the First World War might be called an 'honourable' settlement, the settlement after the Second World War basically erased some national minorities from the European map. The integration discourses of the 21st Century seem to bring changes to this scenario.

Discourses of integration and Europeanization promote de-territorialized politics at all levels, trans-national, state and regions as well as cross-border. This means new non-nation state narratives for these areas and the people who populate them. New research shows that at the regional and cross-border levels, national minorities are engaged in regional politics.[3] Discourses of integration and Europeanization promote development politics. This means new narratives of modernization and innovation for public and private actors alike. New research shows that national minorities have teamed up with public actors to design regional strategies for development. Discourses of integration and Europeanization promote democratic approaches. This means new narratives of inclusion for excluded groups. While national minorities have been excluded from the democratic processes for centuries, new research shows that partially as a result of the convergence of democratization and integration policies, national minorities are increasingly able to participate in the democratic process.[4]

The research drawn upon in this Issue Brief is based on data compiled in the Danish-German border region in 2007. The national minorities in that region are informing current European discourses with narratives based on solidarity towards the emerging European polity, based on accumulation of social capital which allows them to perform acts of citizenship of relevance to European integration, and based on virtues of normative participation in environmental protection.[5] In short, national minority narratives exhibiting moral commitments are increasingly articulated in European integration discourses.

The discourses of relevance to national minority narratives in the 21st Century Europe are a direct outcome of the peace building and economic consolidation efforts begun in the 20th Century by the European Union (EU). With the economic and political integration processes having reached an intensive level at the end of the 1990s, the first decade of the 21st Century has seen the implementation of specific policies directed towards

specific problems and issues in the enlarged EU. Policies such as the Cohesion Policy, the Regional Policy and the Environment portfolio are policies aimed at European integration and development, each of which has taken on the aura of a discourse in the sense that many actors participate and articulate views as to how the policies should be designed and implemented.[6] As the policies get moulded within the EU institutions and at the national level, the power struggles in these discourses get into play.

Although national minority narratives are by no means a new phenomenon,[7] it is only recently that these narratives have become the focus of political sociology research. The data from the Danish-German border region thus provide a very different picture of national minorities as actors and participants in mainstream society. This is research that shows the ability of national minorities to show solidarity, accumulate social capital and apply virtues in the quest to protect the environments of their homelands.[8] Thus, it could be contended that had research focused on these type of national minority narratives over the last couple of centuries, the sedimented views of national minorities might not have become so entrenched. There are therefore compelling reasons to redesign the research framework on national minorities.

The focus of this Issue Brief is on national minorities understood as those minorities who live traditionally in a homeland territory from which they derive their identity as members of a certain nation. The homeland territory is usually situated in regions whose sovereign allegiance and belonging have been contested among competing national states. Often the territory has been contested through bellicose means thus rendering the national minorities of the region objects of wars and eventually of settlements. At times the settlements have resulted in transfer of sovereignty to new rulers, thus incurring a need for the minorities to change allegiance to the new rulers or flee the territory. It is for this reason that national minority issues became articulated in a security discourse and later, when democratic rights became implemented in Europe, in a justice discourse. In the 20th Century these two discourses trapped national minorities in an Oriental narrative[9] that did not serve them well and whose negative and patronizing articulations hold them hostage in the 21st Century. There is therefore a need (1) to map out the real national minority narratives of the 21st Century, and (2) to relate these to the new integration and Europeanization discourses which are gaining hegemonic positions in Europe. But first, a brief look at the old discourses that held minority narratives hostage to the Oriental view.

Old European discourses

From the Peace of Augsburg (1555) to the Dayton Peace Agreement (2005), the securitization of minorities has been steady. Today, this security discourse is exemplified in the work of the High Commissioner on National Minorities (HCNM) within the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE). After the adoption of the United Nations' (UN) Universal Declaration on Human Rights (1948) a justice discourse developed which sought to protect members of national minorities as individual human rights holders. The hegemonic agent of this discourse is the Council of Europe's Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities (1995) and the monitoring system thereto attached. In these discourses, the focus on national minorities has shifted from religious minorities to national minorities and very lately back to religious minorities. Throughout, minorities have been a hot political agenda item often situated at the top of the agenda for military and inter-state war settlements. Consequently, the existence of minorities was seen as threatening European security and peace. The events in the Balkans at the end of the 20th Century helped cement this view. As minorities were subjected to the ongoing power struggles of the day, the focus on security and later on justice was a natural but not necessarily a comprehensive approach. The next two sections focus on national minorities as objects of these two discourses.

The security discourse

Security in Europe is intrinsically linked to treaties and agreements settling inter-state conflicts and disputes. With the Peace of Augsburg (1555),

religious minorities became a bilateral issue in Europe.[10] With the Peace of Westphalia (1648), they became an inter-state issue.[11] With the Congress of Vienna (1815), the focus turned to national minorities as a multilateral issue in Europe.[12] In the Peace of Paris (1919), national minorities became an international issue in Europe.[13] This trend continued through the 20th Century until it became a supra-national issue through the European Union's Copenhagen Criteria (1993) and the subsequent accession of new member states to the Union from the former Soviet Bloc. Thus, the security discourse represents a binary relationship of war and peace. The notion that members of minorities are not supporters of peace because they think and act differently than the majority, that they need to be controlled because they are troublemakers or likely to become war mongers, is therefore a categorization that has been attached to minorities by the holders of power in conflicts but which for the most part was not a realistic description of minorities.[14]

This view has lingered through till the end of the 20th Century, when it was carried into the range of international justice instruments that legitimize the link between the security discourse and national minorities, as exemplified in the ubiquitous references in these documents to the OSCE as well as in the work of the HCNM.[15] Even if national minorities are not conflict prone but rather victims of other conflict prone groups, their existence has been cemented as a security issue rather than a question of integration of multinational states. Hence, the combined force of governments of national states and international organizations constitute the discourse in which security articulations are made and from which flows the view that minorities need to be controlled.

However, the social reality of national minority existence does not necessarily evidence trigger happy minorities seeking to instigate ethnic conflict. Conflicts involving national minorities and ethnic groups are of course conflicts-involving-ethnic-groups but they are not necessarily 'ethnic conflicts.' Rogers Brubaker explains this in terms of (1) organizations and (2) coding.[16] First, the "representativeness" is often variable of organizations that allegedly represent national minorities or ethnic groups or the degree to which organizations can claim to represent the will, interest, and support of its constituents. Because of the lack of boundedness, coherence, static existence and collective agency of ethnic groups, organizations such as the IRA, the KLA and the PKK cannot claim to represent collectively and comprehensively *all* Catholic Irish, or *all* Kosovo Albanians, or *all* Kurds of Turkey, respectively. While one might be able to see entire minority groups as objects of conflict and violence, there is no logic connection to think of every member of a minority group as a subject of ethnic action in conflicts. The upshot of this analysis is that organizations not national minorities and ethnic groups stage conflict.

The chief protagonists of conflicts involving national minorities and ethnic groups are various kinds of organizations and their empowered and authorized incumbents. Organizations include states and autonomous polities plus their agencies, terrorist groups paramilitary organizations, armed bands, ethnic associations, social movements, churches, newspapers, radio and television, etc. Such organizations are the principal actors in conflicts because they possess certain material and organizational resources that allow them to be capable of organized action. But they are not necessarily *ethnic* organizations. While they may become ethnicized in their strategies, ethnicity is not at the source of these strategies.[17]

This mischaracterization of ethnicity is also a coding problem, according to Brubaker who explains that violence is often defined *ex post* not only by perpetrators and victims but also by politicians, officials, journalists, researchers, relief workers etc.[18] Violence is thus framed not in terms of inhumane behaviour but in terms of structural and cultural characteristics, such as ethnicity. The interpretive framing and narrative coding of violent acts thus becomes powerful feedback which in turn informs subsequent events. The bias of coding and framing is particular dangerous when analyst of conflict are not able to take this into account. In short, 'ethnic conflict' is a phenomenon of "composite and causally heterogeneous texture" which must be analyzed through disaggregation.[19] The analysis of conflict must therefore differentiate between the national minority or ethnic group and its complexities, on the

one hand, and the organizations that claim to act on behalf of complex national or ethnic groups, on the other, because this relationship is deeply ambiguous.

The justice discourse

Since justice in Europe is primarily a post-World War II phenomenon linked not only to the rise of the UN system of peaceful states forming a club but also to the establishment of the inter-governmental co-operation in the Council of Europe, justice in terms of human rights is seen as necessary to protect individual humans against the arbitrary power of the state. Thus, the justice discourse represents a binary relationship of rights and power. With regard to national minorities, one might call this discourse the protection discourse. The notion of protection has become specifically pronounced in relation to protecting members of minority groups. While minority rights were not included in the discourse immediately after World War II and the establishment of the UN human rights regime, the Council of Europe did articulate non-discrimination of national minorities as a new idea in the European Convention of Human Rights.[20] Moreover, the events in the Balkans after 1989 induced the Council of Europe to expand the range of international legal instruments seeking to provide justice/protection for national minorities in Europe culminating in the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities (FCNM).

The protection approach was furthermore paralleled in the UN system by the Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities, and in the EU system by the Charter of Fundamental Rights. While protection through justice is clearly an honourable goal, there should not be any doubt that like the security discourse, the justice discourse is a state-centred discourse. One might even go as far as arguing that some of the legal instruments designed to protect national minorities against the arbitrary power of governments are disingenuous in that they promote state-centred policies against the overall aim of the instrument thus preventing it from fulfilling the goal of benefitting the beneficiaries.[21] A dichotomy of state versus minority in both the security discourse and the justice discourse is therefore the true picture of the protection of national minority existence because the ultimate goal is not the survival of national minorities but the survival of the state.

Thus, it should be no surprise that there has not been space for national minority narratives in the two discourses where national minority issues have traditionally been placed. National minority narratives seen from a political sociology perspective do not lend any support to the state-centred view of the two 20th Century discourses. In fact, any view of national minorities as pro-active actors and contributors to society and democracy would interfere with the main tenets of these discourses. For instance, the main tenet of modern international law sees national minorities as a threat to its structure because it threatens the hegemonic identity of state sovereignty.[22] This is why it has been argued that the real problem of the FCNM is that 'the assumptions upon which it was drafted are being challenged by the very existence of the beneficiaries that it is supposed to protect.'[23] It follows that if the purpose of the FCNM is to protect members of national minorities, the instrument will not be able to reach its objective. As it is, focusing on protection seems rather minimalist, at least when it concerns national minorities.

The main issue is empowerment versus protection. Empowerment leads to self-protection, and self-protection is the corollary of self-determination.[24] This is why it is important to understand that self-determination is more than empowerment in terms of self-government and power over territory and population. Self-determination is the self-protection of self-constituting communities, and self-constituting communities are precisely the reality of the national minority narratives that have emerged in Europe after 1945. However, many of these narratives have yet to be mapped out. This Issue Brief draws on a limited segment of data from one national minority region which is likely to be seen as further developed historically. But other research is emerging.[25] Of course, the two notions are in a binary relation. The idea of convergence between rights protection and democratization policies, on the one hand, and European integration policies, on the other, is no longer foreign to minority research.[26] In

fact, assessing the extent to which convergence is happening is dependent on the mapping of national minority narratives.

So, alternative questions have to be asked. Is it possible to think of representatives of national minorities as intermediaries in conflict resolution processes or inter-cultural dialogues? Or, can we imagine national minorities taking pro-active action on regional development involving the border between two former enemy nations? These are the kind of questions political sociologists ask. In general, the notion that national minorities can contribute to state and nation building is foreign. Indeed, their competencies as citizens as well as taxpaying citizens often come as a surprise to policy makers.[27] The remainder of this Issue Brief will focus on European integration discourses and how national minority narratives relate to these.

New European discourses and national minority narratives

It has been argued that the EU is the moral space within which to search for ethical models of national minority accommodation.[28] Notwithstanding the adoption of the reformed Lisbon Treaty (2007), [29] this has not materialized. Nevertheless, the EU integration and Europeanization processes have given space to new discourses that will find it difficult to domesticate the national minority narratives the way the security and justice discourses have. These discourses include the cohesion discourse as well as the European citizenship discourse and the global environmental discourse. They have created spaces where national minority narratives can become relevant and speak to the current power struggles.

The cohesion discourse

The cohesion discourse in Europe forms around the EU's territorial cohesion through regional policies that aim to bring European countries closer together economically and socially. Solidarity between member states is an important articulation of this discourse, and the concept of solidarity is clearly the binary value of cohesion. In addition to territorial cohesion, social cohesion and social unity are other specific articulations of this discourse.

The cohesion discourse involves a complex matrix of institutions, policies and national agendas. It began forming in 1986 as a result of the Single European Act but consolidated around the EU's Agenda 2000 which allowed for a fundamental reform of the EU's regional policies and brought in new approaches in the light of the 2004 and 2007 enlargement waves. Currently, the EU's Regional Policy is the Union's second largest budget item, with an allocation of EUR 348 billion for the budget period 2007-2013.[30] For the period 2007-2013, economic and social cohesion is concentrating on crucial development concerns in the field of economic growth and employment while continuing to support regions which are facing specific structural problems (areas undergoing industrial restructuring, urban areas, rural areas, areas dependent on fishing, and areas suffering from natural or demographic handicaps).

The Regional Policy has also begun to focus on important sub-regions, such as the Baltic Sea Region and the Danube Region thus indicating that the EU territory consists not only of several layers of policy making but also of several layers of development for growth. These regions are also called Regions for Economic Change, which refers to the idea that there is a need for a more coordinated approach to good practice exchange and more effective networking among regions in order to contribute to improving the quality of the Cohesion Policy. Specifically, the initiative is supposed to introduce new ways to dynamise regional and urban networks and test innovative ideas. Both the Baltic Sea Region and the Danube Region represent areas where national minorities have traditionally lived for centuries and where their networks may support inter-state cohesion because they span sovereign borders.

Border regions are of particular concern because they are notoriously outer lying regions and often neglected in terms of national economic policies. In many of these regions, national minorities are at the forefront of this aim because they live near or on former sovereign borders and because they have accumulated experience with border management. Today, these minorities represent competencies to

intensify the aim of cohesion because they usually speak the languages of both the states separated by the border, they have bi-cultural and inter-cultural knowledge that is valuable to improving the networking and contacts across the former borders, and they are often more engaged in the preservation of the region than the average majority population. Unfortunately, the notion that national minorities can be motivated by solidarity towards both the national state and the kin-state and thus promote cohesion is seldom accepted.

However, the narratives of the three national minorities in the Danish-German border region speak to this discourse. In a recent report it has been established that the national minorities in that region co-operate and participate in the aim to develop the border region towards greater economic investments and ultimately prosperity.[31] The narrative is a story of co-operation across the border for many decades, but the co-operation intensified after 2001 when Denmark joined the Schengen Agreement signed in 1985, and the sovereign border became open. Cross-border co-operation (CBC) became a necessity rather than a desire. Not only did police CBC become a necessity but also business and labour market integration. Thus, eyeing a window of opportunity and driven by their hybrid identities, the national minorities began to put their cross-cultural knowledge and social capital to use in those sectors that needed CBC. For instance, cross-border ambulance services and an express bus have been established as a result of the minorities identifying opportunities. The hybrid streak in the identities of the national minorities thus met with the more instrumental creed of the local elite players. This "marriage" of otherwise antagonist players is unique in the sense that both have a vision about European and EU integration as a common good in so far that it benefits the border region.[32]

The citizenship discourse

The European citizenship discourse has formed over the last couple of decades and often takes its clues from the public debate on EU constitutionalism and the so-called 'democratic deficit.' The Maastricht Treaty is seen as the watershed that began the citizenship discourse. It aimed to address the problem of democratic deficit which put the EU on the path towards a constitution. The EU's approach is civil society oriented and aims to overcome the gap between the EU and its citizens. Thus, it focuses heavily on activating citizens to become involved with a goal to overcome the democratic deficit. The binary value to citizenship in this discourse is participation. It is therefore not a normative discussion of citizenship rights and the legal ramifications for those who are not included in the EU polity because of being excluded from holding citizenship in one of the EU member states. Rather, it a discourse articulating ideas of action towards a shared identity.

The EU provides various symbols (flag, anthem, Europe day, etc.) and a motto 'Unity in Diversity' to support the process of Europeanization towards a common identity. More recently, the Lisbon Treaty has enumerated the common values around which European as citizens can gather. However, scholars are rather more sceptical about the idea that Europeans can unite around a common identity. Rather than a common European identity based upon a common language, ecological sensibility, sense of history and shared culture, scholars argue that the new narratives of European citizenship represent the emergent European polity of how to protect and nurture a multiplicity of complex, overlapping, hybrid, national identities institutionally. Not only do policies based on the norm of cultivating citizenship in Europe now unfold within the context of a mosaic of robust and dynamic, actually existing civil societies that tend to intermingle as an emergent European civil society but this patchwork quilt of civil societies also comprises a multiplicity of identities of regional loyalties, gender, market position, sport, music and respect for the sacred that have the effect of challenging and de-centring national identity.[33] Seen in this way, the project of European citizenship is attempting to detach nationality and citizenship.

The space between the national legacy of citizenship and the post-national project is clearly becoming demarcated in the citizenship discourse. Most radically, it has been argued that citizenship should no longer be seen as a status of privileged

membership of a state and a nation, but instead as an institutional role enabling individuals' capacities to shape the context of their lives and promote the freedom and well-being of others.[34] A European citizenship on this notion would be independent of any specific form of political organisation; rather, it would allow for a choice between different sorts of constitutional values for the EU itself.

The idea of a national minority citizenship would clearly fit well into this notion of attachment to values rather than states. National minorities proclaim allegiance to nations representing certain values, not states representing certain ideals. Moreover, European citizenship is to be understood as a fluid identity that internalizes ongoing negotiations of particular differences, multiple identities and shared or common loyalties, as a new type of complex citizenship that guarantees citizens their 'right to be different.'[35] Such characteristics clearly exist in the identities of members of national minorities. The negotiation of dual loyalties, dual attachments and often dual responsibilities in national minority identities fosters the fluid outlook of identity. Detaching citizenship from the dogmatic state-centred view of social organization is thus the only outlook for a national minority citizenship.

National minority narratives inform the European citizenship discourse seeking to incorporate articulations and narratives of acts and action about values. Forces of acts and action are bigger and wider than those generated by top-down *ex post* contributions to the integration of Europe. They are social and cultural trends towards the formation of a European civil society, a vast, dynamically inter-connected and multi-layered European social space consisting of many thousands of non-governmental initiatives, networks, personalities, movements and organizations. This civil society comprises individuals, households, businesses, non-profit and non-governmental organizations, coalitions, conferences, social movements and cultural-religious groups. Their situated actions comprise the material from which civil society is made and in turn feeds the work of charities, lobby groups, citizens' movements, independent media, trade unions and sporting bodies.[36]

National minority narratives are stocked with volunteering and actions as civil society actors. In fact, national minorities are likely to accumulate more social and human capital than the average citizen due to the nature of national minority existence. Social capital and participation are thus the key words in the narratives that national minorities represent in terms of citizenship. Taking again the example of the narrative of the three national minorities in the Danish-German border region, the national minorities have exhibited citizenship skills, in particular in terms of drawing on their social and human capital when participating in local politics.[37] The human and social capital of the national minorities in the Danish-German border region is evidenced in the large self-administration of institutions, such as educational and social care facilities. The self-administration of such institutions alleviates the majority society from significant burdens in terms of both finances and structures, because the self-administration of those institutions would otherwise require public administration that was funded by the national government. Moreover, human capital is evidenced at the level of political participation both through the political parties and the corporate institutions. Their political participatory competence is a sign that they possess the human capital needed in a democratic society that wishes to encourage not only representation, but also participation.

The environmental discourse

In Europe the environmental discourse is rather disparate. At the global level, it became articulated in a discourse of global disaster through the so-called Rio Process which started in 1972. In the EU it is still a non-directional discourse where no member state or main actor is able to take the lead. A strategy has been devised in 2001, and the idea of Sustainable Development is now the mantra and a full EU strategy. The notion of sustainable development of the environment has been a global concern since the Bruntland Commission's report (1987).[38] It is difficult to determine what constitutes the binary value in the environmental discourse in Europe. Scholars distinguish between environmentalism,

meaning the need to protect the environment, and ecologism, meaning the idea that human beings construct their lives entirely around respect for non-human species and accept a hierarchical relationship where humans are not on top.[39] Much is done in Europe to turn Europeans into Green citizens and Green virtues are fostered to make Europeans protect the Earth for future generations. It could therefore be argued that the environmental discourse represents a binary relationship of planet and virtues.

To national minorities who live traditionally in homelands from which they derive their identities, the environment is particularly important. This means that the protection of the environment is often intrinsically linked to the protection of the minority culture because the survival of the culture is dependent on the survival of the homeland, i.e. the region's environment. The familiar minority narratives that speak to the environmental discourse are in fact not European. To the Zapatistas in Mexico, the destruction of the jungle for oil extraction and large-scale logging were some of the core issues that motivated their freedom movement. Native Americans in other parts of the Western hemisphere are known for a moral concern for the Earth that provides for more natural management of the environment than any environmental agency could muster.

In Europe, the narratives of national minorities in Western Europe show increasing participation in the environmental sector. German minority farmers in Denmark have taken the lead in bringing Danish agriculture into the organic realm as well as in creating bio-energy. In Germany, an environmental wing of the Danish minority has created a grass-root organization following the "think globally, act locally" mantra of the new environmental movements. The North Frisian minority is directly involved in the protection of the islands off the west coast of Schleswig-Holstein. They participate in a Euro-region called the Euro-region Wadden Sea, which consists of a number of the islands off the west coast of Northwest Europe. The aim of this Euro-region is the preservation of the biodiversity in the wading waters off the coast. Indeed, in Northern Italy, the German-speaking minority living in the Province of Bolzano in South Tyrol has installed green infrastructure on the skiing slopes. In fact, a member of the Green party in South Tyrol has proposed an entirely different type of minority, not defined by ethnicity or allegiance to a nation but by the biosphere that it inhabits, the Alps. In other words, in action and in ontology, the narratives of indigenous people and national minorities are defined along the lines of Green virtues and participation in environmental protection.

Conclusions

The notion that national minorities can promote rather than obstruct European integration has yet to be accepted in politics and explored fully in research. When new capacities emerge and new spaces for politics become defined national minorities are rarely seen as primary actors. The tendency in the 20th Century to trap national minority narratives in the security and justice discourses has not served them well. It seems that prejudiced outsider interpretations of national minorities have saddled them with negative articulations shaped by attitudes of European 19th Century Orientalism. The shift to a patronizing attitude at the end of the 20th Century has not improved much in terms of understanding national minority narratives. This Issue Brief has aimed to demonstrate that the case in point, the three national minorities in the Danish-German border region as well as other regions live narratives that defeat this sedimented view.

The brief analysis provided of the integration discourses in Europe gives reason to believe that the view of national minorities as trouble makers is ready for revision. With national minorities evidencing collective action capacities in the democratic processes to reunite Europe peacefully through modernization and regional development, opportunities to see national minorities in a new light have emerged. Firstly, the cohesion discourse is being informed by national minority narratives of solidarity. Secondly, the citizenship discourse is being informed by national minority narratives of social capital and participation. Thirdly, the environmental discourse is being informed by national minority narratives of virtues, virtues of Green participation.

In short, the argument is that in the formation of a new European polity, there is reason to argue that national minorities are formidable actors and contributors because they evidence ability to show solidarity towards both the national state and the kin-state, because they show ability to accumulate social capital needed in support of a European citizenship, and because they evidence virtues needed in the normative effort to protect our planet. Although a small scale sample, this Issue Brief has attempted to show that national minorities should be seen as a resource to society rather than a burden.

Notes

[1] Jennifer Jackson Preece, N*ational Minorities and the European Nation-States System.* (Clarendon Press, 1998)
[2] Tove H. Malloy, *National Minority Rights in Europe* (Oxford; Oxford University Press, 2005)
[3] Tove H. Malloy, "Creating New Spaces for Politics? The Role of National Minorities in Building Capacity of Cross-Border Regions" in *Regional and Federal Studies*, Vol. 20, No. 3 (2010), pp. 335-352
[4] Tove H. Malloy, "Minority Rights and the Dynamics of Europeanization: Policy convergence in the Danish-German Border Region", *ECMI Working Paper*, (2011 forthcoming)
[5] "Competence Analysis: National Minorities as a *Standortfaktor* in the German-Danish Border Region: Working with each other, for each other" prepared by the European Academy (EURAC), Bolzano/Bozen and published in 2008. The "Competence Analysis" established that that the minorities could well be considered a location factor (*Standortfaktor*) in terms of regional development. The study identified hard as well as soft location factors that the minorities represent in terms of enriching the region in the views of investors. These factors were based on identification of social and human capital as well as cross-cultural knowledge of the minorities. The study also provided a tool-kit for intensified co-operation across the border on issues related to national minority knowledge. The report was commissioned by the Schleswig-Holstein *Landtag* . Available online at http://www.landtag.ltsh.de/parlament/minderheitenpolitik/minderheitenpolitik_.html
[6] A discourse may be defined as neither an organizing centre nor a structure. A discourse does not promote meaning; it informs social interaction. It does not prescribe cognitive action; it influences it. The identity of a discourse is constructed through political struggles and is also transformed through political struggles. Torfing, Jacob, *New Theories of Discourse. Laclau, Mouffe and Zizek* (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1999).
[7] A narrative is the method of storytelling which organizes chronologically a single coherent story. Usually it is descriptive rather than analytical; it is concerned with people not abstract circumstances; and it deals with the particular and specific rather than the collective and statistical. Lawrence Stone, "The Revival of Narrative: Reflections on a New Old History," *Past and Present* 85 (1979), pp 3-24 at 3.
[8] Competence Analysis: National Minorities as a *Standortfaktor* in the German-Danish Border Region... op.cit.
[9] By Oriental narrative is meant Orientalism in the sense of the critique lodged by Edward Said in his 1978 book by same name. Said used the term to describe a pervasive Western tradition, both academic and artistic, of prejudiced outsider interpretations of the East, shaped by the attitudes of European imperialism in the 18th and 19th centuries. Said was critical of both this scholarly tradition and of some modern scholars directly. A central idea of Said's is that Western knowledge about the East is not generated from facts or reality, but from preconceived archetypes that envision all "Eastern" societies as fundamentally similar to one another, and fundamentally dissimilar to "Western" societies. This a priori knowledge establishes "the East" as antithetical to "the West". Such Eastern knowledge is constructed with literary texts and historical records that often are of limited understanding of the facts of life in the East. See Said, *Orientalism* (New York: Vintage Books, 1978)
[10] The Peace of Augsburg settled the strife between Catholics and Lutherans and afforded Lutheran princes the right to religion.
[11] The Peace of Westphalia did not per se grant any minority rights but it set the stage for the national state system which eventually became the guarantor of minority rights.
[12] The Congress of Vienna for the first time in European history tabled the issue of protecting minorities belonging to a different national state than the one where they resided. See further, Patrick Thornberry, *International Law and the Rights of Minorities* (Clarendon Press, 1991)
[13] The Paris Peace Treaty set the stage for the League of Nations and the Minority Treaties imposed by the Allied on the losing states in World War I
[14] For the difference between control and integration, see Donald L. Horowitz *Ethnic Groups in Conflict* (California University Press, 1985),
[15] The HCNM operates with a mandate aimed at spotting conflict situations at an early stage and seeks to mediate between national minorities and the state in danger of descending into civil war.
[16] Rogers Brubaker, *Ethnicity without Groups* (Harvard University Press, 2004), pp. 15-16
[17] Ethnicization is a craft that enframes through boundary drawing and perceptions of external danger. "Ethnocraft" thus inscribes dangers to be exterior to the community, and if needed legitimise violent performances in the name of survival. See Tarja Väyrynen, "Securitised Ethnic Identities and Communal Conflicts: A Need for Problem-Constructing Conflict Resolution?" available online at http://www.gmu.edu/academic/pcs/vayryn.html. For an interesting theory of the state-nation relationship, see Benjamin Miller, "States, Nations, and Regional War", *Ethnopolitics*, Vol. 7, No. 4, 2008, pp. 445-464.
[18] Brubaker, *Ethnicity without Groups*, p. 16
[19] Brubaker, *Ethnicity without Groups*, p. 5
[20] Article 14.
[21] Tove H. Malloy, *National Minority Rights in Europe*, Chapter 2 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005).
[22] Joshua Castellino argues along similar lines in his book, *International Law and Self-Determination* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2000) at 59.
[23] Malloy, *National Minority Rights*..., op. Cit., Chapter 7
[24] Malloy, *National Minority Rights*..., op. Cit., Chapter 9

[25] See Special Focus "Crossborder Cooperation and Minorities in Eastern Europe: Still Waiting for a Chance?" in the *European Yearbook of Minority Issues*, Vol. 6 (2006/7), (Leiden: Brill, 2008), Section B. See also, Matthias Vogt et al., *Minderheiten als Mehrwert* (Peter Lang, 2010)
[26] Tove H. Malloy, "Minority Rights and the Dynamics of Europeanization: Policy Convergence in the Danish-German Border Region?", ECMI Working Paper, (2011 forthcoming). See also, David J. Galbreath And Joanne McEvoy, "Epistemic Communities And Inter-Organizational Cooperation: The Case Of The European Minority Rights Regime", Studies In Public Policy Number 463, Centre For The Study Of Public Policy, (University of Aberdeen, 2009)
[27] Competence Analysis: National Minorities as a *Standortfaktor* in the German-Danish Border Region.. op.cit.
[28] Malloy, *National Minority Rights*...., op.cit., Chapter 8
[29] The Lisbon Treaty includes in Article 6 on Union Values, the 'respect for minority rights'
[30] With the 2007 enlargement, the surface area of the EU has increased by over 25%, its population by over 20%, and its wealth by only 5% approximately. The average GDP per capita fell by more than 10% and regional disparities doubled.
[31] Competence Analysis: National Minorities as a *Standortfaktor* in the German-Danish Border Region... op.cit.
[32] See further, Malloy, "Creating New Spaces for Politics? The Role of National Minorities in Building Capacity of Cross-Border Regions" in *Regional and Federal Studies*, Vol. 20, No. 3 (2010), pp. 335-352
[33] Jo Shaw, *The Transformation of Citizenship in the European Union: Electoral Rights and the Restructuring of Political Space* (Cambridge University Press, 2007)
[34] Lynn Dobson, *Supranational Citizenship* (Manchester University Press, 2006)
[35] Zigmunt Bauman, *Identity* (Polity Press, 2004)
[36] Engin F. Isin, "Theorizing Acts of Citizenship" in Isin and Nielsen (eds.), *Acts of Citizenship* (London: Zed Books, 2008). See also, Carter & Pasquier, "Introduction: Studying Regions as 'Spaces for Politics': Re-thinking Territory and Strategic Action" in *Regional and Federal Studies* , Vol. 20, No. 3 (2010), pp. 281-294
[37] Malloy, "Regional (cross-border) Development as a Space for Minority Politics: *ex-ante* Europeanization in the Danish-German Border Region?" ECMI Working Paper, (2011 forthcoming)
[38] "Our Common Future", the Bruntland Commission (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987).
[39] Andrew Dobson, *Green Political Thought*, 3rd edition (Routledge, 2000)