JEMIE
Journal on Ethnopolitics and Minority Issues in Europe

Journal on Ethnopolitics and Minority Issues in Europe

Vol. 11, No 3, 2012, 8-39

The 'Do-No-Harm' Debate in External Democracy Promotion

Franziska Blomberg*
European University Viadrina, Frankfurt (Oder)/Germany

This article analyzes at the neglected debate around the potential negative side effects of the European Union's (EU's) democracy promotion in the ethnically diverse Western Balkan states. Despite significant efforts by the EU to promote democracy, the results frequently lag far behind the goals declared by both the EU and the target states. This investigation examines how ethnicity—widely assumed to be crucially linked to democratic consolidation—has been taken into account in the EU's democracy promotion. EU program documents are analyzed and then contrasted with two case studies from the ethnically diverse Western Balkan states. The findings suggest that, surprisingly, the EU has deliberately risked lagging behind the standard of 'do-no-harm', which has been the declared minimal of EU development cooperation for several decades.

Keywords:

Western Balkans; European Union; external democracy promotion; ethnic conflict; power sharing.

1. The European Union's External Democracy Promotion and Ethnic Diversity in Southeastern Europe

Since the late 1960s, numerous actors from the international community[1] have taken up the endeavour of external democracy promotion (EDP)[2] in many states around the world. Despite the significant increase of non-autocratic states in the last 60 years, the relative share of "hybrid" regimes, "partly free" regimes, and "democracies with

* Franziska Blomberg is a PhD candidate at the European University Viadrina (Frankfurt/Oder, Germany). She has also worked as trainer and facilitator with civil society organizations in Eastern and Southeastern Europe. Email: Blomberg@europa-uni.de.

adjectives" has increased (Marshall and Jaggers, 2011; Levitsky and Way, 2010; Freedom House, 2010).[3]

Legions of international actors (states, inter-, or trans-national organizations such as the United Nations (UN), the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the European Union (EU), the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), different non-governmental organizations (NGOs), international non-governmental organizations (INGOs), government-organized non-governmental organizations (GONGOs), political and private foundations, etc.) have undertaken to contribute to continued democratization. They use many different measures and aim to achieve diverse goals though various strategies. Sometimes, external democracy promotion has pejoratively been called the "boom-industry" of international cooperation, currently disposing of a worldwide annual budget of about €10 billion (Schraeder, 2000 in Grävingholt, Leininger and Schlumberger, 2009: 28–33). Especially in its "neighbourhood", including the Western Balkans[4], the EU has actively promoted and supported the development of democracy, with the goal of democratic consolidation. However, a consistent policy approach and moreover an external evaluation of the effects—which are increasingly coming under criticism for producing negative side effects—are often lacking.

This is quite surprising as external democracy promotion, and its evaluation of positive and sometimes negative effects, has been an important issue in the older field of development cooperation. In this context, the concept of 'do-no-harm' has been mainstreamed since the 1990s (Anderson, 1999). With regard to EU democracy promotion in developed states, to date awareness and knowledge about the (negative) side effects is a relatively unknown field. Events in recent years (the economic crisis, EU accession fatigue among old and aspiring EU members, stagnating democratization, as well as cases of corruption regarding funds accorded to target states and/or organizations for democracy promotion) have nurtured doubts as to whether the billions spent in EDP by the EU actually can stand up to the expected impact, and whether that impact will always be positive.

The effectiveness and efficiency of EDP have long been subjects of controversial discussion. Interestingly, for the former socialist and communist states

only recent years have seen a debate around the 'do-no-harm' principle in the context of democracy promotion. One very important factor that poses a particular challenge to EDP, and is often linked with the quality and performance of democracy, is ethnic diversity.[5] This article focuses on how this declared factor has been considered in the EU's EDP in the Western Balkans. Furthermore, it examines the role and impact of one the financially strongest single actors in democracy promotion today: the EU. For the year 2006 alone, for example, the European Commission allocated €1.4 billion (18% of its 2006 aid budget) to governance and support for economic and institutional reforms (Youngs, 2008: 160–169).

2. Ethno-nationalism and Stagnating Democratization in the Western Balkans

Since the 1990s, the successor states of the former Yugoslavia have been major beneficiaries of the EU's EDP. Compared to most post-communist and other post-socialist states, at the time of their independence these were comparatively advanced in terms of their economies and aspects of their civil liberties. Violent conflicts severely hindered the democratization trajectories of the states, but even after the violence ended they were relatively slow to achieve democratic consolidation.EU support for the Balkans has taken a long time to shift from reconstruction towards democracy building (Youngs, 2008: 160–169): or, as Belloni puts it, from an approach 'of managing the consequences of the Yugoslav Succession Wars to that of integrating the Balkans into Europe' (2009: 319). At the Zagreb summit in 1999, the Stabilisation and Association Process (SAP) was established as an incentive mechanism for Western Balkan countries with the ultimate goal of EU accession (Youngs, 2008: 160–169).[6]

In transformation research much has been written about factors of democratization, as well as factors of democratic consolidation, for instance debates about state building versus nation building, path-dependency determined by the former regime, modernization theory assumptions about the relevance of economic progress, to name but a few.[7] Frequently underlined factors of consolidation are: whether democracy is seen as "the only game in town" (1996); and to what degree the monopoly of state power is contested (conversely, major divergent interests between

different actors can decrease the state's capacity for governance and the procedural aspects of democracy). In many of today's reluctant "democratizers", these fields are often contested by rival actors competing for power and resources (see Rupnik, 2011). One crucial factor for successful democratic consolidation remains how former or ongoing ethno-nationalist politics are dealt with. In the context of international intervention, the protection of minorities and support for anti-discrimination policies have become major achievements in many states, and were supported during democracy promotion efforts in states on their way to democratic consolidation.

When looking at progress made by the Western Balkan states to date, it is striking that, despite very different starting positions and contextual factors (including violent conflicts, demographic composition, governments and neighbours), today, according to the Freedom House democracy score, five of the seven states are now at very similar stages of democratic consolidation (see Table 1).

Table 1. Democratization in the Western Balkans: Albania (AL), Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), Croatia (HR), Kosovo (KOS), Montenegro (ME), Macedonia (MK), Serbia (SRB).

	AL	BiH	HR	KOS	ME	MK	SRB
Freedom House democracy score 1999	4.75	5.42	4.46	(5.67) (Serbia)	(5.67) (Serbia)	3.38	5.67
Freedom House democracy score 2010	3.93	4.3	3.71	5.07	3.79	3.79	3.71
Democratization 1999-2010 (Freedom House)	0.82	1.17	0.75	0.6	1.88	0.04	1.96

These scores indicate that democratization efforts after independence were not in fact as successful as once hoped, and in some cases have even stagnated.

The EU has been strongly criticized for its approach towards ethnicity in the Western Balkans, especially in the aftermath of conflicts fought along ethnic lines (Belloni, 2009: 313–331). According to Florian Bieber (2004a: 2), 'after the break-up of Yugoslavia ethnicity was institutionalized in the Western Balkans', which mostly happened by ensuring 'the representation of ethnic groups *as ethnic groups* in state institutions, including legislature, executive, judiciary and public administration'. As a consequence, to date ethnicity and ethno-national categories continue to determine much of the political reasoning within the seven states. The consequences are an ethnicization of political processes, often manifesting itself as blocking of political processes; and political patronage systems that hamper not so much the form of democratic institutions but their functioning, and thus the democratic process. However, as this is not particular to the Western Balkans, further insight into these mechanisms is useful for research, including beyond the region.

Especially with regard to the EU's eastern vicinity, many scholars critically discuss the role of the EU in the context of democracy and its handling of ethnicity (see for example Kymlicka, 2008: 1–32; Taras and Ganguly, 2006; Saideman, 2001; Chandler, 1999, 2007; Howard, 2009). The main line of argumentation revolves around the question of whether: (a) to support the primacy of the protection of (ethnic) minorities by favouring and promoting strategies that are based on ideas of consociationalism, and by granting different ethnic groups collective rights to access political power and other resources (based on Lijphart, 1969: 207–225; 1977, and later publications in this vein); or (b) to favour primacy of individual citizens' rights, protecting minorities but discouraging allusions to ethnicity as a basis for collective rights and promoting cross-cutting aggregation of interests, as Horowitz (1985) suggests in his "integrative approach" (see also Sisk, 1996; Pfaff-Czarnecka, 2004: 49–68; Kymlicka, 2008: 1–32, who uses the terms "accommodationist" and "integrationist" to refer to a roughly similar distinction).[8] In this context, Bieber (2005) calls for a third, integrative but minority-sensitive approach, while Sisk (1996) points out that each case is likely to require an individual mix of consociational and integrative approaches.

3. Empirical Investigation and Methodological Approach

To date, there has been little systematic data available on the concepts and practical implementation of the strategies the EU has applied in the Western Balkans. Usually, studies focus on certain policy fields (such as police reforms, internally displaced persons (IDPs) and post-conflict reconstruction). Moreover, much of the relevant literature has been produced by practitioners in the respective fields, and thus tends to present a biased, experience-based perspective. No extensive research of EU program documents has been conducted to date. In order to achieve new insight into the assumptions of EU democracy promotion programs, this article analyzes the content of EU institutional documents and possible changes over time.

As illustrated so far, the policies of the EU, as the main actor in democracy promotion in the Western Balkans, are insufficiently understood in relation to issues of ethnicity during democratization, not to mention their possible negative side effects. With the aim of introducing the "do-no-harm" debate into the broader issue of external democracy promotion and ethnicity policies, this paper examines: (a) the underlying assumptions of the EU's approach and its theoretical foundations with regard to ethnicity, and (b) practically applied strategies and their consequences for ethnic dynamics and democratic consolidation. The main research question under investigation is: what underlying assumptions about ethnicity has the EU been implementing in the Western Balkans, and how have these affected the overall development of ethnic dynamics and democratic consolidation in the seven target states?

In the following empirical section the article fills this research gap with insights into the strategies that the EU has used for democracy promotion efforts in the Western Balkans states. It then compares the findings against the background of actual developments in the states, examining both practical implementation and effects on ethnicity and democratization in the states.

For the present investigation, data were collected from documents from different EU instruments include, or have included, democracy promotion for the Western Balkans. The documents are analysed with regard to EU strategies of ethnicity, democratization/democratic consolidation, inter-ethnic relations, and

various contextual factors in the states themselves. Accordingly, a "small-n" study attempts to find out more about the "what" and "why" questions in the field under investigation (for more on case studies c.f. Flick, 2008a; Gerring, 2007; George and Bennett, 2004; McKeown, 2004: 139–167; Ragin, 2004: 123–138).

The following table gives a brief overview of the EU EDP programs, the states eligible for them and the funding priorities linked to democracy- or ethnicity-related fields:

Table 2. Democracy Promotion by the European Union

Program	**Years**	**Budget (overall, incl. WB) (€)**	**Western Balkan states eligible**	**Support of democracy or ethnicity related areas**
PHARE	1989-2006	approx. 10.9 bn	AL, BiH, HR, MK, FYR (SRB, ME, KOS)	Strengthening public administration and institutions for the purpose of efficient functioning in the EU; promoting economic and social cohesion.
Tacis	1991-2006	7.3 bn	AL, BiH, HR, MK, FYR (SRB, ME, KOS)	Supporting the process of transition to market economies and democratic societies in the countries of Eastern Europe, South Caucasus and Central Asia.
OBNOVA	1996-2002	400 mn	BiH, HR, MK, SYR (ME, KOS)	(Among many others), consolidation of democracy and civil society; the return of refugees; the reintegration of refugees, strengthening of NGOs and and cultural and educational institutions.
CARDS	2000-2006	5 bn, including macro-financial assistance	AL, BiH, HR, MK, FYR/SRB, ME, KOS	(1) Reconstruction for, and return of, refugees; and (2) creation of an institutional and legislative framework to underpin democracy, the rule of law and minority rights, the development of civil society, the independence of the media and the fight against organized crime.
IPA	2007-2013	11.468 bn	AL, BiH, HR, KOS, ME, MK,	Strengthening democratic institutions; promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms and enhanced respect for minority rights; development of

			SRB	civil society.
EIDHR	2007-2013	11.2 bn	AL, BiH, HR, KOS, ME, MK, SRB	Enhancing respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms where they are most at risk and providing support and solidarity to victims of repression and abuse; strengthening the role of civil society organizations (CSO) in promoting human rights and democratic reform, developing political participation and representation, and supporting conflict prevention; supporting the international framework for the protection of human rights, the rule of law and the promotion of democracy; building confidence in democratic electoral processes through further development of electoral observation and assistance.

The analysis of program documents was conducted using qualitative content analysis[9] with the help of the text analysis software MAXQDA. For this purpose, Timothy Sisk's categorization of consociational[10] versus integrative[11] conflict-regulating practices was used to define two meta-codes each including further sub-codes (see Table 3 below).

Table 3. Codes for the Content Analysis of EU Documents

Consociationalist	Integrationist
1. Decentralization 2. Proportional representation 3. Integration based on ethnical criteria 4. Minority rights and protection	1. Disfavouring differentiation based on ethnicity, race, national minority attribution 2. Equal opportunities 3. Strengthening state power 4. Anti-discrimination 5. Human rights protection

The major EU programs promoting democracy in the Western Balkans have been PHARE, TACIS, OBNOVA, CARDS, IPA, and EIDHR.[12] These programs are

included in this analysis for the period from 1989 to 2011. The texts of the program documents were subsequently analysed in order to determine whether they include passages that correspond to one of the two meta-categories (consociational versus integrative) or their subcategories. The findings were interpreted against the background of the guiding research question. The nature of the EU program documents is assumed to allow conclusions about: (a) the program objectives, their priorities, and the development of relevant discourses over time; and (b) approaches towards democracy and ethnicity with regard to the above-illustrated categorization, as seen in changes in the programs over time.

In addition to examining the EU's EDP strategies dealing with ethnicity in the Western Balkans, this article goes one step further. Empirical evidence suggests that the program documents only allow for limited conclusions with regard to the actual implementation and the contextual factors that impact on that process.[13] In order to gain additional insight into these issues, the article uses findings from interviews in two states that are deeply divided along ethnic lines[14]—Bosnia-Herzegovina and Macedonia[15]—as a background against which to discuss the results of the document analysis.

4. Negative Side Effects and the EU's Approach towards Ethnic Diversity

This section presents the findings from the document analysis. Subsection 4.1 focuses on: (1) the content of the documents, (2) the use of terms related to the two categories (consociationalist/intergrationist), and (3) possible changes in content over time , and if and how references allude to these categories. Next, subsection 4.2 discusses the findings against the background of implementation in ethnically divided Western Balkan states.

4.1 The European Union's Dealing with Ethnicity in Democracy Promotion

During the analysis of program documents, the following results were found with regard to if or how the respective documents were related either to consociationalist

or integrative approaches. Due to the lack of space, at this point only a short summary of the findings is presented.

PHARE (1989–2006)

Western Balkan states only gained access to the PHARE program at a later stage. PHARE projects focused primarily on technical and administrative support, and the documents do not provide information about EU approaches towards ethnicity.

TACIS (1991–2006)

The TACIS program initially targeted states from the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS); however, later, Western Balkan states also became eligible. The program focused on providing technical assistance. Interestingly, however, program documents explicitly underline the importance of human rights and minority protection, stating that assistance will be 'fully effective only in the context of progress towards free and open democratic societies that respect human rights, minority rights and the rights of the indigenous people, and towards market-oriented economic systems'.[16] However, there is no mention of possible consequences in the event of shortcoming, and there are no further statements alluding to either consociational or integrative approaches for state building in the context of the EU's external democracy promotion.

OBNOVA (1996–2002)

In the OBNOVA program documents, the importance of human rights (categorized for the analysis as integrative) is underlined. There is not much reference to any issue that can really be classified as belonging to either of the two categories of analysis, except for very general references to human rights, reconciliation and return and (re)integration of refugees and displaced persons. Thus, also under OBNOVA, EU policies did not pay much attention to reflecting their own core principles, and refrained from issues of ethnicity in the target states.

CARDS (2000–2006)

CARDS was established in order to systematize the previously divided approaches between PHARE and OBNOVA. The founding document of CARDS states, again very generally, that: 'A precondition for receiving assistance is that the recipients

respect democratic principles, the rule of law, human and minority rights, fundamental freedoms and the principles of international law'.[17] The document also calls for increased regional cooperation, including between the former warring states. Thus, the documents establishing the CARDS program refer to both categories of analysis: they mention human rights and minority protection, but lean broadly towards calling for strategies closer to consociationalist approaches. In 2006, the EU issued extensive reports on the results achieved during the CARDS program in the Western Balkans, referring to consociational or integrative approaches.

For Serbia (and Montenegro), the EU's CARDS documents call for improved guarantees in human rights, the rule of law, the inclusion of IDPs and refugees, and increased decentralization, stating that the capacity of the state administration in these areas was generally sufficient, but required further development in Montenegro. In general, Serbia (and Montenegro) received a rather positive assessment by the EU.

In the case of Kosovo, the CARDS documents call for further improvement in the situation of 'minorities by ensuring the viability of minority communities and their non-discriminatory participation in Kosovo society' and 'for sustainable returns and the rights of communities already living in Kosovo'. It further stated that '[m]embers of all communities must be able to participate fully in economic, political and social life of Kosovo, and must not face threats to their security and well-being based on their ethnicity', while the implementation of anti-discrimination legislation must be promoted. The report finds success in the processes of 'return of refugees and reintegration of refugees and internally displaced persons', 'self-reliance for more beneficiaries in socio-economically disadvantaged areas', 'actions and events to promote inter-ethnic dialogue' and the development of 'the public broadcaster to operate as an independent, responsible and efficient service for all ethnic communities of Kosovo' as the latter 'significantly develops its capacity to deliver non-inflammatory accurate programming content and news for all of Kosovo's communities'.

Regarding Macedonia, the CARDS report[18] refers to ongoing goals to '[c]onsolidate democratic institutions and democratic principles and promote the application of the rule of law and good governance' and to '[s]upport the development

of social cohesion and social justice while promoting inter-ethnic integration'. It further mentions that '[t]he programme specifically addresses the recommendation of the European Partnership to implement the strategic plan for equitable representation of minorities *(Implement the Ohrid Framework Agreement)'*. The objectives of the EU are stated in the report as follows: '[to]o support the Government in the process of full implementation of the Framework Agreement. Ease inter-ethnic tensions and contribute to the consolidation of the country's political stability. To ensure substantial progress towards meeting the requirements of the Framework Agreement with respect to representation of non-majority ethnic groups in the Public Administration', in the judiciary, and in the police. Also, the 'programme specifically addresses the recommendations of the European Partnership to facilitate access to education, promote higher education for minorities and ensure that higher education in Albanian' and to 'support increased access to higher education to non-majority ethnic community representatives'. Finally, decentralization is to be increased.

In Bosnia and Herzegovina, the CARDS 2006 program had the aim of facilitating the return and 'social integration of returnees and fighting discrimination practices'. 'The European Partnership priorities calling on BiH to ensure a satisfactory level of human rights protection (in particular of minority rights, including those of Roma), to ensure comprehensive implementation of the Law on the Rights of National Minorities', and to undergo all necessary legal reforms.

Concerning Albania, the report does not provide much reference to ethnicity or related issues beyond several general references to international standards in human rights and minority rights and calls for increased decentralization.

IPA (2007–2013)

In the IPA founding document[19] the general approach remains quite similar: 'Assistance shall, where appropriate, be used in the beneficiary countries […] to support the following areas: (a) strengthening of democratic institutions, as well as the rule of law, including its enforcement; (b) the promotion and the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms and enhanced respect for minority rights, the promotion of gender equality and non-discrimination; (c) public administration reform, including the establishment of a system enabling decentralisation of

assistance management to the beneficiary country […] ; (d) economic reform; (e) the development of civil society; (f) social inclusion; (g) reconciliation, confidence-building measures and reconstruction; (h) regional and cross-border cooperation.' In the formulations, a change can be detected in how the reference is made: i.e. where documents previously mentioned human rights *and* minority protection, the IPA documents use the phrasing 'human rights *including* minority protection' (author's emphasis) —which might illustrate a shift towards a more integrative approach.

EIDHR (2007–2013)

This program, as its full name 'European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights' implies, makes a direct connection between democracy and human rights, and was a reaction to an identified need for further support in these particular areas. Its founding document[20] notes that '[d]emocracy and human rights are inextricably linked. The fundamental freedoms of expression and association are the preconditions for political pluralism and democratic process, whereas democratic control and separation of powers are essential to sustain an independent judiciary and the rule of law which in turn are required for effective protection of human rights.' It also states the aim to support 'measures to facilitate the peaceful conciliation of group interests, including support for confidence-building measures relating to human rights and democratisation'. The document explicitly points to the importance of 'the rights of indigenous peoples and the rights of persons belonging to minorities and ethnic groups'. The aims of the EIDHR are defined as 'contributing to the development and consolidation of democracy and the rule of law, and of respect for all human rights and fundamental freedoms', 'the fight against racism and xenophobia, and discrimination based on any ground including sex, race, colour, ethnic or social origin, genetic features, language, religion or belief, political or any other opinion, membership of a national minority, property, birth, disability, age or sexual orientation', and 'cooperation with civil society on sensitive human rights and democracy issues, including migrants' enjoyment of human rights, rights of asylum seekers and internally displaced persons, providing the flexibility to respond to changing circumstances or to support innovation'.

As in the IPA documents, the EIDHR program document generally mentions minority rights and the protection of minorities as being part of human rights. Nevertheless, respect for the rights of indigenous people and national minorities are underlined and, overall, the EIDHR document mentions and underlines the importance of issues that can be attributed to both major coding categories, implying a further shift in the direction of an integrative approach.

4.2 Conclusion from the Program Analysis

This section summarizes the findings from the program descriptions above. Of course, the EU documents refer to common criteria based on EU standards that must also be applicable to a large number of states. Accordingly, many formulations of the programs consist of rather general references to international economic and political standards. Nevertheless, as illustrated by the 2006 country reports from the CARDS program, at later stages the assessment of EU programs implemented in the Western Balkan became increasingly sensitive to the individual context. Accordingly, depending on the ethnic composition of the state in question (e.g. the ethnically more homogeneous Albania or post-conflict Bosnia) and depending on the degree of (non-)cooperation between different ethnic groups, implementation of the CARDS program seemed to respond to individual local needs.

Moreover, documents about the EU's Western Balkans programs show three general tendencies:

1. From TACIS onwards, the programs increasingly paid attention to ethnicity and its significance for democratization and stability. This is most likely owed to political developments and previous violent (ethno-national) conflicts in the region; it became clear after several years that this dimension could not be ignored. The political experience gained over the year years also is likely to have resulted in increased demands for the rights of ethnic groups and ethnic minorities, as well as increased awareness on the part of the EU to consider ethnicity as an important factor for further development.

2. Despite frequent accusations to the opposite, the document analysis illustrates that the EU does in fact have the ability to integrate learning processes into its programs development and implementation, i.e., it is able to develop and adapt its policies on the basis of previous experiences. Furthermore, despite frequent reproaches that the EU is not context-sensitive enough, the document analysis suggests that EU policies do take account of specific contextual issues. On the one hand EU programs mirror the existing ethnic composition and the respective power structures of the relevant states; on the other hand, where there is awareness for the need to support certain ethnic minorities (e.g. Serbs in Montenegro, Albanians in Macedonia, Roma in most of the states, etc.), general calls for to their inclusion (e.g. within the state apparatus, the police and the employment market) become part of the program documents. Overall, the program documents need to be applicable to several states, all of which are highly particular. Thus, they leave substantial room for interpretation and manoeuver with regard to their implementation, and with regard to establishing approaches towards ethnicity that increasingly lean towards integrative approaches. This in turn opens the door for context-sensitive application, as illustrated by the CARDS reports.

3. With the fading out of the CARDS program and the instigation of the IPA, the fact that both programs explicitly pay a lot of attention to the amalgamation of democracy and human rights (versus minority rights) can be seen as a direct consequence of experience, namely, that democratization proved to be a lengthier process than originally anticipated and that the ethnic composition of the region posed additional challenges that needed to be met. The chosen approach of both the IPA and the EIDHR has been to place the importance of individual human rights and the rule of law over that of ethnically defined collective rights, all the while paying attention to anti-discrimination and social inclusion measures aimed at persons belonging to minority groups. Thus, it can be concluded that from 2007 onwards the EU approach has placed a stronger emphasis on integrative over consociational approaches in its handling of ethnicity-related issues.

When considering the working reality of the EU as a multilevel actor, the results of the document analysis are not particularly surprising. A certain flexibility in the interpretation of relevant program documents not only seems highly appropriate, but even the only viable solution. The contexts in the target states—their historical, political, and social realities—are quite different from each other. Debates about the transferability of programs and objectives, and about the ability of democracy promoters to take into account the different contexts of the recipient states are not new. The debate over the need to take into account the local context has been an issue in development cooperation for about 40 years and has been discussed in the context of democracy promotion for many years.

4.3 Interpretation of the Findings: Context Factors and Implementation in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Macedonia

In order to illustrate how the EU's programs are currently implemented in the Western Balkans and to what effect, this subsection investigates two case studies in which dealing with ethno-national diversity has proven particularly challenging, namely: Bosnia and Herzegovina and Macedonia. In both states, the EU's policies are very much linked to the implementation of two peace agreements, respectively: the Dayton Peace Accords (signed in 1995) and the Ohrid Framework Agreement (signed in 2001), which installed consociational guarantees aimed at securing participation of the (biggest) ethnic communities living in both states. In this section, the findings of the document analysis are contrasted against assessments from experts in democratization regarding their implementation results. The analysis pays particular attention to outcomes related to consociational versus integrative approaches, and is structured around the following three categories: (1) consequences of the EU's structure, based on the different interests of multiple member states with different domestic interests relating to ethnicity and minority rights; (2) the technical approach of the EU versus its context-sensitive approach; and (3) the results of favoring consociationalist over integrative approaches.

Data for the case studies is taken from semi-structured interviews conducted by the author in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Macedonia between December 2009

and June 2011. Fifty-two respondents were interviewed: 27 from Macedonia, 20 from Bosnia-Herzegovina (half from both states were actors from domestic civil society, half employees of international organizations), and 5 additional international experts (working for or with international organizations dealing with external democracy promotion).

Consequences of the EU's Structure

One issue frequently mentioned in the interviews was that the EU is itself so large and diverse that it is almost impossible to have any clear and coherent agenda on ethnicity and how to deal with ethno-national issues. Instead, this has been left to other organizations (e.g. the OSCE, the UN, the UN Development Programme and private foundations) or state embassies. In many cases this division of tasks was deliberate and known to most actors in the field. It revealed that it was in fact the preferences of particular individuals (working for international organizations, embassies, etc.) in the target countries that were the most decisive factors in the choice of strategies applied. Additionally, some of the EU's foreign policy changes in the Western Balkans might not only be attributable to the growing body of experience that came from years of cooperation, but might also be based on the input of the younger EU member states that shared a common history and territory. In general, persons working for EU institutions in both states noted that the past 10 years had seen notable progress in the area of reforms that were also supported by the EU, and that such reforms were a uniting element for both states' different ethno-national groups, even if inter-ethnic tensions continued to have a significant impact on democratic processes (e.g., Caruso, 2007).

Technical Approach of the EU versus Context-Sensitive Approach

Despite remarkable initial progress in democratization from the late 1990s, since 2007/2008 the process has slowed or even stagnated. Accordingly, most interview partners expressed frustration about the "continued crisis" and ongoing hardship in economic and political areas. Blame for this was partly attributed to the decreased incentive of EU accession due to EU "enlargement fatigue" and the purported lack of capacity or interest from state actors attempting to prolong the period before accession in order to evade control of the system they were using to their own benefit (see also

Rupnik, 2011: 28). Furthermore, international interview partners viewed the existing stagnation as a consequence of the lack of capacity (or willingness) by those responsible in the target country to properly implement the laws they passed. By contrast, local interview partners interpreted low motivation for the implementation of reforms on the inept and inflexible EU programs and the technicality of their procedures.

Many of those interviewed described the political situation as one of stagnating democratization and noted the increased importance of patronage systems tied to political parties. This was blamed on the EU's focus on institutions, administrative processes and proportional representation, which created space for existing abusive structures. According to many scholars and interview partners, this has led to a strategy of "faking democracy" and "symbolic politics" among local actors and the EU and other international organizations, which provide the officially required results but nevertheless ensure that strategies can be adapted to particular interests and possibilities within the local context (compare Levitsky and Way, 2010; Bliesemann de Guevara and Kühn, 2010; Chandler, 1999). According to the interviewees, this is a consequence of EU pressure (linked to their need to illustrate the success of their programs) to show quick results, while domestic politicians in the target states are not willing to embrace the required changes and to implement reforms. Especially since 2007, incentives for local politicians to introduce unwelcome reforms have decreased, and as the possibility of EU accession has become more remote this trend has been aggravated, a problem that has been discussed in the context of repeated calls for a common EU Balkan policy (Rupnik, 2011) and the debate around the effect of EU conditionality (for more on EU conditionality see e.g. Gülnur and Bieber, 2011, Schimmelfennig and Scholz, 2008).

Results of Favouring Consociationalist Approaches

When comparing the findings from the document analysis with statements from interviews in both states, the answers ranged from a positive overall assessment of the EU's politics that resulted in significant successes, to rather negative assessments that were mostly connected to ongoing inter-ethnic tensions, notably at the political level. Interview partners overall agreed with the conclusions of the document analysis

above: the EU only developed critical approaches relatively late. This only happened after realizing that in addition to their primary focus on strengthening minority protection and participation (in a consociationalist manner) they also needed to increasingly provide incentives or pressure for cooperation between different ethno-national groups. According to one person, the problem was that the EU established ethno-nationally divided structures which have then been further institutionalized by elections, ethnic quota, and so on (with the support of the EU and other international actors), so that incentives for cooperation between groups were overshadowed by strong competition over political power and financial resources.

One interview partner even traced the change in the international community's approach from a strong emphasis on minority protection (based on the logic of collective rights) to approaches leaning more towards human rights (based on a logic of individual rights and cooperation incentives) back to one particularly negative experience: after granting substantial minority rights to ethnic Albanians in Macedonia under the Ohrid Framework Agreement, these were later used mainly to stall compromises and cooperation. Although these resulted in increased participation of Albanians in education and the police, there is still a long way to go before upward social mobility and equal rights will actually be achieved.

To date, both Bosnia and Herzegovina and Macedonia have seen strong nationalist rhetoric, mainly among politicians who can rely on nationalist categories to gain support and votes in elections. The fact that in both states the political party system is based on ethnic categories—formally in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and informally but consistently in Macedonia—very much supports that. The EU has increasingly taken the approach that politics in both state must be based on international criteria of human rights and non-discrimination, especially after the European Court for Human Rights ruled in 2009 that the fact that the right to run for office in Bosnia and Herzegovina was tied to belonging to one of the three "constituent peoples" was a human rights violation (ECtHR, 2009) or when repeatedly, until today, calling on the Macedonian government to reform their anti-discrimination policy. Nevertheless, to date, in both states the governments have not yet fully implemented all relevant reforms, despite substantial criticism by the EU, and one might wonder why the EU's leverage in these fields is today so low.

To date, it remains difficult for individual citizens in both states (in both the private and political spheres) to cooperate irrespective of ethnic belonging or across ethnic lines. By institutionalizing the rights applicable to the two respective largest ethnic groups, smaller minority groups are further disadvantaged and everyone is pushed to associate with a group based on ethnic belonging, making it difficult to create other forms of association, across ethnic divides. Today, in both states, ethno-national cleavages determine access to political resources linked to patronage networks at all political levels, from state to local administration, and determine, for instance, who gets a position as a teacher in a local school.

Furthermore, EU-promoted decentralization seems to have had the effect that 'the capital is only a showroom for the internationals', as one respondent stated. Local authorities, which are strongly linked to clientelist and patronage networks, will frequently act according to their own political agenda, and against cooperation across ethnic lines. That said, there are examples of municipalities that have developed very constructive and ethnically inclusive politics, e.g. in Gostivar in Macedonia, persons without any political affiliation become headmasters of local schools (although maybe this is precisely because of their lack of affiliation).

One area that was mentioned by every single interview partner was the education system, in which international organizations, including the EU, have supported enhanced rights for minorities to receive an education in their own language and in separate classes, or to have teaching take place in ethnically segregated shifts, so as to decrease the chance of (potential) conflict. This has had greater consequences for Macedonia, as Albanian and Macedonian are languages are far more different from one another than the three official languages of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The "two schools under one roof" policy in Bosnia and Herzegovina was disastrous, with the segregation of children merely increasing the gap between them. More recent educational reforms have specifically sought to overcome this problem. Interestingly, the same model was later introduced to Macedonia without, as some interview partners stated, proper consultation over the similar experience in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Plans to reintegrate the segregated school system were negotiated in the government but were never implemented after the early elections of 2011 changed the government's agenda.

Finally, there are areas where cooperation, especially at the local level, is possible and brings about constructive results: where issues are of common practical interest, be it in relation to the organization of the town's waste disposable system, or relate to economic cooperation or inter-ethnic cooperation funded by international organizations (as a criteria for funding), there is willingness to cooperate, which as a side effect promotes encounters and brings about cases of successful cooperation.

5. Conclusion: Side-Effects of the EU's Approach to Ethnicity in the Western Balkans

To sum up, there two striking findings from the analysis of the EU's EDP programs in the Western Balkan and how they treat ethnicity. The first is that, during strong ethnic mobilization in the Western Balkans, consideration of ethnicity in the EU's programs was very low, and only gradually increased as events showed that despite the increased passage of time since the violent conflict, inter-ethnic competition still and increasingly determined political and social life. It is only in recent years that EU program documents contain passages that call increasingly for the application of human rights approaches and the rule of law, *including* the rights of persons belonging to minority groups, such as the Roma. Additionally, however, the EU programs still underline the importance of implementation of, for example, the ethnic quota for the representation of Albanians in political institutions, public employment including the police and higher education,. that were laid down in the Ohrid Framework Agreement.

To say the least, EU programs were not able to counter the trend towards increased definition of social and political realities along ethnic lines. The EU program documents provide a general framework for specific projects chosen and implemented by local branches of EU institutions. It is not just that the general documents of the IPA and the EIDHR have developed increased sensitivity to human rights and the rule of law versus minority rights protection; rather, that sensitivity was also very much channeled from the local branches to the EU's headquarter. Accordingly, most employees of EU institutions on the ground are highly aware of current political and social inter-ethnic relations and consider the latest developments

when choosing and implementing their projects together with their local counterparts—all the while dealing with the persistently ethnically divided structures. So it is crucial that there is close follow up and that EU institutions on the ground insist on dealing with ethnicity in a constructive, and where possible integrative, way during program implementation.

To date, ethnic rhetoric and ethnic segregation have stood in the way of ongoing democratic consolidation as patronage and clientelist systems determine loyalties and careers. Even in cases where formally democratic institutions are in place, these are circumvented by the informal system.

A second striking finding of this article is that the EU documents, which are often used in content analyses in political research, do not provide much insight unless the political dynamics in and between EU member states and target states are closely considered in a contextualized analysis. This article illustrates that three main factors can be identified as having strong consequences on how the EU has dealt with ethnicity during democracy promotion in the Western Balkan states. First, the choice to prioritize democratic structures over political processes in democracy promotion is not surprising, as very complex systems must be evaluated by an enormously bureaucratic apparatus. It is left to the states to guarantee the functioning of these institutions. However, how the establishment of these structures is supposed to overcome the earlier political culture and mode of functioning in a context of extremely reduced resources is an open question that is gaining increased importance. For Solveig Richter (2009a; 2009b), support to democratic institutions, but also the focus on the Copenhagen Plus criteria, has had clear negative effects on democratic consolidation in these states. This has happened especially in cases where unclear prospects of EU accession that have led domestic politicians to shift their priorities towards increasing their domestic resources were coupled with the limited direct ability of the EU to sanction the slow movement of processes. So far it seems that only the clear and credible incentive of EU accession can convince politicians to seek their gains in EU accession and not in maximizing gains in the domestic arena, which includes putting off necessary but unpopular reforms (see, for instance, Schimmelfennig and Scholtz, 2008).

Second, individual actors and their willingness to cooperate are highly important. Due to the nature of the processes involved, it is not always easy to guarantee dialogue and involvement, and thus support from the wider public, in the target state. This may result in a loss of EU accession support among the public, which in turn decreases prospects for successful democratization reforms, as the last few years have shown.

Third and finally, a strong focus on accommodationist approaches with regard to ethnicity has stopped violent conflicts but perpetuated and cemented ethnic cleavages in political and social life. These continue to strongly interfere with democratic consolidation, at least in Kosovo, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia and to some extent in Serbia. The findings from this article support what Will Kymlicka pointed out in his 2008 article: in the last 20 years, in the context of the (partially violent) ethnic reconfiguration of the Western Balkans, EU institutions in particular have shifted their approaches increasingly from favouring more consociational/accommodationist, particular-rights supportive, to supporting increasingly integrative/integrationist, universal individual rights-supportive, approaches (Kymlicka, 2008: 1–32; see also Caruso, 2007).

However, so far, insufficient attention has been paid to the "substance" or "software" side of state building that goes beyond institutions. Social and cultural elements underpin state institutions and are crucial to ensuring their functioning, and are all the more important during democratic consolidation (comp. Bieber, 2005). Additionally, and not surprisingly, the extent to which domestic actors adapt external democracy promotion to their own social realities and obligations, thus affecting the process and impact of programs, is often underestimated (Bliesemann de Guevara, Kühn 2010).

The implementation of the EU's programs thus strongly depends on contextual factors, such as: the history of interethnic relations; previously granted minority rights or even power-sharing arrangements; personal individual experience, priorities and preferences of the staff of EU programs, of organizations being funded, and of the domestic politicians including their existing options and interests. As a consequence,

EU programs and outcomes in the respective states are more contextual than the wording of the documents may suggest.

New approaches are needed that, on the one hand, guarantee the protection and participation of minorities, but at the same time foster cooperation across ethnic cleavages. External actors such as the EU should provide incentives for domestic elites and individual citizens to cooperate on common solutions to political and economic questions instead of clinging to ethnically based patronage systems (comp. Sisk, 2003: 139-150; Roeder and Rothschild, 2005); and to push domestic actors in the target states to provide new elements of common identification (see e.g., Ivie and Waters, 2010).

In conclusion, it can be said that EU programs have been very slow to take up the delicate issue of dealing with ethnicity directly in their external democracy promotion. It remains to be seen whether the EU can and wishes to foster cooperation across the currently still strong ethnic division lines. This approach once resulted in both conflict settlement and positive self-determination of previously discriminated ethnic groups. Nevertheless, it has also led to protracted ethnicized political competition and diminished the state's ability to govern.

The recent stagnation in, or even retrogressive, democratic consolidation, not only in the Western Balkans but in other post-communist and post-socialist states, calls for increased focus on the actual functioning of the existing democratic structures. The difficulties facing the EU as a multilevel player to come up with a clear and new agenda that increases incentives to de-ethnicize politics are understandable, but this is a necessary step that the EU conditionality process must lock in.[21] However, the risk of further concentrating on institutions without taking into account and fostering their democratic functioning are illustrated in the current slowing down of democratization processes and ongoing ethnic politics in the EU's neighbourhood states. The debate over the possible side effects and do-no-harm principle of democracy promotion can contribute to answering these questions.

Notes

[1] In this article the term "international community" is used as a basket term, referring to the plethora of national, international, intergovernmental, etc. large organizations coming from outside the target countries. Allcock rightly points out that the term 'community' in this context seems misleading, as the loose coalition of state and non-state structures does not correspond to the sociological notion of "community" (2004: 26).

2 According to Grävingholt, Leininge and Schlumberger (2010: 2): '"democracy promotion" comprises all non-military means of (re)establishing or strengthening a democratic political order. While a distinction is often made between "democracy assistance" (in the sense of direct, positive measures) and "democracy promotion" (which may also include negative military and/or economic incentives or coercion), we use the term in this paper in the (non-military) sense […] . Democracy promotion comprises such activities as support for democratic institutions (e.g. parliaments) and procedures (e.g. elections), human rights, the rule of law and civic education. Donors use sets of instruments that include measures in support of democratic processes that are negative (e.g. conditions attached to loans and grants), positive (e.g. aid to civil society), direct (e.g. capacity-building with parliamentarians) and indirect (e.g. promotion of fiscal transparency).'

3 Due to limited space at this point it is beyond the scope of this article to present an in-depth discussion of so-called "hybrid regimes", "states in the gray zone", "defective" or other "democracies with adjectives" and the implications and criticism of these concepts (c.f. for example Collier and Levitsky, 1997: 430–451; Diamond, 2002: 21–35, 1986, 2002). The terms are used interchangeably in this article.

4 For the purposes of the European Union's foreign policy the "Western Balkans" comprise the following states: Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Kosovo, Macedonia, Montenegro, and Serbia (European Commission, 2011).

5 See for example Cederman and Girardin 2007: 173–185; Easterly, 2001: 687–706; Reilly, 2000: 162–185; Bunce and Watts, 2006; Chandra, 2005: 235–252; Francis, 1965; Jarstad, 2008b; Lepsius, 1986: 751–759; Pfaff-Czarnecka, 2004: 49–68; Pridham, 2005, 2001a; Reilly, 2000: 162–185, 2001; Smooha and Järve, 2005; Alesina *et al*., 2003: 155–194; Fearon and Laitin, 2003: 75–90; Fearon, 2003: 195–222; Laitin and Posner, 2001.

6 C.f. European Commission, 2010.

7 For more on democracy and democratic consolidation see, for exemple, Freedom House, 2010; Zinecker, 2007: 1–33; Diamond, 2002: 21–35; Merkel, 2004: 33–58; Lauth and Merkel, 1997: 12–34; Carothers, 2002: 5–21.

8 For a good exemplary comparative overview of the two approaches see, for example, Vetterlein, 2010 and Sisk, 2003.

9 For more on qualitative content analysis see Mayring, 2002, 2003; Wirth, 2001, for a discussion on explorative coding see Kruse, 2008.

10 Timothy Sisk gives five major points he considers most characteristic of consociationalist agreements: (1) granting territorial autonomy and creating confederal arrangements; (2) creating a polycommunal, or ethnic, federation; (3) adopting group proportional representation in administration appointments, including consensus decision rules in the executive; (4) adopting a highly proportional electoral system in a parliamentary framework; (5) acknowledging group rights or corporate (nonterritorial) federalism (1996).
11 For the integrative approach, Sisk also presents five main points that are relevant in solutions in this vein: (1) creating a mixed, or non-ethnic, federal structure; (2) establishing an inclusive, centralized unitary state; (3) adopting majoritarian but ethnically neutral, or non-ethnic, executive, legislative, and administrative decision-making bodies; (4) adopting a semi-majoritarian or semi-proportional electoral system that encourages the formation of pre-election coalitions (vote pooling) across ethnic divides; (5) devising ethnicity-blind public policies (1996).
12 The full names for the programs are 'Poland and Hungary: Aid for Restructuring of the Economies' (PHARE), 'Technical Assistance to the Commonwealth of Independent States' (TACIS), 'Reconstruction' (OBNOVA), 'Community Assistance for Reconstruction, Development and Stabilisation ' (CARDS), 'Instrument for Pre-accession' (IPA), 'European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights' (EIDHR).
13 During interviews with the author, officials from various professional backgrounds were frequently surprised when confronted with scholars who take the content of the program documents as literal intentions. They also tend to very much neglect the fact that omissions, phrasing and implicit meaning often say more about the intentions of implementation than the written text itself.
14 Unfortunately, due to limited space an extensive discussion of the concept and implications of ethnic divisions and ethnic fragmentations cannot be given here. For more discussion of "ethnic fragmentation", see for example Alesina *et al.,* 2003; or Collier, 2001; Reilly, 2000; Bjørnskov, 2008, Vetterlein, 2010.
15 The other Western Balkan states have struggled, and in some cases continue to struggle, with questions concerning, among others, minority protection, discrimination and ethnic claims. However, their state context and (more homogeneous) ethnic composition have provided more favorable conditions to deal with ethnic diversity, both for domestic elites and the European Union institutions (Bieber 2004a, 2004 b; Belloni, 2009: 313–331).
16 See European Council, Regulation EURATOM No 99/2000, 29 December 1999.
17 European Council, Regulation No 2666/2000 of 5 December 2000 on assistance for Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, repealing Regulation (EC) No 1628/96 and amending Regulations (EEC) No 3906/89 and (EEC) No 1360/90 and Decisions 97/256/EC and 1999/311/EC.
18 CARDS Assistance to the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Multi-annual Indicative Programme 2005-6, ANNEX 1(a).
19 European Council, Regulation No 1085/2006 of 17 July 2006 establishing an Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance (IPA).
20 European Council, Regulation No 1889/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 December 2006 on establishing a financing instrument for the promotion

of democracy and human rights worldwide.
22 For more on the interplay of EU conditionality and ethno-nationalist rhetoric see, e.g., Džihić and Wieser, 2011.

References

Alesina, A., A. Devleeschauwer, W. Easterly, S. Kurlat, and R. Warcziag. 'Fractionalization'. *Journal of Economic Growth* 2 (2003): 155–194.

Allcock, J. B. 'Comeback Dayton! All is Forgiven!'. In *Dayton and Beyond. Perspectives on the Future of Bosnia-Herzegovina*, eds. C. Solioz and T.K. Vogel, 25–36. Baden-Baden, Nomos, 2004.

Anderson, M. B. *Do No Harm: How Aid Can Support Peace – or War*. Boulder; London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1999.

Aybet, G. and F. Bieber. 'From Dayton to Brussels: The Impact of EU and NATO Conditionality on State Building in Bosnia and Hercegovina'. *Europe-Asia Studies* 10 (2011): 1911–1937.

Belloni, R. 'European Integration and the Western Balkans: Lessons, Prospects and Obstacles'. *Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies* 3 (2009): 313–331.

Bendeland, P., A. Croissant, and F. Rüb. *Zwischen Demokratie und Diktatur*. Opladen: VS, 2002.

Bieber, F. 'Minority Rights in Practice in South Eastern Europe, Discussion Paper', 2004a. http://www.kbs-frb.be/uploadedFiles/KBS-FRB/Files/Verslag/MRP_discussion_paper.pdf.

_____ 'Institutionalizing Ethnicity in the Western Balkans Managing Change in Deeply Divided Societies'. ECMI Working Paper 19, 2004b. http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/UNTC/UNPAN015487.pdf. _____ 'External De - and Re -construction of Multiethnic States: The Case of Bosnia-Herzegovina, 2005'. http://fbieber.files.wordpress.com/2009/02/2005-cornell.pdf.

Bjørnskov, C. 'Social Trust and Fractionalization: A Possible Reinterpretation'. *European Sociological Review* 3 (2008): 271–283.

Bliesemann de Guevara, B. and F. P. Kühn. *Illusion Statebuilding. Warum sich der westliche Staat so schwer importieren lässt.* Hamburg: Edition Körber-Stiftung, 2010.

Bunce, V., and S. Watts. 'Managing Diversity and Sustaining Democracy: Ethnofederal versus Unitary States in the Postsocialist World'. Washington, D.C.: National Council for Eurasian and East European Research, 2006. http://www.ucis.pitt.edu/nceeer/2005_819-03g_Bunce2.pdf.

Carothers, T. 'The End of the Transition Paradigm'. *Journal of Democracy* 1 (2002): 5–21.

Caruso, U. 'Interplay between the Council of Europe, OSCE, EU and NATO', 2007 . http://www.eurac.edu/en/research/institutes/imr/Documents/ReportoninterplayWEB.pdf.

Cederman, L.-E., and L. Girardin. 'Beyond Fractionalization: Mapping Ethnicity onto Nationalist Insurgencies'. *American Political Science Review* 1 (2007): 173–185.

Chandler, D. *Bosnia. Faking Democracy after Dayton*. London/Sterling, Virginia: Pluto Press, 1999.

Chandra, K. 'Ethnic Parties and Democratic Stability'. *Perspective on Politics* 2 (2005): 235–252.

Collier, D. 'Implications of Ethnic Diversity'. *Economic Policy* 32 (2001): 127–155.

Collier, D. and S. Levitsky. 'Democracy with Adjectives: Conceptual Innovation in Comparative Research'. *World Politics* 3 (1997): 430–451.

Collier, P., P. Honohan, and K. O. Moene. 'Implications of Ethnic Diversity'. *Economic Policy* 32 (2001): 129–166.

Diamond, L. 'Thinking About Hybrid Regimes'. *Journal of Democracy* 2 (2002): 21–35.

Džihić, V., and A. Wieser. 'Incentives for Democratisation? Effects of EU Conditionality on Democracy in Bosnia & Hercegovina'. *Europe-Asia Studies* 10 (2011): 1803–1825.

Easterly, W. 'Can Institutions Resolve Ethnic Conflict?' *Economic Development and Cultural Change* 4 (2001): 687–706.

European Commission. 'The Stabilisation and Association Process'. http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/enlargement_process/accession_process/how_does_a_country_join_the_eu/index_en.htm. Updated October 2011.

——— 'Western Balkans'. Updated July 2012. http://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/customs/customs_duties/rules_origin/preferential/article_784_en.htm.

European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR). Grand Chamber. *Sejdić and Finci v. Bosnia and Herzegovina*. Judgment, 22 December 2009.

Fearon, J. D. 'Ethnic and Cultural Diversity by Country'. *Journal of Economic Growth* 2 (2003): 195–222.

——— and D. D. Laitin. 'Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War'. *American Political Science Review* 1 (2003): 75–90.

Flick, U., E. von Kardorff, and I. Steinke. *Qualitative Forschung. Ein Handbuch, 6th edition* Reinbek bei Hamburg: Rowohlt, 2008.

Francis, E. *Ethnos und Demos. Soziologische Beiträge zur Volkstheorie*. Berlin: Duncker and Humblot, 1965.

Freedom House. 'Nations in Transit. Year to Year Democracy Score'. 2010. http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=551.

George, A. and A. Bennett. *Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences*. Cambridge, London: MIT Press, 2004.

Gerring, J. *Case Study Research*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007.

Grävingholt, J., J. Leininger, and O. Schlumberger. ‚Demokratieförderung: Quo vadis?' *APuZ* 8 (2009): 28–33.

_____ 'The Three Cs of Democracy Promotion Policy: Context, Consistency and Credibility'. Briefing Paper 1/2009, Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik. http://www.die-gdi.de/CMS-Homepage/openwebcms3_e.nsf/%28ynDK_contentByKey%29/ANES-7QAH6E/$FILE/BP%201.2009.pdf.

Horowitz, D. L. 'Making Moderation Pay: The Comparative Politics of Ethnic Conflict Managament'. In *Conflict and Peacemaking in Multiethnic Societies*, ed. J. M. Montville, 451–475. New York: Lexington, 1990.

_____ 'Constitutional Design: Proposals vs. Processes'. In *The Architecture of Democracy. Constitutional Design, Conflict Management, and Democracy*, ed. A. Reynolds, 15-36. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002.

_____ *Ethnic Groups in Conflict*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1985.

Howard, I. 'Mistakes Donors Make'. Unpublished Manuscript. Sarajevo, 2009.

Ivie, R. L., and W. T. Waters. 'Discursive Democracy and the Challenge of State Building in Divided Societies: Reckoning with Symbolic Capital in Bosnia and

Herzegovina'. *Nationalities Papers* 4 (2010): 449–468.

Jarstad A. K. and T.D. Sisk. *From War to Democracy*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008.

Jünemann, A., and M. Knodt. *Externe Demokratieförderung durch die Europäische Union*. Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2007.

Kruse, J. *Einführung in die qualitative Interviewforschung*. Freiburg: Unveröffentlichter Reader, 2008.

Kymlicka, W. 'The Internationalization of Minority Rights'. *International Journal of Constitutional Law* 1 (2008): 1–32.

Laitin, D., and D. Posner. 'The Implications of Constructivism for Constructing Ethnic Fractionalization Indices'. Published in APSA-CP: The Comparative Politics Newsletter 12, Winter 2001. http://www.sscnet.ucla.edu/polisci/faculty/posner/pdfs/imp_of_const_b.pdf.

Lauth, H.-J. and W. Merkel. 'Zivilgesellschaft und Transformation. Ein Diskussionsbeitrag in revisionistischer Absicht'. *Forschungsjournal Neue Soziale Bewegungen* 1 (1997): 12–34.

Lepsius, M. R. '"Ethnos" und "Demos". Zur Anwendung zweier Kategorien von Emerich Francis auf das nationale Selbstverständnis der Bundesrepublik und auf die Europäische Einigung'. *Kölner Zeitschrift für Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie* 4 (1986): 751–759.

Levitsky, S., and L. A. Way. *Competetive Authoritarianism. Hybrid Regimes After the Cold War*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010.

Lijphart, A. 'Consociational Democracy'. *World Politics* 2 (1969): 207–225.

_____ *Democracy in Plural Societies: A Comparative Exploration*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1977.

Marshall, M. G. and K. Jaggers. 'Polity IV Project'. http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm.

Mayring, P. *Einführung in die qualitative Sozialforschung. Eine Anleitung zu qualitativem Denken*. Basel: Beltz, 2002.

_____ *Inhaltsanalyse: Grundlagen und Techniken*. Weinheim/Basel: Beltz, 2003.

McKeown, T. J. 'Case Studies and the Limits of the Quantitative Worldview'. In *Rethinking Social Inquiry. Diverse Tools, Shared Standards*, eds. H. Brady and

D. Collier, 139–167. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2004.

Merkel, W. 'Embedded and Defective Democracies'. *Democratization* 5 (2004): 33–58.

O'Donnell, G., P. Schmitter and L. Whitehead. *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986.

_____ 'Illusions about Consolidation'. *Journal of Democracy* 2 (1996): 34–51.

Pfaff-Czarnecka, J. 'Demokratisierung und Nation-Building in "geteilten Gesellschaften". In *Nation-Buidling: Ein Schlüsselkonzept für friedliche Konfliktbearbeitung?,* ed. Jochen Hippler, 49–68. Bonn: Stiftung Entwicklung und Frieden, 2004.

Pridham, G. *Designing Democracy. EU Enlargment and Regime Change in Post-Communist Europe*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005.

——— and A. Àgh. *Prospects of Democratic Consolidation in East-Central Europe*. Manchester, New York: Manchester University Press, 2001.

Ragin, Charles C. 'Turning the Tables: How Case-Oriented Research Challenges Variable-Oriented Research'. In *Rethinking Social Inquiry. Diverse Tools, Shared Standards*, eds. H. Brady and D. Collier, 123–138. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2004.

Reilly, B. 'Democracy, Ethnic Fragmentation, and Internal Conflict. Confused Theories, Faulty Data, and the "Crucial Case" of Papua New Guinea'. *International Security* 3 (2000): 162–185.

_____ *Democracy in Divided Societies: Electoral Engineering for Conflict Management*. Cambridge, M.A.: Cambridge University Press, 2001.

Richter, S. *Zur Effektivität externer Demokratisierung. Die OSZE in Südosteuropa als Partner, Mahner, Besserwisser?* Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2009a.

_____ 'Zielkonflikte der EU-Erweiterungspolitik? Kroatien und Makedonien zwischen Stabilität und Demokratie'. SWP-Studie 2009/S 19, 2009b.

Roeder, P. G., and D. Rothschild. *Sustainable Peace: Power and Democracy After Civil Wars*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2005.

Rupnik, J. 'The Balkans as a European Question'. In *The Western Balkans and the EU: 'The Hour of Europe'*, ed. J. Rupnik, 17–30. Chaillot Papers June 2011, Institute for Security Studies, 2011. http://www.iss.europa.eu/uploads/media/cp126-The_Western_Balkans_and_the_EU.pdf.

Saideman, S. *The Ties That Divide: Ethnic Politics, Foreign Policy, and International*. New York: Columbia University Press, 2001.

Schimmelfennig, F., and H. Scholtz, 'EU Democracy Promotion in the European Neighbourhood. Political Conditionality, Economic Development and Transnational Exchange'. *European Union Politics* 2 (2008): 187–215.

Schraeder, P. J. *Exporting Democracy. Rhetoric vs. Reality*. London: Lynne Rienner, 2000.

Sisk, T. D. *Power Sharing and International Mediation in Ethnic Conflicts*. Washington, D.C., New York: United States Institute of Peace Press, Carnegie Corporation, 1996.

_____ 'Power-sharing after Civil Wars: Matching Problems to Solutions'. In *Contemporary Peace Making. Conflict, Violence and Peace Processes*, eds. J. Darby and R. Ginty, 139–150. London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003.

Smooha, S.and P. Järve. 'The Fate of Ethnic Democracy in Post-Communist Europe', Series on Ethnopolitics and Minority Issues, Vol. III. Local Government and Public Service Reform Initiative. http://soc.haifa.ac.il/~s.smooha/download/SmoohaJarveBookEthDemoPostCommunistEurope.pdf.

Taras, R. and R. Ganguly. *Understanding Ethnic Conflict*. New York: Longman, 2006.

Vetterlein, M. *Konfliktregulierung durch power-sharing-Modelle: das Fallbeispiel der Republik Makedonien*. Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2010.

W. Wirth, and E. Lauf. *Inhaltsanalyse: Perspektiven, Probleme, Potentiale*. Köln: Herbert von Halem, 2001.

Youngs, R. 'What has Europe been Doing?' *Journal of Democracy* 2 (2008): 160–169.

Zinecker, H. 'Regime-Hybridity and Violent Civil Societies in Fragmented Societies: Conceptual Considerations', 2007. http://www.einaudi.cornell.edu/PeaceProgram/publications/ occasional_papers/Zinecker-final.pdf.