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## **Turkish and European Union Interests in a Cyprus Settlement**

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*Turkish membership in the European Union (EU) is, like the alternative Islamic and Turanian options, more about permanent friendships than permanent interests. Defining European interests might now be seen in a historical development from national to milieu interests. Turkish interests in a Cyprus settlement are discussed in terms of the impact on the integrity of the Turkish state and economic interests. European interests are in creating peace in the Eastern Mediterranean and in taking seriously its new self-definition as a multicultural and security actor protecting minorities and human rights. A possible way forward from the present impasse on the island is for an international conference to define a new framework settlement, modelled on the Israeli-Palestine agreement on Jerusalem in 1995.*

## **I. Introduction**

*On the principle that countries do not have permanent friends, but only permanent interests, Turkish diplomacy had done a remarkably effective job. (Hale 2000: 102)*

As for individuals, the maxim that states have permanent interests means different things in different contexts. Hale invokes it here in the context of defending the Turkish Republic's policy of neutrality in the Second World War until Turkey allied with the United Nations in February 1945. But the book from which the quotation is taken – on Turkish policy from 1770 to 2000 – can also be read as an account of how the end of the Ottoman Empire and the construction of a modern republic carried with the change of unit a very different understanding of Turkish interests. Secondly, as the international context changes, so do interests.

The Cyprus story illustrates the well-understood change from the imperial concept to that of the nation-state, and the less secure change in Europe from a framework of national interests to what might tentatively be called a European milieu interest. At a general level, it is indisputable that the Cyprus question had a different meaning when the interests at stake were those of empires – Ottoman, Russian, Austrian, British, French and German. The Sultan's lease of Cyprus to the British Empire had nothing to do with

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Cypriot self-determination. As late as 1958 the British decision to deploy 40,000 troops in Cyprus, and to employ disproportionate numbers of Turkish Cypriots as policemen, were intended to crush a nationalist liberation movement in a colony.

After 1960, British actions, in common with other European countries, were based on a narrowly defined concept of national interest. This transition was blurred by the continued presence of British soldiers on the sovereign bases, an imperial anachronism, and in the United Nations peacekeeping force. However, the major determinants of UK policy are no longer British imperial interests, but rather the protection of British citizens, British commercial interests and Britain's relationship with the USA. In the event of war over Cyprus, the British will evacuate their nationals – tourists, residents and soldiers. In 1974 they did not risk British lives in protecting the Cyprus constitution from either Greek or Turkish attack; and in the previous decade had allowed the Greek Cypriot majority and Turkish Cypriot minority to accelerate the trend away from mixed villages. Britain chose to interpret its Guarantor status as a source of rights, rather than duties (James 1998: 16). Today the 40,000 non-Cypriot troops presently in Cyprus are there for reasons of Greek and Turkish and British national interests.

The claim that since the end of the Cold War the framework of relations among European nation-states has been transformed from one solely based on national interests to one that is also based on a common milieu interest is more contentious. It makes more sense to the countries of Western Europe, where no country expects war with its neighbours, than in the Eastern Mediterranean where every country prepares for war with all its neighbours. The milieu concept is that the fifteen nation states constituting the European Union (EU) have become an effective guarantor of the borders, democratic regimes and minority rights of European states. The applicants for EU membership in Eastern Europe have adapted to West European norms in trade, pluralist political parties and human rights for the same benefits that the ex-fascist states of Greece, Spain and Portugal have already received from membership. The reunified Germany has subsumed the Deutsche Mark in the Euro. Instead of dominating an anarchic Eastern Europe, Germany has been the strongest advocate of an enlarged and institutionalised Europe, deliberately prioritising milieu goals. Greece, in the Kosovo and Macedonian conflicts, similarly subordinated its national identification with Serbia and Russia to a common

European policy. Since the disasters in Srebrenica and Rwanda, European statesmen have recognized that, if there is to be a multicultural Europe worthy of the name, they have a duty to risk their soldiers in conflicts where their national interests are not involved. Turkey has offered 5,000 troops for an EU Rapid Reaction Force for humanitarian operations where Washington is unwilling to commit its troops. The European Union, for these various reasons, has thus become a more important regional security actor than NATO (Wæver 2000: 262). This is not to deny that nationalism since 1989 has been both powerful and unpredictable, and that it is possible to interpret what I have called a duty as no more than enlightened national interest.

Two further introductory points are relevant. This article is written from the perspective that Turkish membership would benefit the EU and Turkey. The European Union is precisely about having permanent friends, each bound by the principle of solidarity to help other member states in difficulties, whether or not those difficulties are of their own making. European solidarity is much more far-reaching than the membership of the NATO alliance to which Turkey has been committed since 1952. It is also relevant that two of Turkey's alternatives to the European Union also envisage permanent friends. Mr Erbakan was interested in promoting the solidarity of the Organization of Islamic countries, and Mr Korkmaz Haktanır's speech in Northern Cyprus about a possible Union of Turkic republics envisages future solidarity among Turkic-speaking peoples (Brewin 2002: 10).

Secondly, national interests are defined by the government of the day. Hitler's understanding of German national interest differed markedly both from that of Konrad Adenauer in post-war West Germany and Walther Ulbricht in East Germany. The election of Chancellor Gerhard Schröder in Germany put Turkey's candidature on the EU agenda in place of the preference for a stable framework short of membership preferred by the Christian Democrat and Social Democrat Chancellors who preceded him in Bonn. In the September 2002 election in Germany, the Social Democrats are unlikely to make an issue of Mr Stoiber's opposition to Turkey's candidature. At the time of writing, July 2002, Turkey is expected to go to the polls in November, to the dismay of all the parties in the government coalition. If İsmail Cem's new party and Tayyip Erdoğan's party do well, this may yet improve Turkey's membership prospects.

It is time to look more closely at the separate and common interests of Turkey and the European Union in a settlement of the conflict in Cyprus between two mutually suspicious communities/societies who have been physically separated for two generations.

## **II. Turkish interests in a Cyprus settlement**

*When we consider*

*The importancy of Cyprus to the Turk,  
And let ourselves again but understand,  
That as it more concerns the Turk than Rhodes  
So may he with more facile question bear it;*

Shakespeare, *Othello*

On 29 March 2002, Mesut Yilmaz, Turkey's deputy Prime Minister in charge of relations with the European Union told the *Turkish Daily News* that “[Turkish] membership of the EU cannot be linked to the settlement of the Cyprus problem, a position which has been put on record in the relevant EU documents”. Heinz Kramer has documented Turkey's long-standing refusal officially to discuss a Cyprus settlement with the European Union (Kramer 2002). For example, in April 1987 Mesut Yilmaz as foreign minister refused to attend the meeting of the Turkey-EEC Association Council immediately following the Turkish application for membership. His problem was that, at Greek instigation, the introductory remarks of the German EC Presidency referred to the Cyprus problem as affecting European relations with Turkey. Having made the point that Cyprus should not be a topic on the formal agenda, Mr Yilmaz then discussed the problem at dinner. In March 1995, the EU foreign ministers at a General Affairs Council overcame the Greek veto on the final stages of the Customs Union with Turkey. At the dinner following the simultaneous but separate meeting of the EU-Turkey Association Council, the Turkish foreign minister, Murat Karayalçin, refused publicly to accept that a package deal had been made. Instead he sought to counter Turkish Cypriot and Turkish charges that he was betraying Turkish interests by finalising a Customs Union with the EU, knowing that Greece had obtained from its fellow-members a date for opening the EU accession process with Cyprus. As a non-member, Mr Karayalçin had not been a party to this

agreement. However, he made it clear that Turkey, in the absence of a Cyprus settlement, would match the steps integrating Southern Cyprus with the EU by integrating Northern Cyprus with Turkey (Brewin 2000: ch. 1). Turkey's official policy of refusing to discuss Cyprus with the EU was also a factor in its own accession process. In December 1999, Mr Bülent Ecevit did not accept the Helsinki summit offer of candidacy status until a letter from the EU Presidency had been received in Ankara. This letter is not in the public domain, but it can be inferred that the Presidency promised that the Cyprus issue would only be discussed behind closed doors in the first stage of the Accession Partnership. Prime Minister Ecevit told the Anatolian Agency on 20 July 2001 that the EU representatives "saw how sensitive we were about some foreign issues and national matters...they flew to Ankara by a private plane at midnight and said words which meant they would not make us uneasy about these issues". The Commission did not include progress in Cyprus among the short-term aims for the Accession Partnership with Turkey. When the Council inserted this demand, Ankara announced that it might have to re-assess its relations, a coded threat of withdrawal from the accession process (Brewin 2002: 23). Given that Ankara has every reason to think that Greece would not be alone in refusing to contemplate Turkish EU membership unless there is a settlement of the Cyprus dispute, it is plain that Turkish diplomats and public opinion hold that Turkey's national interests are at stake. In November 2001, the Turkish Grand National Assembly held its tenth secret session devoted to the Cyprus issue. All the political parties agreed a national pact on Cyprus categorizing it as a national issue involving "Turkey's vital national and strategic interests" (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2000). The claim that EU membership generally, and the Cyprus issue particularly, puts at risk the integrity of the Turkish state is discussed in the next section, followed by a short review of economic interests at stake.

#### *Integrity of the state*

Unlike Scandinavian or Central European states, Turkey's application for membership of the European Union is understood in Turkey as 'Westernisation'. Its purpose is to strengthen the creation of the modern, territorial, secular and Jacobin republic envisaged by Ataturk. Turkish leaders describe EU membership as a further stage in securing

Western recognition of their equal standing, as founder member of the UN, full member of NATO and of the Council of Europe, Associate of Western European Union. Unlike, say, France, Turkish leaders do not distinguish sharply between Americanization and Europeanization. In contrast to the Greek emphasis on their cultural identification as the fount of democracy and European civilization, Turks do not stress their European heritage as the location of Roman, early Christian and Byzantine artefacts. They prefer to recall that, where Britain and France categorized Turkey as a Middle Eastern country, American pressure secured Turkish membership of NATO, linked to SACEUR, the American Supreme Allied Commander Europe. American pressure similarly helped reverse the Luxembourg Council's rejection of Turkey's EU candidature, and overcome the Greek and Swedish opposition expressed at the Cologne summit of 1999, the summit before Helsinki.

As the purpose of membership is to strengthen the state, it follows that a great deal of the Turkish opposition to membership focuses on those aspects of Europeanization that might undermine the ability of the state to enforce its authority against what Charles de Gaulle in the French context called 'les éléments de dispersion'. Military leaders are not alone in fearing that European demands for civilian control will undermine the capacity of the National Security Council to act decisively against Islamic and Kurdish threats to the secular and indivisible state. The EU demand that political parties be allowed greater freedom of expression carries with it the real possibility that a Kurdish party will promote the secession of South East Turkey, and that an Islamic party will promote distancing from European secular norms. The decisions of the Strasbourg European Court of Human Rights within Turkey have been particularly salient in Turkey. The long-running civil war, and the long-standing identification of judiciary and the police with state repression of dissent, have provided plenty of cases. A second reason is that the acceptance of extra-territorial judicial oversight took place over a long period in Western Europe and has been more sudden in Turkey. The Loizidou verdict, finding that Turkey was the occupying power in Northern Cyprus and therefore responsible for compensating Greek Cypriots for loss of rights and psychological harm, was widely interpreted in Turkey as a political case making a settlement with the Greek Cypriots more difficult. On the other side are those who think that it is in Turkey's interest to reform its political and judicial

system for its own sake, to make Turkey the kind of republic to which Kurdish and Islamist parties could choose to be loyal.

Cyprus has become a national issue for Turkey. At one end of the spectrum are those who consider that Turkey would be stronger if the Cyprus dispute ceased to be a thorn poisoning relations with Greece, complicating all its international relations, and burdening the budget with the costs of troop deployment and corrupting subsidies to the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) budget. At the other end of the spectrum are the more public expressions of a stance which denies the legitimacy of the Greek Cypriot government, and regards the costs of supporting the TRNC as cheap in protecting Turkey's existing borders and in protecting the 200,000 Turks and Turkish Cypriots in Cyprus. Prime Minister Ecevit frequently claims that he brought peace to Cyprus in 1974; Foreign Minister İsmail Cem's rapprochement with Greek Foreign Minister George Papandreu has so far not been extended to the Cyprus and Aegean issues (Turkish Daily News, 14 December 1999).

In terms of kith and kin, President Denktash of Northern Cyprus has been able to make claims quite unlike those of the Bulgarian or Thracian Turkish minorities. In 1999 he defended his claim that the TRNC constitutes a state,

Turkish Cypriots on Cyprus have established a state. It cannot be a nation-state, because there is no Turkish Cypriot nation. A Turkish Cypriot is the extension of Turkey in Cyprus. So we are Turks, of Cyprus.... We are Turks, as Turks of Anatolia are; but because our geography is Cyprus, we are Turkish Cypriots. If you were to organize Turkey on a geographical basis you would call a Turk from Erzerum an 'Erzerum Turk' (Güven-Lisaniler and Rodriguez 2002: 183).

The logic of equating Cyprus Turks with Erzerum Turks is that, as happened with Hatay, the TRNC could decide in a referendum to become a province of Turkey. Proud of being Anatolian, the electorally popular President of the TRNC is unconcerned that national officials from Turkey have authority in every ministry of the independent Turkish Cypriot state. The Turkish forces and the Turkish Cypriot troops, the fire brigade and the police, are all commanded by Turkish nationals; (just as in the internationally recognized Republic of Cyprus, the National Guard and the Greek troops have commanders from the Greek mainland). Again Mr Denktash does not insist that he be treated on his frequent

visits to the only country that recognizes the TRNC with the protocol due to a foreign head of state.

On the other hand, his Turkish patriotism may have been decisive in keeping a public silence when Prime Minister Tansu Çiller decided that it was in Turkey's national interest in March 1995 to complete the Customs Union with the EU, knowing the price exacted by Greece on Cyprus. Moreover many Turkish Cypriots do not share this sense of total identification with Anatolia. While the programme of the political party which regularly receives the most votes in Northern Cyprus, the UBP, agrees that the "Turkish Cypriot people are an indivisible part of the Turkish nation", the opposition CTP wants to preserve the Turkish Cypriot community against immigrants from places like Erzerum. Its political programme states that "the inflow of foreigners prevents the shaping of a Turkish Cypriot will and threatens their existence" (Güven-Lisaniler and Rodriguez 2002: 187). Whatever their birthplace, most Turkish Cypriots want to retain their dominance in the North, with a Turkish presence. Hence the widespread objection to being categorized as a minority, and now officially to being categorized as a community. Forty years have passed since Turkish Cypriots dealt with their Greek Cypriot compatriots as neighbours. They fear rule by a Greek Cypriot majority; they fear that free movement for individuals and groups would lead to confrontations fuelled by property claims and hatred.

A final point on Turkish identification with Northern Cypriots as a national issue is more ideological. In 1974, Kemalists of all political parties supported the 'Peace operation' in Cyprus. They did not object to the partition of Cyprus on the grounds that Ataturk had denied any Turkish responsibility for the welfare of Turks outside the frontiers claimed in 1923. There was more unease in 1983 when Mr Denktash formally seceded from the Republic of Cyprus by establishing the TRNC when the new civilian administration of Mr Özal was still weak, and the support of the Turkish ambassador was doubtful. But some Kemalists might well oppose nationalist opinion if the issue was the integration of Northern Cyprus into Turkey as a riposte to the accession of the Republic of Cyprus to the European Union. Faced with the end of the EU membership process and of the Customs Union, some Kemalists might suggest that it was inconsistent to oppose Kurdish secession, 'peace at home', while promoting secession in Cyprus, endangering

‘peace abroad’. This links to the second aspect of Cyprus as a national issue, the threat to the existing frontiers of Turkey posed by a united Cyprus under Greek majority rule.

### *Military interests*

Turkey and Greece are the only European countries in NATO to have increased their arms expenditure since the end of the Cold War. This is partly to compensate for the phasing out of American military assistance, and partly to meet the costs of suppressing the Kurdish PKK. The main justification for the huge re-equipment programme envisaged to 2025 is the increased volatility of Turkey’s many neighbours since 1989. Turkey is the leading actor in a regional security complex, defined as “a set of states whose major security perceptions and concerns are so inter-linked that their national security problems cannot reasonably be analysed or resolved apart from one another” (Buzan et al. 1998: 12). Moreover, most Turks respect the Turkish army as the guarantor both of the secular state and its borders because, despite the armed forces’ huge commercial interests, they regard officers as incorruptible. The General Staff’s assessment of military requirements is rarely questioned, inside or outside the Grand National Assembly.

Since 1974, the Turkish army has maintained the 3:1 superiority which in pre-helicopter days was judged necessary to defend an island. As the Greek Cypriot National Guard and Greek contingent on Cyprus amount to 10,000 men, Turkey has deployed numbers fluctuating between 30,000 and 35,000 men. (Lindley 1999: 201). Given Turkey’s large runways in the North of Cyprus, its command of the air in conjunction with Israel, its helicopters and landing craft, and its parity with the Greek navy, the Turkish General Staff might accept that it could reinforce a smaller contingent on Cyprus. The Greek mainland is 500 miles distant. What it could not accept is that a Greek Cypriot state could use those same runways to threaten Turkey’s air or sea communications, or enable Greece to blockade the Turkish ports of Mersin, 40 miles distant, and Iskenderun, the oil route to Ceyhan from which it exports Iraqi oil and hopes to export Caspian oil, or Israel. To Turkey this perceived threat is aggravated by the two-front aspect of preparing for a conflict in the Aegean. This aspect would be less serious if the Greek Aegean islands, militarized by Greece after their 1974 experience, were demilitarized, perhaps in

response to the reduction of the Turkish Aegean army. The gap between Turkish and Greek military strength has increased. Greek doctrines of ‘extended deterrence’ and the coupling of its defence with that of Cyprus through the Joint Defence Doctrine are not enough to maintain the credibility required for Greece to deter Turkey by military power. It is most interesting that the Turkish army agreed that it could postpone some of its projected expenditure as a contribution to showing the IMF that the Government’s budgetary deficit could be reduced, an unusually frank acknowledgement of the connection between government expenditure and inflation.

#### *Economic issues*

The Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus has also experienced a banking crisis, requiring additional subsidies from the mainland and controls imposed on expenditure. A settlement of the Cyprus dispute would enable tourists to be flown directly to the unspoiled North, bringing with it foreign investment in infrastructure. The concomitant risks seen from the Turkish perspective are that Turkish Cypriots will be bought out by the richer Greek Cypriots, or even that Turkish Cypriots who want to sell will be physically attacked by those who fear Southern domination. These risks could be reduced if the local administration could control sales through licensing, as the Swedish-speaking Åland islanders are entitled to do under the terms of Finland’s accession treaty with the European Union.

For Turkey itself one of the main attractions of EU membership would also be an inflow of foreign investment. A study by Loewendahl et al in 2000 found that capital flows into Turkey “have rarely reached \$1billion in any year, a quarter of the figure for Poland”, a less populous country. Turkey’s geographic location, potential home demand, and membership of the Customs Union are favourable to foreign investment. The quality of Turkey’s young, educated labour force ranks above all 47 competing countries in the study. Turkey’s failure to attract anything like the investment in Poland is only partly explicable by its governmental and monetary instability, and an administrative tradition hostile to foreign ownership. These drawbacks apply also to a lesser extent to Poland. The single most important difference is that Poland is assured of early membership in the EU, offering more assurance to mobile capital of a stable political and economic future.

Turkish access to the European market is at risk from the European sanctions that would be applied if Turkey fulfils its threat to integrate Northern Cyprus, which would be depicted by Greece and the Republic of Cyprus as a change of frontiers without the consent of all interested parties.

On the other side of the argument, it can be said that membership of the Customs Union has so far meant a trade deficit and a loss of government revenue from higher tariffs. Continued participation is not justified unless it leads to full EU membership with access for agricultural production and an equal say in the making of future European rules. Turkey, like Japan, is big enough to remain an independent sovereign state, and its nationalists are willing to pay the political and economic costs of going it alone.

### **III. EU interests in Turkey becoming a Member State**

Lacking an elected government, the European interest is whatever the Member States can agree on – ideally on the basis of a proposal from the Commission, perhaps now also with input from the Chairman of the Political and Security Committee – and the subsequent assent of the European Parliament. The institutions, most Member States, and public opinion have been unenthusiastic both about the accession of Cyprus without a settlement and the accession of Turkey. The official line of the European Commission is that a settlement in Cyprus is a matter for the communities under the aegis of the UN Secretary-General; and that it is up to Turkey to reform itself to the point where the Member States can authorize the Commission to begin accession negotiations. The linkages between Cyprus accession, to be finalized this December, a settlement, and a date for opening accession negotiations are shrouded in obscurity. You have to read Paragraphs 4, 9 and 12 of the Helsinki Conclusions in conjunction with a hint last November in Nicosia by Commissioner President Romano Prodi that the EU might overlook its principles of free movement if there were a settlement on Cyprus.

What is missing from the Commission Opinions on Cyprus and Turkey is any strong sense that it is in Europe's interest to create peace in the Eastern Mediterranean. Peace between France and Germany had to be created on the basis of equality. The island of Cyprus would be more prosperous, and an example of peace instead of conflict, if the two

communities could be united in observing European Union directives on the basis that they are united by geography. Greece and Turkey could be equals in the European Union, united by geography despite their cultural and policy differences. Just as France took the risk of substituting a ‘good neighbour’ policy for ‘no appeasement of Germany’, so Greece has reason to prefer Turkey as a good neighbour instead of refusing all appeasement of a country in illegal occupation of part of an Hellenic island.

The second European interest in having Turkish Cyprus and Turkey included in the Union has to do with changes in Europe’s composition and self-image since 1950. It is no longer possible to teach the European idea as built on the heritage of Rome, Jerusalem and Athens, or as the secular successor of Christendom. There are probably more than 12 million Muslim residents and citizens within the territories of the EU15. Yet if their present lack of proportionate representation in the political and administrative institutions of the nation-states is bad enough, they are even less well represented at the European level. No Muslims attend any meetings of the European Council or the Councils of Ministers. There are no Muslim Commissioners, and few Muslims are employed by the European Commission. There is one Muslim member of the European Parliament. Turkish membership might not be welcome to Pakistani, or Moroccan, or Kurdish communities in the EU15, but the presence of a secular Islamic state, and of a self-ruling Islamic community, in the EU would go some way to making a multicultural Europe more visibly a reality.

Thirdly, the European Union is not just a community of merchants but also now a community of human rights. The European Court of Justice is closely if still incoherently linked to the Council of Europe’s European Court of Human Rights. The decisions to include Spain, Portugal and Greece were not based on European economic interests or military advantage. The leaders of France and Germany went against the most articulate interest groups in their respective countries to finance and promote what might be called milieu interests in having democratic and peaceful neighbours. A sense of cultural identity seems to have been less important, although the fact that Giscard d’Estaing and Hans-Dietrich Genscher were Hellenophiles probably influenced the Council’s decision to override the Commission’s negative Opinion on Greece. Today, the quickest and most effective way to secure human rights and civilian democracy in Turkey would be, as it

was in Greece and Spain, through early EU membership, not first requiring a period of good behaviour. A date for opening accession talks would help those in Turkey campaigning for reforms.

#### **IV. Conclusion**

On this view of Turkish and European interests in a Cyprus settlement, the failure of talks between Mr Clerides and Mr Denktash might be followed by an international conference called by the European Union summit at Copenhagen this December. If Turkey chose to participate, the EU and Turkey together could invite the Turkish Cypriots on the same basis as the Palestinian leadership were invited to the Oslo process and to the Camp David talks. According to Ian Brownlie, “State practice shows that no recognition is implied from ...presence at an international conference at which the unrecognized entity participates” (Brownlie 1990: 96). If successful, the proposals would be submitted to popular referenda on both sides of the Green Line. It may be that this conference will be unsuccessful, in which case the accession of the Republic of Cyprus will be followed by an ice age of uncertain length between the EU and Turkey, even though the Turkish language, by virtue of its status in the Constitution of the Republic of Cyprus, will become an official language of the European Union.

On a more hopeful note, I append a proposal for joint rule in Cyprus under EU law modelled on the only agreement ever concluded between the Palestinians and Israelis, the 1995 Yossi Beilin/Abu Mazen framework agreement for joint rule in Jerusalem. The democratic communitarian basis suggested implies concessions of principle from both Cypriot communities and the international community. As European law would prevail, elected councillors would, like American mayors, have more executive than legislative functions. Greek Cypriots might agree that the policing of the North, the development or not of central institutions, and the conduct of foreign policy will be primarily a matter for those elected by Turkish Cypriots. Turkish Cypriots might agree that the Greek Cypriots are entitled to the Presidency, to the control of the Central Bank and the majority of central ministries, and to a reduction of Turkish influence. The European Union might agree that its principles of free movement have to be subject in the Turkish Cypriot zone

to the requirements of peaceful order as defined by the elected provincial authority; the UK might, as with the retained sites, accept leasehold instead of sovereign rights over its two base areas as its contribution to the geographical reunification of the whole of Cyprus.

## *Appendix*

### DRAFT FRAMEWORK AGREEMENT FOR CYPRUS

With a view to the early accession of a united Cyprus to the European Union, the elected Presidents of the two major communities agree that the following terms be put to their electorates as a compromise settlement of their dispute on how the island shall be governed.

#### MUTUAL ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

- Each of the two sides acknowledges the moral and material harm caused to the people of the other side in the past. Greek and Turkish Cypriots commit themselves to act with goodwill in seeking reconciliation in the future.

#### TERRITORY

- The island of Cyprus will be a federal state, comprising two autonomous provinces. The Southern Province shall comprise fifteen districts; the Northern Province shall comprise five districts.
- The British sovereign base areas will become part of the sovereign territory of the Republic of Cyprus, leased to Britain for 49 years.
- The zonal boundary follows the line of the old railway from Famagusta to Nicosia. From Nicosia westwards, the division through Morphou reduces the Northern zone to 28% of the whole island (the British bases to be included in the Southern zone).

#### PROPERTY

- Each Provincial Authority shall be responsible for generously and speedily compensating residents of its own zone who can prove that their loss of property in the other zone has not yet been adequately compensated.
- The European Union will provide financing for half the sums that are agreed by the parties as fair compensation for either moral or material loss, or both.

- Individuals who choose to refuse compensation for the material loss component due to them shall retain title to their property, but the future exercise of their rights shall be subject to the requirements of public order as determined by the Authority in each zone.

## GOVERNMENT

- The Central Council will be composed of one representative (and one alternate if the representative cannot be present) from each district *i.e. a small Executive directly elected by the districts rather than having indirect elections from two Assemblies*
- The Council shall elect the President *i.e. a Greek Cypriot for the foreseeable future*
- The President shall appoint ministers from members of the Council. The minister responsible for foreign policy must be a Turkish Cypriot. The President, with the agreement of at least three Turkish Cypriot members of the Council, shall appoint the Governor of the Central Bank. Other ministers would have responsibility for water supplies, civil aviation, telecommunications, electricity services, archaeological sites and any other matters agreed by a majority defined as including at least three Turkish Cypriot members.
- The work of the Central Council will be financed by a proportion of receipts from Value Added Tax as set by a majority including at least three Turkish Cypriot members.
- Elections by citizens of Cyprus resident in the districts of each zone shall determine the composition of each Provincial Authority, responsible for local taxation, local services, police and gendarmes (limited to side-arms), transport, education, housing, planning, and immigration.
- Troops from other Member States of the European Union will be stationed in Cyprus by agreement with the President of Cyprus, who may request their assistance if he judges that there is a situation of civil disorder.

- The Turkish Cypriot Provincial Authority may authorize Turkey to station up to 5,000 men in the vicinity of one designated airfield. Additionally, for an emergency period of six months, the Provincial Authority may authorize Turkey to deploy such troops as Turkey deems necessary in any of the five Turkish Cypriot districts.

### NICOSIA

- The Municipality of Nicosia will be unified.
- An elected sub-municipality of fifteen Greek Cypriot boroughs will be responsible for local services.
- An elected sub-municipality of five Turkish Cypriot boroughs will be responsible for local services.
- A Joint Higher Municipal Council will be composed of one representative (and one alternate) from each of the fifteen Greek Cypriot and five Turkish Cypriot boroughs.
- The Joint Higher Municipal Council will elect the Mayor by majority. In setting a municipal rate for central services, the majority must include at least three Turkish Cypriots.
- The Mayor will appoint from among the representatives councillors responsible for such central services as may be agreed.
- In all matters relating to the Turkish Cypriot area of the Municipality of Nicosia, the Municipal Council shall obtain the consent of the Turkish Cypriot Provincial Authority.
- In all matters relating to the Greek Cypriot area of the Municipality of Nicosia, the Municipal Council shall obtain the consent of the Greek Cypriot zonal authority.

## HOLY PLACES

- Holy places will be managed by the religious authorities to which they belong. The Central Council may grant the Greek Cypriot Provincial Authority extraterritorial jurisdiction over the St Andreas monastery in Karpas provided that it grants the Turkish Cypriot Provincial Authority extraterritorial jurisdiction over the Tekke of Umm Haram in Larnaca.

## THE EUROPEAN UNION

- European law will obtain in Cyprus. The Treaty of Accession will provide that the freedom of movement of persons, goods, capital and labour may be subject in each zone to such licensing by the Provincial Authority as it deems necessary for the maintenance of public order. *The treaty could specify that the public order exception allowed in the treaty of Rome be a matter for the provincial authorities in Cyprus.*
- The Euro will be the currency of Cyprus.

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- Two referenda will be held simultaneously in both zones of Cyprus on the question, “Do you wish that Cyprus unified on the terms set out in this agreement accede to the European Union?” A majority in both zones is required.

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## Biographical Note

Christopher Brewin was educated at the Universities of Grenoble, Oxford and Harvard. He teaches International Relations at the University of Keele, UK, and has been five times a Visiting Professor at Marmara University, Istanbul. For ten years he wrote the Annual Review of the European Communities for the *Journal of Common Market Studies*. He is the author of *The European Union and Cyprus* (Huntingdon: the Eothon Press, 2000) and holds a Leverhulme Fellowship to work on Turkey and Europe.