

Between neo-Ottomanist kin policy in the Balkans and Transnational Kin Economics in the EU

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Abstract

During the last century Turkey's kin politics in the Balkans have undergone a transition from ethnic nationalist politics to neo-Ottomanist cultural economics. After a short overview of the historical development of Turkish kin politics in the Balkans, this article investigates the contemporary institutional and discursive novelties and challenges on the agenda of Turkey's kin policy, and its institutional and discursive transition from ethnic nationalist kin policy in the Balkans towards transnational economic and religious strategy prioritizing 'Turks abroad' in the EU. The study is based on local investigations and interviews in Macedonia, Albania and Bulgaria, as well as content analysis of official documents and articulations of decision making institutions such as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Parliament, The Agency of Turks and Kin Abroad, Yunus Emre Institutes, TIKA, Diyanet, and migrant associations.

Keywords: kin politics, Turks abroad, Balkan Muslims, EuroTurks, Turkey

Introduction

Kin politics was one of the most influential strategies in the regional territorial policies of the Balkan states during the interwar years. The nation-building processes, the Wilsonian principle of self-determination, and the delineation of the Westphalian territorial borders of the new nation-states called the attention of the Balkan states to the minority issues and kin in the region. The main kin policy at that time had been based on various migration strategies varying from population exchanges and deportations to ethnic cleansing of certain sacred territories. The interwar years were followed by post-WW2 regime changes and Stalinist

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reforms in the Eastern Block, especially in Chubrilovic's year in Former Yugoslavia and the Stalinist Soviet Union. That is why almost the first half of the 20th century saw extensive ethnic and minority forced movements across the region.

The rise of minority rights discourse at the end of the Cold War brought kin minority policies as a bargaining strategy onto the agenda of IR politics again. During the 1990s kin politics rose as conveyers of cross border ethnic nationalist policies and found a place among the primary national security goals of the Balkan states and Turkey. Nevertheless, the return of genocide and ethnic cleansing as strategies of irredentist policies in the Balkans securitized cross border kin politics as a major regional threat to the territorial integrity of the newly establishing Balkan states. (Poulton, 1997:194-213)

The contemporary notion of kin politics has been transformed to a more complex, multifaceted and transnational phenomenon at the beginning of the 21st century. The intensification and diversity in transnational capital and international migration (around 232,000,000 migrants) (IOM, 2015:2) converged with foreign policy searches for extraterritorial extension of economic, political and cultural sovereignty. Subjects such as kin and migrants remittances, investments and capital, kin enterprises, extraterritorial elections, multiple citizenship, lobbying, transnational extension and enlargement of the “national” borders and transnational expansion of national identity, borders and politics etc. entered the foreign policy agendas. Indeed, the new sovereignty perception does not end at the national territorial borders but extends to new cognitive borders of a virtual economic or cultural sphere of influence delineated by the dispersion of the kin minorities around the world. In particular, the spread of multiple citizenship as a practical solution for increasing emigration and nationality issues gave opportunity for initiation of new phenomena such as cross border or transnational elections. While in the previous century the scholarship used to study and talk about the Jewish, Armenian and Greek diaspora in the world politics, now there are numerous growing diasporas around the world such as the German, Russian, Chinas, African, Turkish etc.

1. Defining the kin in the Balkans: from ethnic to neo-Ottomanist definition of kin

During the 20th century, the definition of kin abroad used to shift between ethno-linguistic and ethno-religious components of Turkish identity “spread from the Adriatic sea up to Great China's wall.”¹ This shift was defined usually by domestic hegemonic ideology of political

elite and its national security conceptions. Indeed, Turkey's strategic goals and priorities in the Balkans and Central Asia found reflection in the official articulations about the so called Turkish World expanding across European and Asian continents. For these reasons old Ottoman entities such as Gagauz, Pomaks, Albanians and Bosniaks had to face different approaches, sometimes inclusive, sometimes exclusive. On the other hand Turkish-speaking Christian Orthodox emigrants and refugees living abroad, such as Anatolian Greek refugees in Greece, Anatolian Armenians or Jews, have never found place within the definition of kin or Turks abroad policy in Turkey.

Based on its Ottoman legacies, Turkey had essential difficulty in defining who is included and who is excluded from the kin abroad, and thus has never developed a constant definition and criteria for "who is the kin abroad?" The early Republican leaders used to define the Turkish identity in connection to Ottoman Islamic heritage. In this early post-Ottoman conception of the "Turks left in the lost Ottoman lands" the Bosniaks, Albanians and the other Muslim communities in the Balkans were categorized as heirs of the Ottoman culture, thus, being Ottoman Muslim was considered a priory condition for the membership in the young Turkish Republic. In spite of this, the autochtonous non-Muslim groups such as Greeks, Armenians and Jews were approached as outsiders in the newly constructed Turkish nation.

Before the rise of the Germanophile movement in Turkey, the religion and Ottoman culture constituted the basic features of the Turkish identity. The famous phrase of "Elhamdullillah Türküm" (Thank God I am Turkish) points to these early years. During the 1930s, German nationalism had a great influence among the Turkish political elite and was followed by public calls for appropriation of the new Turkish language as the essential basis of the Turkish identity. The Bosnian, Albanian, Sanjak and Turkish immigrants and refugees who left their lands as result of land nationalization and ethnic cleansing policies in the Serbo-Croatian-Sloven Kingdom or as a result of the Lausanne Treaty became first targets of these nationalist aspirations. (Nurcan Özgür Baklacioglu, 2011)

According to the Ottoman Commission for Migration, after the post-WW1 Bulgarian and Serbo-Croatian-Slovenian colonization and nationalization of the occupied Ottoman lands, i.e. between years 1919-1926 (Stokes, 1998: 25-30), Turkey received 198,688 (Şimşir, 1986) refugees from Bulgaria and 131,000 refugees from Kingdom of Yugoslavia. After the implementation of the Law for Agricultural Reform and Colonization in 1931, the number of the refugees who left the Kingdom of Yugoslavia rose to 350,000 Albanian Muslims

according to Albanian historiography (Instituti i Historisë i Kosovës ed. 1997:40; Shehu, 1994:5) and 116,487 Bosnians, Albanians, Turks and Sanjak Muslims who settled in Turkey by 1940 (See Geray, Appendix Tables)

The Yugoslav refugees were followed by the Pomak and Turkish refugees, as result of the Bulgarianisation campaign against the Pomak population in Southwestern Bulgaria between 1931-35 and the policies of fascist Koseivanov government. The territorial exchanges at the Romanian-Bulgarian border in the Dobrudza region (Eastern Dunau region) caused the forced emigration of hundreds of Tatars and Turks. According to Ahmet Cevat Eren, from the proclamation of the Republic until 1970 Turkey received approximately 1,519,368 Ottoman Muslims and Turks from the Balkans (Table 1) (Eren, 1966:91).

Table 1: Balkan Migrations to Turkey

Years	Yugoslavia	Romania	Greece	Bulgaria
1912-1913	440.000			
1923-1939	115.427	117.095	384.000	198.688
1940-1945	1.671	4.201	-	15.744
1946-1960	152.003	55	23.808	154.112
1961-1970	30.502	274	2.081	15.000
1971-1980	1.797	136	-	116.104
1981-1990	2.623	760	-	178.664*
1993-1997				77.000
Total	304.023	122.521	409.889	749.648
General Total	2.026.081			

Source: Şimşir, 1990; Kirisci, 1995:175-80

Indeed, following the Balkan War refugees and Lausanne exchanges, the Balkan migrations of the 1920s shifted the Bosnian or Albanian speaking population from 29,224 in 1927 up to 91,425 in 1935. These are not comprehensive data because of some deficits in the implementation of population censuses at that time (Table 2).

* This number does not include the 133,272 returnees who returned to Bulgaria after the fall of the Jivkov regime.

Table 2: The Balkan Population in Turkey according to the Language based Censuses

Languages	1927		1935		1945		1950 ²
	1 st Lang.	2nd Lang.	1 st Lang.	2nd Lang.	1st	2nd Lang.	1 st Lang
Yugoslavia							
Albanian	21,774	-	22,754	26,161	14,165	17,701	16,079
Total	21,774		48,915		31,866		16,079
Bosnian	7,450 [*]	-	24,613	13,526	13,280	9,599	24,013
Total	7,500		38,141		22,879		24,013
Serbian	-	-	4,369		4,100		1,605
Total	-		4,369		4,100		1,605
General Total	29,224	-	51,736	39,687	31,545	27,300	41,697
Yugoslavia Total	29,224		91,425		58,845		41,697
Bulgaria							
Bulgarian	8,245	-	8,245	-	8,750		6,491
Total	8,245		8,245		8,750		6,491
Pomak	12,309		32,661	8,380	13,033	5,594	36,612
Total	12,309^{**}		41,041		18,627		36,612
Tatar	11,465	-	15,615	4,106	10,047	2,255	
Total	11,465		19,721		12,302		
Total Languages	32,019		56,521	12,486	31,830	7,849	43,103

* At the census of 1927 Bosnian is counted under the category of “Other languages”, however, according to Fuat Dündar there were registered at least 7,450 Bosnian speakers in Kocaeli, İzmir and Bursa

** The Pomak language is not referred to at the census of 1927, however it is possible to identify the number of the Pomak immigrants through the data of the Bulgarian speaking Muslim population. Indeed, of the 1,207 Bulgarian speakers in Kocaeli, as one of the Pomak populated cities in Turkey, only 25 expressed Christian religion. When the Pomak language appeared in the census of 1935, the number of Bulgarian speaking population fell to 8,245. See (Dündar, 1999: 156-159).

Bulgaria Total	32,019		69,007		39,679		43,103
General Total	48,934	-	108,257	52,173	63,375	35,149	84,800

Source: (Dündar, 1999:156-159)

This linguistic diversity had a profound ethnification effect on the Kemalist and Germanophile political elite's definition of the Turkish identity. Ankara promoted cross border linguistic modernization and Turkification initiatives amongst the Turkish and Muslim intellectuals in Bulgaria and Macedonia, i.e. the modern Turkish alphabet entered the Turkish language and education in the Balkans during the 1930s and became important criteria in defining kin abroad until the 1950s.

The Cold War migration era (Castles et al., 2008) followed harsh ideological competition across the two sides of the Berlin Wall. The Bulgarian-Turkish border had undergone political asylum movements between the Eastern and Western Blocs. Indeed, 31% of the Balkan immigrants who came to Turkey until 1960 came from Bulgaria, and 22.4% from Yugoslavia (Geray, 1962: 6-12). The socialist modernization reforms and the collectivization of the land and production tools put double cultural and economic pressure on the Muslim populations in these countries. Religious oppositions against the Stalinist reforms resulted in forced emigration of 250,000 Bulgarian Muslims and Turks (Stoyanov, 1992:10-11) and according to the register of the Turkish Ministry of Rural Affairs 151,889 Yugoslav immigrants (Geray, 1962), according to Albanian and Serbian data 246,108 Muslims from Yugoslavia (Shehu, 1994:30; Mušović, 1990:456-472).

Until the end of the 1980s, any Muslim immigrant coming from the atheist Communist bloc was approached as a good Muslim kin. Since then, the Turkish speaking Christian Gagauz immigrants from Bulgaria and Romania have not been approached and accepted as kin. Similarly, the Westernization and modernization project never allowed Arab Muslims into this category. On the contrary, Bosnian, Pomak and Albanian Muslim immigrants who moved to Turkey as a result of Stalinist and Tito's policies of nationalization and communist modernization were provided primary protection as victims of the atheist oppressive regimes in the Communist Bloc. It is important to remember that these immigrants constituted significant political vote support for the conservative Democratic Party regime too (Nurcan Özgür Baklacioglu, 2011:458-60).

Besides the last language-based census in 1965, there is no official data about the Balkan population in Turkey today. There is knowledge about immigrant cities and districts in different parts of Turkey, such as Bursa, Adapazarı, Balıkesir, İzmir, Kocaeli, Tokat, Aydın, Denizli, Bilecik, Bolu, Eskişehir, Samsun etc. (Nurcan Özgür Baklacioğlu, 2010:408-20). It is rumoured that there are 10-20 million Balkan immigrants in Turkey organized in hundreds of migrant associations. No matter what is the number, 20th century Muslim immigration and refugee movements to Turkey had significant impact on the formation of the kin perceptions and policies in post-cold war Turkey.

After the so called “Great Excursion” of Bulgarian Turkish refugees in 1989, Turkey received temporary refugee inflows of 35,000 Bosnian (1993-95), 15,000 Kosovo (1997-98) and 6,151 Macedonian Turkish (2001) war refugees. Most of these refugees returned back to their lands after the end of the wars and were followed by temporary economic migrations to Turkey based on family links, marriage, employment or education opportunities. The most significant impact of these last migrations is that they triggered the revival of the Albanian and Bosnian identity amongst the former Bosnian and Albanian immigrant settlers in Turkey. The organization of Albanian, Bosnian and Sanjak immigrant community in Turkey initiated cross border links between these communities, Turkey, and the countries of origin in the Balkans.

In the new era of global circular migrations, there is a constant increase in the circular visits and suitcase trade between the Balkan countries and Turkey. In contrast to the previous migrations, the main reasons for emigration to Turkey or Western Europe are of socio-economic nature (Maeba, 2004). The underdeveloped infrastructure, low investments and agricultural setback compounded by wide unemployment in the Balkan villages result in ascending emigration to the cities, Turkey or Western Europe. (Laczko et al, 2002:187) Contemporary data indicates a formation of a new Bulgarian Turkish kin community in Europe that exceeds 30,000 Bulgarian Turks in Sweden, 10-30,000 in the Netherlands and 1000 in Austria³. The real number of Bulgarian Turkish seasonal migrants in Western Europe surpass the available data, because there is constant circulation of labour between the minority regions and Western European countries. The already established employment networks between the Western Europe and the minority villages in Bulgaria augmented the minority emigration and resulted in emptied or old-age populated villages, shut down schools, leaving Turkish teachers unemployed and low educational levels amongst the minority children.

There are claims about selective and corrupted implementation of the EU minority development projects applied primarily in the Pomak and Roma minority regions.⁴

While the labor emigration to Turkey leads to regularization of the stay and illegal employment and results in permanent settlement in Turkey, the labor emigration to Western Europe is under temporary legal residence and employment that is managed and organized through employment agents or co-villagers networks. The field work shows that the labor emigration to Western Europe rarely results in permanent emigration; instead, the accumulation of the migrant remittances promotes internal migration in Bulgaria, i.e. emigration from the village to the city where there are sufficient education opportunities for the children.

These new migratory movements are reflected in the conceptual perception of both the kin and kin-state. The perception of Turkey and Turkishness amongst the Muslim societies in the Balkans is not mobilized as it used to be before late 1990s. At the beginning of the 21st century it is possible to talk about two main categories of kin in the Balkans: the Turkish minorities in Bulgaria, Greece, Macedonia and Kosovo, and societies with Ottoman descent, i.e. Bosniaks and Albanians in Kosovo, Macedonia, Bosnia, Montenegro, Sanjak and Tatars, Pomaks and Gagauzs in Romania and Bulgaria. The beginning of this century brought a new category of kin abroad onto the agenda: the Turkish citizens living abroad. While before, the definition of the kin was articulated around the Turks in the Balkans, Caucasus and Central Asia, today the so called “Turkish hinterland” is enlarged to the “Turks abroad” in Europe, Africa, Asia and America.

Differentiated from the Turks abroad, the category of kin broadened into a religion-based inclusive and expansionist category. It grasped any affiliation grounded on Islamic identity, and then on place of birth, ethnic identity, family roots, acquisition of Turkish language, education in Turkish schools, historical consciousness or immense capital investment. In this way contemporary kin abroad policy has more instrumental, functional, cultural, political, and market-based character.

There are various political, social and economic reasons for this conceptual shift in the official discourse. According to official statements the diaspora of the Turkish citizens who live abroad exceeds five million people. Most of them live in Western countries such as Germany (1,658,083 Turks), France (459,611), Netherlands (372,728), U.S. (250,000), Switzerland (71,691), and thus provide strategic lobbying power in Turkey’s EU policy. The Turkish diaspora in the EU was articulated as mobilized and manipulative electoral and

economic power based on the migrant remittances economics in the world. While historical, religious and cultural affiliation became prime features of the kin policy in the Balkans, the economic and political interests have a determinant role in the conceptualization of the “Turks abroad” policy. Similarly, while the traditional kin conception and policy was primarily based on the ethnic or religious identity, the new categorization placed legal differentiation between the Turkish citizens and Muslim societies with Turkish origin or Ottoman affiliation. Thus, in the case of kin policy in the Balkans it is possible to talk about two categories: Turkish minorities in the Balkans and Ottoman Muslim kin societies in the Balkans. This categorization is reflected in the contemporary kin policy in the region.

2. Historical Memory of Turkey’s Kin Politics

The kin state perception and definition of the kin, as well as its approach, expectations and policies in relation to the kin plays defining role in the cases of ethnic politics and conflicts. The policies of the kin state can either facilitate the peaceful solution of a certain ethnic conflict or obstruct any peaceful solutions and escalate the conflict into a domestic or regional war. Traditionally the kin policy of Turkey was a secondary issue primarily dependent on the national, regional, and international geopolitical interests and security priorities of Turkey. The perpetual security dilemma under the conditions of WWI, WWII and the Cold War established migration as a strategy for the peaceful solution of ethnic conflicts or interstate disputes between Turkey and its neighbourhood.

The early republican political elite was the first to utilize this Ottoman legacy of migration as a policy of nation-building and Turkification. An important aspect of this early republican kin minority policy in the Balkans was also based on bilateral agreements prioritizing the principle of reciprocity. The Treaty of Lausanne and the 1925 Good Neighbourhood and Friendship Agreement with Bulgaria are two important examples for Ankara’s attempts to keep and preserve the kin in the Balkans through comprehensive provision of the legal minority and/or human rights. Moreover, as the unsigned (Sejdiu, 1996:268) 1938 Agreement for Migration of the Turkish Muslims from the South Serbian lands shows, there was an important effort by the Kemalist elite to arrange extensive financial compensation for the lost properties and rights of the forced migrants who were forced to leave South Serbia after 1933.⁵ There is no knowledge about such effort during the first mass refugee flows from the lost Ottoman lands. This agreement was set back on the agenda of the Turkish-Yugoslav relations in 1948, when the Belgrade government was anxious about the

total solution of the Albanian issue under the Chubrilovic's plan for the deportation of the Albanians to Turkey. In relation to this migration agreement it is important to realize that the rejection of the agreement did not cause and could not prevent the mass-migrations of the 1930s and 1950s, but the rejection of these agreements impeded the actualization of the extensive compensations that it foresaw for the lost properties (lands, farms, immovables, animals, agricultural instruments, uncollected crops etc.), values, and rights (to return back, to keep its property and citizenship) in the abandoned lands. Yet the details of the agreements show that the political elite in Ankara was very well informed about the collectivization and nationalization of the private properties and their utilization for solving the nationalities issue in certain parts of the federation (Nurcan Özgür Baklacioglu, 2011:157-162).

The security trap of the Cold War interrupted the human rights and minority rights grounded policy perspective of the republican elite. The ideological confrontation and the exacerbated communist threat brought forward the anti-communist and pro-American discourse of the Democratic Party of Menderes, who also followed the Ottoman legacy of Muslim immigration from the former Ottoman lands. The discourse of human and minority rights was abandoned and later on replaced by the religious discourse on solidarity with the Muslims left under the tyranny of the oppressive atheist communist regime. Relying on the conservative vote of the rural population, the Democratic Party promoted the immigration of thousands of Albanian, Bosnian and Turkish Muslims from Tito's Yugoslavia.

After 1970's, the nationalist geo-political "Turkic World" discourse of the Turk-Islam Synthesis gained wide support among the growing nationalist anti-Soviet circles in Turkey. According to this approach the Turks and Muslims in the communist world are oppressed by the Soviet regime and have to be liberalized and organized within a new geo-cultural space, the so-called Turkish World, extending from the Adriatic Sea to the Great Wall of China. This discourse retained its predominance until the mid-1990s and focused on the newly liberated former Soviet republics. The lack of sufficient financial, institutional and political support limited the effectiveness and influence of the Turkish World approach within the circles of the Nationalist People's Party in Turkey. However, Turkishness stood out as a distinguishing pattern of Turkey's kin policy in Central Asia, the Caucasus and the Balkans.

The end of ideological confrontation, the opening of the borders, and the democratization wave in the Balkan states required a new approach that partly resembled a return towards the principles of the Kemalist republic. The kin in the Balkans was articulated as a cultural bridge for peace and friendship policy in the Balkans. Ankara undertook the

responsibility to protect the Muslim kin in Bosnia and Kosovo, and thus initiated intensive international diplomacy against the genocide in Bosnia and Serbian atrocities in Kosovo, provided refugee for the war refugees from the region, and participated or cooperated in the NATO peace operations in the region. Undoubtedly, these diplomatic, political and military activities and operations in the region promoted Turkey's role as a peacekeeper and regional power in the Balkans until the recognition of the Kosovo independency. This was also a strategy to balance the expanding Greek economic and EU-based influence in the region at the end of 1990s. Since Turkey was more a commercial rather than economic actor in the Balkans, the military elite gained a strong say in the decision-making for Turkey's Balkan policy at that time. Indeed, Turkey became important military power that not only participated in the UN and NATO operations but took part in the educational and infrastructural building of the national armed forces in numerous regional states.

During this turbulent period of post-Cold War Balkan history, the kin policy was approached as an extension of Turkey's desire to keep its position as a regional power and balance the Greek-Russian-Serbian axis (Abazi 2008: 76). The main goal was to preserve the Turkish minorities in the region through complication of kin immigration towards Turkey, i.e. visa restrictions, entrance prohibition and administrative deterrence. Guided by numerous Balkan Turkology Research Centers established by Turkology and national history faculties, the main goal was to protect Turkish culture and history in the area.

Turkishness constituted an important reference point in the definition of the scope of the kin policy at that time. The kin policy consisted of an amalgam between a policy of national responsibility and a policy of cultural integration based primarily on cultural and financial support for strengthening the Turkish identity in the region. The main strategies of the kin policy at that time were to support the Turkish parties in the region, and to provide educational materials for promoting Turkish language education in the region. The discourse of Turkish minorities as a bridge for cooperation and peaceful neighbourhood with the states in the region kept its priority in Turkey's official approach to the region. The accommodation of dual citizenship for the former immigrants from the Balkans was an important innovation that had a very valuable impact on the life of both Turkish migrants and minorities living across the Turkish-Balkan borders. Former immigrants from Bulgaria, Kosovo and Macedonia who succeeded in restoring their former citizenship of the abandoned country activated the economic, cultural and cross border voting activities between Turkey and

Bulgaria, Bosnia and Kosovo. The cross border elections were a long-standing significant innovation that opened a way for political return of former migrants to the abandoned lands.

Finally, another significant novelty in the Turkish kin policy during the 1990s was the provision of Ministry of Education scholarships and contingency for graduate and post-graduate education of students coming from the so called “Turkish hinterland”, i.e. Balkans, Caucasus, and Central Asia. This soft power strategy brought its strategic impact during the 2000s, when many of those early graduates were appointed to strategic decision-making posts in their countries. Later on the AKP government extended the geographical scope of the Turkish hinterland towards its spheres of influence in the Middle East and Africa.

Finally, the 1990s are characterized by the constant critique about the lack of a separate institution for the coordination of the Turks abroad as a whole and kin policy in Turkey. The absence of such a coordination agency was a significant weakness of the kin policy decision-making at that time. Main agents of the kin policy at that time were the embassies, Ministry of Education, TİKA and kin representatives and political parties in the Balkans. The core decision makers were the advisers and undersecretaries on Turkish kin and communities abroad placed under the Prime Ministry. Turkish armed forces and General Staff in Ankara had a heavy say with regard to the kin policies in the region as well. Numerous personal conversations with Turkish intellectuals in the region pointed out the guiding role of the General Staff in solving the problems or fulfilling the requests of the Turkish minorities in the region. Thus many Turkish intellectuals in the region used to avoid the embassies and the prime ministry, but paid often visits to the General Staff in Ankara.

Above all, it should be underlined that the contemporary kin policy constitutes coexistence between the geopolitical and strategic continuity of the kin policies of the 1990s and the administrative, institutional and discursive novelties of the last decade. While the geo-strategic basis keeps its strong say in the mentality of the kin policy, the actors, institutions, instruments and overall ideological discourse of the Turkey’s kin policy have undergone extensive change during the last decade.

There is an expansive shift from the narrow kin definition of the 1990s, i.e. the priority of the kin policy shifted from Turkish minorities in the Balkans towards Muslim kin in the Balkans. Some use to define this phenomenon within the Neo-Ottomanist discourse because there is a strong reference to the Ottoman cultural legacy and Ottoman roots and culture of the Muslims in the Balkans. There is also a discursive shift from “Balkan Turks” to “Ottoman Muslims in the Balkans” followed by a functional rearticulation from “Bridge” into “Evlad-1

“Fatihan” (The Sons of the Conquerors). This discourse was prominent during the hegemony of the Turkish-Islam synthesis in the Turkish political life. Approached from this historical point of view, I would rather suggest that this process refers to a rebirth of the Turk-Islam synthesis of the 80’s that had significant influence in the cultivation of the Ozal’s (ANAP) and AKP’s political elite. Since the rule of the Democratic Party in the 1950s Islam has always been basic reference point in the kin policy tradition towards the Muslim population living in the lost Ottoman lands in the Balkans, the Caucasus and Central Asia.

3. The Rise of Turks Abroad Policy in the EU: institutional and discursive novelties, geopolitical continuities

An important novelty that entered Ankara’s EU policy agenda during the late 1990s was the rise of the Turks Abroad policy exclusively based on the notions of citizenship and human rights. After 2006 returning migration increased and led to the formation of a foreign return population of nearly half a million around the so-called Turkish Riviera (Balkir & Sudas, 2014). Accordingly, the policy priority shifted from “Kin Abroad” to “Turkish Citizens Living Abroad”. The institutionalization and principles of Turks abroad policy have been promoted firstly by the high presence of EuroTurks in the EU and later enforced and implemented by EuroTurk returnees that found positions among Turkey’s EU or migration policy decision makers in Ankara.


The Turkish citizens living abroad constitute the prior socio-economic, political and cultural challenge facing Turkey’s contemporary kin policy that shows an enforced continuity of a post-nationalist conservative economic liberal discourse and extensive political instrumentalization of the Turks in the EU. In the contemporary foreign policy discourse in Ankara approximately 5 million EuroTurks are approached primarily as an important source of remittances. In 2001 Turkey was rated as 3rd among the highest remittances income sending countries (Ostergaard-Nielsen 2003: 81-84). The role of emigrants in Turkey’s growing tourism and foreign trade sectors is immense as well.

During the 2015 elections Turkey received 2,867,658 political votes organized around 112 electoral boxes in 54 countries.⁶ The political, cultural and economic outcomes of post-12 September 1980 military coup asylum to the EU as well as the 1990s German Retired Immigration to South Turkey become more and more observable. During the June 2015 general elections the Kurdish and Turkish refugees in the EU voted for HDP (Peoples and

Democracy Party). Known as a mainly Kurdish party, HDP gained 21.04 % of the general vote abroad, a rate higher than the one gained at the national level. HDP was especially strong among the Kurdish refugees mobilised in Sweden, Denmark, Norway, and left-oriented Turkish citizens in France.

The ruling party AKP and the President Erdogan were the other political actors that benefited the most from the Turks abroad vote. During the presidential elections in 2014 T. R. Erdogan had reached 66-80% of support among the neo-conservative Turkish citizens living in Germany (68%), France, Austria (80%), Belgium and the Netherlands (77%). Mobilized around the mosques and Muslim religious centers in the EU, the AKP vote reached 49.36% of the total vote abroad during 2015 general elections.⁷

Map 1: Political Party Distribution of the Turkish Vote Abroad



By 2013 Turkey is not anymore among the first 10 high remittances income countries and the rate of the remittances to GDP is as small as 0.1% of the national GDP. Moreover, after its transition to a receiving country Turkey takes part among remittances sending countries especially for regions such as MENA and Asia.⁸ Nevertheless, the EU-Turkey transnational migration economy has evolved into economics of the circular migration of goods, services and financial capital through millions of returnees, EU retired citizens, and tourists who maintain comprehensive living transnational capital accumulation. For instance, there are more than 4 million young or retired German returnees and permanent seasonal EU

tourists that constitute a significant community of consumers and agents of commercial and financial links between Turkey and the EU (Push and Splitt, 2013). There are 140,000 Turkish companies in the EU zone with a total annual turnover that exceeds 50 billion Euros. The annual expenditure of the Turkish citizens living in Western Europe constitutes a market of 22 billion Euros.⁹ In 2015 foreign trade between the EU and Turkey is expected to reach 300 billion USD.¹⁰ Three quarters of the 31 billion Turkish FDI in 2013 consisted of financial and petroleum investments in the EU and US.¹¹ So, compared to the kin in the Balkans, the Turks abroad constitute a population of strategic concern for Turkey.

Until the beginning of the century the 1,700,000 kin population in the Balkans headed the suitcase trade income and connected Turkish market to the former Eastern Block markets. This cross border performance slowed down at the end of 1990s. Today Ankara's Ottoman kin definition encompasses roughly 8,200,000 Muslim kin in the Balkans and includes all Muslims in the all Balkan countries such as Albania, Bosnia, Macedonia, Greece, Kosovo, Bulgaria, Montenegro, Serbia and Romania.¹² The quantity looks big, but the impact of neo-Ottomanist discourse remains relatively weak, especially among the nearly 4.5 million Sunni and Bektashi Muslims in Albania and Bosnia. It is difficult to say whether there is a successful link between the Muslim kin presence and Turkey's economic performance in the region. Ankara's insistence on the Ottoman heritage card does not increase Turkey's usual position as 3rd or 4th among the first 5 investment or trade countries in the Balkan market. Moreover, according to Bulgarian sources, in 2014 Bulgaria received 830 million USD remittances from the Bulgarian Citizens in Turkey.(Velickov,2015)

So, at the beginning of 21st century Turks Abroad are a prior source of formal/informal remittances that exceed the income from the investments and trade at the small markets of Macedonia, Bulgaria, Bosnia and Kosovo. As World Bank and IMF studies show, remittances transferred from the North to the South surpass the total amount of investments and trade income in the South.¹³




Figure 1: Main Actors in the Kin Policy Decision Making Process

Approached as a comprehensive transnational financial sector, the economic and political management of the EuroTurkish world required further institutionalization in Ankara. While in the 1990s the establishment of an agency for the Turks abroad found wide expression among the Turks in the Balkans, today the newly established Presidency of Turks Abroad constitutes an important coordination center for the Turks in the world. Although designed during 1990s the Presidency of Turks Abroad found realization during the AKP government that had extensive connections with political and religious mobilization among the conservative Turkish immigrants living in the EU. Established under the Prime Ministry and the guidance of the Parliamentarian Commission on Turks Abroad and Kin Societies, the Presidency of Turks Abroad and Kin Communities has a task to coordinate all institutions and organizations that operate in the field of kin policy.¹⁴

The most significant novelty that followed the EuroTurkish presence in the decision making process has been related to the introduction of the notion of human rights. Avoided in any domestic public space and external kin policy, the reference to the human rights and HR law is extremely emphasized in regard to the Turkish citizens abroad who “...*did not take part in any terrorist action...*”¹⁵. The Turks Abroad policy embrace only the loyal EuroTurks who are somewhat subjected to a reciprocal policy against the EU’s constant critique in regard to the HR violations in Turkey. This “new” strategy foresees access to the citizenship of the

receiving country, protection from xenophobic and racist violence, exclusive instrumentalization of the EU human rights law, human rights advocacy and further human rights education and awareness among the Turks in the EU, as well as equality in the access to human rights between the Turkish citizens and the other immigrants in the EU.

Although the 1st Article of the Law establishing the Presidency for Turks Abroad and Kin Societies foresees cultural, social and economic relations and policies towards the kin communities abroad¹⁶, the human rights perspective has never been present in Turkey's kin policy in the Balkans. That is why Ankara always has had problems with some human rights-oriented minority political elites in Bulgaria, Kosovo or Macedonia. Such a conflicting relationship led to the change in the leadership of one of the strongest Turkish parties in the Balkans, the retreat of MRF leader Ahmed Dogan and the establishment of numerous opponent parties in Macedonia and Kosovo.¹⁷ While the human rights based kin policy is of vital importance for the strengthening of the minority status and fighting ethnic and religious discrimination in the Balkans, it is avoided as a compromise for good relations with the Balkan neighbourhood.

During the last years the AKP government initiated the formation of opponent minority parties that favour Turkey's priorities in the region, but this Erdogan-promoted strategy did not find substantive support among the minorities. Formation of opponent minority parties triggered slight democratic competition and accountability and less monopolization in the political choice, and they could probably lead to more democratic voting at the local elections. However, in cases of quantitatively small minorities such as the Turkish minorities in Macedonia and Kosovo these initiations led to dispersal of the minority vote and mobilized vote losses at the national level. Ankara's traditional strategy was to keep the Turkish minority vote mobilized around a certain leader or political party. During the AKP era, similarly to the model of the EuroTurks, the kin minorities in the Balkans have seen a growing number of local civil society actors in Bulgaria, Greece, Macedonia and Kosovo that have the support of the Diyanet or Presidency for Turks Abroad and Kin Communities.

The kin's functional representation as a bridge is reformed into conveyer of Turkey's neo-Ottoman or religious-cultural policy in the Balkans. When it comes to the EuroTurks, this approach presents a strong cultural insight for the protection of the national cultural identity of the Turkish citizens abroad.¹⁸ As defined in Article 8/f of the Law on the Presidency for Turks Abroad, the final goal of the new Turkey's Turks Abroad policy is to promote a powerful image of Turkey in the international field as well as provide a strong and effective Turkish

lobby abroad. The Presidency for Turks Abroad and Kin Communities is expected to work as a coordination office to build on long-standing policy and strategy in this field.¹⁹ Under the motto “*We are wherever there are our citizens, kin and relatives*”, the Presidency is expected to coordinate some newly established institutions in the field of kin policy. One of those newly established institutions is the Union of Turkish World Municipalities.

Founded in 2006, the Union of Turkish World Municipalities aims at expanding the network of cross border twin municipalities between Turkey and the close neighbourhood.²⁰ One of the most developed twin networks is realized with Balkan countries such as Bulgaria, Macedonia, Kosovo and Greece. There are more than 40 twin municipalities between the Turkish-populated municipalities in Bulgaria and Balkan migrants-populated municipalities in Turkey. The majority of the activities between the twin cities works towards the promotion of cross border economic exchange, business meetings and mutual investments.

In 2008, Ankara established another important kin policy institution: the Yunus Emre Foundation. This Foundation aims at promoting the Turkish language and culture around the world. Inspired by the works of well known British, German, French and American cultural centers around the world, it has founded 26 Yunus Emre Cultural Centers and plans to establish 100 Turkish libraries around the world. So far, the Yunus Emre Foundation is one of the most referred to actors in the field of kin policy. In 2009 the government established the so called Turkish Council i.e. the Council of the Turks Abroad in İstanbul (Türk Konseyi), the Turkish Parliamentarian Assembly in Baku (TÜRKPA), the Turkish Academy in Kazakhstan; and the Council for Cooperation of the Turkish Speaking Countries (Türk Dili Konuşan Ülkeler İş Birliği Konseyi). These institutions provide a platform for meeting and the exchange of knowledge and experience between representatives of different Turkish or kin societies around the world.

In June 2012, The Presidency organized the Ankara meeting of 600 Turkish NGO representatives coming from 17 different countries around the world. The Presidency also coordinates the Turkish scholarship program that enrolled 9,000 students in 2011 and followed 45,000 applications in 2012. The program provided scholarship to 3916 students in the academic year 2012-2013.²¹ In 2014 the number of foreign students who study in Turkey through the Turkish Scholarship program has reached 50,000.²² Initiated in 1992 this program was applied only to the Turkish minorities and communities in the Balkans, Cyprus, Caucasus and Central Asia. Under the motto “Turkey: a world education center”, the AKP government expanded the Turkish scholarship program and promoted university tourism from all around

the world. Today the number of international students expands with the Turkish citizens and kin abroad, and the Turkish Scholarship Program consumes almost half of the Presidency budget. In the first half of 2014 the Presidency spent 16,084,662 Euros on scholarships for 12,000 international students of the so-called “Grand Student Project”. Another 40 percent of the budget is used for financing NGO projects, research, and cultural activities of the EuroTurks and kin abroad. In total, 86 percent of the budget goes directly to international scholarships, NGO support and research projects and programs. In 2014 the Presidency budget has been increased by almost 20 percent to 64,834,666 Euros.²³

All these institutions constitute the soft power of the Turkish foreign cultural and economic policy in the Balkans (Kalin, 2012). However, the actor on the rise during the last decade is Diyanet, the Religious Affairs Directorate. The Diyanet has gained importance in the field of kin policy based on the preference and expectations of the EuroTurks. It exceeded the role of the TIKA -Turkish Cooperation and Development Agency as one of the oldest Turkish institutions in the Balkans, which has 33 coordination offices in 30 countries, and 10,086 projects applied between 2002 and 2011 in approximately 100 countries. In the past TIKA has been active especially in the Balkans, however nowadays its activity zone has been expanded to Africa, Asia and Far East. In 2011 TIKA realized 425 projects in the Balkans. It also gained recognition as an agent of moderate Ottoman Islam in the Balkans versus Wahhabism and Selefism. Yet, TIKA was brought to the Turkish Parliament with claims about connections to ISIS and El-Nusra.²⁴ TIKA is in close collaboration with charities that aim at Turkish language and Ottoman culture education, such as AKEA, Charity for Culture and Education and also the local Kosovo Islam Union in Kosovo.²⁵ As a major renovator of the Ottoman mosques and Ottoman Heritage in the Balkans²⁶, TIKA is one of the institutions that also saw a high increase in its budget. In 2013 the budget of TIKA increased by 15% and has reached 99,791,000 TL. This budget constitutes approximately $\frac{1}{4}$ of the budget of Diyanet in 1913. In general, as the debates of the 2013 budget show, it is possible to conclude that all these new and old soft power actors in Turkey’s Balkan politics are considered under the umbrella of the Diyanet, because the budget of strategic institutions such as the Presidency, Yunus Emre Foundation and TIKA were debated in one package with the Diyanet’s budget.

Conclusion

In contrast to the 1990s, Turkey's kin policy undergone four important changes during the last decade:

- 1) The conceptual distinction between the kin and the Turks Abroad followed extensive marketization and institutionalization of the kin policy. As opposed to the narrow ethnic conception of the 1990s, the early 21st century kin policy definition gained predominantly religious and geopolitical content grasping the Turkish citizens living abroad and Islamic societies with Ottoman geo-cultural heritage.
- 2) While Turks Abroad rose as primarily a political and economic diaspora, the kin in the Balkans served as cultural ground for Turkey's neo-Ottomanist policy of fighting radical Islamic movements in the region.
- 3) The Diyanet rose as chief actor in both kin and Turks Abroad policies;
- 4) The EuroTurks policy provided a model and strategy for the kin policies in the Balkans

The priority of EuroTurkish preferences and experience in the kin policy decision making infrastructure led to discrepancies in defining the problems and needs of the EuroTurks and Muslims in the Balkans. Indeed, while Ankara senses an important lack of religious institutions, imams and education among EuroTurks, and the number of the mosques, imams and Islamic centers among the Muslim communities in the Balkans is relatively sufficient. Unlike the EuroTurks, the Muslim communities in the Balkans undergo problems such as ethnic and social discrimination, human rights violations as result of radical nationalist attacks, unemployment, poverty, education problems, emigration, empty villages etc. Based on the idea of fighting radical Islam, Ankara claims to promote soft Turkish Islam policies and strategies towards both EuroTurks and kin in the Balkans and Central Asia.

The main sign of this policy is the functional and financial activation of the Diyanet in the region.²⁷ The activity of the Directorate for Religious Affairs is a novelty typical for the era of the AKP government. In 2013 its budged increased by 18 % up to 4,604,649,000 TL and exceeded the total budgets of the Ministry of Environment, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry for European Union Affairs. About 81% of this budged is devoted to personnel spending under the Diyanet's 2005 project on appointing religious personnel to the EuroTurks and the other Muslim communities abroad. After the appointment of 38 counsellors, 15 attaches and 20 coordinators, by the end of 2013 the Diyanet was represented by 60 Religious

Affairs Counsellors, 44 Religious Affairs Attaches and 20 Religious Affairs Coordinators in various Turkish embassies all around the world. All these counselors, coordinators and attaches have additional religious affairs personnel with specialized knowledge to coordinate and initiate the construction of mosques, religious schools, social and cultural centers.²⁸

After the proclamation of the 2005 International Theological Program (İlahiyat Programı) the Diyanet sponsored the education of 655 students from abroad. It established seminaries and appointed functionaries in 180 twin-cities in the Balkans, Central Asia and the Caucasus. It established the Islamic Theological Department at the Frankfurt Goethe University and Islamic courses, seminars for enhancing the culture and knowledge of the Islamic clergy abroad, as well as building of new religious high schools abroad. The Diyanet also opened seminaries in Romania, Bulgaria, Azerbaijan, Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan. The Diyanet funds the education of seminary students coming from Kosovo, Bulgaria, Crimea, Albania, Cyprus, Macedonia and Bosnia-Herzegovina to study in the seminaries in Turkey. In 2011-2012 Diyanet sponsored 318 graduate seminary students from 84 countries, and in 2012-2013 the number of these students increased to 360. The Mustafa Germirli Anadolu Seminary in Kayseri is one of the main education centers for the professional education and training of 188 clerks coming from the close neighbourhood and Africa. While the Istanbul Fatih Sultan Mehmet Anadolu Seminary accommodates 71 students from abroad, the Konya Selçuklu Mevlana Seminary provides education to 324 seminary students coming from 98 countries from around the world.²⁹

Beside the European cities, under the programs of Diyanet, young seminary educators or imams are being appointed to various villages and cities in the Balkans as well. Based on Ankara's goal to fight radical Islamic influence³⁰ and teach better Islam in the Balkans³¹, this policy has two reasons: one is to fill the empty positions in religious institutions located abroad, the second is related to the moral and academic education of the kin religious clergy abroad.³² However, unlike in the EU member states where the Islamic tradition and institutions are weak, there is no need for external clergy in most of the Balkan countries that have inherited the Ottoman architecture. Moreover, it is important to mention that the major necessity in the Balkans is not the appointment of a religious clergy from Turkey, but the restoration of the destroyed Ottoman heritage in the region. Unlike the EU member states, the local Balkan Muslim population has its own religious clergy that knows the local culture, habits, history and psychology, and thus has more effective communication skills and links with the local people. Interviews with imams and religious personnel in Macedonia and

Bulgaria show that the appointed Turkish clergy has to pay respect and attention to the local cultural and religious texture and Islam in the Balkans. Discursive marginalization of the Islamic knowledge and morality of the Balkan Muslims, i.e. and top-down enforced efforts to teach the local imams the “right” rules of a prayer may lead to future disagreement between the local and the imposed Turkish Islam.

The strengthened role of Diyanet as one of the main actors in Turkey’s kin and Turks Abroad policy in the Balkans and Europe is also a contemporary novelty that provides a basis for Turkey’s so called neo-Ottoman policy discourse. While Turkey’s goal is to undertake and restore the Ottoman image and heritage in the Balkans, the activities of the Diyanet may raise new questions and doubts among both Muslim and non-Muslim populations in the region.

Finally, unlike the case of EuroTurks, Turkey’s economic presence in the Balkans remains behind Croatia, Germany, Serbia and Italy. Infrastructure construction, banking, education and industry share the most part of the Turkish investments in the region. During the last decade there has been a steady increase in Turkish university tourism and education sector activities. The number of the Turkish universities, especially in Bosnia and Kosovo, is increasing. Yunus Emre Institutes and TIKA work as road builders ahead of the private investors and trade companies in the region. Considerable state investment in culture, religion and education is observable especially in Bosnia, Kosovo and Macedonia. Turkey seems to promote its cultural and economic hegemony in the region through construction of religious institutions, universities, exchange programs, cultural centers, and Turkish courses.

Notes

¹ A phrase often emphasized by the Turkish nationalist or right wing Turkish political elite during 90s. Similar ideas can be found in Putin’s geo-political discourse on Eurasian integration.

² No registered 2nd language at the census of 1950 available.

³ “*Turkish Bulgarians fastest-growing group of immigrants in the Netherlands*” *The Sophia Echo*, http://www.sofiaecho.com/2009/07/21/758628_turkish-bulgarians-fastest-growing-group-of-immigrants-in-the-netherlands (accessed 26th July 2009).

⁴ Information obtained from personal interviews with local members of the Turkish community during local fieldworks in the Bulgarian Turkish villages in the Northeastern Bulgaria, Razgrad and Ruse region, Belovets, Pchelina, and Zdravets, in the summer of 2011 and 2012.

⁵ The agreement was initiated as a bargaining tool during Turkey's negotiations of the 1934 Balkan Antant and was not signed by the Turkish Parliament on the basis that it aims at ethnic cleansing of the Turkish Muslims from the Yugoslavian Lands. There is no note about the deportation of the Albanians, but it foresees emigration from regions populated by both Albanians and Turks. See the text of the agreement: (Bajrami, 1990: 334-326)

⁶ See the contemporary data on 2015 General Election results abroad at: www.ysk.gov.tr

⁷ "2015-genel-seçimleri-sonuçlarina-yurtdisi-seçmeni-etkisi", 14.04.2015, Source: www.internethaber.com

⁸ World Bank, *Migration and Remittance Flows: Recent Trends and Outlook 2013-16*, October 2, 2013

⁹ Turkey's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *Turkish Citizens Living Abroad*, www.mfa.gov.tr

¹⁰ "Uluslararası Yatırım Zirvesi", www.SonDakika.com

¹¹ Mustafa SÖNMEZ, "Turkey at the bottom rung of ladder in investments abroad", *Hürriyet Daily News*, 27 April 2015

¹² This calculation is provided by Turkey's Center for Strategic Studies. See: Caner Sancaktar, "Balkanlar Türkiye İçin Neden Önemli?", *TASAM*, 27.05.2010

¹³ Sema Erder, *Istanbul Bir Kervansaray mı?*, İstanbul: Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları, 2015, p.275-80.

¹⁴ "Yurtdışında Yaşayan Vatandaşlarımızın Sorunlarının Araştırılarak Alınması Gereken Önlemlerin Belirlenmesi Amacıyla Kurulan Meclis Araştırma Komisyonu", *T.B.M.M.* Dönem 22, *Esas No. : A.01.1.GEÇ.10/8,48-91, Date.: 17.12.2003*

¹⁵ The Turkish version is as follows: "Hangi ülkede yaşadıklarına bakılmaksızın Türkiye Cumhuriyetine vatandaşlık bağlı ile bağlı, teröre karışmamış her birey Devletimiz için çok önemli ve değerlidir.", See: "Yurtdışında Yaşayan Vatandaşlarımızın Sorunlarının Araştırılarak Alınması Gereken Önlemlerin Belirlenmesi Amacıyla Kurulan Meclis Araştırma Komisyonu", *T.B.M.M.* Dönem 22, *Esas No.: A.01.1.GEÇ.10/8,48-91, Date.: 17.12.2003*

¹⁶ Yurtdışı Türkler ve Akraba Topluluklar Başkanlığı Teşkilat ve Görevleri Hakkında Kanun", Kanun Numarası : 5978, Kabul Tarihi : 24/3/2010, R.Gazete Tarih: 6/4/2010 Sayı : 27544, Tertip : 5 Cilt : 49

¹⁷ Kosovo Turkish Justice Party (KTAP) was founded on 15 April 2013 in Mamusa. Source: <http://www.aksam.com.tr/dunya/kosovada-3uncu-turk-partisi-kuruldu/haber-187895>

¹⁸ "Yurtdışında Yaşayan Vatandaşlarımızın Sorunlarının Araştırılarak Alınması Gereken Önlemlerin Belirlenmesi Amacıyla Kurulan Meclis Araştırma Komisyonu", *T.B.M.M.* Dönem 22, *Esas No. : A.01.1.GEÇ.10/8,48-91, Date.: 17.12.2003*

¹⁹ Yurtdışı Türkler ve Akraba Topluluklar Başkanlığı Teşkilat ve Görevleri Hakkında Kanun", Kanun Numarası : 5978, Kabul Tarihi : 24/3/2010, R.Gazete Tarih: 6/4/2010 Sayı : 27544, Tertip : 5 Cilt : 49

²⁰ Başbakan Yardımcısı Bozdağ'ın Bütçe Konuşması, 2013, Source: <http://www.bekirbozdag.com.tr/haberler/78-haberler/152-basbakan-yard-mc-s-bozdag-n-buetce-konusmasi>

²¹ Başbakan Yardımcısı Bozdağ'ın Bütçe Konuşması, 2013, Source: <http://www.bekirbozdag.com.tr/haberler/78-haberler/152-basbakan-yard-mc-s-bozdag-n-buetce-konusmasi>

²² YTB, *Kurumsal Mali Durum ve Beklentiler Raporu*, Ankara, Temmuz 2014

²³ *Ibid.*

²⁴ "TIKA'nın Kosova'da Radikal Dinci Örgütlerle İlişkisi Var İddiaları", Source:

http://www.cihan.com.tr/news/TIKA-nin-Kosova-da-radikal-dinci-orgutlerle-iliski-var-iddialari-TBMM-ye-tasindi_3876-CHMTU0Mzg3Ni8xMDA1

²⁵ “ Kosova’da Algi Operasyonu Yapiliyor”, Source:

<http://www.timeturk.com/tr/2014/09/26/kosova-da-algi-operasyonu-yapiliyor.html#.VJCa4PmJvmM>

²⁶ “ Kosova’da Terzi Mahalle Camisinin Acilis Toreni”, Source:

<http://www.haberler.com/kosova-da-terzi-mahalle-camisinin-acilisini-2204234-haberi/>

²⁷ http://www.zaman.com.tr/gundem_diyanet-kosovada-buyuk-bir-cami-yapacak_2064388.html, <http://www.diyanetvakfi.org.tr/449/guncel/banglades-ve-kosovadan-tdkiye-ziyaret>

²⁸ “Diyanet’e Dev Bütçe: 2013 Yılı Bütçesi Yüzde 18.34 Arttı”, *Din Diyanet Net*, <http://www.dindiyonet.net/diyanet/diyanete-dev-butce-2013-yili-butcesi-yuzde-1834-artti-h4003.html>

²⁹ Başbakan Yardımcısı Bekir Bozdağ’ın 2013 Eskişehir’in Türk Dünyası Kültür Başkenti olmasına ilişkin TBMM’deki konuşması, 2012, Source: <http://www.bekirbozdag.com.tr/konusmalari/83-tbmm-konusmalari/273-basbakan-yard-mc-s-bekir-bozdag-n-2013-eskisehir-in-tuerk-duenyas-kueltuer-baskenti-olmas-na-iliskin-tbmm-deki-konusmas>

³⁰ Tuba Ünlü Bilgiç, Bestami Bilgiç, “Kosova Türkleri: Sıradışı bir Türk Diasporası”, *Bilik*, Summer 2012, Number 62, p.53-59

³¹ <http://www.diyanetvakfi.org.tr/449/guncel/banglades-ve-kosovadan-tdkiye-ziyaret> (accessed on 25 September 2014)

³² Ibid p.68

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