CHAPTER 5

SECURITY CHALLENGES IN EUROPE AFTER NATO ENLARGEMENT

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The post-Cold War years are over. A quick thought for the years lived since the reintegration of the two Germanys into one, and the disintegration of the Soviet Union into many, serves as a reminder that they have proven to be less demanding than in 1919-24, when the post-war system emerged only in the aftermath of the ill-fated French occupation of the Ruhr, or than in 1945-49, when the post-war structure began to settle with the signing of the Washington Treaty and, subsequently, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). The future is about to begin. Moving the clock forward to April 1999, when revisions to the Washington Treaty will be formally signed, helps anticipate issues of European security beyond the first phase of NATO enlargement, which can also be declared as over.

But what future—one that will resurrect the worst features of the distant past or one that will strengthen the best legacies of a more recent past? The evidence gathered to date remains contradictory. As should have been expected, the post-Cold War era in Europe was fraught with many instabilities and much uncertainty. These were seen and endured most visibly and most painfully in the Balkans, including but not limited to Bosnia and what used to be known as Yugoslavia. They have to do, too, with future conditions in what used to be known as the Soviet Union, including Russia, the defeated state, but also many of the countries that fell under its domination before and after the Revolution of 1917. On the whole, though, these post-Cold War instabilities and uncertainties have little to do with the Cold War. Rather, they mainly grow out of earlier wars, including the two world wars that conditioned the

distribution of power in Europe and beyond, during much of the 20th century.

As a result of these instabilities, the debate over the post-Cold War future of NATO proved to be stillborn. With the post-war expectations quickly exhausted, calls for new structures that would substitute for wartime alliances quickly faded: the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) gained a new name and then disappeared. For a short while after 1989, calls for a dissolution of NATO were heard, mainly from those who had been making the same calls during the Cold War as well. Since 1993, however, these calls have become less frequent and the centrality of NATO has been less and less challenged. Concomitantly, expectations of a quick and full completion of the European construction have lost the intensity they had after the Maastricht Treaty which had been signed in December 1991. Instead, the war in Bosnia has confirmed that this is not Europe's time after all, whether for its separate nation-states or for the European Union (EU), to which 15 nation-states already belong, with more to come. At best, the time is half-before-Europe, pending on Europe's ability to take further and better care of its security needs.

Nor are there many questions raised any longer over the centrality of the U.S. role and power within NATO, and hence in post-Cold War Europe. If anything, compared to the aftermath of either one or both of the previous two world wars, there have been fewer calls for a return home, fewer indications of a collapse or a fragmentation of the victorious wartime alliance, and fewer indications of new hegemonial bids from either the defeated states or new contenders for regional or global hegemony.

In and of themselves, therefore, the legacies left from the long reprieve from history imposed by the Cold War are sound. These are especially in evidence in the West—the part of the continent, that is, that begins mainly where the Ottoman and Russian empires used to end. The legacy,

there, is that of a new European space that has been modified by five major events that have truly changed the established course of Europe's history: the collapse of colonial empires; the erosion of the nation-state; the end of the the Left-Right cleavage; the de-legitimation of wars; and the return of the New World into the Old.

Considered separately, these changes are well-known. The colonial wars that followed the two world wars provided a global stage in which conflicts in East-West relations could erupt at the least cost for its main protagonists, but they also served frequently as a catalyst for discord in transatlantic and intra-European relations. The Left-Right cleavages, which had been a recurring source of serious instabilities from within each European state since 1919, became an invitation for destabilizing political intrusions from without after 1945. After Europe's nationalisms were protectively forced into the cage loosely called "Europe," the progressive transformation of nation-states into member states has imposed the institutional obligations made to the collective "We" by all member states on the sovereign "I" of each nation-state. On the western side of the continent at least, Europe's taste for armed conflicts, too, has soured after the orgy of violence endured during both world wars, but also because of the impotence showed during the Cold War when the countries of Europe could neither gain their autonomy nor regain their independence, let alone whatever control they used to hold over distant lands. Last but not least, the post-war U.S. decision to stay in Europe, which defined Europe after 1945, proved to be far more entangling than the Truman administration had envisioned, both during the Cold War when the U.S. commitments grew steadily and since the Cold War as these commitments could no longer be reversed.

These developments were all linked, and how these linkages worked has not been discussed as fully as the ways in which each emerged and unfolded separately. For example, it is after the small states of Europe had lost their empires in Africa and Asia that their quest for space took

the more civil form of European integration. Thus, the colonial wars end at about the time when a small European Community is launched and the political wars within each of its six initial members begin to recede—say, between 1958 and 1963. In turn, the sense of an ever wider European "community" of states enlarged to nine and more states, coupled with the rise of never-ending affluence and the end of increasingly debilitating colonial conflicts, helped delegitimize the use of force both from within and from without. Such prosperity and stability among the allies in turn emerged as an open invitation for the United States to disengage from the "over there" of yesteryears, or at least achieve a more equal and more equitable sharing of the many burdens of the West, whether in defending its values in the East or in extending its interests in the South.

As the century ends, sustaining the changes that have conditioned the transformation of Europe since the century began represents a defining challenge for the years to come. A reversal of the trends inherited from the Cold War could take different forms. Thus, with regard to countries at the periphery of the continent, there is little danger, of course, of the European states attempting to rebuild their empires in Africa or in Asia—at least not by force. These days are over. Still, the South will continue to play a central role in the life of Europe, as well as in Europe's relations with the United States and Russia. This role is especially decisive on the southern shores of the Mediterranean, where lies an arc of Islamic crises extending from Algeria and the balance of North Africa and farther south, to Turkey and the Muslim republics of the defunct Soviet Union.

The return home of Europe's old empires can take many forms. Most evident is the fact and the threat of large inflows of immigrants intent on leaving the harsh economic and political conditions that prevail in their respective countries to settle in the former mother country or elsewhere in a broad and affluent Europe made wide open by agreements designed to end frontiers. Alternatively, former imperial dependencies can export to the former

mother countries either economic scarcities with a manipulation of the price and supply of vital commodities, or they can export sheer violence with terrorism and the like—either export being, of course, the source of serious political instabilities.

In either of these conditions, the question of Islam in Europe—a question distinct from, but admittedly related to, the question of Europe and Islam—is real and may raise a significant, possibly decisive, challenge to European security. Relations with Islam have been experienced in Europe differently than in the United States, and they are still lived differently not only from one side of the Atlantic to the other but also from one European state to another. After 1999, this challenge to Europe's security could quickly become internal, even more than it might be external, as the threats raised by the radicalization of an Islamic dispora within many European states would be all the more genuine as they could rely on potential ties with the radical Islamic states abroad. More broadly, Europe's relations with Islam, and Islam's relations with Europe, impact on political trade-offs and bargains within the EU: such important issues as Schengen or the allocation of structural funds, and by implication of EU enlargement to the East, fall into the new North-South divide that characterizes the EU at 15. Finally, in a growing number of cases—including the Gulf (over "dual containment"), the Middle East (over the Arab-Israeli peace process), and even North Africa—how to deal with Islamic revolutionary states has a significant impact on Europe's relations with the United States, and even Russia.

The end of the Left-Right cleavages does not mean the end of political divisions and hence, the end of political and even regime instabilities. Already during the Cold War, cleavages within the Left and within the Right were often as significant as the Left-Right cleavage, just as the U.S. opposition to the Left, especially the communist left, was occasionally more significant than the U.S. opposition to the conservative Right, especially the nationalist Right. Now,

however, the collapse of communism has given the socialist Left a new lease on life in the largest European states: in Britain and Italy first, and in France next. Later in 1998, the social democrats' new bid for power in Germany may end 15 years in the opposition. Europe's non-communist Left is all the more at ease in this new political environment as it no longer needs to be revolutionary. Compassion for the unemployed sells well, and claims of competence are especially convincing if and when these claims are made relative to, and against, the insufficiencies of those in power.

On the other side of the political spectrum, the collapse of the Soviet Union restores for the extreme right prospects for a legitimacy denied by its conservative competitors because of the Cold War against totalitarianism. Being an assertive nationalist may no longer be as "bad" as was the case earlier. In countries like Austria and France, the extreme right commands between one-sixth and one-fourth of the electorate. In Italy, a reborn neo-fascist party regains its political legitimacy around a dynamic new leader who contends for national leadership. In this case, too, Germany might be next as it unloads the debilitating burdens of uniqueness and rediscovers a past that Germans had previously learned to master by pretending that there was no past.

Political changes in Europe after NATO enlargement could be quite significant. Renewed clashes within the two sides of the political spectrum and between them risk a fragmentation of the current consensus and public outbursts of anger aimed at the EU or NATO, as well as at the United States. The risk, too, may be over changes in the constitutional frameworks that helped achieve stability during the Cold War. In some cases, the constitutional risk is to do nothing, as in France where political cohabitation between President Jacques Chirac and Prime Minister Lionel Jospin until 2002 would erode the presidential identity of the 1962 constitution, and end the Fifth Republic as it has been known since de Gaulle. In other cases, as in

Italy, the risk is over doing something, like a constitutional reform that would launch a presidential regime that gives precedence to charisma *à l'italienne* (i.e., that of the neo-fascist Fini) over competence *à l'américaine* (i.e., that of the neo-centrist Prodi).

Whatever may happen, it will happen around "Europe" as the defining political issue. For it is now the intrusion of the European Union into the day-to-day lives of each nation-state that can best motivate political ideologies that will enable the state to claim that it protects the citizens from the market, and the nation's identity from the Union.

In a narrow sense, the EU is the victim of its own agenda: too much Europe may be killing it, and the EU suffers from an agenda overload whose rigid timetable carries dangers of derailment with every delay or setback. The main issues of the agenda are known: the euro of Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) in January 1999 when the EU states will begin a long farewell to their currencies; another Inter-Governmental Conference (IGC) in or around the year 2001, to address the issues of institutional governance that were not settled in 1996; and enlargement by 2003, when the EU will begin its expansion to 21 states. The scope, complexity, and significance of this agenda are truly unprecedented: deepen in order to widen, widen in order to deepen, and reform in order to do both. In every instance and for all 15 members, the EU will cost a lot of money, will take away a lot of sovereignty, and will impose a lot of austerity—in short, the EU now promises to impose a lot of pain that will cause a lot of public resentment.

In a broader sense, the EU is victimized by its own successes. Nonmembers view it as a short cut for economic prosperity and democratic stability. Members continue to view it as a recipe for affluence at home and influence abroad. The latter's growing awareness of the costs of integration, and the former's future discovery of the costs of membership are what gives the process unprecedented fragility. For the past 40 years, whenever community

building in Europe carried a cost (meaning, economic dislocations or erosion of sovereignty) that cost could be contained with vocal national leaders (whether General de Gaulle in the 1960s or Margaret Thatcher in the 1980s) or with new institutions (like the European Council in the 1970s). Now, in the 1990s neither can be found. Although Helmut Kohl remains a forceful and committed "European" leader, he is not an identifiable "national" leader for Europe. Similarly, the Euro-Council envisioned to protect each EU state from the European Central Bank is not likely to be effective if the euro is going to work: no institutional gimmick is going to hide the further erosion of sovereignty under conditions of economic hardship in the continent.

The mixture of economic and cultural crisis—meaning, questions over affluence and identity—has never had good consequences on Europe. Now, however, the countries of Europe lack the means and the will to fight together as a union of states, let alone fight alone or, least of all, with each other. Plans for a Western European Union (WEU) should be encouraged, but they remain an aspiration more than a reality. The war in Bosnia could have been the catalyst for the further development of WEU, but the issue proved to be too demanding militarily under conditions that were too distracting politically. As elsewhere and nearly everywhere, the mood in Europe is inward and the interests are self-centered. Now, the focus of EU attention is on EMU. After 1999, only a derailment of monetary union could create enough national urgency, and release enough institutional energy, for a relaunch of Europe along the lines of a common foreign and security policy (CFSP)—as proved to be the case in the mid-1950s, when the collapse of the European Defense Community became the catalyst for the decision to launch an economic community. To be sure, even a CFSP launch in 1999, whatever form that decision might take, would still leave any credible common *security* policy postponed for many more years, pending the resolution of numerous and complex institutional issues. Yet, in the intervening years, a CFSP could display a

common *foreign* policy centered on enlargement to the East before or after 2003, depending on how well EMU proceeds.

Finally, the future of the Cold War legacies in Western Europe is related to the future of U.S. involvement in Europe. Some still view the fact of even the perception of an American withdrawal, whatever form it might take, as a catalyst for action. Rather, it should be feared as a trigger for a generalized *sauve qui peut* whereby the nationalisms of Europe would be unleashed with a variety of bilateral deals within Europe, including Germany looking to the East, with France initially but alone next. A Franco-German *ménage à trois* with Moscow might thus balance an Anglo-Saxon *pas de deux* choreographed by the United States. Depending on the goals which these bilateral deals might seek for Europe, not to mention other deals struck between European states and non-European rogue states like Iraq, vital U.S. economic and strategic interests might be progressively at risk.

With the end of the Cold War transition, U.S. leadership is questioned more openly in much of Europe, and by many of the European states, as unreliable, hazardous, deceptive, intrusive, and unpredictable: unreliable because it tends to come late and remains tentative even after it has come; hazardous because the risks of failure are often assumed by the protected parties; deceptive because of a tendency to not do what is said and not say what is done; intrusive because of an overbearing hegemonial posture that is all the more cumbersome as, precisely, it is viewed as unreliable, hazardous, and deceptive; and, last but not least, unpredictable because the quality of U.S. leadership and the sustainability of U.S. policies seem to depend on internal factors which many in Europe view as incomprehensible or irrelevant. Still, even as American power and leadership are questioned, neither is truly in question, whether in Europe or in the United States. That such would be the case matters. On both sides of the Atlantic, the case for American involvement is a case based on interests: nowhere else can there be found a relationship

that is as *complete* as the relationship between North America (the United States but also Canada) and Europe, a relationship that relies on decisive security ties, as well as on inescapable economic, political, and even cultural ties.

There are many remaining points of strategic, economic, and political derailment, however. Thus, in coming months and years causes for concern might include a defeat in the Balkans, meaning an unlikely decision to withdraw U.S. forces before the Dayton agreements would have been convincingly fulfilled or without preserving minimal order in Kosovo; unmanaged conflict in the Gulf or in the Middle East, meaning a European perception of U.S. policies implemented for national goals at the expense of the allies' needs, combined with a U.S. perception of the allies as good-weather friends; or even a military conflict in Asia, including the like of Korea or Taiwan, which the European allies would choose to ignore. No less significantly, points of transatlantic derailment might also include an economic crisis reminiscent of the interwar years that bridged the gap between the two world wars: for example, a monetary storm in Europe after the hypothetical collapse of EMU—with, without, or because of an economic meltdown in Asia—could trigger an agonizing reappraisal of the post-Cold War transatlantic economic ties notwithstanding the interests that justify these ties. Finally, a political crisis that would result from an open discord over security issues in the Gulf or elsewhere, or from an open confrontation over competing corporate interests, and lead the U.S. Congress to force unilateral actions on the part of the U.S. president and counteraction on the part of the EU Commission prompted by some of its members, would be a great concern.

Thus, the main security challenges in Europe are mostly of its own making. An enlarged NATO does not truly address many or most of these instabilities, except for the fact that it represents the conduit for a U.S. commitment which, as argued, Europe continues to need because of its own insufficiencies, and continues to expect in spite of itself. That NATO might stand at the margin of the most direct

challenges to Europe's stability during the coming years is not troubling. In 1949, too, the North Atlantic Treaty signed by the United States and 10 European states plus Canada did not attend to many of the most immediate security issues faced by the European allies, including imperial wars in the South and political wars at home that came dangerously close in some cases to outright civil wars. After the Cold War, the commitment to NATO enlargement was made without explaining the interests that would justify it. Needless to say, it should have been the other way around: interests define commitments, and the will for a commitment emerges out of a shared awareness of the interests that justify that commitment.

After 1999, the case for enlarging NATO beyond its then-19 members will have to be made on strategic grounds as well as on institutional grounds. In other words, it will no longer be enough to suggest that this is Romania's turn—or that of Slovenia or that of the Baltic states. Instead, it will be necessary to define the Alliance's needs for the missions and objectives sought by its 19 members, and it will be necessary, too, to determine which new members either Western institution should welcome in order to fill the new gaps open by the ongoing rearticulation of Europe's civil and stable space.

The full institutional logic of NATO and EU enlargement has not been articulated yet. Even as NATO enlargement proceeds, it remains a policy without a rationale, notwithstanding the body of scholarly literature that helped promote it during the early post-Cold War years. In 1998, the decisive argument for enlargement was that the predictable cost of not enforcing the commitment to enlarge would far outweigh the unpredictable costs of going ahead with a fairly prudent decision—prudent *vis-à-vis* the new members (limited in number and carefully selected as to their location) but also, therefore, *vis-à-vis* Russia. After enlargement has been voted in the U.S. Senate, the decision to enlarge beyond 19 should be based more explicitly on a strategic rationale. An exclusively institutional case can be

made for the EU, which has an identity of its own as, literally, the 16th member of the European Union: affluence, and hence stability, without the EU is difficult to imagine. The same case cannot be made for NATO, whose members would not necessarily lose their security without the guarantees offered by the treaty and its organization. Now, instead, the rationale for NATO enlargement ought to be realistic, meaning that it should be threat-conscious in addition to being institution-conscious. It must be made differently—either more or less convincingly—about Romania than about the Baltic states or the Ukraine, on the basis of security needs and pending the evolution of Russian policies and objectives in the affected regions.

In 1949 as now, NATO and its subsequent enlargements (in 1952 and 1955) provided a security context within which Europe's internal questions of political stability and economic growth could be addressed, and community-building could be launched. In other words, while it may be argued that NATO alone did not produce peace within the North Atlantic area, the fact that it deterred war from without that area helped buy the time needed for the good Cold War legacies to build up. This carries two implications. First, the European economic community was a by-product of, and a prerequisite for, the transatlantic security community. In other words, the idea of Europe and the Atlantic idea were not only compatible, they were also complementary. It was understood that they would follow parallel tracks—each with its own locomotive, its own ambitions, its own capabilities; but it was also anticipated that at some point these parallel tracks would converge, with a Europe so self-sufficient as to make the Atlantic idea redundant, or with an Atlantic idea so well-rooted into reality as to make the idea of Europe secondary.

Accordingly, the evolution of NATO and the EU, including their enlargement as well as their institutional reforms, must be made not only compatible but also complementary. Both respond to a comprehensive institutional logic that shapes the patterns of space

redistribution. Questions of membership and interests, but also questions of timing and procedures—who and why, when and how?—are raised on behalf of a common Euro-Atlantic space whose articulation began more or less consciously after the two world wars, and proceeded more or less effectively during the Cold War. Each institution must remain aware of what the other does and cannot do: NATO and the EU should be aware of states that cannot enter the EU and NATO soon, whatever the reasons, and of any state that belongs to only one of these institutions. Within such a common space, the two processes of NATO and EU enlargement cannot be separated even as they remain separable because that space would achieve its coherence when a finite number of European states achieve converging membership in both institutions and with the United States. Such convergence can be anticipated in three successive phases.

First, after 1999, a NATO at 19 members would expand toward EU countries that are not yet NATO members, including Austria and (possibly) Sweden and Finland. With Romania, too, a strong candidate for NATO membership on grounds of security in the Balkans (but an unlikely candidate for EU membership for many more years), a post-1999 NATO expansion would respond to military needs in southeastern Europe and political realities in the EU and WEU without raising new risks in, for, or from Russia and other nonmembers. Simultaneously, an EU at 15 members would expand to 21 members by 2003, even though early admission for the smallest of the five Eastern contenders, namely, Slovenia and Estonia, would help confirm the seriousness of the EU process and the firmness of its members' commitment to achieve enlargement at the earliest possible time.

After 2003, a NATO at 21+ (NATO at 19 + Austria + . . . + Romania) could consider additional enlargement to remaining EU neutral states (including, by that time, Ireland), the newly admitted EU states (including Estonia and Slovenia), and even the other two Baltic states

(depending on conditions in Russia). This next phase would also carry a 4-year timetable during which the EU, too, would expand to new NATO members not yet members of the EU (including Romania) and to states that complete the regional clusters in the Baltics (Latvia and Lithuania) and Central Europe (Slovakia). By that time, too, Norway might reconsider its long-delayed interest in EU membership. Finally, late during that period, too, access talks with Turkey could finally be launched lest Turkey be "lost" by the end of the decade as the only European member of NATO that would not be a member of the EU as well.

After that, past the year 2007 and nearing 2010, the convergence would be completed with decisions as to how much farther, if at all, the process might continue. By that time, too—for the 50th anniversary of the Rome Treaties—a new relationship between the United States and the EU would engineer explicit ties between NATO and the EU. These ties might take the form of a U.S.-EU treaty, a TAFTA (Transatlantic Free Trade Area), and new institutional arrangements for binding consultation between the United States and whatever type of institutional governance might have then emerged within the EU.

The integrated economic space of the EU, in close association with the United States, and a common Euro-Atlantic security community explicitly based on U.S. power are both futures that have already happened. That space will be all the more cohesive and safe as it continues to respond to some of the features that helped define it over the past 50 years.

- First, the United States may not be a European Power, but it is a Great Power in Europe. To pretend the former is misleading: the very history of the United States makes the closeness of its relations with Europe still look somewhat unnatural. But the tangible components of the U.S. presence in Europe can no longer be ignored: unlike the U.S. relationship with Asia, the U.S. relationship with Europe is complete.

• Second, the Atlantic Idea and the Idea of Europe are complementary. To pretend otherwise is self-defeating. After World War II, each was a precondition for the other; during the Cold War, each helped strengthen the other. After the Cold War, the future of each will condition that of the other, as well as of all others.

• Third, NATO and its enlargement is only one institutional venue for a return of the East into the West as part of the rearticulation of space in Europe and across the Atlantic. To pretend otherwise is not only to reduce the totality of the Cold War legacies to one dimension, but also to distort that dimension.

• Fourth, the enlargement of the Western institutions is only beginning, but it must be and remain finite. In other words, membership for all is not desirable for the good performance of either or both NATO and the EU, and membership in either the EU or NATO may not be desirable for all states in Europe.

Integrating these features in the formulation of the questions and answers raised by the new security challenges faced by Europe after the enlargement of NATO will help pursue the vision that was articulated 50 years ago as the Cold War was about to provide the rationale for a North Atlantic Treaty designed to extend America's stay in Europe. As these 50 years are remembered, they provide much room for satisfaction over what has been accomplished and leave much room for apprehension over what remains to be done.