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A British soldier guides troops from the 2d Cavalry Regiment off of a M3 Amphibious Rig Bridge after ferrying them across the Nemen River near Kulautuva, Lithuania. Photo: US Army: Spc. Andrew McNeil/22nd M/released

THE US AND NATO RESPONSE

Recognizing the resurgence of Russia as a strategic competitor, the United States and NATO have taken several significant steps to respond to multiple aspects of the Russian challenge.

On the political, economic, and other non-military fronts, some notable progress has been made since 2014. The United States spearheaded sanctions, some multinational with EU partners, to punish Russia for its illegal annexation of Crimea, hybrid war and aggression in Eastern Ukraine, its cyber and critical-infrastructure attacks, and its interference in elections in the United States and Europe.³⁶ The United States, with the support of Congress, also established the Global Engagement Center (GEC) at the Department of State to counter Russian disinformation and

influence operations in Europe and Eurasia—though many assert that more resources and authorities are required for the GEC to have a real impact.³⁷ NATO has created its own Hybrid Analysis Branch focused largely on Russia, signed a watershed joint declaration to boost NATO-EU cooperation against hybrid threats, and, alongside the EU, supported the establishment in Helsinki of a multinational European Center of Excellence (COE) for Countering Hybrid Threats.³⁸ Many European allies have also sharpened their approaches for holistically tackling Russian malign influence.

On the military front, the United States and NATO have also made important strides by adapting their force posture, as described in more detail below.

³⁶ Mark Landler, Annie Lowrey, and Steven Lee Myers, “Obama Steps Up Russia Sanctions in Ukraine Crisis,” *New York Times*, March 20, 2014, <https://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/21/us/politics/us-expanding-sanctions-against-russia-over-ukraine.html>; Allan Smith, “U.S. Imposes New Russia-Related Sanctions, Citing Election Interference, ‘Other Malign Activities,’” *NBC News*, December 19, 2018, <https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/politics-news/u-s-imposes-new-russia-related-sanctions-citing-election-interference-n949991>.

³⁷ Gardiner Harris, “State Dept. Was Granted \$120 Million to Fight Russian Meddling. It Has Spent \$0,” *New York Times*, March 4, 2018, <https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/04/world/europe/state-department-russia-global-engagement-center.html>.

³⁸ European Centre of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats, “Common Set of Proposals for the Implementation of the Joint Declaration by the President of the European Council, the President of the European Commission and the Secretary General of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization,” December 6, 2016, <https://www.hybridcoe.fi/wp-content/uploads/2017/08/Common-set-of-proposals-for-the-implementation-of-the-Joint-Declaration-2.pdf>.

NATO AND US FORCE POSTURE IN EUROPE PRE-2014

At the height of the Cold War, the United States, as the driving force behind NATO, had upward of three hundred thousand personnel deployed to Western Europe, operating as a *deterrence by denial* force. Posture in Europe was centered around four divisions and five brigade combat teams, primarily located in Germany, the expected point of attack for Soviet forces.³⁹ These NATO forces were supplemented by major stockpiles of equipment for further reinforcements in the event of a war. NATO routinely trained this capability in REFORGER exercises, which transported large-scale reinforcements from the United States to West Germany, and ensured NATO had the ability to rapidly return forces to Europe in the event of a conflict with the Soviet Union.⁴⁰

The end of the Cold War eliminated the basis for this American force posture in Europe. The collapse of the Soviet Union removed an urgent and significant military threat, and Russia under the leadership of President Boris Yeltsin generated hopes for a genuine and lasting partnership between the West and Moscow. In the years that followed the fall of the Berlin Wall, notwithstanding conflict in the Balkans, the United States began decreasing its military footprint in Europe. In the late 1990s, the United States maintained four brigades permanently in Europe, housed under two divisions—the 1st Armored Division and 1st Infantry Division—in Germany, with an airborne brigade in Italy.⁴¹

In the early 2000s, with growing European integration, relative peace and stability on the European continent, and rising demands for US forces in the Middle East and elsewhere, US military leadership asserted that the United States could fulfill its commitments to an enlarged NATO with fewer forces in Europe. In 2004, President George W. Bush's administration decided to remove the heavy armored brigades of the 1st Armored Division and 1st Infantry Division back to the United States, along with their enablers and headquarters elements, as part of the Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) commission in 2005.⁴² This move was later

paused, in part due to infrastructure concerns in the United States.⁴³ In 2012, citing a downsizing of the US Army and a new focus on the Asia-Pacific region, the Barack Obama administration carried out the removal of these two brigades long stationed in Germany, and brought home all the US tanks and other heavy vehicles prepositioned in Europe. This left the US Army, the primary component of US forces in Europe, with just two light BCTs and approximately sixty-five thousand total US personnel stationed in Europe by 2014.⁴⁴

Still, throughout those years, the NATO Alliance maintained a modest, but important, presence on Europe's eastern flank, particularly to support its newest allies. Since 2007, NATO has maintained a Baltic Air Policing mission over Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, a Joint Force Training Center (JFTC) in Bydgoszcz, Poland, under NATO's Allied Command Transformation, and the Multinational Corps Northeast (MNC-NE) in Szczecin, Poland.⁴⁵ MNC-NE was established by framework nations Germany, Denmark, and Poland to assist with the collective defense of NATO territory, contribute to multinational crisis management including peace-support operations, and provide command and control for humanitarian, rescue, and disaster-relief operations. This grew to include fourteen contributing nations by 2014. However, in the early 2000s, many of its personnel were assigned to NATO's International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) mission in Afghanistan, reflecting the West's rising focus on counterterrorism. Despite this shift, the United States continued to contribute a four-aircraft rotation to the Baltic Air Policing Mission, and maintained a small number of troops at both MNC-NE and the JFTC.

NATO FORCE POSTURE IN EUROPE POST-2014

Notwithstanding Russia's invasion of Georgia in 2008, the transatlantic community was shocked by Russia's invasion of Ukraine in 2014—including the illegal annexation of Crimea and the seizure of territory in eastern Ukraine by Russian-led forces—as well as the Kremlin's demonstrated capacity for hybrid war-

39 Kathleen H. Hicks, et al., *Evaluating Future U.S. Army Force Posture in Europe* (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2016), https://csis-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/publication/160712_Samp_ArmyForcePostureEurope_Web.pdf.

40 "Countdown to 75: US Army Europe and REFORGER," US Army, March 22, 2017, https://www.army.mil/article/184698/countdown_to_75_us_army_europe_and_reforger.

41 Ibid.

42 Gary Sheftick, "Army Planning Drawdown in Europe," US Army, March 26, 2012, https://www.army.mil/article/76339/army_planning_drawdown_in_europe.

43 "Lawmakers Scramble to Save Bases," CNN, May 14, 2005, <http://www.cnn.com/2005/POLITICS/05/13/base.closings/>.

44 Philip Breedlove, statement to the House Armed Services Committee, February 25, 2015, www.eucom.mil/media-library/.../u-s-european-command-posture-statement-2015.

45 Paul Belkin, Derek E. Mix, and Steven Woehrel, "NATO: Response to the Crisis in Ukraine and Security Concerns in Central and Eastern Europe," Congressional Research Service, July 31, 2014, <https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R43478.pdf>.

fare in eastern Ukraine and against Western democratic institutions. In response, the United States and NATO began to quickly rebuild their defense-and-deterrence posture in Europe, while also increasing assistance to non-NATO countries on NATO's periphery, to allow them to defend their territory from ongoing and potential Russian attack and subversion.

The Alliance's initial response to the invasion of Ukraine, a non-NATO nation on its frontier, was "assurance measures" focused on air defense and surveillance, maritime deployments, and military exercises. The primary focus was Europe's northeast, where allied territory was most vulnerable because of its geographic proximity with Russia. NATO increased the Baltic Air Policing mission from four to sixteen aircraft, and NATO AWACS conducted sustained missions over Poland and Romania to monitor events in Ukraine.⁴⁶ In the maritime domain, NATO deployed two maritime groups on patrol to the Baltic and Mediterranean Seas.⁴⁷ Outside of NATO's existing exercise regimen, NATO member states conducted a series of military drills in the Baltics, such as a drill in Estonia with six thousand participating allied troops, aimed at repelling a potential attack on Estonian territory.⁴⁸ Some allies, particularly the Baltic States, called for a more robust response, one that included the permanent stationing of troops in NATO's east.⁴⁹

At the NATO Wales Summit in September 2014, seven months after the invasion of Crimea and with escalating Russian-Ukrainian hostilities in eastern Ukraine, Alliance leaders promulgated a Readiness Action Plan designed to combine some of the short-term "assurance measures" already in place with "adaptive measures" that offered a longer-term response to Russian aggression.⁵⁰ The Readiness Action Plan centered around building up NATO's reinforcement capabilities, rather than building a permanent conventional deterrence structure. The plan increased the size of the NATO Response Force (NRF), nearly tripling it from thirteen thousand to forty thousand personnel, and incorporating land, sea, air, and special-forces

components.⁵¹ Within the NRF structure, NATO created the Very High Readiness Joint Task Force (VJTF), a quick-reaction force of five thousand personnel designed to respond to a crisis within a matter of days. Allies also established NATO force integration units (NFIU), small teams staffed to support defense planning and facilitate rapid reinforcement, and deployed them to the Baltic States, Poland, Romania, and Bulgaria.⁵² Other adaptation measures included the establishment of a new multinational division for the southeast in Romania, prepositioning, and preparation of infrastructure to support reinforcement.⁵³

NATO's existential deterrence strategy, implemented through the Wales Summit initiatives, relied heavily on the existence of these relatively small spearhead units. While it reduced the arrival time for NATO reinforcements, many judged this limited rapid-reaction capability insufficient to deter Russian aggression, whether large-scale conventional attack or a scenario involving ambiguous hybrid methods, such as those Moscow demonstrated in Crimea and eastern Ukraine. Many allied and NATO leaders made it clear that a more significant military response was required, calling for a "sufficiently robust and multinational forward presence backed up by swift reinforcements," to signal to Russia that the cost of breaching NATO borders would be too high.⁵⁴

At the July 2016 Warsaw Summit, the Alliance took that next step by deploying its enhanced Forward Presence (eFP) battle groups, a ground combat force, to Eastern and North Central Europe, still the most significant potential flashpoint for a conflict with Russia. Allied leaders agreed to deploy four multinational NATO battle groups to each of the Baltic States and Poland, on a rotational basis. The presence, which became operational in 2017, used the framework-nation model, with the United States leading the battalion in Poland, the United Kingdom leading in Estonia, Germany leading in Lithuania, and Canada leading in Latvia. In early 2018, this presence numbered more than 4,600 troops, with seventeen contributing nations.⁵⁵

46 Ibid.

47 Ibid.

48 Ibid.

49 Richard Milne, "Baltics Urge NATO to Base Permanent Force in Region," *Financial Times*, April 9, 2014, <https://www.ft.com/content/86e4a4cc-bfb5-11e3-9513-00144feabdc0>.

50 NATO's Readiness Action Plan, July, 2016, NATO, https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf_2016_07/20160627_1607-factsheet-rap-en.pdf

51 Ibid.

52 Ibid.

53 Ibid.

54 Alexander Vershbow, "A Strong NATO for a New Strategic Reality," (keynote address at the Foundation Institute for Strategic Studies, Krakow, March 4, 2016), https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_128809.htm.

55 "NATO's Enhanced Forward Presence," NATO, February 2018, https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/

This eFP mission transitioned NATO's defense of North Central Europe to a strategy of *deterrence by trip wire*. The location of eFP battalions and their multinational character are intended to make clear to Russia that any aggression would be met immediately—not just by local forces, but by forces from across the Alliance. As the Warsaw Communiqué states, the battle groups “unambiguously demonstrate, as part of our overall posture, Allies’ solidarity, determination, and ability to act by triggering an immediate Allied response to any aggression.”⁵⁶ In Warsaw, the Alliance also declared cyber an operational domain.⁵⁷ Amid a growing number of cyber incidents and hack-and-release tactics by Russia against the United States and Europe, this empowered the Alliance to coordinate and organize its efforts to protect against cyber threats in more efficient and effective ways, thereby increasing deterrence.

While eFP marked a significant increase in allied force presence in North Central Europe, the combination of these forward-deployed elements and host-nation forces still faced significantly larger, and more heavily armored, combined Russian forces immediately across the border. Thus, defending North Central Europe in a crisis would immediately require substantial reinforcements from elsewhere in Western Europe, or even the United States. These forces would take time to mobilize and deploy, giving Russia a limited window for opportunistic aggression, which could result in a *fait accompli* and require the Alliance to undertake costly offensive action to reacquire territory seized by Moscow.

At its July 2018 Brussels Summit, NATO sought to shorten this time-distance gap.⁵⁸ The NATO Readiness Initiative (NRI), the so-called “Four 30s” plan, requires thirty ground battalions, thirty air squadrons, and thirty major naval combatants ready to deploy and engage an adversary within thirty days. NATO also undertook significant command-structure reform, to help address this problem and ensure the structure was fit for purpose in today's security environment. As part of the more robust command structure, allied leaders agreed to establish a Joint Support and Enabling Command (JSEC) in Germany to facilitate the support and rapid movement of troops and equipment across Europe,

and a Joint Force Command Norfolk to protect crucial sea lines of communication and transport between North America and Europe. In a related effort, NATO and the EU have also collaborated on a “military mobility” initiative, under Dutch leadership, which seeks to facilitate the rapid movement of forces and equipment across the European continent, especially as it relates to border crossings, infrastructure requirements, and legal regulations.⁵⁹ In light of increasingly aggressive cyber incidents perpetrated by Russia, at the Brussels Summit NATO also established a Cyber Operations Center. The center was designed to coordinate NATO's cyber deterrent and nations' capabilities, through a team of experts fed with military intelligence and real-time information on threats in cyberspace. When operational, the center could help boost deterrence by potentially using offensive cyber capabilities provided by nations to take down enemy missiles, air defenses, or computer networks, in appropriate circumstances.

These decisions from the Wales, Warsaw, and Brussels Summits have accumulated and evolved, laying the groundwork for *deterrence by rapid reinforcement*, the Alliance's current strategy for defending its eastern frontier.

To facilitate these efforts, European allies and Canada have also taken steps to halt the drop in defense spending that had undercut allied deterrence. In 2014, only three allies—the United States, the United Kingdom, and Greece—met NATO's 2-percent-of-GDP defense-spending target, and only seven allies spent 20 percent of their defense budgets on major equipment, as required by NATO's benchmark. Since 2014, European allies and Canada have added \$46 billion to their defense budgets.⁶⁰ Eight allies are expected to have met the 2-percent threshold in 2018, and the majority have plans to reach that mark by 2024, as allies pledged to do at the Wales Summit.⁶¹

US FORCE POSTURE IN EUROPE POST-2014

The drawdown of US troop levels in Europe since the end of the Cold War—particularly the 2012 downsizing

pdf_2018_02/20180213_1802-factsheet-efp.pdf.

56 NATO, press release, “Warsaw Summit Communiqué,” July 9, 2016, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_133169.htm.

57 Colin Clark, “NATO Declares Cyber a Domain; NATO SecGen Waves Off Trump,” *Breaking Defense*, June 14, 2016, <https://breakingdefense.com/2016/06/nato-declares-cyber-a-domain-nato-secgen-waves-off-trump/>.

58 NATO, press release, “Brussels Summit Declaration,” July 11, 2018, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_156624.htm.

59 Current efforts seek to ensure diplomatic clearance for force movements within five days of their reaching a border.

60 “Secretary General's Annual Report: The Alliance is Stepping Up,” NATO, March 17, 2018, 6, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_152805.htm

61 Ryan Heath, “8 NATO Countries to Hit Defense Spending Target,” *Politico* EU, May 7, 2018, <https://www.politico.eu/article/nato-jens-stoltenberg-donald-trump-8-countries-to-hit-defense-spending-target/>; “Secretary General's Annual Report: The Alliance is Stepping Up,” NATO.

of the US Army presence from four to two BCTs—had raised concerns among commanders at EUCOM and in the Office of the Secretary of Defense. However, it was not until the events of 2014 that those views were shared widely in the White House and Pentagon.⁶² In conjunction with the Readiness Action Plan laid out at the 2014 Wales Summit, the United States reacted quickly to reassure Eastern and Central European allies of its dedication to the Alliance's collective-defense mission.

Immediately after Russian troops entered Crimea, EUCOM deployed company-level elements from army units based in Europe to Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland as an immediate reassurance measure.⁶³ The United States also recognized a need for deterrence in the air domain, deploying six F-15s to the Baltic Air Policing mission, along with an aviation detachment of twelve F-16s to Łask, Poland.⁶⁴ This tripwire force, similar in doctrine to NATO's subsequent eFP deployments, allowed the United States to immediately reinforce the collective defense-and-deterrence mission, while it slowly expanded deployments and funding. Many of these efforts were supported by the FY2015 European Reassurance Initiative (ERI), a watershed military program launched by the Obama administration as part of Operation Atlantic Resolve. ERI, which later became the European Deterrence Initiative (EDI), has continued to expand under the Trump administration, providing significant funding to support US presence, exercises and training, enhanced prepositioning, and improved infrastructure throughout Europe.

From there, under the auspices of ERI, the United States continued to slowly augment its presence, particularly in North Central Europe which is the focal point of potential confrontation with Russia. Nearly two years after Crimea, the United States had added roughly four thousand additional rotational troops to Europe, in addition to the BCTs already permanently deployed to Europe: the Germany-based 2nd Cavalry Regiment at Vilseck and the Italy-based 173rd Airborne BCT at Vicenza. In Grafenwöhr, the United States also maintains the Grafenwöhr Training Area—its largest training facility in Europe—

which supports US and NATO force qualifications.⁶⁵ Recognizing the longer-term nature of strategic competition with Russia, during the discussion of the 2017 NDAA, the US Congress changed ERI's name to EDI to reflect the evolution of the mission from reassuring allies to deterring Russia. Acknowledging that current US and allied forces in North Central Europe were insufficient for deterrence purposes, in 2017 the United States also began the nine-month, heel-to-toe armored brigade combat team (ABCT) rotations to Europe, supported by EDI. These continue today in Poland, with detachments deploying regularly throughout Central Europe.⁶⁶ Before the arrival of the first rotational brigade, the US Army filled the gaps with Regionally Allocated Forces (RAF) from the 1st BCT, 3rd Infantry Division, of Fort Stewart, Georgia. Between their rotation cycles, soldiers from 2nd Cavalry Regiment and the 173rd Airborne BCT filled in.⁶⁷ These rotations now provide periods during which US forces are systematically postured closer to the frontline of a potential conflict in North Central Europe, to further reduce the time-distance gap and enhance deterrence in the region.

While certainly nowhere near its Cold War level, US posture in Europe is markedly different today than it was four years ago, with a strong emphasis on *deterrence by rapid reinforcement* and the rotational presence of forward-deployed combat units. The US Army in Europe (USAREUR) currently maintains thirty-five thousand US soldiers in theater, with twenty-two thousand permanently assigned to USAREUR. The US Army presence in Europe includes the 12th Combat Aviation Brigade (CAB), USAREUR Headquarters, the 21st Theater Sustainment Command, the 16th Sustainment Brigade, the 10th Army Air and Missile Defense Command, the 7th Army Joint Multinational Training Command, the 66th Military Intelligence Brigade, and the 5th Signal Command, which provide headquarters and enabler units including rotary-wing assets, command and control, logistics, sustainment, intelligence, and engineering support.⁶⁸ The US Army also employs 12,500 local nationals, eleven thousand civilian officials from the US Department of the Army, and RAF rotating through as part of Atlantic Resolve.⁶⁹ In

62 Hicks et al., *Evaluating Future US Army Posture in Europe*, 15.

63 Jesse Granger, "173rd Conducts Unscheduled Training with Latvian Army," US Army Europe Public Affairs, April 25, 2014, https://www.army.mil/article/124667/173rd_conducts_unscheduled_training_with_latvian_army.

64 Belkin, et al., "NATO: Response to the Crisis in Ukraine and Security Concerns in Central and Eastern Europe."

65 7th Army Training Command, <http://www.7atc.army.mil/>.

66 Michelle Tan, "Back-to-Back Rotations to Europe Could Stress the Army's Armored BCTs," *Army Times*, February 11, 2016, <https://www.armytimes.com/news/pentagon-congress/2016/02/11/back-to-back-rotations-to-europe-could-stress-the-army-s-armored-bcts/>.

67 Ibid.

68 "Evaluating Future US Army Posture in Europe," Center for Strategic and International Studies, June 29, 2016, https://csis-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/publication/160712_Samp_ArmyForcePostureEurope_Web.pdf.

69 "Fact Sheet: U.S. Army Europe," US Army Europe Public Affairs Office, November 14, 2018, <http://www.eur.army.mil/Portals/19/documents/20181114USArmyEuropeFactSheet.pdf?ver=2018-11-14-105314-843>.

2018, USAREUR participated in fifty-two exercises to enhance readiness and interoperability of these forces, with approximately twenty-nine thousand US personnel and more than sixty-eight thousand multinational participants from across forty-five countries.⁷⁰

In addition to its major Army units, the United States' European Command (EUCOM) has at its disposal a number of other land, air, and naval assets in its area of operations, totaling more than sixty thousand military and civilian personnel.⁷¹ Significant units are listed below.

- There is a sizeable military presence in Germany, which, alongside the permanently stationed cavalry regiment, includes: a permanently stationed combat aviation brigade (CAB) and a rotational CAB operating in support of Atlantic Resolve; a special-forces battalion; theater-level training, air and missile defense, battlefield-coordination, and theater-sustainment commands; a fighter wing of twenty-eight F-16s; and an airlift wing of fourteen C130s.⁷² The additional rotating CAB, which offers a combination of attack/reconnaissance helicopters (AH-64 Apache), medium-lift helicopters (UH-60 Black Hawk), and heavy-lift helicopters (CH-47 Chinook), provides a significant supplemental capability to the region.
- In the high north in Norway, the US Marine Corps maintains a battalion-sized rotational presence, alongside a brigade-level prepositioning site under the Norway Air-Landed Marine Expeditionary Brigade (NALMEB) program.⁷³
- In the United Kingdom, the US Air Force maintains a supplemented fighter wing of forty-seven F-15s alongside a tanker wing, an intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) squadron, and a special-operations

wing composed of CV-22 Ospreys and MC-130 Hercules aircraft.

- In Southern Europe, EUCOM maintains a range of air, land, and sea assets, with a naval station in Rota, Spain, currently supporting: four US Navy Aegis destroyers; a permanently stationed airborne BCT, F-16 fighter wing, and anti-submarine warfare (ASW) squadron in Italy; a naval support facility in Souda Bay, Greece; and attack, tanker, and ISR squadrons stationed at Incirlik, Turkey, used to support operations against the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS).
- The Atlantic Resolve BCT and CAB rotations are deployed throughout Central Europe, with company-level detachments rotating through Bulgaria and Hungary, and a battalion from the BCT deploying to Romania, coupled with an aviation detachment and engineer battalion. Romania also hosts a permanent Aegis Ashore missile-defense facility.
- In addition, the United States maintains several prepositioned stock sites in Belgium, Germany, and the Netherlands, which can outfit an armored BCT, whose personnel would be flown in from the continental United States (CONUS).

Over the last four years, EDI has continued to grow, reaching a \$6.5 billion budget request for FY2019.⁷⁴ One major output from the FY2018 EDI was the prepositioning of Air Force equipment and airfield infrastructure improvements to support current operations, exercises, and activities, and to enable a rapid response to contingencies.⁷⁵ The FY2019 budget builds on this, funding European Contingency Air Operations Set (ECAOS) Deployable Airbase System (DABS) prepositioned equipment at various locations throughout Europe.⁷⁶ This provides a basis for implementing the concept of adaptive basing for air forces as an important element of NATO's reinforcement strategy. The

⁷⁰ Ibid.

⁷¹ "EUCOM Posture Statement 2018," EUCOM, March 8, 2018, <https://www.eucom.mil/mission/eucom-posture-statement-2018>.

⁷² "Fact Sheet: U.S. Army Europe," US Army Europe Public Affairs Office.

⁷³ Ryan Browne, "US to Double Number of Marines in Norway Amid Russia Tensions," CNN, June 12, 2018, <https://www.cnn.com/2018/06/12/politics/us-marines-norway-russia-tensions/index.html>.

⁷⁴ US Department of Defense, "Department of Defense Budget Fiscal Year (FY) 2019, European Deterrence Initiative," https://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/fy2019/fy2019_EDI_JBook.pdf.

⁷⁵ "2018 European Deterrence Initiative (EDI) Fact Sheet," EUCOM, October 2, 2017, <https://www.eucom.mil/media-library/document/36100/2018-european-deterrence-initiative-edi-fact-sheet>.

⁷⁶ US Department of Defense, "Department of Defense Budget Fiscal Year (FY) 2019, European Deterrence Initiative.

FY2019 EDI also supports “the continued buildup of a division-sized set of prepositioned equipment that is planned to contain two armored BCTs (one of which is modernized), two Fires Brigades, air defense, engineer, movement control, sustainment and medical units.”⁷⁷ USAREUR has identified Powidz Air Base, Poland, as

a brigade-level prepositioning site.⁷⁸ Additional EDI funding is also designated for ammunition and bulk fuel storage, rail extensions and railheads, a staging area in Poland, and ammunition infrastructure in Bulgaria and Romania, which is a welcome development.⁷⁹

⁷⁷ Ibid., 11.

⁷⁸ “Fact Sheet: Army Prepositioned Stock,” US Army Europe Public Affairs Office, September 13, 2018 <http://www.eur.army.mil/Portals/19/Fact%20Sheets/FactSheet-APS.pdf?ver=2019-01-22-110643-650>.

⁷⁹ US Department of Defense, “Department of Defense Budget Fiscal Year (FY) 2019, European Deterrence Initiative,” 25.



Current US Force Posture in Poland

- ★ ★ Armored Brigade Combat Team (BCT): four maneuver battalions totaling about 3500 soldiers at 4-6 training sites (HQ at **Żagań**, elements at **Skwierzyna**, **Bolusławiec**, and **Świętoszów**)
- ★ Leadership of NATO enhanced Forward Presence (eFP) Battle Group: 550 soldiers from 278th Armored Cavalry Regiment (**Orzysz**)
- ★ Battalion of 4th Combat Aviation Brigade and Air Base (**Powidz**)
- ★ ★ US Command personnel at NATO's MNC NE (**Szczecin**) and MND NE (**Elbląg**)
- ★ US Mission Command Element: about 90 rotational personnel from 1st Infantry Division (**Poznań**), serves as HQ for US rotational deployments under Operation Atlantic Resolve.
- ★ Aegis Ashore: about 100 US military and civilian personnel at construction site (**Redzikowo**)
- ★ US Aviation detachment to support US Air Force flights via Air Base (**Łask**)
- ★ US Aviation detachment for MQ9 ISR reconnaissance unit (**Mirosławiec**)
- ★ 10th Special Forces detachment (**Kraków**)
- ★ Reserve transportation battalion and combat service support unit (**Powidz**)
- ★ US personnel at NATO Force Integration Unit (**Bydgoszcz**)
- ★ Defense Attaché Office at US Embassy (**Warsaw**)

Additional facilities under construction

Building storage to preposition one Army brigade set

Building fuel and ammunition storage sites

- ★ Enlarging runway (**Powidz**) and building up railheads