

Report Part Title: ANNEX A: THE INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT: UN, EU AND NATO VIEWS ON STABILIZATION

Report Title: DESIGNING FUTURE STABILISATION EFFORTS

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ANNEX A: THE INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT: UN, EU AND NATO VIEWS ON STABILIZATION

A.1 INTRODUCTION

Contemporary stabilization missions are multilateral enterprises. Practically if not actually all states lack the requisite means, expertise and legitimacy to conduct stabilization unilaterally. Therefore, stabilization missions are virtually always deployed under the auspices of multinational organizations. For the Netherlands, the most important multilateral organizations in this regard are the United Nations (UN), the European Union (EU), and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). These organizations have developed diverging approaches to stabilization.

The UN has the longest tradition of involvement in post-conflict situations. Since 1948, the UN has deployed peacekeeping missions, contributing to the stabilization of countries emerging from violent conflict. Peacekeeping has since evolved to encompass tasks ranging from creating a safe and secure environment to institution-building.

The EUs involvement in stabilization is much less longstanding. The EU has nevertheless deployed an impressive number of missions since 2003. EU stabilization is primarily focused on capacity-building and the provision of training and advice.

NATO's role in stabilization is relatively recent. NATO has transformed itself into a multi-purpose security institution. While NATO generally operates at the high end of the violence spectrum, it also carries out initial stabilization tasks after violent conflict has been stemmed.

Below we describe in detail how stabilization is approached by the UN, the EU and NATO. We address the conduct of stabilization by these organizations, and highlight recent developments and contentious issues. This provides an insight into the divergence of mission types that these multilateral organizations engage in.

A.2 UNITED NATIONS STABILIZATION MISSIONS

THE UN'S APPROACH TO STABILIZATION

The UN stabilizes conflicts by deploying peacekeepers. Peacekeeping is “a technique designed to preserve the peace, however fragile, where fighting has been halted.”¹¹⁹ It consists of “many elements – military, police, and civilian – working together to help lay the

¹¹⁹ Department of Peacekeeping Operations and Department of Field Support, *United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines*, 18.

foundations for sustainable peace.”¹²⁰ Modern peacekeeping missions are multidimensional, and also contribute to peacebuilding measures, which are “aimed at reducing the risk of a country lapsing or relapsing into conflict by strengthening national capacities for conflict management.”¹²¹

UN peacekeeping missions “help countries emerging from conflict make the transition to sustainable peace.”¹²² Important measures to achieve this goal include the creation of a secure and stable environment; facilitation of a political process and the establishment of legitimate institutions of governance; and coordination activities with international actors.¹²³

EVOLUTION OF UN PEACEKEEPING

The role of peacekeepers in stabilization has evolved considerably over time. Originally, the objectives of peacekeeping were limited. During the Cold War, peacekeeping consisted primarily of supervising ceasefire agreements by putting boots on the ground between no-longer-warring parties. Peacekeeping missions did not necessarily play a role in devising a political settlement, but created space for peace negotiations between the conflict parties.¹²⁴ This changed after the end of the Cold War. Newfound consensus in the Security Council led to a rapid increase in peacekeeping missions.¹²⁵ Peacekeepers were given a wide variety of new tasks, ranging from the organizations of elections to the repatriation of refugees.¹²⁶ However, the initial optimism about the use of peacekeeping as a conflict management tool was extinguished by the failure of missions in Somalia, Rwanda and Bosnia.¹²⁷ It became clear that peacekeeping by non-violent methods was not necessarily the right panacea for the peaceful solution of conflicts.

In Somalia, Rwanda and Bosnia peacekeepers were sent into situations where non-violent stabilization was not possible. In such cases, as painful lessons learned, peace enforcement, which “involves the application, with the authorization of the Security Council, of a range of coercive measures,” might be more appropriate.¹²⁸ It was also contended by then UN Secretary General Boutros-Boutros Gali, that peace enforcement should not be carried out by peacekeepers.¹²⁹ Military alliances, such as NATO, are better equipped to carry out such activities. Peacekeepers, conversely, are not equipped for enforcement measures, and should not be expected to engage in such activities, because it would harm the unique nature of peacekeeping. Peacekeeping, it was held, was inextricably intertwined with the principles of consent, impartiality, and the non-use of force except in self-defense or in defense of the mandate. Meanwhile, the principles of consent, impartiality and non-use of force remain characteristic for peacekeeping, although their interpretation has changed over time. The

¹²⁰ Ibid.

¹²¹ Ibid.

¹²² Ibid., 22–23.

¹²³ Ibid.

¹²⁴ Bellamy, Williams, and Griffin, *Understanding Peacekeeping*, 5.

¹²⁵ Berdal, “The Security Council and Peacekeeping,” 187.

¹²⁶ Ibid.

¹²⁷ Ibid., 194.

¹²⁸ Department of Peacekeeping Operations and Department of Field Support, *United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines*, 18.

¹²⁹ Boutros-Ghali, “Supplement to An Agenda for Peace: Position Paper of the Secretary-General on the Occasion of the Fiftieth Anniversary of the United Nations,” para. 12.

interpretation of the principles has become more flexible. Consent is only required from the main parties of the conflict. Moreover, peacekeepers should be impartial and implement their mandate without prejudice, but they should take action in the face of behavior that works against the peace process. Finally, peacekeepers may use force at a tactical level to protect themselves, their mandates, and civilians under imminent threat of physical harm.¹³⁰

CONDUCT OF CONTEMPORARY PEACEKEEPING MISSIONS

Since the early 2000s, there has been a renewed surge in peacekeeping. Currently 116,000 people serve in 15 peacekeeping missions around the world, which constitutes a tenfold increase compared to the late 1990s.¹³¹ The UN spends over \$7.5 billion on peacekeeping per year. Peacekeeping enjoys wide international support, because “it is a very versatile tool but also cost effective.”¹³²

Contemporary peacekeeping missions are multidimensional and carry out a wide range of stabilization activities. They do not only stem violence, but also support and carry out programs designed to prevent the recurrence of violence.¹³³ Peacekeeping missions fill the security and public order vacuum to stabilize countries. They address the root causes of conflict and ensure that partners on the ground can carry out their activities. The focus of peacekeeping has shifted to a long-term holistic approach to stabilization.

The strengthening of domestic capabilities is a central focal point in contemporary peacekeeping missions. Especially “institutions responsible for ensuring security and rule of law” must be strengthened. Otherwise, when the United Nations reduces its military and police presence [it risks] jeopardizing the gains [it has] made.”¹³⁴ Peacekeepers provide direct support to national government and facilitate the activities of other actors on the ground by providing a safe and secure environment. Concretely, peacekeepers may be mandated to carry out the following stabilization tasks:

- Provide support to basic safety and security by assisting national security sector reform programs and capacity building of the military, police and other law enforcement institutions;
- Enable national governments in developing disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programs;
- Support strengthening the rule of law institutions of the host country;
- Support peace consolidation and inclusive political processes;
- Help establish security conditions for the delivery of humanitarian aid;
- Protect civilians, particularly those under threat of imminent physical violence;

¹³⁰ Department of Peacekeeping Operations and Department of Field Support, *United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines*, 31–34.

¹³¹ United Nations, “Peacekeeping Factsheet.”

¹³² Ladsous, Interview to MINUSTAH FM.

¹³³ Department of Peacekeeping Operations and Department of Field Support, *United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines*, 25.

¹³⁴ Ban, Secretary General's Remarks to the Security Council Open Debate on United Nations Peacekeeping: A Multidisciplinary Approach.

- Cooperate and coordinate with partners to support host government in designing economic development policies.¹³⁵

Contemporary peacekeeping missions thus engage in a wide range of stabilization tasks. In the short term they provide security, protect the civilian population, and ensure the delivery of humanitarian aid.¹³⁶ In the long term, peacekeepers support institution-building and socio-economic reconstruction.

The advent of multidimensional peacekeeping has resulted in the use of the term stabilization mission. To date, three such missions have been launched: the UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) in 2004; the UN Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO) in 2010; and the Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) in 2013. The mandates of these missions are focused on institution-building and the strengthening of local capacities. However, other recently launched missions which are not called stabilization missions, such as the United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS), have similar multidimensional mandates. Thus, the name stabilization mission does not denote a specific type of peacekeeping. UN peacekeeping has become multidimensional across the board.

ISSUES AND RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

Peacekeeping can be considered to be a very useful and cost-effective tool for deterring and reversing conflict.¹³⁷ The demand for peacekeeping remains high, and is even expected to grow. Peacekeeping missions operate in large and complex environments that require long-term stabilization. In some cases peacekeepers are deployed in situations where peace processes have collapsed.¹³⁸ As a result, peacekeeping is faced with considerable issues. Long-term presences in complex and volatile conflict situations have caused personnel overstretch in the headquarters and on the ground, and significant financial pressures. Moreover, peacekeepers need better guidance to carry out their tasks effectively in complex environments.

A reform process is ongoing to address the aforementioned challenges. If peacekeeping is to remain a widely used stabilization tool, it will have to evolve in order to deal with these challenges. It has been recognized that complex stabilization missions require a “clear and achievable mandate.”¹³⁹ Peacekeepers need clear guidance on the delivery of critical roles, i.e. the protection of civilians; a robust implementation of the mandate; and essential reconstruction tasks.¹⁴⁰ Some recent developments in this regard can be identified. In March 2013, for example, the formation of an intervention brigade under the command of the MONUSCO force commander was approved.¹⁴¹ This intervention brigade is authorized to use

¹³⁵ UN Security Council, *Security Council Resolution 2086*, para. 18.

¹³⁶ Department of Peacekeeping Operations and Department of Field Support, *United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines*, 23.

¹³⁷ Center on International Cooperation, *Building on Brahimi: Peacekeeping in an Era of Strategic Uncertainty*, 1.

¹³⁸ *Ibid.*, i.

¹³⁹ Department of Peacekeeping Operations and Department of Field Support, *United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines*, 10.

¹⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, 19.

¹⁴¹ UN Security Council, *Security Council Resolution 2098*, para. 9.

force to neutralize armed groups in eastern DRC to protect civilians. The capabilities of peacekeeping missions also need to be linked to operational tasks. Peacekeepers require adequate equipment and support to carry out their mandate. More personnel and financial resources are required to carry out large-scale, complex stabilization missions. To meet the high demand for peacekeeping, the UN increasingly cooperates with partners. In Mali, for example, French troops provide a parallel force alongside MINUSMA.¹⁴²

IN SUM

The UN deploys peacekeepers to achieve both short-term and long-term stabilization objectives. The primary task of peacekeepers is to provide security, especially for the civilian population. By creating a safe and secure environment, other actors can contribute to the long-term peace consolidation process. Peacekeepers often contribute to this process too, for example by supporting capacity-building and institution-building programs. UN stabilization typically takes place after violent conflict has ended. Peacekeeping is positively not an enforcement measure, because peacekeepers are not equipped for enforcement tasks. What is more, the future utility of peacekeeping would be decreased if peacekeepers would engage in enforcement action, because it would be much harder to obtain consent for the deployment of future missions. Peacekeepers therefore operate at the low end of the violence spectrum. However, peacekeepers may use tactical force. In fragile post-conflict situations, civilians are at risk, even if a peace process is ongoing. In such cases, it is imperative that vulnerable people are protected by peacekeepers.

A.2 EU STABILIZATION MISSIONS

THE EU APPROACH TO STABILIZATION

The European Union (EU) draws on a wide array of policy tools to stabilize countries, ranging from development funds to the deployment of civilian and military missions. The EU's approach to stabilization is focused on both security and development, because "there cannot be sustainable development without peace and security, and [...] without development and poverty eradication there will be no sustainable peace."¹⁴³ Transition from fragility to stability is achieved by improving security conditions and addressing the root causes of conflict. The latter requires the creation of "grass-root conditions for economic opportunity and human development [as well as] robust public institutions and a more accountable government, capable of providing basic development services."¹⁴⁴

The EU addresses security challenges through capacity-building programs. Strengthening the capacities of the security, law enforcement and rule of law sectors provides national governments with autonomous capabilities to respond to security threats.¹⁴⁵ Additionally, the

¹⁴² UN Security Council, *Security Council Resolution 2100*, para. 18.

¹⁴³ Council of the European Union, "Security and Development: Conclusions of the Council and the Representatives of the Governments of the Member States Meeting within the Council," para. 1.

¹⁴⁴ European External Action Service, "Strategy for Security and Development in the Sahel," 2.

¹⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, 7.

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EU helps to create the conditions for sustainable peace by promoting a political dialogue; supporting the creation of accountable institutions; and contributing to socio-economic development.¹⁴⁶ The EU's initial response to crises is aimed at the immediate needs of the population, such as the improvement of access to basic services.¹⁴⁷ The long-term objectives of EU stabilization efforts are to enhance "political stability, security, good governance, social cohesion [...] and economic and education opportunities."¹⁴⁸

EVOLUTION OF EU STABILIZATION MISSIONS

The EU conducts military and civilian stabilization missions within the framework of the Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP). The conduct of missions under the flag of the EU is a relatively recent development. In the 1999 Treaty of Amsterdam, the EU first referred to stabilization and conflict management tasks it aspired to be able to carry out. An expanded list, which was introduced in the Treaty of Lisbon, enumerates these tasks: "joint disarmament operations, humanitarian and rescue tasks, military advice and assistance tasks, conflict prevention and peacekeeping tasks, tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking and post-conflict stabilization."¹⁴⁹

Since 2003, thirty CSDP missions have been launched. These missions have carried out a multitude of tasks, ranging from border assistance (EU Border Assistance Mission in Libya) to taking over judiciary and administrative tasks from the local government (EU Rule of Law Mission (EULEX) in Kosovo).¹⁵⁰ In recent years, however, the focus of CSDP missions has narrowed, and a pattern seems to be emerging in the mandates. Most ongoing missions provide training and technical assistance. In Mali and Somalia the EU trains soldiers, and capacity-building missions in Niger and the Horn of Africa support the strengthening of the local law enforcement sectors. Ongoing missions have also set up security sector reform programs.¹⁵¹ By providing training and advice, the EU strengthens the autonomous capacity of the host state to address security threats. These activities contribute to stabilization in post-conflict situations, but also play a role in conflict prevention. In Mali and Somalia, the EU seems to contribute to a secure post-conflict environment by training the militaries of the host states. In the Horn of Africa, on the other hand, the EU seeks to prevent insecurity by bolstering state capacity for law enforcement.¹⁵²

CONDUCT OF EU STABILIZATION MISSIONS

The decision to launch a CSDP mission is made by the member states in the Council of the EU.¹⁵³ The EU cannot launch missions on its own accord, and it does not have autonomous means or capacities. The standing EU battle groups are not to be deployed in CSDP

¹⁴⁶ Ibid.

¹⁴⁷ Commission of the European Communities, "Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions: Towards an EU Response to Situations of Fragility," 7.

¹⁴⁸ European External Action Service, "Strategy for Security and Development in the Sahel," 4.

¹⁴⁹ *Treaty on European Union*.

¹⁵⁰ European External Action Service, "Ongoing Missions and Operations."

¹⁵¹ Ibid.

¹⁵² European Union, "A Secure Europe in a Better World: European Security Strategy," 11.

¹⁵³ Rehl and Weisserth, *Handbook CSDP*, 57.

missions.¹⁵⁴ The member states decide on the design of the CSDP missions when a crisis emerges, and provide the necessary material and personnel.¹⁵⁵ Since the planning process of CSDP missions is to a large extent owned by the member states, no doctrinal planning documents for EU missions exist. Recently, however, regional strategies for the Horn of Africa and the Sahel region have been adopted. CSDP action in these regions is embedded in the regional strategies.

CSDP missions draw on the expertise of the member states. EU stabilization missions are generally much smaller than mission deployed by the UN or NATO. UN peacekeeping missions, for example, often have a large footprint, because the monitoring of a peace progress requires the presence of a large number of troops. The EU does not engage in stabilization activities that require a large footprint (with exception of EULEX Kosovo). Instead, EU stabilization missions are small-scale and primarily require highly trained personnel that can provide advice and support for capacity-building.

OBSTACLES TO FURTHER DEVELOPMENT OF CSDP

Small-scale EU training and capacity-building missions can make a considerable contribution to stabilization. However, the focus on these types of missions is indicative of restraint among the member states to engage in more ambitious missions. There is a lack of political will to carry out all the tasks enumerated in the Treaty, especially missions requiring considerable military engagement.

The member states disagree about the EU's role as a stabilization and crisis management actor. Some member states, such as France, believe the EU should strengthen its capabilities for military action and should set up permanent military command and control structures.¹⁵⁶ Other member states, such as the UK, believe the EU's role in stabilization should be limited. The UK in particular is concerned that the EU will conflict with NATO.¹⁵⁷ In this respect the accession of Cyprus to the EU is particularly problematic. Due to Cyprus' antagonistic relationship with NATO member Turkey, integration and division of stabilization tasks between the EU and NATO is currently impossible.¹⁵⁸

OTHER EU STABILIZATION TOOLS

The EU complements CSDP action with other policy tools. CSDP missions primarily contribute to the improvement of security conditions, while stabilization also requires socio-economic development and political dialogue. The Commission plays an important role in reconstruction and development. Under the Instrument for Stability, the Commission funds projects which focus on issues "such as support to mediation, confidence building, interim administrations, strengthening Rule of Law, Transitional Justice or the role of natural resources in conflict."¹⁵⁹ Financial assistance for socio-economic development is given through the European

¹⁵⁴ Hatzigeorgopoulos, "EU Battlegroups: Battling Irrelevance?," 8.

¹⁵⁵ Keohane, "Lessons from EU Peace Operations," 208.

¹⁵⁶ Spear, "Is There a Distinctive European Approach to Stability and Reconstruction Operations?," 8.

¹⁵⁷ Biscop and Coelmont, "A Strategy for CSDP: Europe's Ambitions as a Global Security Provider," 21.

¹⁵⁸ Simon and Mattelaer, "Unity of Command: The Planning and Conduct of CSDP Operations," 8.

¹⁵⁹ European Commission, "Instrument for Stability (IfS) – EU in Action."

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Development Fund.¹⁶⁰ Moreover, the European External Action Service promotes political dialogue, for example by appointing EU special representatives.

The policies of the different EU institutions are part of the EUs comprehensive approach to stabilization. Since security and development are inextricably intertwined, the EUs policies are coordinated within and overarching strategy. Although a comprehensive approach to stabilization is not unique, the EU is somewhat special because it possesses all policy tools to promote security and development in all phases of the conflict cycle. It has a number of funds for long-term socio-economic development, a diplomatic service, and the capabilities to deploy civilian and military stabilization missions. In general, however, the EU seeks to cooperate with partners and will not act unilaterally.¹⁶¹

IN SUM

The EU deploys small-scale military and civilian stabilization missions that provide training, assistance and advice. The primary short-term objective of the EU is to improve security conditions by strengthening the host states autonomous capabilities to respond to security threats. This is achieved by deploying highly trained experts from the member states. The EU seeks to achieve its long-term objectives, such as political stability and socio-economic development, by including other policy tools in a comprehensive approach to stabilization. Funds are available for institution-building and long-term economic reconstruction. EU representatives moreover facilitate a political dialogue.

EU stabilization missions are deployed in low-violence situations, either before violent conflict has emerged or after a firm ceasefire is in place. Unlike the UN, the EU does not deploy immediately after violent conflict has ended. The EU at the low end of the violence spectrum and does not engage in enforcement activities, because this is regarded as NATOs prerogative. The EU also does not carry out troop intensive activities, such as ceasefire monitoring, partly because there is a lack of political will, and partly because the UN already carries out these activities.

A.3 NATO STABILIZATION MISSIONS

NATO APPROACH TO STABILIZATION

Crisis management is NATOs umbrella term for all activities which refer to the concept of stabilization operations. NATOs role in crisis management goes “beyond military operations.”¹⁶² A crisis can be political, military or humanitarian in nature and can be caused by “political or armed conflict, technological incidents or natural disasters.”¹⁶³ NATO can address the “full spectrum of crises – before, during and after conflicts”¹⁶⁴ – and employs a comprehensive

¹⁶⁰ European Commission, “European Development Fund.”

¹⁶¹ Rehr and Weisserth, *Handbook CSDP*, 20.

¹⁶² NATO, “NATO - Crisis Management.”

¹⁶³ Ibid.

¹⁶⁴ NATO, *Active Engagement, Modern Defence: Strategic Concept for the Defence and Security of the Members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization*, 7.

approach which combines political, civilian and military means for effective crisis management. Generally, though, NATO becomes engaged while violent conflict is ongoing.¹⁶⁵

All crisis management operations outside an Article 5 collective self-defense scenario are called “crisis response operations” (CRO) or, alternatively, “peace support operations.”¹⁶⁶ They may be conducted in any part of the world, contrary to the Euro-Atlantic coverage of Article 5, and are conducted in support of a UN Security Council mandate or “at the invitation of a sovereign government.”¹⁶⁷ Indeed, the different kinds of CROs that NATO foresees are strongly aligned to the requirements of the UN. CROs can be peacekeeping, peace enforcement, conflict prevention as well as peacemaking and peacebuilding operations, depending on the mandate of the mission and its basis in the UN charter.¹⁶⁸

Although these types of operations correspond well with our definition of a stabilization mission, the concept of stabilization as such has not been described at the strategic level in an overarching document (although recently a political guidance document was published, more about which below). Instead, NATO published a doctrine at the tactical level which spells out stabilization activities and tasks which can occur within the framework of any NATO operation within any campaign theme.¹⁶⁹

THE EVOLUTION OF STABILIZATION IN NATO

For much of its existence since 1949, NATO's main purpose was the deterrence and the countering of the Soviet threat. Although this initial purpose of providing relative peace and stability in Europe was arguably a stabilization mission of its own, it is essentially after the end of the Cold War that NATO began to engage in operations which are closer to our definition of stabilization.

Contrary to the predictions of some,¹⁷⁰ the lifting of the Iron Curtain and the dissolution of the Warsaw pact did not lead to the end of NATO. Instead, NATO operations gradually became more visible than ever before. With the adoption of the 1991 Strategic Concept, the Alliance paved the way for the “management of crises affecting the security of its members,” moving away from the primary focus on Article 5.¹⁷¹

Soon after, in 1992, NATO's capabilities were needed in the emerging conflict in the former Yugoslavia. The 1993 air campaign *Deny Flight*, aimed at prohibiting flights of the Bosnian Serbs, constituted NATO's first non-Article 5 crisis response operations (NA5CRO). The air campaign evolved into operation *Deliberate Force* in 1995. After the Dayton Agreements ended the war in Bosnia, NATO was given the responsibility for the military aspects of the consolidation of peace.

¹⁶⁵ Ibid., 19.

¹⁶⁶ Also referred to as: non-Article 5 crisis response operations (NA5CRO)

¹⁶⁷ NATO, “NATO - Crisis Management.”

¹⁶⁸ Ibid.

¹⁶⁹ NATO, “NATO Standard ATP-3.2.1.1 Guidance for the Conduct of Tactical Stability Activities and Tasks,” para. 0001.

¹⁷⁰ Mearsheimer, “Back to the Future.”

¹⁷¹ NATO, “NATO - Crisis Management.”

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Following more experiences in the Balkans, with operations in Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and Kosovo, the 1999 Strategic Concept put more emphasis on conflict prevention and crisis management and underlined that crisis management operations would include non-Article 5 operations.¹⁷²

9/11 was a cataclysmic event in many ways. For the first time ever, NATO invoked Article 5: collective defense clause. In the aftermath of 9/11, NATO launched the maritime monitoring operation *Active Endeavor* in the Mediterranean. More importantly, however, the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) missions in Afghanistan, which evolved from the US-led Operation *Enduring Freedom* in 2003, is still ongoing.

The 2010 Strategic Concept has been drafted with the Afghanistan experience in mind and stresses a comprehensive approach to crisis management which emphasizes training, the development of local forces, and the enhancement of civil-military planning and cooperation and NATO's involvement in all stages of a crisis.¹⁷³ Furthermore, the 2010 Strategic Concept contains the explicit goal to "further develop doctrine and military capabilities for expeditionary operations, including counterinsurgency, stabilization and reconstruction operations."¹⁷⁴

Within the bulk of CROs, stabilization and reconstruction efforts have recently received greater attention. In September 2011, NATO released its vision on its role in stabilization and reconstruction efforts in crisis management and crisis response operations.¹⁷⁵ Stabilization and reconstruction address "complex problems in fragile, conflict and post-conflict states."¹⁷⁶ They contribute to a "comprehensive approach to crisis management and to complementarity, coherence and coordination of the international community's efforts towards security, development and governance. [...] Stabilization and reconstruction activities should be understood to include support to establishing long-term stability and strengthened governance, local capacity building and the promotion of ownership by the relevant national authorities, encouragement of the rule of law and establishing the basis for economic, human and social development."¹⁷⁷

Concerning the duration of NATO efforts, it is stressed that NATO should handover its stabilization and reconstruction activities to the national authorities or international actors as soon as conditions allow.¹⁷⁸

CONDUCT OF NATO STABILIZATION MISSIONS

All decisions to conduct crisis management operations have to be taken by consensus on a case by case basis in the North Atlantic Council, and there is no obligation for NATO members to take part in non-Article 5 crisis response operations.¹⁷⁹ Currently, NATO has around

¹⁷² Ibid.

¹⁷³ NATO, *Active Engagement, Modern Defence: Strategic Concept for the Defence and Security of the Members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization*; NATO, "NATO - Crisis Management."

¹⁷⁴ Ibid., 21.

¹⁷⁵ NATO, "NATO - Political Guidance on Ways to Improve NATO's Involvement in Stabilisation and Reconstruction."

¹⁷⁶ Ibid.

¹⁷⁷ Ibid.

¹⁷⁸ Ibid.

¹⁷⁹ NATO, "NATO's Assessment of a Crisis and Development of Response Strategies."

110,000 military personal engaged in missions around the globe, “from combat to peacekeeping, to training and logistics support, to surveillance and humanitarian relief.” ¹⁸⁰

At the tactical level stabilization activities and tasks can occur “within the framework of any operation within any campaign theme,”¹⁸¹ and can be conducted “across the spectrum of conflict in conjunction with offensive and defensive tactical activities and supported by enabling activities.”¹⁸² Stabilization is one type of activity, next to either offensive, defensive or enabling activities which all come with respective tasks.

There are four types stabilization activities, namely Security and Control, Support to Security Sector Reform (SSR), Support to Initial Restoration of Services, and Support to Initial Governance Tasks.¹⁸³ For every type of stabilization activity, there are a number of corresponding stabilization tasks which are executed continuously throughout all operations.¹⁸⁴ To illustrate this point and its implication for land forces describes stability as one type of activity, next to either offensive, defensive or enabling activities which all come with respective tasks.




Figure 30. NATO Land Tactics¹⁸⁵

¹⁸⁰ NATO, “NATO Operations and Missions.”
¹⁸¹ NATO, “NATO Standard ATP-3.2.1.1 Guidance for the Conduct of Tactical Stability Activities and Tasks,” para. 0001.
¹⁸² Ibid., para. 0102.
¹⁸³ Ibid., para. 0131.
¹⁸⁴ Ibid., para. 0110.
¹⁸⁵ Ibid.

ISSUES

The ability of NATO to act depends heavily on the political will of its member states. The thirteen additional members who entered the Alliance over the course of the last fifteen years have not made decision making much easier. NATO has been described as multi-tier entity with different groups of countries finding it increasingly difficult to agree on a common course of action.¹⁸⁶ On the other hand it has been argued that it is precisely because NATO's post Cold War purpose has not been defined too concretely, that the Alliance has survived.¹⁸⁷

Frictions within NATO also exist on how (stabilization) operations should be conducted. For example during the Afghanistan campaign, differing views on the use of force in military operations and a diverging willingness to take risks among the troop contributors were seen to undermine Alliance solidarity.

The 2011 Libyan air campaign is another example of heterogeneous ideas regarding the use of military power within the Alliance. The coalition of the willing that contributed to *Operation Unified Protector* and the no-fly zone over Libya is seen by some as a model for the future, especially since austerity measures and decreased defense spendings across the members states could make burden sharing more rather than less difficult.¹⁸⁸ In terms of stabilization tasks and activities, it is hard to imagine them being possible solely by operations from the air. Yet, it is doubtful whether there will be a lot of appetite in the near future for complex operations like Afghanistan which require a significant number of boots on the ground.

IN SUM

NATO has undergone a remarkable transformation since the end of the Cold War and has become a multi-purpose security institution. Today NATO calls itself a “regional organization with global reach.”¹⁸⁹ NATO does not refer to stabilization as an independent campaign type at the strategic level but uses the term crisis management to describe operations which are essentially stabilization missions. Over time NATO has become more akin to the EU and the UN because the increasing attention for combining civil, military, and political instruments in crisis management. However, NATO still is a militarily oriented organization, and does not have the comprehensive policy toolbox the EU possesses. NATO therefore prefers quick handovers of responsibility to national or international actors after it has become involved.

A.4 MULTILATERAL STABILIZATION MISSIONS: CONCLUSION

The UN, EU, and NATO all engage in stabilization missions, although each has developed distinct approaches to stabilization.

¹⁸⁶ Noetzel and Schreer, “Does a Multi-Tier NATO Matter?”

¹⁸⁷ Forster and Wallace, “What Is NATO For?,” 111.

¹⁸⁸ Daalder and Stavridis, “NATO's Victory in Libya.”

¹⁸⁹ NATO, “NATO - Crisis Management.”

The UN, EU and NATO typically become involved at different stages in a conflict and carry out different tasks. This has allowed the organizations to build expertise and to complement each other. Both within and across organizations, a comprehensive approach to stabilization is increasingly being adopted. NATO, for example, has the assets and expertise to intervene in ongoing conflict. The UN does not, but possesses the legitimacy and has extensive experience in monitoring ceasefires and institution-building. The EU, in turn, has a very broad portfolio at its disposal which can be deployed in different stages.




Figure 31. Timing of involvement of multilateral organizations in the conflict cycle

In Figure 31, we have attempted to visualize the involvement of multilateral organizations in the conflict cycle. The EU typically engages in stabilization when the level of violence is low. Through funding and capacity-building missions, the EU seeks to prevent conflict before it escalates, or to consolidate security and improve development when a sustainable ceasefire is in place. Because the EU has an extensive portfolio of funding mechanisms, it can remain involved long after violent conflict has ended. UN stabilization overlaps somewhat with EU involvement, although the UN also becomes involved in more violent situations. Peacekeepers may be deployed when a ceasefire is in place, even if the situation on the ground remains volatile. Peacekeepers may also be deployed to dissuade conflict actors in a conflict which is no longer active. Unlike the EU, the UN deploys large-scale missions. NATO, lastly, typically becomes engaged for shorter periods of time (the ISAF operation in Afghanistan notwithstanding) when violent conflict is ongoing. Unlike UN peacekeepers and EU advisors, NATO is able to use force to initiate stabilization.

A.5 HOW STRATEGIC DESIGN FITS INTO NATOS OPERATIONAL PLANNING PROCESS

The past decade has seen some interesting new thinking about the relative merits of the particular form of operational planning that took root, as we described before, in Western military establishments in the 19th century, as it was perfected over the past two centuries,

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and as culminated in some of the most dramatic campaign plans from Blitzkrieg to Desert Storm.¹⁹⁰

When confronted with any mission – including stabilization missions – military planners are expected to identify a certain (typically) military objective/end state and then proceed to plan how to achieve that with their current military capability bundle. This process, known as the operational planning process, as specified in a number of NATO doctrinal manuals,¹⁹¹ has seen quite a few changes in the past decade. Military planners across the developed world are now encouraged to spend more time on the broader strategic design element in the early stages of the planning process. Within NATO, for instance, the new Comprehensive Operational Planning Directive (COPD) process, outlined in the following diagram, differentiates between the strategic, operational and tactical planning processes, which each go through a number of sequential (but interconnected) steps (see Figure 32).




Figure 32. Stages of NATO's Operational Planning Process

At the strategic echelon,¹⁹² the Strategic Operations Planning Group (located at SHAPE, the strategic military headquarters of Allied Command Operations (ACO)) is supposed to take care of the strategic planning process, whereas the Joint Operations Planning Group (located at the Joint Force Commands, ACO's operational military headquarters) is in charge of the operational-level planning. Each one of these three processes follows the same generic six sequential phases (See Figure 33):

1. Situational awareness – understanding the complex system within which a mission may take place)
2. Assessment (whereby the complex system is related to NATO)
3. Option development (with the Brussels side of the house responsible for the political-military options, and SHAPE and the JTFs for the purely military response options)
4. Planning,
5. Execution

¹⁹⁰ For a good overview, see Citino, *Quest for Decisive Victory*; Citino, *Blitzkrieg to Desert Storm*.

¹⁹¹ MC133/3 (NATO's Operational Planning System, 08-2005); COPD ACO Comprehensive Operations Planning Directive (11-2010) and AJP-5 Allied Joint Doctrine for Operational Planning

¹⁹² The level at which a nation or group of nations determines national or multinational security objectives and deploys national resources, including military, to achieve them. (AAP-6)




Figure 33. NATO Crisis Response Planning

Over the past years Alliance planners, taking their cue from lessons learned in recent operations, have put significant effort into pushing this Crisis Response Planning framework to the left (the assessment) and the top (the strategic level) on this diagram. While this is a significant and sensible improvement to the previous OPP procedures, one of the weaker links in the current system remains the top-level, and especially the political-strategic level, where the genuinely comprehensive (i.e. not only military but also other instruments of national – and alliance – power) planning steps are supposed to be carried out. This level remains essentially under the purview of the national capitals as represented within NATO by the North Atlantic Council, the Alliances highest political decision-making body. And at that level, sound analysis is invariably trumped by other considerations, which may have to more with politics than with policy.

At the operational (and - to a lesser extent - strategic-military) echelon, Concepts of Operations (CONOPS) development has evolved in a structured thinking and planning process in which a numbers of courses of action (COA) are first developed, then tested against a set of (mostly operational-level) criteria, after which they are refined, wargamed, and then, finally, selected (see Figure 34 & Figure 35).




Figure 34. Course of Action development




Figure 35. Concept of Operations development

Under the influence - and to the credit - of the officers and civilians involved in this process, efforts have been made to widen both the actual effort involved and the debate about operational planning. It is widely acknowledged that in many of the recent complex endeavors our countries have been engaged in militarily,¹⁹³ actual effects are generated by a variety of actors beyond the military (See Figure 36).






Figure 36. Effects created by variety of actors

In theaters like Iraq and Afghanistan, much effort has been put in overcoming some of these stovepipes, including in the deliberate planning process (Figure 37).

These efforts to comprehensivize the operational planning process have even extended to the strategic design stage, but then primarily for ongoing operations (as opposed to the forward piece - i.e. before a decision is made to intervene) and with a continued focus on the military aspect (see the bottom box of Figure 38).

¹⁹³ Alberts and Hayes, *Planning*, 2007.



Yet, most of these efforts continue to focus on the military operational-level. An important reason for this disconnect between the strategic and the operational level may be while there is ample evidence that non-military considerations play an increasing role in the military planning process, there is so far little evidence that military considerations play a role in the decision-making processes of these non-military effectors. So a key question is how a better understanding of the entire system and of the various instruments of power that affect it (including non-military ones) can improve the military planning process at the strategic level.