

# Peace Building and Human Security: Kosovo Case

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## I. Intersection of human security and peace-building

In the last 15 years, human security<sup>2</sup> and peace-building<sup>3</sup> have become core concepts in the international discourses on ‘soft power’,<sup>4</sup> which have been dominated by arms control, disarmament, détente policy, human rights and development issues. These concepts became the basis for a new evolving culture of international relations. Additionally, both human

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<sup>2</sup> According to the Commission on Human Security, human security “means protecting vital freedoms. It means protecting people from critical and pervasive threats and situations, building on their strengths and aspirations. It means creating [political, social, environmental, economic, military and cultural] systems that give people the building blocks of survival, dignity and livelihood.” (Human Security Commission, *Final Report*, available at: <http://www.humansecurity-chs.org/finalreport/Outlines/outline.html>. In Kofi Annan’s view human security “in its broadest sense, embraces far more than the absence of violent conflict. It encompasses human rights, good governance, access to education and health care and ensuring that each individual has opportunities and choices to fulfil his or her potential. Every step in this direction is also a step towards reducing poverty, achieving economic growth and preventing conflict. Freedom from want, freedom from fear, and the freedom of future generations to inherit a healthy natural environment - these are the interrelated building blocks of human - and therefore national - security”, Kofi Annan, *Secretary-General Salutes International Workshop on Human Security in Mongolia*, Press Release SG/SM/7382, Ulaanbaatar, 8-10 May 2000, available at: <http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2000/20000508.sgs7382.doc.html>.

<sup>3</sup> The agenda of peace-building may vary according to the meaning given to the term ‘peace-building’. This paper adopts a definition given by Charles T. Call and Elizabeth M. Cousens, largely shared among the scholars: “*Peace-building is defined as those actions undertaken by international or national actors to institutionalize peace, understood as the absence of armed conflict ('negative peace') and a modicum of participatory politics (as a component of 'positive peace') that can be sustained in the absence of an international peace operation.*” Call, Charles T. and Elizabeth M. Cousens, *Coping with Crisis*, Working Paper Series, International Peace Academy, New York, 2007, at p. 2. Charles Call and Susan Cook refer to peacebuilding as “*efforts to transform potentially violent social relations into sustainable peaceful relations and outcomes*”. (Call, Charles T. and Susan E. Cook, *On Democratisation and Peacebuilding*, *Global Governance*, vol. 9, no. 2, 2003, at p. 240). For a review of how different agencies conceptualize, operationalize, and prioritize post-conflict activities, see: Barnett, Michael, David Kim, Madalene O’Donnell and Laura Sitea, *Peacebuilding: What’s in a Name?*, *Global Governance*, Vol. 13, No. 3, 2007.

<sup>4</sup> Nye defines soft power as “*the ability to get what you want through attraction rather than coercion*”. It is cultivated through relations with allies, economic assistance and cultural exchanges with other countries, projecting a sense that U.S. behaviour corresponds with rhetorical support for democracy and human rights and, more generally, maintaining favourable public opinion and credibility abroad. It is the opposite of hegemony, sovereignty, and unilateralism. Nye, Joseph S., *Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics*, Public Affairs, New York, 2005, pp. 2-32.

security and peace-building are increasingly institutionalized across the international landscape.

While the consensus among scholars and practitioners about the necessity of the conceptual change in state-building operations has increased, the spectrum of instruments for the coordination of the various activities of international peace operations in a comprehensive and integrative perspective<sup>5</sup> has become more and more nuanced. The change involved a holistic approach to reconstruction and development – with equal consideration and importance - as the only way to safeguard stability and peace in the affected country. Or, in other words, instead of dealing with the hierarchies within the traditional security discourse as ultimately counterproductive and gravely misleading, i.e., placing security above development, the state above the individual, men above women and protection above empowerment, we should treat all these issues as inseparable. Therefore, state-building agendas should include good governance based on the rule of law, human rights, and civil liberties; a free-market economy; a pluralistic democracy; and above all, socio-cultural changes and acceptance of new values and responsibilities across the board - all these coincide with human security dimensions.

However, a hiatus between the norm of declared synergy of peace-building and human security and the reality of conflict transformation record in the affected countries has been widening. There has been commendable work to redress this gap and improve the effectiveness of nonviolent response to internal conflicts.

Consequently, peace-building has been understood to include different levels of intervention as well as an overall strategy of human security – and particularly the interaction of peace-related interventions with other issue areas like relief and development, human rights and constitutional reform. Yet in practice both peace-building and human security have been addressed separately, as demonstrated by the existence of distinct branches and experts within national governments and supra-national bodies, with a strict division of labor and hierarchy between them. The ‘peace-building community’ seldom refers to human security dimension as an integral element of overall nation-building and state-building strategies. Moreover, human security has been neglected or underestimated when international peace-building missions prioritized state-building, under the pretext that individual rights are best protected through a system of relatively strong states; and that among three variables - state, democracy and human rights, state is the most important as *conditio sine qua non*.

Most of the liberal theories of International Relations maintain, that for a successful peace-building a minimally effective and legitimate state is necessary,<sup>6</sup> i.e. that it can occur only in the context of capable state institutions. It is state capacity and, especially, state legitimacy which will maintain the structures and mechanisms for conflict resolution and peace in the conflict-affected society. The process of state-building for peace then focuses on increasing legitimacy and accountability of the state with its constituents and building the capacity of the

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<sup>5</sup> Commission on Human Security, *Human Security Now*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2003; United Nations Development Program (UNDP), *Human Development Report*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1994; McRae, Rob and Don Hubert (eds), *Human Security and the New Diplomacy*, McGill-Queen’s University Press, Montreal, 2001.

<sup>6</sup> Call, Charles T., *Ending Wars, Building States*, in: Call, Charles T. and Vanessa Hawkins Wyeth (eds), *Building States to Build Peace*, Lynne Rienner Publishers, Boulder, 2007. The different interpretations over the operationalization of peace-building lead to differences over appropriate strategies and priorities; some organizations might highlight democratic elections, transitional justice, and rule of law programs, while others highlight demobilization and private sector reforms.

state to perform certain critical functions.<sup>7</sup> State institutions are assumed to have the long-term potential for mediating and mitigating social conflicts. The statist paradigm inspired The Dayton Peace Accords, as well as the Kosovo ‘status before standards’ option. Current peace-building practices attempt to create a particular kind of state that is presumed to have legitimacy and that has a measure of stateness. Yet the development of legitimate, effective states cannot be imposed from outside but rather emerges from internal negotiations, as a bottom-up endeavor. However, since 1999 Kosovo has been under international stewardship, this amounted in a way to a third- party state-building, different from indigenous state-building. The distinctive feature of an international territorial administration is both the scope of its interest in the governmental functions of the relevant state or territory and its authority over these functions.<sup>8</sup>

This liberal model has been the subject of considerable commentary and heated debates in recent years, particularly since it might not promote peace, but instead rekindled the conditions for conflict.<sup>9</sup> Several scholars have noted that the peace-building project, far from eliminating the root causes of conflict, creating the liberal-democratic state, or creating an effective ally in international antiterrorism efforts, have collapsed within five years, sending countries spiraling back into conflict.<sup>10</sup> Rebuilding a state after conflict is about far more than repairing damaged buildings and re-establishing public institutions. Fundamentally, it is about restoring the people’s trust and confidence in governance systems and the rule of law, rebuilding relationships at all levels, and providing the population with greater hope for the future. These processes are all critical to the consolidation of peace and security in fragile post-conflict situations. When they are neglected, the threat of conflict re-emerging is very real.

In this sense, state-building and peace-building are potentially contradictory processes – the former requiring the consolidation of governmental authority, the latter involving its moderation through compromise and consensus. The challenge for both national and international peacemakers is to situate reconciliation firmly within the context of state-building, while employing state-building as a platform for the development of mutual trust and lasting reconciliation. In the Kosovo case, it goes without saying that neither of these processes can be possible without the broad and inclusive engagement of the Kosovo people, although facing a range of constraints which limit their ability to participate.

The ‘Kosovo case’ points to the need of a complementary relationship between peace-building and human security, one which exists in many circumstances and should be maintained. Even more so if we bear in mind that building new state is a long, complex, and

<sup>7</sup> OECD, *Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States (Draft)*, 7 April 2005.

<sup>8</sup> Caplan, Richard, *International Authority and State-Building: The Case of Bosnia and Herzegovina*, in *Global Governance*, 10:1 (January-March 2004), pp. 53-65.

<sup>9</sup> Nearly 50% of all countries receiving assistance slide back into conflict within five years, and 72% of peace-building operations leave in place authoritarian regimes. Collier, Paul et al., *Breaking the Conflict Trap: Civil War and Development Policy*, Oxford University Press and World Bank, New York, 2003, at p. 7.

<sup>10</sup> Call, Charles T. and Susan E. Cook, *On Democratization and Peace-building*, *Global Governance*, 9, 2, Apr-Jun 2003, pp. 233-246, available at <http://www.watsoninstitute.org/pub/CallCookArticleFINAL.pdf>; Call, Charles T., *Institutionalizing Peace: A Review of Post-Conflict Peace-building Concepts and Issues for DPA*, UN paper, January 2005, at p. 8; Fukuyama, Frances, *International Order and State-building*, Cornell University Press, Princeton, 2003; Doyle, Michael W. and Nicholas Sambanis, *Making War and Building Peace: United Nations Peace Operations*, Princeton University Press, 2006, at p. 14, 344; Doyle, Michael W., and Nicholas Sambanis, *International Peacebuilding: A Theoretical and Quantitative Analysis*, American Political Science Review, Vol. 94, No. 4, 2000, at p. 779; Paris, Roland, *At War's End: Building Peace After Civil Conflict*, Cambridge University Press, New York, 2004.

arduous process and ultimately dysfunctional if human security agenda is not properly handled. Notwithstanding that the difference in values and emphasis between these two concepts should also be noted, and that these overlapping concepts can diverge in consequential ways when programs and aid policies are designed around their respective end goal. Moreover, very often conventional wisdom neglects the attitudinal dimension of divided societies—and mistakes differences in perception for a conflict over values, which could seriously undermine peace-building efforts.

It is in this context that current debates on peace-building record in Kosovo are taking place, echoing early discussions about identifying a clear end-point of intervention and how can progress in peace-building be assessed. Much work has been done to evaluate these concerns and efforts, yet the overall assessment of international peace-building endeavor in Kosovo is far from being systematized, critically examined or comprehensively elaborated. Too many specific, problem-oriented studies still dominate the research community and different agencies. The demand for more systematic evaluation of peace building endeavor persists due to scattered efforts, and absence of co-coordinated strategies to achieve them. Moreover, the assessment of the success or failure of international peace-building efforts in Kosovo varies significantly with the perceptions of the respective observing social group. All International actors involved have their own perspectives, assessments and narratives, starting from the UNMIK and KFOR, NGO community, domestic state and rural elites, to file and rank K-Albanian, K-Serbian and Non-Albanian population. Each of them is reflecting dominant interest and institutional agendas that comply with their particular point of view and concerns.

What are the repercussions for Kosovo, if state-building turned out to be long-standing project of transferring political power from external actors to local political elite which ultimately surpasses the UN's capacities in his respect? Notwithstanding that in Kosovo case the complexities of the process are further aggravated by a degree of congruence between the nation and state-building projects<sup>11</sup>. Furthermore, is it possible for *external* actors to guarantee a new constitutional order by building and supporting institutions from the outside, and additionally, whether these actors could bring together disparate and antagonistic social groups in a common government, within the state-building and nation-building processes<sup>12</sup>?

In an unpredictable environment, with constantly changing political and security dynamics,

<sup>11</sup> As Jans Narten succinctly remarks: “*Without a successful handover of control and competencies from external state-builders to local actors following an essential period of international involvement, state-building missions would either become open-ended and extraordinarily costly, or would come to a sudden end without generating sustainable and self-sustaining local structures. But promoting “local ownership” faces a dilemma. If the transfer of powers to local actors takes place too early and in an all-encompassing way, most postwar societies will be unable to take over relevant functions due to a lack of their own capacities. But if the transfer occurs too late or is too limited, the state-building process runs the risk of losing popular support and generating domestic resistance. The case of Kosovo provides an opportunity to investigate the competing and sometimes contradictory dilemmas of promoting “local ownership”.*” Narten, Jans, *Dilemmas of Promoting Local Ownership: State-building in Postwar Kosovo*, in: Roland Paris and Timothy Sisk (eds), *State-building after Civil War: The Long Road to Peace*. Paper for the Research Partnership on Postwar State-building, 2007, available at: [http://www.core-hamburg.de/CORE\\_english/ma\\_narten.htm](http://www.core-hamburg.de/CORE_english/ma_narten.htm).

<sup>12</sup> Englehart, Neil A., *In Defense of State Building*, Dissent Magazine, Fall 2003, available at: <http://www.dissentmagazine.org/article/?article=452>. See also: Patrick, Stewart and Kaysie Brown, *Greater than the Sum of its Parts? Assessing ‘Whole of Government’ Approaches to Fragile States*, International Peace Academy, New York, 2007; Samuels, Kirsti and Vanessa Hawkins Wyeth, *State-building and Constitutional Design after Conflict*, International Peace Academy, New York, August 2006; Cockayne, James, *Commercial Security in Humanitarian and Post-Conflict Settings: An Exploratory Study*, International Peace Academy, New York, March 2006; Security-Development Nexus, *Research Findings and Policy Implications*, Security-Development Nexus Program Report, International Peace Academy, New York, February 2006.

Kosovo has been a paradigmatic case for a simultaneous state building and nation building projects under external, international guidance and supervision, due to several characteristics which conjointly contributes to its qualification as a dysfunctional entity/province/state. It has:

- 1) weak political institutions unable to deal with the increasing political participation;
- 2) unconsolidated democracy;
- 3) religiously, linguistically, and culturally heterogeneous population;
- 4) populace accustomed to a world of corporate privileges;
- 5) economic 'backwardness'; and demographical dominance of one ethnicity.

The view of peace-building as a mainly 'external' undertaking implies that it is interpreted as a process, which has been fragmented into sequences, and/or phases ('emergency phase', 'transitional phase', 'consolidation phase', 'concluding phase' with different time intervals). This indicates that international peace-building mission has chosen an option of comprehensive, slow-paced, multi-phased operations for Kosovo, rather than hard power interventions or shock therapy from outside or violent insurgencies or *coup d'etat* from inside. From the very beginning the multidimensional peace-building in Kosovo has been planned as a four (some see it as five) stage transition in the evolution of Kosovo's sovereignty, and the intervenors have been pretty much aware that it is too optimistic to expect to transfer a state back to full sovereignty, but it may be more appropriate to aim for a state that remains embedded in and monitored by international institutions. Therefore, 'sovereignty' has been more rhetorically deployed than acknowledged in its full meaning and functions.<sup>13</sup> Consequently, state-building was conceived in more or less technical terms: Kosovo's sovereignty should develop from the *status quo* as defined by Resolution 1244 (stage one) to 'independence without full sovereignty' (stage two), allowing for reserved powers for the international community in the fields of human rights and minority protection, to the 'guided sovereignty' (stage three) that Kosovo would enjoy while negotiating with the EU and finally to 'shared sovereignty' (stage four) inside the EU. To the disappointment of all actors involved, UNMIK has performed its mission with mixed results.<sup>14</sup> It has applied a scenario which we may call "*mission civilisatrice*", after Roland Paris,<sup>15</sup> since it refers to a particular

<sup>13</sup> For instance, there are ten core functions of state sovereignty laid out by Ghani et al. and they are: (1) legitimate monopoly on the means of violence; (2) administrative control; (3) management of public finances; (4) investment in human capital; (5) delineation of citizenship rights and duties; (6) provision of infrastructure services; (7) formation of the market; (8) management of the state's assets (including the environment, natural resources, and cultural assets); (9) international relations (including entering into international contracts and public borrowing); and (10) the rule of law. Ghani, Ashraf et al., *Closing the Sovereignty Gap: An Approach to State-Building*, Overseas Development Institute, London, 2005.

<sup>14</sup> International Crisis Group, *Collapse in Kosovo*, Europe Report No. 155, 2004, available at: <http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=1243&l=1>; International Commission on the Balkans, *The Balkans in Europe's Future*, available at: [www.balkan-commission.org/](http://www.balkan-commission.org/), pp.15-22; *Kosovo's First Month*, Crisis Group Europe Briefing No. 47, 18 March 2008; International Crisis Group, *Kosovo: No Good Alternatives to the Ahtisaari Plan*, Europe Report No. 182, 14 May 2007; International Crisis Group, *Will the Real Serbia Please Stand Up?*, Crisis Group Europe Briefing No. 49, 23 April 2008.

<sup>15</sup> Paris, Roland, *International Peace-building and the 'Mission Civilisatrice'*, Review of International Studies, Vol. 28, No. 4, 2002, pp. 637-656; Paris, Roland, *Peace-building and the Limits of Liberal Internationalism*, International Security, Vol. 22, No. 2, 1997, pp. 54-89; Lens, Allen, *From Peacekeeping to Peace-building: The United Nations and the Challenge of Intrastate War*, in: Price, Richard and Mark Zacher (eds), *The United Nations and Global Security*, NY: Palgrave Press, 2004; and International Peace Academy, *The Future of UN*

vision of how states should organize themselves internally, based on the principles of liberal democracy and market-oriented economics. By reconstructing war-shattered states in accordance with this vision, peace builders have effectively ‘transmitted’ standards of appropriate behavior from the Western-liberal core of the international system to the spaces of instability where rising levels of conflict have been accompanied by economic collapse, human rights abuses and loss of life, commonly referred as the failed states of the periphery and/or ‘geopolitical black holes’.<sup>16</sup> This approach of ‘social engineering’ clearly remains a liberal project, given that it is guided both by a universal understanding of human liberty, human dignity, and human freedom,<sup>17</sup> and by domestic concerns about human rights, freedom and democracy.

Only a comprehensive overview will enable the observer to pinpoint the connections and linkages between various collective actors more or less united in their “*liberal peace-building*” efforts to create stable political entity defined by the rule of law, markets, democracy which respects human rights, representative institutions, a vigilant media, and periodic elections.<sup>18</sup> Central to these aspirations is the idea that democratic polities regard the creation, maintenance and expansion of well-functioning democracies as part of the national interest, supporting mutually beneficial stability, security and prosperity. Therefore, conventional democracy-promotion and good-governance programs are typically rooted in Western liberal-democratic principles that stress the competitive dimension of democratic societies.

The UN peace-building enterprise in Kosovo was mandated in three parts:

- 1) to administer Kosovo;
- 2) to create the institutions and other conditions necessary for Kosovo to exercise substantial self-government;

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*State-Building: Strategic and Operational Challenges and the Legacy of Iraq*, Executive summary from a conference held on 14-16 November 2003.

<sup>16</sup> Ó Tuathail, G., *The postmodern geopolitical condition: States, statecraft, and security at the millennium*, Annals of the Association of American Geographers, (90), 2000, at p. 170; Mullenbach, M. J., *Deciding to keep peace: An analysis of international influences on the establishment of third-party peacekeeping missions*, International Studies Quarterly, (49), pp. 529-556; O'Loughlin, J., *The Political Geography of Conflict: Civil Wars in the Hegemonic Shadow*, in: Flint, C.(ed), *The geography of war and peace*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005, pp. 85-110.

<sup>17</sup> The re-establishment of a functioning judiciary formulated on rule of law principles, such as equal legal protection and effective remedy, became a major field of UNMIK’s work, with its own administrative pillars, i.e. designated for justice and police (UNMIK pillars I and II). Along those same lines, OSCE’s efforts as UNMIK pillar III concentrated on the general promotion and protection of human rights, with the specific task of institution-building within the rule of law, and development of the judiciary and legal community. In addition, UNMIK’s strong focus on fostering local self-government and political decentralization reflects civilizing efforts toward political interdependence under the principle of subsidiarity. As a joint institutional task of NATO, the UN, OSCE, and the EU, the promotion of a constructive culture of conflict resolution within the Kosovo society represents a cross-cutting issue, which can best be identified in OSCE’s project of so-called reconciliation. This is also evidenced in UNMIK’s effort to foster the right to peace, respect the rights and liberties of others, and establish dialogue between Pristina and Belgrade.

<sup>18</sup> Chesterman, Simon Cf., *You, the People: The United Nations*, Transitional Administration, and State-building, New York: Oxford University Press, 2004. This argument is most closely associated with Roland Paris. See his *At War’s End: Building Peace after Civil Conflict; International Peace-building and the ‘Mission Civilisatrice’*, op.cit. See also Richmond, Oliver, “The Globalization of Responses to Conflict and the Peace-building Consensus”, *Cooperation and Conflict*, Vol. 39, No. 2, 2004, pp. 129-150; Meierhenrich, Jens, *Forming States after Failure*, in Rotberg, Robert (ed.), *When States Fail: Causes and Consequences*, Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2003, pp. 155-156.

### 3) to resolve the issue of Kosovo status.

Eventually the ‘international peace-building community’ has renounced the original concept after having chosen status rather than standard criteria (which had meant that Kosovo must meet international standards on human rights and the rule of law before the question of its status could be dealt with), and seeking to reframe human security in favor of the dominant interests of states and institutional agendas. The key question is to know how the normative status of the concept might affect its operationalization in terms of those for whom they are intended. In that respect, Kosovo illustrates numerous difficulties and even imponderables of the new strategic approach by which state – building, contrary to the original mission design, takes prevalence over human security agenda. International community consented that the most appropriate role for an exterior actor according to a human security agenda would be to facilitate productive change by the state that requires outside assistance; a rebuilding of existing structures to improve their capacity and effectiveness as opposed to imposing a new order of affairs. The ultimate end point however of this line of thought must be that rebuilding institutions with exterior resources cannot achieve any human security goals as long as the political will to achieve those goals is lacking.

The previous Special Representative of the UN Secretary- General, Michael Steiner, identified eight goals or standards that must be met by Kosovo’s authorities in order for the gradual transfer of competence and responsibility to the provisional Kosovar institutions to take place.<sup>19</sup> They include functioning democratic institutions, enforcement of the rule of law, freedom of movement, the return and reintegration of all inhabitants of Kosovo, development of a market economy, full property rights for all citizens, dialogue and normalized relations with Belgrade, and reduction and transformation of the Kosovo Protection Corps (KPC) in accordance with its mandate.<sup>20</sup> However, these objectives are hampered when the loyalties are limited in scope and may not extend to everyone in the territory and complying with the institutions.

Throughout the aforementioned phases of intervention the general strategy towards state-formation has persisted. Considering the situation from this perspective seems to infer that the implementation of a human security amounted to building legitimate domestic institutions while the means were provisional institutions for democratic and autonomous institutions. Creating and/or restoring state institutions and reshaping state-society relations have become intrinsic values, instead of instrumental values justified in the name of establishing or re-establishing human security.<sup>21</sup> Therefore, after eight years of international engagement in Kosovo, revitalizing state institutions and processes has been the main focus of peace-

<sup>19</sup> *Address to the Security Council by Michael Steiner, Special Representative of the Secretary-General*, UNMIK Press Release PR719, 24 April 2002, available at: [www.unmikonline.org/press/2002/pressr/pr719.htm](http://www.unmikonline.org/press/2002/pressr/pr719.htm). See also Standards for Kosovo, UNMIK Press Release 1078, 10 December 2003, available at: [www.unmikonline.org/press/2003/pressr/pr1078.pdf](http://www.unmikonline.org/press/2003/pressr/pr1078.pdf).

<sup>20</sup> The KPC was established in 1999 as a multi-ethnic civilian emergency organization. For the issues surrounding it see: The UN Security Council, *Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo*, 26 January 2004, at p. 15, available at: <http://www.un.org/Depts/dhl/da/kosovo/kosovo3a.htm>.

<sup>21</sup> Julie Mertus follows this line of thought in her assessment of nation-building efforts in transitional countries: “*where foreign intervenors perceive that the general populace needs a strong state, more effort will go into state-building. Where intervenors think that a strong state and democracy must come before human rights, some human rights violations will be overlooked in the reform effort*”, Mertus, Julie, *Substantive Self-Determination: Democracy, Communicative Power and Inter/National Labor Rights, Mapping Civil Society Transplants: A Preliminary Comparison of Eastern Europe and Latin America*, University of Miami Law Review, University of Miami, 1999, at p. 938.

building mission, while a human security framework which relates to analysis of priorities in governance, civil society, economic interventions, security sector reform, and regional and international engagement with the European Union was given a secondary place. Whether the fact of a blatant lack of progress on human security resulted from insufficient knowledge and analysis of the intrinsic tensions and contradictions of externally-assisted state-building, and as such it was more an unintended result than a deliberate decision-making, future will tell.

It is common knowledge that Kosovo is currently a major UN nation-building projects and one of the most extended, interesting and complicated state-building operations in Europe in recent times.<sup>22</sup> The critical intention of the international community has been to integrate Kosovo in the long run in the Euro-Atlantic structures, motivated by the EU's consideration of regional and international stabilization according to the global liberal project. The rationale has been that more durable peace-building outcomes would require more focused attention on building up governmental institutions in formerly warring state. As a matter of fact, this approach also characterized previous state-building practices of "*international peace-building community*" in countries emerging from conflict, (and usually these were weak and/or failed states). Simply put, state-building has been focused on stateness. Intervenors can assist in different activities across sectors, they can even improve human security standards and objectives, but ultimately, the implementation of human security objectives demands an efficient and effective state that is able to offer protection and empowerment for their populations.

Based upon an understanding that efforts to civilize conflict and to promote human rights in a sustainable manner need to work from within a society in a bottom-up process, it becomes obvious that the efforts of the UN, OSCE, EU, and NATO failed to realize this necessity, despite their intense division of labor. Instead, they employed a top-down policy in nearly all dimensions of the civilizing process and its related human rights functions,<sup>23</sup> which led to an alienation of democratically elected representatives of the Kosovo people from state responsibilities.<sup>24</sup>

These observations are all the more reason to put in question the nature of this approach 'within the box' which didn't guarantee success, but rather revealed many shortcomings of

<sup>22</sup> See Dobbins, James et al., *America's Role in Nation-building: from Germany to Iraq*, RAND, 2003, pp. 111-128; Cockell, John, *Joint Action on Security Challenges in the Balkans*, in: Pugh, Michael and Waheguru Pal Singh Sidhu (eds), *The United Nations and Regional Security: Europe and Beyond*, Lynne Rienner, 2003; Alexandros Yannis, *Kosovo: the Political Economy of Conflict and Peace-building*, in: Ballentine, Karen and Jake Sherman(eds.), *The Political Economy of Armed Conflict: Beyond Greed and Grievance*, Lynne Rienner, 2003; Måansson, Katerina, *Cooperation in Human Rights: Experience from the Peace Operation in Kosovo*, International Peacekeeping, 8/4, 2001, pp.111-136; Marshall, David, *Reviving the Judicial and Penal System in Kosovo*, in: Pugh Michael and Waheguru Pal Singh Sidhu, *The United Nations and Regional Security*, Lynne Rienner, 2003, pp.155-174; International Crisis Group, *Collapse in Kosovo*, 2004, available at: [www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=1243&l=1](http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=1243&l=1), pp.1-30; International Commission on the Balkans, *The Balkans in Europe's Future*, available at: <http://www.balkan-commission.org/>, pp. 15-22.

<sup>23</sup> For example, state authorities were only partially transferred over a long period of time, with the Special Representative of UN Secretary General (SRSG) of UNMIK retaining the sole monopoly of force, extensive authority, and legislative veto power over internal and foreign affairs, budget and finance, the judiciary, and the police, etc.

<sup>24</sup> Also, and parallel to these authorities, all international organizations enjoyed full legal immunity from prosecution for abuse or omission of their duties, thus violating the citizens' right to effective remedy and equal protection by law. Narten, Jens, *In Need of Self-Reflection: Peace-building In Post-War Kosovo*, The Whitehead Journal of Diplomacy and International Relations, vol. VIII (1), 2007, available at: <http://www.journalofdiplomacy.org>

the ready-made solutions.<sup>25</sup> Clearly, whereas generic categories of peace building can be listed in an inclusive design,<sup>26</sup> peace-building operations must be tailored to the circumstances they face. More specifically, a standard model has to be adapted to developing strategies responding to specific sets of problems and shaped by a particular material and political context, collapsed economy and state institutions, ethnic rivalries, radical changes in ethnic boundaries and the malfunction of the central government. According to the logic of the ‘peace-building triangle’: *“the deeper the hostility, the more the destruction of local capacities, the more one needs international assistance to succeed in establishing a stable peace.”*<sup>27</sup>

## II. Threats to Human Security in Kosovo

Kosovo today faces several related human security challenges which are at the forefront of almost every government agency and NGO strategy, experiencing the need to give preeminence to human security as opposed to the traditional respect for the principle of state sovereignty. Daunting challenges and threats to human security in Kosovo are indeed numerous pertaining to the sectors of health, education, governance, human rights regime, labor and employment, social inclusion, property restitution, the controversial issues of law enforcement and protection of historical, cultural, and religious monuments - to mention only the most important.

In Kosovo, Resolution 1244 has made UNMIK the ultimate authority. That gives it the power to carry out police investigations, the powers of arrest and the authority to try suspects and imprison criminals. Not advisory powers, as international police in Bosnia had, but executive powers, powers that are critical to meeting the challenge of its mission – to achieve fundamental standards that apply to all functioning societies. Hence the aforementioned unfavorable conditions engendered a provision of human security, in its ‘narrow sense’ as *“freedom from fear”*, connoting a concern with the protection of human beings, which only includes security threats that are directed towards the individual. Strong emphasis on *“freedom from fear”* favored military stabilization at the expense of social and economic development. As for the wider meaning of human security - *“freedom from want”*, it embraces all sources of social and economic insecurity associated with poverty, unemployment and disease, thus referring to all threats towards the individual, ranging from lack of development to environmental scarcity - all indispensable for political and economic stability.

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<sup>25</sup> *Has peace-building Made a Difference in Kosovo? A Study of the Effectiveness of Peace-building in Preventing Violence: Lessons Learned from the March 2004 Riots in Kosovo*, CDA Collaborative Learning Projects, July 2006. See *Executive Summary*, pp. viii-xiv, available at: [http://www.cdainc.com/cdawww/pdf/book/cdapeacebuildingreportkosovo\\_Pdf4.pdf](http://www.cdainc.com/cdawww/pdf/book/cdapeacebuildingreportkosovo_Pdf4.pdf).

<sup>26</sup> For Doyle and Sambanis these categories are the following: (1) the degree of hostility of the factions (measured in terms of human cost—deaths and displacements—the type of war and the number of factions); (2) the extent of local capacities remaining after the war (measured, for example, in per capita GDP or energy consumption); and (3) the amount of international assistance (measured in terms of economic assistance or the type of mandate given to a UN peace operation and the number of troops committed to the peace effort). Doyle, Michael W. and Nicholas Sambanis, *International Peace-building: A Theoretical and Quantitative Analysis*, op.cit.

<sup>27</sup> Doyle, Michael W. and Nicholas Sambanis, *Making War and Building Peace*, Princeton University Press, 2006, at p.4.

Human security approach also demonstrated that the economic development or ‘income generation’ is badly needed to address the country’s poverty and unemployment, and to generate tax revenue to enable the new democratic governance structures to function. The grim economic outlook, along with the lack of security, are some of the obstacles to the return of the remaining refugees and internally displaced persons (mostly Serb and Roma citizens living in inner Serbia and Montenegro), despite the international community’s strong policy and financial focus on this issue amounting to several billions of euros. Common to both conceptions is that threats to citizens in reality often emanate from the state itself. In sum, human security, described as freedom from fear and freedom from want, appears to be a key issue for stability in Kosovo.

Human development indicators in Kosovo are among the lowest in Europe, due to neglect, inefficiencies and conflict which have had a devastating effect on basic survival and human development in Kosovo. According to the World Bank *Kosovo Poverty Assessment*, Kosovo’s macroeconomic and social context is the following: GDP growth has been poor. The average annual growth rate of real GDP between 2002 and 2006 is estimated at less than one and half percent. Potential sources of growth, especially in mining and energy and agriculture, would benefit enormously from new and modern technology. However, inefficient legacies and uncertain property rights continue to hamper the flow of foreign direct investment. Therefore, the outlook for the economy does not seem bright in the medium term. Furthermore, agricultural growth has been sluggish, disappointing labor market performance, low prospects for poverty reduction.

Unprecedented amounts of reconstruction and development aid poured into Kosovo. The international community has invested enormous sums of money, goodwill and human resources here. It has put 25 times more money and 50 times more troops on a *per capita* basis in post-conflict Kosovo than in post-conflict Afghanistan. Yet, after nearly nine years of investing several billions of euros<sup>28</sup> - on a variety of economic, social and cultural initiatives, Kosovo human security record is commendable and at best a mixed one. In spite of the numerous efforts aimed at bridging the gap separating the different ethnic groups, the international community has clearly failed in its attempts to bring substantial security and development to the province. A multi-ethnic Kosovo does not exist except in the bureaucratic assessments of the international community. The events of March 2004 were a sad reminder of the urgent need to assess critically whether such interventions were contributing towards the goal of building a peaceful, multi-ethnic society in Kosovo,<sup>29</sup> instead of supporting the

<sup>28</sup> The BBC team working with Jane's Defense Weekly estimated in 1999 that the final cost of NATO's ‘strategic bombing’ of Kosovo was approximately \$4.63 billion dollars US, the BBC's study of the costs of the Kosovo conflict, *78 Days: An Audit of War*, available at: [www.news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/476134.stm](http://www.news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/476134.stm). In comparison, the reconstruction of Kosovo was \$33.86 billion dollars including the cost of reconstructing sites destroyed by the bombing, which cost approximately \$4 billion. Rather, the bulk of the money went to costs such as rehabilitating refugees, rebuilding damaged homes and razed villages in rural Kosovo, and implementing institution-building and democratization. The BBC/Jane's research did not include the costs of environmental damage following bombing raids on oil refineries and industry. The figures were presented in British Pounds at a currency rate from 1999. The conversion was done at the historical conversion rate of 1 British Pound/1.65170 USD, found at FX History – Historical Currency Exchange Rates, available at: <http://www.oanda.com/convert/fxhistory>. For example, \$4.63 billion = £2.63 billion. According to the latest estimates of the EU, over the past years Kosovo has received €2 billion, and till 2010 the EU will allocate more resources to Kosovo per capita than any other place in the world (nearly €330 million). See *European Union – Background: the EU in Kosovo*, February 2008, available at: <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/kosovo>.

<sup>29</sup> A team of researchers conducted by Diana Chigas of CDA Collaborative Learning Projects, together with CARE, OSCE in Mitrovicë/Mitrovica, Mercy Corps, UNMIK Pejë/Peć, Kosovan Nansen Dialogue, a number of

abrupt declaration of independence. A substantial share of the blame for the failure of the project of a multiethnic society in Kosovo should be placed at the door of UNMIK and the international community, including local political elites. Over the past few years UNMIK has on several occasions been actively involved in a policy of reverse discrimination in Kosovo.

Politicization of all activities has prevented the creation of any space for inter-ethnic engagement at the citizen level, while the situation on the ground is very much politicized but also very confusing. According to the study *Has Peace-Building Made a Difference in Kosovo?*, the peace-building programming did not contribute significantly to prevention of interethnic violence, and we should “envise the immense challenges that will continue to haunt Kosovo after the resolution of its political status.”<sup>30</sup> The study also states the following:

*“The report indicates that important achievements obtained through dialogue and training in dispelling certain fears and breaking down stereotypes and ‘enemy images’ remain at the level of individuals and are not adding up by involving larger groups of individuals, communities and key organizations or by creating broader networks that could contribute more effectively to reducing tension and generating meaningful forms of inter-ethnic cooperation. However, the assumption that the implementation of ethnically mixed initiatives will bridge political divisions, diminish feelings of hatred and fear, and will facilitate acceptance of the “Other” is not materializing. This is due, among other reasons, because ‘multi-ethnicity’ is widely perceived as a ‘conditionality’ imposed by the international community, and because these initiatives are not addressing the issues that continue to divide and confront Kosovo along ethnic lines such as war crimes, missing persons, justice, impunity, security and property titles.”*<sup>31</sup>

The difficult environment has led many people to conclude that peace-building can only build capacity for improving inter-ethnic relations *after* status is decided.<sup>32</sup>

As the UNDP *Early Warning Report Kosovo 2008* demonstrates, disconnection between promises made before independence and the reality post-independence – the Government of Kosovo has blamed lack of statehood for many public problems for many years now, and this argument is no longer valid. Since December 2007, a significantly greater number of Kosovo’s citizens are holding UNMIK responsible for Kosovo’s political situation as opposed to the Government of Kosovo. The May 2008 poll however, shows a slight change of this trend with the gap between those respondents holding the Government of Kosovo and those holding UNMIK responsible for Kosovo’s political situation on the increase – similar to what happened in December 2006 and June 2007. Given all the important political developments that took place in Kosovo between December 2007 and May 2008 – such as the declaration of independence, and approval of the Kosovo Constitution<sup>33</sup> – it would not be unreasonable to assume that more people would see the Government of Kosovo as being mainly responsible for Kosovo’s political situation. This is the case across Kosovo’s main regions.<sup>34</sup>

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local and international NGOs, as well as by municipal governments and some international organizations carried out an extensive research on effectiveness of peace-building in preventing violence in Kosovo.

<sup>30</sup> *Has peace-building Made a Difference in Kosovo?*, at p. 7.

<sup>31</sup> *ibid.*, pp. 6-7.

<sup>32</sup> *ibid.*, at p. 143.

<sup>33</sup> Which effectively intends to assume tasks and competences currently carried out by UNMIK as interim civil administration (Pilar IV) with regard to the administrative authority over socially owned and publicly owned enterprises, and to remove UNMIK’s authority and capacity to control these areas.

<sup>34</sup> United Nations Development Programme Kosovo, *Early Warning Report Kosovo*, 20/21, 2008, at p. 20, available at: [www.kosovo.undp.org/repository/docs/EWR20\\_eng\\_press.pdf](http://www.kosovo.undp.org/repository/docs/EWR20_eng_press.pdf).

The situation on the ground is far from being satisfactory. The latest International Crisis Group report<sup>35</sup> acknowledges that Kosovo has taken its first steps in state building, but the international community has failed to meet its commitments and prospects for a *de facto* partition of the state are growing. Furthermore, the report states that “*the international community has not found its footing since independence was declared on 17 February*”, that “*major violence has been avoided but the calm is deceptive*” and that:

“*divisions between Albanian and Serb areas have widened. If de facto partition continues, Kosovo’s Serbs south of the Ibar River will be at risk, pressure will mount to redraw borders on ethnic lines throughout the states of the former Yugoslavia, and EU membership prospects for these countries will fade.*”<sup>36</sup>

But there are other issues emanating from the ongoing ethnic tensions in Kosovo, mainly between the Albanian and Serb populations. For instance, ethnic tensions perpetuate a rigidly segregated both educational and health care system. Some other minority communities, such as the Roma, Ashkali and Egyptians, are afflicted by the double burden of getting caught up in the middle of these ethnic disputes and at the same time suffering from poverty and discrimination. Numerous reports indicate a less than a modest progress in the field of the return of refugees and internally displaced persons.

Despite the long presence of the United Nations in form of the United Nations Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), despite the unilateral declaration of Kosovo’s independence(17 February) and coming into force of the Kosovo Constitution(15 June), as well as a subsequent recognition of the new state by several dozens of countries, a Security Council resolution remains out of sight.

The continued presence of Serbian parallel structures in Kosovo, and the influence of Belgrade in hindering the integration of Kosovo Serbs into the Kosovo institutions and society, especially the requests and calls from Belgrade to the K-Serbs to create their own parallel structures, contributes to the furthering ethnic segregation in Kosovo and self-imposed isolation of Kosovo Serbs, which does not lead anywhere.<sup>37</sup> Serbian government allocates €500 million per year in Kosovo,<sup>38</sup> mostly for salaries of different state officials in the area of administration, health and education but very little of that money reaches the population, who remains the poorest in the region.<sup>39</sup> Moreover, every month 8,127 double salaries are extracted from the budget for Serbian employees in Kosovo, (as a compensation for difficult working conditions and as a state policy measure to encourage mobility of professionals from Serbia to Kosovo) which indicates not only a degree of lawlessness and corruption but also the amount of people who are profiting form the misfortunes of Kosovo Serb population.<sup>40</sup>

<sup>35</sup>International Crisis Group, *Kosovo Fragile Transition*, Europe Report (196), 2008, at p.3, available at: [www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=5695](http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=5695).

<sup>36</sup> Ibid.

<sup>37</sup> Nationalist politicians in Belgrade hope at a minimum to secure partition into Albanian and Serbian entities, or to incite Kosovo Albanians to react violently and so do great damage to the international standing of their state-building project, while Pristina does not yet have an operational strategy for getting its message across to Kosovo Serbs. See Kosovo’s *First Month*, Crisis Group Europe Briefing, (47), 2008.

<sup>38</sup>Finance minister promises jobs for K. Serbs, B92, Tanjug, 2008, available at [http://www.b92.net/eng/news/business-article.php?yyyy=2008&mm=04&dd=10&nav\\_id=49271](http://www.b92.net/eng/news/business-article.php?yyyy=2008&mm=04&dd=10&nav_id=49271).

<sup>39</sup> Blic Daily, 21. September 2008, at p. 4, available at: <http://www.blic.rs/arkhiva.php>.

<sup>40</sup> Ibid, “*podaci sa terena govore da na Kosovu gotovo da nema funkcionera koji nije u sukobu s nekim propisom ili u sukobu interesa. Zakonski je nemoguće imati dva radna odnosa u dve različite državne firme i dve plate. Ako se to igde dešava, to je nezakonit radni odnos - kaže za „Blic nedelje“ Radovan Ristanović, direktor*

To the large extent Belgrade is responsible for furthering ethnic segregation in Kosovo. Until the very end of his second government Kostunica, together with the Radical party, was fueling unrealistic hopes of the Serbian populations, insisting on parallel institutions of their own and boycotts of Kosovo institutions, thus contributing to their further alienation, ghettoization, confusion and disorientation. Belgrade has devoted significant resources to creating parallel structures to manage many spheres of public life, including education, health, municipal governance, telecommunications, pensions, police and the judiciary.<sup>41</sup> Tactics in Serbia's strategy for fighting Kosovo independence include downgrading relations with neighboring countries that recognize Kosovo, denying the legitimacy of the EU mission there and strengthening parallel institutions in both the enclaves and the north.<sup>42</sup>

Part of Kosovo Serb's political leadership deliberately ignores the fact that EULEX's fight against corruption may contribute to K-Serbs as well, that it also provides a secure environment for the new Serb-majority municipalities extensive self-rule, and that K-Serbs have a much brighter future as citizens of Kosovo than as pawns of Belgrade's politicians, used as scapegoats in their political infighting. New government, with Boris Tadić as President, is much more aware of the complexity of the political scene for Serbs in Kosovo. Its Prime Minister, Mirko Cvetković attempted to overcome the first negative reactions towards EULEX,<sup>43</sup> and promised a more realistic policy towards Kosovo.

The Kosovo donors conference, held in Brussels on 11 July, pledged €1.2 billion in aid, in support of Kosovo's socio-economic development, as laid out by the government in its Medium Term Expenditure Framework (MTEF) for 2009-2011. The money is to be used for building capacity in the judicial system, enhancing the business climate and improving the education and energy systems. Needless to say that the money could be also used to improve many conditions of human security in Kosovo, but it will not automatically remove neither ghettos enclosed by physical or imagined barbed wire, nor extremist violence, motivated by both politics and criminal activities which has affected not only Serbs but also other non-Albanian minorities, such as the Gorani, Bosniaks, and Roma, as well as Albanians in some instances. If the basic premise of human security is that state sovereignty must be recognized, but in certain circumstances of human rights violations, the focus must shift to "*the rights of people, not states*", then new state of Kosovo has *per definitionem* equal obligation to safeguard human security of its ethnic minorities. Whether it is able to do so will be an important determinant of the effectiveness and appropriateness of tutelage to help build

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*Inspekcije rada u Beogradu. Posao povlašćenih koji primaju duple plate očigledno je prkošenje svim zakonima, pa i zakonu fizike.*

<sup>41</sup> For instance, Serbia's justice ministry ordered all Serbs employed in the Kosovo judiciary to leave and join the Serbian judiciary, *Nosioci pravosudnih funkcija srpske nacionalnosti vracaju se u svoje maticne pravosudne organe na Kosmetu*, 22 February 2008, available at: <http://www.srbija.sr.gov.yu/vesti/vest.php?id=83551>.

<sup>42</sup> This has manifested itself in the withdrawal of many Serbs from the Kosovo Police Force (KPS) in the enclaves and other Kosovo bodies, including the judiciary, and the seizure of the railroad in northern Kosovo by Serbia's state railway. The government said it would pay all Serbs who leave Kosovo institutions 200 euro 'compensation' monthly. International Crisis Group, *No Good Alternatives to the Ahtisaari Plan, Europe Report*, (182), Kosovo, 2007; *Will the Real Serbia Please Stand Up?*, Crisis Group Europe Briefing, No. 49, 2008, at p 9.

<sup>43</sup> The Prime Minister recently stated that Serbia was not happy that EULEX had started deploying without Belgrade's participation. On the other hand, he underlined that "*it's also clear to us that it does no good to create obstruction just for obstruction's sake.*", and that "*we have big interests in Kosovo, we have people living there, and we expect some more to come back, and we have to improve life in Kosovo for all those citizens that we're responsible for. That's why we have to take part in this UNMIK reconfiguration, and the deployment of EULEX, because we want to be part of a common undertaking*", B92, August 2008, available at: [http://www.b92.net/eng/news/politics-article.php?yyyy=2008&mm=08&dd=28&nav\\_id=53032](http://www.b92.net/eng/news/politics-article.php?yyyy=2008&mm=08&dd=28&nav_id=53032).

institutions, create genuine multicultural civil society, and provide human security for all its citizens.<sup>44</sup>

If we acknowledge a basic premise of human security - that security is a global public good, and as such should be available to all in all societies, and that the provision of security to one individual or a group of people does not reduce the provision of security to the rest of society, then several issues seem to us the most pressing. Admitting that we all in post-communist ex-Yugoslavia are apprentices in democracy would supply the potential for a more open political dialogue, enlightened 'political will' and 'enlighten self-interest'. Second, if the lasting stability cannot be achieved until people are protected from violent threats to their rights, lives and safety, i.e., if human security is jeopardized in its essential sense, then the orientation at all costs towards the state and/or nation-building in Kosovo has been controversial.

State formation and nation building continue to be important preoccupation in the light of the persistence of underdevelopment and prevalence of 'soft states'. But they should not be pursued without a truly participative, bottom-up approach to naming and framing human security as truly relevant. This insight challenges prevailing security thinking, as state-related security - thus ignoring the complex political legacy of Kosovo (as part of previous political entity where the state is seen as a violator of human rights, rather than provider of security). To date, human security as narrowly focused on protecting individuals and communities against violence, i.e. "*freedom from fear*", needs to stay an important component of the state-building agenda in Kosovo, first and foremost for minorities that are the most vulnerable to violence. Without this precondition, many within minority communities are entitled to judge Kosovo's Constitution together with newly formed structures as little more than window dressing, designed to create the impression that "*things are going well and improving*". It should be prior to the standard of equal consideration to political, civil, economic, social, and cultural rights. And, as the latest course of events suggests, we have reasons for moderate optimism since the most of the guarantees of minority rights and positive discrimination that had been enshrined in the Ahtisaari plan for "*supervised independence*" have been respected, coupled with minimal ethnic violence since Kosovo's independence. But until when? The natural inference of this dilemma is that human security must depend on a certain degree of bottom-up approach, in the sense of rule of the people rather than the imposition of a foreign model of political organization which is perhaps less well suited to the context.

Let us hope that the EU's decision to abandon its original 'standards before status' approach, would not be short-sighted and hasty deliberation which instead of dealing with the relatively small problem of Kosovo has to tackle with bigger and thornier problem of divided Serbia, or even with critical ethnic issues in Macedonia, Bosnia and Albania, and further from Balkans' periphery to former CIS. As we all know, the emphasis on state-building and monitored sovereignty, favored by the international 'peace-building community', has proven to be an arduous, and open-ended task. With reasonable doubt, we can envisage Kosovo as an international protectorate for the next decade, unless supported by a strong and unwavering civilian contribution. If this were the case, if bottom-up approach were missing, human security agenda may easily continue to be engendered by the new Kosovo state as it has been by the Serbian state before 2000.

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<sup>44</sup> Amnesty International, *Kosovo (Serbia): The challenge to fix a failed UN justice mission*, 2008, available at: [http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/RWB.NSF/db900SID/SODA-7BBALA/\\$File/Full\\_Report.pdf](http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/RWB.NSF/db900SID/SODA-7BBALA/$File/Full_Report.pdf).

 The European Union flag, featuring a blue background with twelve yellow stars arranged in a circle.	<p>The HUMSEC project is supported by the European Commission under the Sixth Framework Programme “Integrating and Strengthening the European Research Area”.</p>	 A stylized blue logo consisting of three curved, flowing lines that meet in the center.
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