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NATO ENLARGEMENT:
A CONSTRUCTIVIST EXPLANATION

FRANK SCHIMMELFENNIG

At its Madrid summit in July 1997, NATO invited three central and eastern European (CEE) countries to accession talks: the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland. In December of the same year, the accession protocols were signed. In this article, I seek to explain NATO enlargement. More precisely, I ask (1) why CEE countries strive to become NATO members;[1] (2) why NATO decided to expand to the east;[2] and (3) why (only) the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland were invited to become NATO members.[3]

I argue that the most prominent rationalist international relations approaches to the study of alliances and international institutions cannot answer these questions convincingly. In both their neorealist and their neoliberal variations, they may be able to account for the CEE countries' bid to join NATO but fail to explain the interest of NATO in expansion (see "Rationalist Puzzles" below). This puzzle for rationalism is solved by a constructivist approach to the study of international institutions which analyzes enlargement as a process of international socialization. In the constructivist perspective, NATO is a specialized organization—the "military branch"—of the Euro-Atlantic or Western community of liberal-democratic and multilateralist values and norms.

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1. Only twelve out of nineteen central European countries (I do not count the Transcaucasian and central Asian OSCE members as part of this group) have formally applied for NATO membership. Among the NATO Partners, the most notable exceptions are the CIS members (Belarus, Moldova, Russia, and Ukraine).

2. The study ends with the decisions made in 1997; it does not include the ratification process.

3. The general decision to expand and the decision to invite the three central European countries are distinct because they were made independently of each other in 1994 and 1997, respectively.

The international socialization approach gives an answer to all three questions: (1) CEE countries strive for NATO membership inasmuch as they share the community values and norms and seek identification with, and recognition by, the West; (2) NATO decided to expand in order to strengthen liberal democracy and multilateralism and to build, in central and eastern Europe, a stable peace based on these values and norms. When a country has internalized the community values and norms and has changed its domestic and foreign policy practices accordingly, it is admitted as a full member to the organization as a reward for its efforts and because of the community's moral commitment to guarantee the security of countries that share its principled beliefs; (3) the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland were invited to join NATO first, because they were more advanced than the other CEE countries in the internalization of the community values and beliefs.

The constructivist explanation of enlargement as international socialization is backed up by an analysis of the enlargement process: In the section "Enlargement Discourse," I show that the discourse of NATO and its members reflects the value-rational motivation for enlargement. Furthermore, the stages of enlargement, above all the PfP Program, fit the image of a process of socialization in which the Western alliance teaches its values and norms to its cooperation partners and evaluates their learning progress. The only facts that constructivism cannot explain (and are better accounted for by rationalism) are the bid to join NATO of rather authoritarian governments (like the Romanian government until 1996 and the Meciar government in Slovakia) and the exclusion of Slovenia from the first round of expansion.

The aim of the study is to give a convincing explanation of NATO enlargement. I do not claim to refute rationalist institutionalism in international relations theory. To begin with, the research design does not allow a thorough test of theories. Moreover, such "paradigmatic" approaches to the study of international institutions (and social phenomena in general) as rationalism or constructivism are impossible to refute empirically. Finally, rationalist and constructivist explanations do not necessarily exclude each other but can be combined.

I seek to demonstrate, however, that a constructivist approach to the study of international institutions provides a superior explanatory framework. The core propositions or "theorems" of the dominant rationalist approaches to the study of alliances—the assumption of rational egoism based on relative gains and balance-of-power concerns (neorealism) or based on absolute gains and welfare maximization con-

cerns (neoliberal institutionalism)—have serious difficulties in accounting for NATO expansion. A constructivist approach—the international socialization of states to the basic norms of an international community of values—offers a parsimonious explanation of the enlargement process. Constructivist and rationalist propositions can be combined to explain NATO enlargement, but the rationalist propositions are only correct when applied within a larger constructivist framework.

RATIONALIST PUZZLES

RATIONALISM, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION, AND ENLARGEMENT

Rationalist theories of international politics and international institutions have dominated the theoretical debate in international relations throughout the 1980s.[4] Despite their many differences, neorealism and neoliberalism share the rationalist premises of individualism, egoism, and instrumentalism. Rationalist explanations of international interaction start with the actors whose identities, interests, and preferences they take as exogenously given and stable. Rationalism assumes that individuals as well as corporate actors act egoistically and instrumentally, that is, they choose the behavioral option which promises to maximize their utility.[5] Institutions are supposed to influence the options available to the actors and their cost-benefit calculations but not their identities and interests.

These premises also characterize the rationalist analysis of international organizations and their enlargement. Rationalist theories start from the assumption that international organizations are instrumental associations which help their members to maximize their utilities. Decisions on membership in international organizations are made according to criteria of instrumental rationality. They are based on exogenously given and stable preferences of both members and candidates for membership.

4. For an overview, see David A. Baldwin, ed., *Neorealism and Neoliberalism. The Contemporary Debate* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993); and Andreas Hasenclever, Peter Mayer, and Volker Rittberger, *Theories of International Regimes* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997).

5. To be sure, the assumption of egoism is no assumption of rational-choice theory as such but a general feature of rationalist institutionalism in international relations. See, for example, Robert O. Keohane, *After Hegemony. Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), 66.

The basic rational-choice approach to the issues of membership and size of organizations is club theory. A club is defined as a voluntary group deriving mutual benefit from sharing a good characterized by excludable and partially divisible benefits.[6] This definition is held to suit most international organizations. NATO provides nuclear deterrence and conventional defense. Both goods are excludable, but while deterrence is basically indivisible, the provision of conventional forces and weapons creates divisible benefits.[7] Whereas extended nuclear deterrence protects all alliance members simultaneously, conventional forces used to defend one alliance member cannot be used to defend another ally at the same time. It is easier for individual NATO countries to withhold their conventional forces from an ally than it is to exclude an individual alliance member from the nuclear umbrella.

If an international organization provides divisible goods, membership becomes a problem because additional members are rival consumers. Enlargement can lead to crowding or congestion, that is, members cannot use the good as much or as often as they would like to because of other members using the good as well. International organizations, then, only expand if the costs of increased congestion are matched by equivalent "cost reductions owing to the sharing of provision expense," that is, contributions by the new members.[8] This applies to all members and candidates for membership individually. Thus, for a club-type international organization to expand, each member state must expect positive net benefits in order to approve of expansion, and each state outside the organization must expect to gain positive net benefits in order to join the organization.

Neorealism and neoliberalism differ with regard to the utilities and the cost-benefit assessments that determine the choices of state actors.

6. This definition is, in abbreviated form, from Richard Cornes and Todd Sandler, *The Theory of Externalities, Public Goods, and Club Goods* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), 24–25, which also provides an overview of club theory. Clubs are "voluntary in the sense that members would not join (or remain in the club) unless a net gain resulted from membership" (Todd Sandler and John T. Tschirhart, "The Economic Theory of Clubs: An Evaluative Survey," *Journal of Economic Literature* 18, no. 4 [December 1980]: 1491). A good is indivisible "when a *unit* of the good can be consumed by one individual without detracting...from the consumption opportunities still available to others from that *same* unit"; it is excludable if its benefits can be "withheld costlessly by the owner or provider" (Cornes and Sandler, *The Theory of Externalities*, 6). The seminal article is James M. Buchanan, "An Economic Theory of Clubs," *Economica* 32, no. 125 (February 1965): 1–14.

7. Todd Sandler, "Impurity of Defense: An Application to the Economics of Alliances," *Kyklos* 30, no. 3 (1977): 443–60.

8. Cornes and Sandler, *The Theory of Externalities*, 159–60.

The neorealist analysis of international politics starts from the assumption that the international system is an anarchical self-help system in which states must be primarily concerned with their security if they want to survive and protect their autonomy.[9] The most useful instrument to achieve this objective is power, above all military power. Therefore states are sensitive to changes in the distribution of power in the international system. They worry about relative gains of other states and seek to defend and—if possible—to enhance their position in the international power structure. In principle, states prefer not to align because alliances reduce their freedom of action and entail the risk of entrapment. Alliances are only formed out of necessity, that is, if states are unable to maintain their security and defend their position in the international power structure by autonomous efforts.

Snyder gives an apt and concise account of the cost-benefit calculations that enter into alliance choices:[10]

> Security benefits in a mutual defence alliance include chiefly a reduced probability of being attacked (deterrence), greater strength in case of attack (defense) and prevention of the ally's alliance with one's adversary (preclusion). The principal costs are the increased risk of war and reduced freedom of action that are entailed in the commitment to the partner. The size of these benefits and costs for both parties will be determined largely by three general factors in their security situations: (1) their alliance "need," (2) the extent to which the prospective partner meets that need, and (3) the actual terms of the alliance contract. Alliance need is chiefly a function of the ratio of a state's capabilities to those of its most likely antagonist(s), and its degree of conflict with, or perceived threat from, that opponent.

The most important neorealist hypotheses about alliance formation differ mainly with regard to the main determinant of alliance need. Whereas balance-of-power theory emphasizes "capabilities," balance-of-threat theory gives precedence to the "perceived threat."

Balance-of-power theory predicts that states align with the weaker side:

> If states wished to maximize power, they would join the stronger side, and we would see not balances, but a world hegemony forged.

9. The basic text is Kenneth N. Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (New York: Random House, 1979).

10. Glenn H. Snyder, "Alliance Theory: A Neorealist First Cut," *Journal of International Affairs* 44, no. 1 (fall 1990): 110.

> This does not happen because balancing, not bandwagoning, is the behavior induced by the system. The first concern of states is not to maximize power but to maintain their positions in the system.[11]

This calculation not only applies to great powers but also to "secondary powers." They "flock to the weaker side; for it is the stronger side that threatens them. On the weaker side, they are both more appreciated and safer."[12] An alliance with the stronger side may provide small countries with security against outside states. At the same time, however, they risk of being dominated or subjugated by their "protector."

In order to come to terms with some of the anomalies which balance-of-power theory encounters in reality—in particular, that balances of power often fail to form—Walt developed a balance-of-threat theory of alliances which is supposed both to refine and subsume balance-of-power theory.[13] According to this theory, states seek allies to balance threats. Whereas the overall capabilities emphasized by balance-of-power theory are an important ingredient of states' threat perceptions, alliance choices are determined by other factors as well: the higher not only a state's aggregate power, but also its geographic proximity, offensive capabilities, and aggressiveness of perceived intentions, the stronger the tendency for a state to align with others to oppose the threat.[14] It is the factor of "perceived intentions" that makes the biggest difference to balance-of-power theory.[15] The core realist proposition concerning enlargement can be summarized in the following conditional expectation: NATO expands if enlargement is a necessary and efficient means for both old and new members in order to balance superior power or perceived threats.

In the neoliberal perspective, the international system is characterized by complex interdependence.[16] Owing to increasing interdependence, military power is losing its effectiveness and fungibility as a

11. Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, 126.

12. Ibid., 127. See also George Liska, *Nations in Alliance. The Limits of Interdependence* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1962), 13.

13. Stephen M. Walt, *The Origins of Alliances* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987).

14. Ibid., 32.

15. Although Walt does not clearly say whether intentions outweigh capabilities in all instances, I will focus on this factor in order to stress the difference between both neorealist theories. In addition, note that, by emphasizing perceptions, Walt departs from the materialist foundations of neorealism.

16. Robert O. Keohane, Joseph S. Nye Jr., *Power and Interdependence. World Politics in Transition* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1977).

means to achieve state objectives in international politics. At the same time, survival ceases to be the primary concern of states. As a consequence, security is not the only and not even the main benefit that states seek by forming and expanding international organizations. Instead of relative losses, states worry most about maximizing their absolute (welfare) gains under conditions of (primarily economic) interdependence in a variety of issue-areas. States create international institutions to manage interdependence and to increase gains from international cooperation. Accordingly, it is the core neoliberal proposition concerning NATO enlargement that NATO expands if both old and new members expect net absolute gains from enlargement.

In the neoliberal analysis, it is inherently difficult to determine the utilities of international actors and their cost-benefit calculations theoretically because there is no clear hierarchy of issues and goals. In the words of Schweller, a "balance of interests" rather than a balance of threat or a balance of power determines alliance choices.[17] While states are expected to balance for security, they may bandwagon for profit. Threat assessments enter into the equation but they are neither the only nor necessarily the decisive variables. That complicates the analysis considerably compared to neorealism. I will, therefore, concentrate on the most important categories of costs and benefits usually itemized in economic analyses of alliances and specifically mentioned in the 1995 "Study on Enlargement." Moreover, the test of the rationalist hypotheses will be limited to an overall qualitative assessment of the cost-benefit calculations for the two main groups of countries involved, that is CEE countries and NATO members. In the order of growing complexity, I begin with balance-of-power theory, move on to balance-of-threat theory, and end with the economic analysis of alliances.

THE CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES AND NATO MEMBERSHIP

Balance-of-power theory fails to explain the interest of CEE countries in NATO membership. Their bid to join NATO is a clear instance of bandwagoning and thus contradicts the theory. The only exception from balancing behavior that Waltz concedes is the case that the weaker coalition does not achieve "enough defensive or deterrent strength to dissuade adversaries from attacking."[18] Russia, however, could have effec-

17. Randall L. Schweller, "Bandwagoning for Profit. Bringing the Revisionist State Back In," *International Security* 19, no. 1 (summer 1994): 99.

18. Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, 127.

tively provided its smaller Western neighbors with the security benefits of deterrence and defense. In spite of all economic and political difficulties, its nuclear second-strike capability has remained intact and credible.[19] At the same time, Russia's reduced power would have given the allies more leeway than they had in the Soviet era.

Balance-of-threat theory explains the behavior of the CEE countries. Although NATO has increased its relative power vis-à-vis Russia and is closer geographically to the central European countries than the eastern superpower, it is not perceived as aggressive. U.S. military hegemony in western Europe has been benign and has excluded the use of force against allies. By contrast, the CEE societies have had a long history of Russian and Soviet domination and, even under the current circumstances, they still are suspicious of Russian intentions. Therefore, it is reasonable for them to balance a potential Russian threat by joining NATO–just as west European countries flocked to the United States during the cold war, although the Soviet Union has always been the weaker superpower.

This result is confirmed by a neoliberal assessment of the costs and benefits of membership. Most importantly, by joining NATO as full members, the CEE countries receive a place under the nuclear umbrella and the right to military assistance by the other members in the case of an acute threat or an attack. They thus acquire a degree of external security that they could not provide on their own (given their status as non-nuclear weapon states and their limited financial and personal resources) and that allows them to spend less on the military than if they had to rely exclusively on their own defense. From the viewpoint of CEE countries, the costs incurred by the need to modernize and adjust their armed forces and military facilities to NATO standards in order to achieve a minimum of compatibility and interoperability are preferable to the costs expected from autonomous defense provision.[20]

Furthermore, membership confers upon the CEE countries the right to vote in the NATO Council, to be represented in the military com-

19. Kenneth N. Waltz, "The Emerging Structure of International Politics," in *The Perils of Anarchy. Contemporary Realism and International Security*, ed. Michael E. Brown, Sean M. Lynn-Jones, and Steven E. Miller (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1995), 50.

20. See the Polish study on the costs of NATO enlargement quoted in Institut für Friedensforschung und Sicherheitspolitik an der Universität Hamburg (IFSH), *Sicherheit in einem ungeteilten Europa. Die NATO-Osterweiterung als Chance nutzen*, Hamburger Informationen zur Friedensforschung und Sicherheitspolitik 20/1997 (Hamburg: IFSH, 1997), 10. For Hungary, see the interview with Minister of Foreign Affairs Kovacs, "Budapest will auf die 'Überholspur'," *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, 14 June 1997.

mand structure of NATO, and to participate in the NATO intelligence processes. Membership thus enhances their possibility to influence NATO decisions. At the same time, they are bound by NATO decisions and obliged to assist other NATO members in the case of attack (Article 5 of the Washington Treaty). On balance, the benefits probably outweigh the costs. First, given the highly asymmetrical interdependence in Europe, CEE countries are strongly affected by NATO policies whether they are members or not. Membership at least gives them some say. Second, it is highly unlikely that NATO will be attacked. Moreover, since the only country capable of threatening NATO is Russia, the CEE members' individual interests to protect their territory are hardly distinct from their obligation to protect the borders of NATO; there is virtually no entrapment risk for CEE countries. Finally, participation in out-of-area missions is voluntary.

NATO MEMBER STATES AND EASTWARD ENLARGEMENT

Realism and neoliberal institutionalism share the rationalist belief that, ceteris paribus, alliances with few members are preferable to alliances with many members: "Small is beautiful." Generally, the larger the size of an international organization, the smaller the "marginal policy contribution" of an additional member, the higher the diffusion of gains from cooperation, the higher the likelihood of free riding, and the higher the administrative costs as well as the costs of finding agreement.[21] In a club-theoretical perspective, then, the marginal benefits accruing to the members of the international organization from enlargement have to be considerably higher than the marginal costs of crowding. They also have to balance the increasing costs of organization, decisions, and compliance. It is difficult to see, however, that benefits of enlargement could be large enough to make old NATO members interested in the accession of CEE countries.

Realists expect NATO to disintegrate rather than to expand.[22] Even if NATO survived, it would have no need to enlarge itself. In a balance-of-

21. See Michele Fratianni and John Pattison, "The Economics of International Organizations," *Kyklos* 35, no. 2 (1982): 252; Mancur Olson, *The Logic of Collective Action. Public Goods and the Theory of Groups* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1971), 35; and Bruce Russett, "Components of an Operational Theory of Alliance Formation," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 12, no. 3 (September 1968): 286. For a realist assertion of the virtue of small numbers in alliances, see Liska, *Nations in Alliance*, 27.

22. See Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, 126; and at a U.S. Senate hearing in 1990 ("NATO is a Disappearing Thing"), quoted by Gunther Hellmann and Reinhard

power perspective, the position of NATO in the international power structure has benefited so greatly from the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Union that no further action is required.[23] The Russian threat has diminished at least as much as Russian power. If anything, balance-of-threat theory appears to predict an even more rapid and far-reaching disintegration of NATO than balance-of-power theory because the perceptions by NATO of a Soviet or Russian threat were reduced faster and to a greater extent than the actual capabilities of the Eastern superpower.[24]

In the realist perspective, preclusion is the only plausible reason for NATO enlargement. Russia's relative weakness provides a unique opportunity to expand NATO eastwards. If in the future Russia regained strength and returned to its traditional policy toward central and eastern Europe, an enlarged NATO would be able to deny Russia the restoration of the former Soviet hegemonic sphere. Even this explanation, however, is not fully satisfactory. As Walt claims, expansion may cause the disease it pretends to cure.[25] It fuels Russian suspicions, strains the relationship between the West and Russia, and may thus provoke a threat in the future where there is none at present. More importantly, assuming that preclusion is the main objective of enlargement, it is difficult to understand the selection of new members. If the window of opportunity had really been so small that immediate action was required, NATO should either have completed enlargement in a single round or should have focused on Ukraine and the Baltic countries, because these countries border on Russia and are the main objects of Russian revisionism. Instead, the first wave of expansion includes countries that could still have joined NATO after a potential manifestation of Russian expansionism in the former Soviet republics. Timing and scope of enlargement do not fit the preclusion hypothesis well. In any case,

Wolf, "Neorealism, Neoliberal Institutionalism, and the Future of NATO," *Security Studies* 3, no. 1 (autumn 1993): 17. Even according to traditional realism, NATO may endure longer than neorealism predicts but will eventually decline in the absence of a common threat. See Randall L. Schweller and David Priess, "A Tale of Two Realisms: Expanding the Institutions Debate," *Mershon International Studies Review* 41, suppl. 1 (May 1997): 21.

23. It may be argued that expansion increases the power of the alliance members. Just as bandwagoning, however, maximizing power is not covered by balance-of-power theory.

24. See the November 1991 "Rome Declaration on Peace and Cooperation," and "Strategic Concept" of NATO. See also Robert B. McCalla, "NATO's Persistence After the Cold War," *International Organization* 50, no. 3 (summer 1996): 451.

25. Stephen M. Walt, "Why Alliances Endure or Collapse," *Survival* 39, no. 1 (spring 1997): 173.

neorealism is indeterminate: the counterfactual event—the refusal of NATO to enlarge—would not have been interpreted as an anomaly for neorealism and would have corroborated its balancing hypotheses more easily than enlargement.

Whereas the realist analysis emphasizes the lack of balancing needs, the neoliberal analysis stresses the absence of absolute gains for the NATO members. The current debate on the costs of NATO enlargement focuses on the monetary contributions that NATO members must make in the future in order to finance enlargement. Whereas initial U.S. calculations ranged from around $30 billion (RAND Corporation, Department of Defense) to about $125 billion (Congressional Budget Office), depending on the scenario, current NATO estimates are below $2 billion and are based on the October 1997 decision that, for the most part, the new members will have to bear the costs of force modernization themselves. Although this figure is contested and may be motivated by an effort to ease ratification in the member states' parliaments, most observers agree that the costs of NATO enlargement are "moderate and affordable."[26]

This is not the only cost factor, however. Crowding effects are to be expected from spatial rivalry and entrapment risks. As far as spatial rivalry is concerned, the inclusion of the Czech Republic and, above all, Poland lengthens the "Eastern front" of NATO. Hungary does not even share a single border with any other NATO country. Entrapment risks, that is the probability of a higher than average consumption of the club good, result from expansion into a politically unstable region and toward Russia, which is not only the most powerful country outside of NATO but also opposed to NATO expansion. Hungary borders on Croatia and Serbia, Poland on Russia and Belarus.[27] These costs are not prohibitive, but they act as further disincentives to enlargement.

It is highly unlikely that the organizational and decisional costs of an enlarged membership, the additional monetary contributions by the old members and disproportionate crowding effects on the use of col-

26. Richard L. Kugler, *Costs of NATO Enlargement. Moderate and Affordable*, Strategic Forum 128 (Washington, D.C.: Institute for National Strategic Studies, 1997). See also Jonathan Eyal, "NATO's Enlargement: Anatomy of a Decision," *International Affairs* 73, no. 4 (October 1997): 711–12.

27. It is assumed, of course, that once a country is a member of NATO, solidarity is quasi-automatic. In theory (even according to the NATO Treaty), it is possible that the members decide case by case according to their cost-benefit assessments. In practice, however, the decision not to defend a member would probably spell the breakdown of NATO.

lective defense will be balanced by higher than average contributions of the new members. This is mainly because they still are in the process of economic transformation, and their GNP per capita is at the low extreme of NATO members. As a consequence, the joint contribution of the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland to the military budget of NATO will probably amount to no more than 4.5 percent. Furthermore, their armed forces are in a poor state, according to internal NATO reports.[28]

In compensation, this technological gap between old and new members gives rise to expectations of high private benefits from CEE orders to the defense industries of the United States and western Europe. Substantial profits, however, are unlikely because the post–cold war arms market is a highly competitive buyers' market and because the budgets of the new members will not allow major expenses. If large-scale sales take place at all, they will most probably be accompanied by indirect and direct offsets as well as Western military aid and credits.[29]

In sum, the main rationalist approaches to the analysis of international institutions explain the interest of the CEE countries in joining NATO but do not convincingly account for the decision of NATO to expand to the east. Starting from neorealist or neoliberal premises, international relations scholars must arrive at the conclusion that Partnership for Peace is "preferable to expanding NATO"[30] and constitutes the more "efficient institutional solution."[31]

THE CONSTRUCTIVIST EXPLANATION

ENLARGEMENT AS INTERNATIONAL SOCIALIZATION

Since the beginning of the 1990s, (social) constructivist approaches to the study of international relations have increasingly challenged the

28. See, for example, "NATO Concerned About Polish Military," *RFE/RL Newsline*, 20 January 1998, referring to a report from NATO headquarters.

29. Joanna Spear, "Bigger NATO, Bigger Sales," *The World Today* 53, no. 11 (November 1997): 272–74.

30. Walt, "Why Alliances Endure or Collapse," 179 n. 55.

31. Thomas Bernauer, "Full Membership or Full Club? Expansion of NATO and the Future Security Organization of Europe," in *Towards a New Europe. Stops and Starts in Regional Integration*, ed. Gerald Schneider, Patricia A. Weitsman, and Thomas Bernauer (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 1995), 186–87.

rationalist paradigm.[32] Constructivism rejects the basic metatheoretical and theoretical premises of rationalism. It problematizes the actors' identities, interests and preferences which rationalism takes as given and stable. In the constructivist perspective, actors and their dispositions are socially constituted and subject to social change. Instead of providing the given starting points for the analysis of international interaction, identities and interests must be explained as the products of intersubjective social structures (culture, institutions) and social interaction. Moreover, constructivists reject the assumptions of egoism and instrumentalism. They claim that international actors are committed in their decisions to values and norms and choose the appropriate instead of the efficient behavioral option.[33]

On the basis of these assumptions, constructivists analyze international institutions not merely as regulatory institutions that constrain the behavioral options available to actors and influence their cost-benefit assessments. Constructivism posits that the origins and the constitution as well as the goals and the procedures of international organizations are more strongly determined by the standards of legitimacy and appropriateness of the international community they represent than by the utilitarian demand for efficient problem-solving.[34] In-

32. In International Relations, "constructivism" has established itself as the generic term for various approaches emphasizing the causal preponderance of intersubjective social structures. See the representative outlines of this research program by Emanuel Adler, "Seizing the Middle Ground: Constructivism in World Politics," *European Journal of International Relations* 3, no. 3 (September 1997): 319–63; Martha Finnemore, *National Interests in International Society* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1996); Ronald L. Jepperson, Alexander Wendt, and Peter J. Katzenstein, "Norms, Identity, and Culture in National Security," in *The Culture of National Security. Norms and Identity in World Politics*, ed. Peter J. Katzenstein (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), 33–75; Alexander Wendt, "Anarchy is What States Make of It. The Social Construction of Power Politics," *International Organization* 46, no. 2 (spring 1992): 391–425; and Wendt, "Collective Identity Formation and the International State," *American Political Science Review* 88, no. 2 (June 1994): 384–96. In particular, I share their view that constructivism provides, above all, an ontological, rather than an epistemological or methodological, alternative to rationalism and materialism.

33. Finnemore emphasizes the "logic of appropriateness" (Finnemore, *National Interests in International Society*, 29–30). This logic was opposed to the rationalist "logic of consequentiality" of James G. March and Johan P. Olsen, *Rediscovering Institutions. The Organizational Basis of Politics* (New York: Free Press, 1989), 160–62. In a similar vein, Max Weber contrasts instrumental rationality (*Zweckrationalität*) with value-rationality (*Wertrationalität*). See Max Weber, *Economy and Society. An Outline of Interpretive Sociology* (New York: Bedminster, 1968), 25.

34. See Peter J. Katzenstein, "United Germany in an Integrating Europe," in *Tamed Power. Germany in Europe*, ed. Peter J. Katzenstein (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1997), 12; Christian Reus-Smit, "The Constitutional Structure of International Society and the Nature of Fundamental Institutions," *International Organization* 51, no. 4 (autumn 1997): 569; and Steven Weber, "Origins of the European Bank for Recon-

ternational organizations are the institutional articulation of international communities of values and norms whose "definitions, rules, and principles are encoded in the prescriptions" they elaborate "for nation-state practice."[35] Moreover, constructivists view international organizations as constitutive institutions that contribute to shaping actors' identities, values and interests, and emphasize their "ability...to impose definitions of member characteristics and purposes upon the governments of its member states."[36] In their external relations, international organizations seek to defend the community against competing values and norms and to expand the community by disseminating its principles and precepts.

In the constructivist perspective, the enlargement of an international organization is primarily conceived of as a process of international socialization.[37] In general, "socialization" means the internalization, by a social actor, of the constitutive beliefs and practices of a social community. In this way, the actor acquires the collective identity of the community. Most commonly, "internalization" is used as a psychological concept that, strictly speaking, only applies to individuals. In the case of states, "internalizing" can be defined as the process of embedding the constitutive beliefs and practices of an international community in the domestic decision-making processes.[38] At an institutional level, a successful internalization is indicated by the integration of the fundamental community norms into the state constitution and their translation into (stable) domestic laws; at a cognitive level, it is reflected in consensual affirmative references to these fundamental norms in the domestic discourse. Both at the institutional and at the cognitive level, internalization is a matter of degree. Successful internalization, however, requires that the community beliefs and practices embedded in domestic institutions and discourses effectively determine state behavior.[39] Thus,

struction and Development," *International Organization* 48, no. 1 (winter 1994), 4–5 and 32.

35. Connie L. McNeely, *Constructing the Nation-State. International Organization and Prescriptive Action* (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood, 1995), 27.

36. Ibid., 33.

37. For an explication of the concept of socialization and a discussion of its uses in international relations, see Frank Schimmelfennig, "Internationale Sozialisation neuer Staaten. Heuristische Überlegungen zu einem Forschungsdesiderat," *Zeitschrift für Internationale Beziehungen* 1, no. 2 (December 1994): 335–55.

38. Kai Alderson, "Dimensions of Internalization" (unpubl. ms., 1997), 1.

39. Internalization does not presuppose that international values and norms are never challenged domestically. Domestic institutions and actors, however, must be strong enough to resist these challenges and successfully defend the internalized values and norms. (See, for examples from regime analysis, Harald Müller, "The Internaliza-

socialization is more than just an opportunistic and superficial adaptation. In order for an actor to become a member of the community, the community's constitutive beliefs and practices must become an integral part of the actor's identity and must be acted upon independently of external stimuli.

In international socialization, an international community and its organizations "teach" their constitutive norms and values to states and societies,[40] either as active promoters or as passive role models. As international organizations only dispose of a weak coercive and legislative authority compared to states, their influence as agencies of socialization is highly dependent on a combination of cultural diffusion or ideological infusion, on the one hand, and resource manipulation or power, on the other.[41] The relationship of states with the community and its organizations depends on the degree to which they base their identity and their interests on the community values and norms. In order to become members, they have to learn the lessons taught by the community's organizations, that is, to internalize their values, norms, and practices. They also have to pass a probationary period during which the community assesses whether the applicants are internalizing its identity or simply adapting to it superficially. Full membership is granted when socialization has sufficiently progressed and the community regards the applicant state as "one of us."[42]

tion of Principles, Norms, and Rules by Governments. The Case of Security Regimes," in *Regime Theory and International Relations*, ed. Volker Rittberger with the assistance of Peter Mayer [Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993], 361–88.) Likewise, individual internalization does not imply the absence of deviant thoughts but requires the individual's conscience to prevent these thoughts from becoming norm-violating deeds.

40. Finnemore, *National Interests in International Society*, 11–12.

41. See Thomas M. Franck, *The Power of Legitimacy among Nations* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990), 36–39; and McNeely, *Constructing the Nation State*, 28 and 35–36. The relative importance of ideational and material factors differs among authors (and probably among real world socialization processes). Whereas Franck stresses the "legitimacy" of rules, "hegemony" is presupposed by both realist and Marxist accounts of international socialization (see G. John Ikenberry and Charles Kupchan, "Socialization and Hegemonic Power," *International Organization* 44, no. 3 [summer 1990]: 283–315; and Robert W. Cox, "Gramsci, Hegemony and International Relations: An Essay in Method," in *Gramsci, Historical Materialism and International Relations*, ed. Stephen Gill [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993], 61–63). Note that, whereas the socialization process can be characterized by reinforcement based on material power or rewards, the socialization outcome requires that external reinforcement or monitoring no longer be necessary in order to ensure compliance.

42. The process of socialization is a special case of the process of positive identification leading to the formation of collective identities analyzed by Colin H. Kahl, "Constructing a Separate Peace: Constructivism, Collective Liberal Identity, and Democratic Peace," *Security Studies* 8, nos. 2/3 (winter 1998/99–spring 1999): 94–144. Socialization is special because it consists of an asymmetrical process between an estab-

In the perspective of socialization analysis, material costs and benefits clearly play a subordinate role both for the international organization and for the countries aspiring to membership. In the case of the organization, the commitment to its constitutive values and norms creates an obligation to diffuse them internationally and to grant membership to all states which share them—even in the case of material losses to the members of the organization. This obligation requires neither self-denial nor immediate membership. It does not extend to costs that are beyond the capabilities of the member states and would threaten the existence of the organization.

For an applicant state and society, accession to an international organization mainly fulfills the needs of identification and legitimation. Being accepted as a member of a group of like-minded countries assures governments and societies of their identity and of the legitimacy of their political and social values. In addition, membership facilitates the assertion of these values against competing values in the domestic as well as in the international arena because it enhances both the material and immaterial resources for their defense. Aspirations to membership vary with a country's perception of the community values and norms. The more the applicant state identifies with the community and perceives its values and norms as legitimate, the greater is its interest in membership and the less costly the requirements for membership appear to this state. The general constructivist hypothesis about the enlargement of international organizations then is: A state is accepted as a member by an international organization if it reliably shares the community values and norms. The faster it internalizes them, the earlier it becomes a member.

NATO AND THE VALUES AND NORMS OF THE EURO-ATLANTIC COMMUNITY

From a constructivist viewpoint, NATO is best understood neither simply as a form of alignment (as in neorealism) nor as a functional international institution (as in neoliberalism) but as an organization of an international community of values and norms. NATO is embedded in the Euro-Atlantic or "Western" community and represents its

lished community preserving its collective identity, on the one hand, and outside actors exchanging their former identity for the collective identity of the community, on the other. The community and its organization(s) serve as the "reference other" in the way this concept is used by Bruce Cronin, "From Balance to Community: Transnational Identity and Political Integration," *Security Studies* 8, nos. 2/3 (winter 1998/99–spring 1999): 270–301.

"military branch." This community is most fundamentally based on the liberal values and norms shared by its members. Liberal human rights, i.e. individual freedoms, civil liberties, and political rights are at the center of the community's collective identity. The liberal principles of social order—pluralism, the rule of law, democratic political participation and representation as well as private property and the market economy—are derived from, and justified by, these rights. They are the "constitutive values that define legitimate statehood and rightful state action" in the domestic and the international realm.[43]

The liberal community values define the basic purpose of the alliance, determine its interpretation and strategy of security and peace, and serve to identify the main threats:

(1) In the preamble to the North Atlantic Treaty, the signatory states declare the protection of their values, rather than just the preservation of national autonomy or the balance of power, as the basic purpose of NATO: "They are determined to safeguard the freedom, common heritage and civilisation of their peoples, founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty, and the rule of law."

(2) Art. 2 of the treaty summarizes the two most important strands of the liberal theory and strategy of peace—republican and commercial liberalism or, in other words, peace through joint democracy and peace through trade (and the intensification of other transnational transactions):[44]

> The Parties will contribute toward the further development of peaceful and friendly international relations by strengthening their free institutions, by bringing about a better understanding of the principles upon which these institutions are founded, and by promoting conditions of stability and well-being. They will seek to eliminate conflict in their international economic policies and will encourage economic collaboration between any or all of them.

(3) On the threat perception of NATO members, Risse-Kappen argues from a constructivist perspective

43. Reus-Smit, "The Constitutional Structure of International Society," 558.

44. See Andrew Moravcsik, "Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of International Politics," *International Organization* 51, no. 4 (autumn 1997): 513–53. For a constructivist interpretation of the liberal theory of peace, cf., Emanuel Adler, "Imagined (Security) Communities: Cognitive Regions in International Relations," *Millennium* 26, no. 2 (summer 1997): 249–77; Kahl, "Constructing a Separate Peace"; and Thomas Risse-Kappen, "Democratic Peace—Warlike Democracies? A Social Constructivist Interpretation of the Liberal Argument," *European Journal of International Relations* 1, no. 4 (December 1995): 491–517.

> that the sense of community, by delimiting the boundaries of who belonged to "us," also defined "them," that is those outside the community who were then perceived as a threat to the common values. In other words, the collective identity led to the threat perception, not the other way round.[45]

Furthermore, the common liberal values underlie the alliance norms governing the behavior of alliance members toward each other. Whereas, in a rationalist perspective, a hegemonic U.S. alliance organized as a "series of bilateral deals with each of the subordinates" would have been the expected institutional form and decision-making structure,[46] NATO is based on the norms of multilateralism. Ruggie defines multilateralism as a generic institutional form that

> coordinates relations among three or more states on the basis of generalized principles of conduct: that is, principles which specify appropriate conduct for a class of actions, without regard to the particularistic interests of the parties or the strategic exigencies that may exist in any specific occurrence.[47]

These "generalized organizing principles logically entail an indivisibility among the members of a collectivity with respect to the range of behavior in question" and generate "expectations of 'diffuse reciprocity'." According to Weber, these principles govern the praxis of NATO:

> Within NATO, security was indivisible. It was based on a general organizing principle, that the external boundaries of alliance territory were completely inviolable and that an attack on any border was an attack on all. Diffuse reciprocity was the norm.[48]

The principles of multilateralism correspond to the basic liberal idea of procedural justice, that is, "the legislative codification of formal, reciprocally binding social rules" among the members of society.[49] In the constructivist perspective, they are an effect of the liberal-democratic identity of the alliance members:

45. Thomas Risse-Kappen, *Cooperation Among Democracies. Norms, Transnational Relations, and the European Impact on U.S. Foreign Policy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995), 32.

46. Steve Weber, "Shaping the Postwar Balance of Power: Multilateralism in NATO," in *Multilateralism Matters. The Theory and Praxis of an Institutional Form*, ed. John Gerard Ruggie (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), 235.

47. John Gerard Ruggie, "Multilateralism: The Anatomy of an Institution," in Rugie, *Multilateralism Matters*, 11.

48. Weber, "Shaping the Postwar Balance of Power," 233.

49. Reus-Smit, "The Constitutional Structure of International Society," 577.

> Democracies externalize their internal norms when cooperating with each other. Power asymmetries should be mediated by norms of democratic decision making among equals emphasizing persuasion, compromise, and the non-use of force or coercion....Norms of regular consultation, of joint consensus-building, and non-hierarchy should legitimize and enable allied influence.[50]

Regarding NATO enlargement, constructivism then hypothesizes: A state seeks, and is granted, membership in NATO if it reliably shares the liberal values and the multilateralist norms of the Western community. The faster it internalizes these values and norms, the earlier it becomes a member.

THE CONSTRUCTIVIST EXPLANATION OF NATO ENLARGEMENT

How well does the constructivist hypothesis answer the three questions of why CEE countries seek NATO membership, why NATO expands to the east, and why the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland were invited to the first round of enlargement? For each question, I will first give the constructivist response and then discuss whether the conditions postulated by constructivism are necessary and sufficient to explain enlargement.

(1) Since the breakdown of the communist domestic and international system, the central and eastern European countries have strived to acquire a new identity and a new "home" in the international system. The "return to Europe," of which NATO membership is an important element, has become their central foreign policy objective.[51] This goal generally enjoys a broad consensus among the major political forces in those CEE countries that have applied for NATO membership and has been pursued no less by postcommunist (for example, in Po-

50. Risse-Kappen, *Cooperation Among Democracies*, 33.

51. See Fouzieh Melanie Alamir and August Pradetto, "Identitätssuche als Movens der Sicherheitspolitik. Die NATO-Osterweiterungsdebatten im Lichte der Herausbildung neuer Identitäten im postkommunistischen Ostmitteleuropa und in der Allianz," *Osteuropa* 48, no. 2 (February 1998): 134–47; Adrian G. V. Hyde-Price, "Democratization in Eastern Europe. The External Dimension," in *Democratization in Eastern Europe. Domestic and International Perspectives*, ed. Geoffrey Pridham and Tatu Vanhanen (London: Routledge, 1994), 225 and 235; George Kolankiewicz, "The Other Europe: Different Roads to Modernity in Eastern and Central Europe," in *European Identity and the Search for Legitimacy*, ed. Soledad García (London: Pinter, 1993), 108; George Kolankiewicz, "Consensus and Competition in the Eastern Enlargement of the European Union," *International Affairs* 70, no. 3 (July 1994): 481–82; and Iver B. Neumann, "Russia as Central Europe's Constituting Other," *East European Politics and Societies* 7, no. 2 (spring 1993): 349–69.

land, Hungary or Lithuania) than by other governments. From a constructivist point of view, the "return to Europe" results from a strong identification with Western values and norms as well as with the Western international community from which these countries were cut off under communist rule. The Western international community constitutes the model of the "good" domestic and international order which inspired the Eastern European revolutions of 1989 and 1990 and which the CEE countries try to emulate in their transformation processes. For the CEE countries, membership in NATO is a symbol for having successfully transformed themselves into modern European countries and for being recognized as "one of us" by their Western role models. At the same time, it indicates that they have broken links with their Soviet Communist past and have cast off their "Eastern" identity.

Furthermore, the prospect of membership in Western organizations serves as an important additional source of legitimacy for the proponents of liberal democratic reform in central and eastern Europe. Changes in domestic and foreign policy as well as the hardships of transformation are easier to justify and implement if they are demanded by Western organizations as a condition of closer cooperation and accession (or can be legitimized this way). The eventual accession to Western organizations confers political prestige upon the CEE governments, strengthens the self-esteem of CEE societies and makes authoritarian reversals more difficult.

Identification with the values and norms of the Western international community is a sufficient but not a necessary condition for the CEE countries' desire to join NATO. It is a sufficient condition because all CEE countries that strongly identify with the West and make a great effort to institutionalize Western norms have applied for NATO membership. On the other hand, as shown above, membership in NATO is attractive for instrumental reasons alone, that is, in order to balance a potential Russian threat, to provide for national security more efficiently, and to gain more influence on NATO decision making. A strong identification with Western values and norms is not necessary for countries to seek membership: Romania and Slovakia have done so under governments with authoritarian tendencies.

(2) According to the constructivist hypothesis, NATO decided to enlarge to the east in order to promote and strengthen liberal values,

(liberal democratic) peace and multilateralism in this area.[52] The prospect of NATO membership serves to give CEE countries an incentive to further pursue democratic reform and consolidate the transformation of their domestic systems as well as to manage international conflicts in this area peacefully, multilaterally, and on the basis of international law. Countries which share the liberal values of the Western community, have made sufficient progress in the internalization of its constitutive norms, and have behaved accordingly for a certain period of time are recognized as "Western." This recognition entails the commitment to grant full membership to this country in the Western organizations and to come to its assistance in the case of a military threat or attack.

The constructivist hypothesis establishes a necessary as well as sufficient condition for enlargement because rationalist theories have severe difficulties in explaining NATO behavior. In the absence of the desire to diffuse and stabilize Western values and norms in central and eastern Europe, and without the moral obligation to admit successfully socialized countries, enlargement would not have occurred given the net material losses involved for NATO members. This makes the value-rational commitment of NATO a necessary condition. It is also a sufficient condition because no other conditions have to be present in order for enlargement to occur.

(3) NATO chose the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland as its first new members because these three countries are more advanced than other CEE countries in their internalization of Western values and norms. They are closest to western Europe not only in terms of geography but also in terms of common history and political culture. More than other CEE countries, they can rightly claim to be a part of the "common heritage and civilisation" of NATO countries. More importantly, they are the forerunners and paragons of liberalization and democratization in the region. Already under Soviet domination, popular movements in Hungary (in 1956), Czechoslovakia (1968), and Poland (1956, 1970, 1980) revolted against the Communist system. In 1989, they led the way in the democratic transformation of the region—with Poland inventing the "round table" of peaceful transition and Hungary opening the "iron curtain" for GDR refugees. Meanwhile, the consolidation of the democratic system is well advanced in these countries. In

52. See Patrick M. Morgan, "Security Prospects in Europe," in Ruggie, *Multilateralism Matters*, 345–46, for the importance of the Western post-war multilateralist experience as a guide to dealing with present developments in eastern Europe.

Hungary and Poland, even the postcommunist parties which came into power through regular elections have not deviated from the path of transformation and integration into the Western organizations.

Moreover, none of the three central European countries has been engaged in major territorial and ethnic conflict with its neighbors or in major domestic ethnic conflict. All of them have shown the willingness and capability to manage such conflicts as there were by peaceful means. Poland granted minority rights to its German-speaking population and made no claims to Lithuanian, Belarusian, and Ukrainian territory that had belonged to its prewar area. The Czech Republic used no force or pressure against Slovak separatism but agreed to a peaceful dissolution of Czechoslovakia. The Hungarian government has stayed away from irredentism despite sizable Hungarian minorities abroad. In the face of considerable domestic opposition and repressive policies against the Hungarian minority in Slovakia and Romania, it has actively and successfully pursued the conclusion of basic treaties with both neighboring countries.

The speed of, and progress in, the internalization of community values and norms is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for the selection of new members in the first round of NATO enlargement. It is obvious that no country is invited without having made such progress and proven its adherence to the community values and norms in word and deed over a certain period of time. Moreover, the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland were more advanced in the socialization process than the other CEE countries. In Bulgaria and Romania, liberal-democratic transformation has stagnated under postcommunist governments until the elections in late 1996 and early 1997. The Baltic countries have advanced very far on the way of economic liberalization and democratic consolidation but still have to contend with difficulties in the integration of the Russian minorities (and with Western criticism about their minority policies). Slovakia had ranked as high on the list of potential NATO members as the Czech Republic until President Meciar and his party embarked upon a course of authoritarian governance and minority discrimination. Only Slovenia matches the liberalization and democratization record of the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland, and after the initial short period of war has successfully insulated itself from the Balkan conflicts. It lags behind these three states, however, with regard to the duration of its participation in the socialization process. Thus, if only three countries were to be invited, constructivism would have predicted the actual choice.

Yet, nothing in the constructivist hypothesis predicts that NATO should limit its initial round of enlargement to three countries in the first place. Whereas one could make a plausible argument for why most aspiring states are not ready for full membership, at least the exclusion of Slovenia cannot be justified on the basis of insufficient socialization. Therefore, the constructivist explanation does not sufficiently account for the choice of new members. Rather, the discussions on the eve of the Madrid summit suggest that the number of new members was restricted mainly because of the United States' resolute opposition against the initiative of France and other European member states to include Slovenia and Romania in the first round of enlargement. The most important reasons given for this limitation were that the admission of further countries would become too costly for NATO, endanger its cohesion, and call into question ratification by the U.S. Senate. Furthermore, it was said that Slovenia's population and armed forces were too small and too weak to make much of a military contribution to collective defense.[53]

To sum up, the first round of NATO enlargement to the east corroborates the constructivist hypothesis about the enlargement of international organizations to a very large extent. The international socialization approach to enlargement stands out most obviously with regard to the central explanandum of this article which, at the same time, constitutes a puzzle for mainstream rationalist approaches to the study of international organizations: the readiness of NATO to admit CEE countries as full members. The constructivist hypothesis provides both a more elegant and a more determinate explanation of enlargement than the main rationalist hypotheses. First, whereas a possible rationalist explanation must be based on the rather marginal preclusion hypothesis and on uncertain future expectations (of a Russian neoimperialism), the constructivist explanation starts from the core hypothesis of international socialization and from factual conditions (the state of liberal transformation in central and eastern Europe). Second, whereas the rationalist explanation would have explained the absence of enlargement as well (and probably more convincingly than its presence), the constructivist hypothesis would have failed if NATO had denied

53. See "Albright on Potential New NATO Members," *RFE/RL Newsline*, 30 May 1997; Michael Mihalka, "Why Only Three Countries Will Likely Be Included in First Wave of NATO Enlargement," *RFE/RL Newsline*, 7 July 1997; "Kohl und Clinton auf einer Linie," *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, 7 June 1997; and "Clinton für drei neue NATO-Länder," *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, 13 June 1997.

membership to the most consolidated CEE democracies. The constructivist hypothesis, however, cannot explain why governments that are not willing to adopt the constitutive values and norms of the Western community nevertheless apply for membership, and why Slovenia was not invited to join the organization together with the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland. These facts are better accounted for by instrumental calculations. Moreover, rationalist theories of international organization give a convincing alternative explanation for the CEE countries' interest in becoming NATO members.

The claim that constructivism provides a better explanation for NATO enlargement than rationalism is mainly based on its ability to explain the interest of NATO in, and its criteria for, admitting CEE countries as full members. So far the constructivist explanation rests on a correlational and conditional account. In other words, I have tried to show that the general constructivist hypothesis about the enlargement of international organizations covers, and establishes a necessary and sufficient condition for, NATO enlargement to the east. The case for constructivism would be even more convincing if it could further be shown that not only the results but also the process of NATO enlargement was congruent with the international socialization perspective. The method of "process-tracing"[54] goes beyond the analysis of correlations and conditions by seeking to establish whether the independent variable(s) postulated by a theory really are at work as causal factors in the production of the fact or event to be explained. In order to provide additional evidence for the constructivist explanation, I shall argue (1) that the presumed cause of NATO enlargement, the community of values and norms, is reflected in the enlargement discourse, that is, in the basic statements and documents supporting enlargement, and (2) that the stages of enlargement resemble, and are regarded as, a process of teaching and learning community values and norms.

54. On this method, see Alexander L. George, "Case Studies and Theory Development: The Method of Structured, Focused Comparison," in *Diplomacy: New Approaches in History, Theory and Policy*, ed. Paul Gordon Lauren (New York: Free Press, 1979), 46; and Alexander L. George and Timothy J. McKeown, "Case Studies and Theories of Organizational Decision Making," in *Advances in Information Processing in Organizations*, vol. 2, ed. L. S. Sproull and P. D. Larkey (Greenwich, Conn.: JAI Press, 1985), 21–58.

ENLARGEMENT DISCOURSE

The enlargement discourse is composed of the oral and written public statements in favor of and against NATO enlargement in both the member and the aspiring countries as well as in transnational and international fora. In order to confirm the constructivist explanation of NATO enlargement, it is not necessary to demonstrate that arguments based on power and threats or, more generally, on costs and benefits, were absent in the enlargement discourse. We should expect, however, that such arguments were mainly put forward by the opponents of enlargement. By contrast, the advocates of enlargement ought consistently to justify their viewpoint by value-based considerations. Value-rational actors would not simply deny that NATO enlargement was against the egoistic security and material interests of its members (in which case they would appear as irrational or, at best, subjectively rational utility-maximizers). Rather, they would argue that the interest of NATO must be interpreted in terms of commitments to its values and norms and that material losses from enlargement must be accepted (as long as they are manageable) in order to honor these commitments. The most important "pieces of evidence" are the basic texts produced by NATO during the enlargement process, that is the 1994 Partnership for Peace (PfP) Framework Document and the 1995 Study on Enlargement. These documents reflect the shared understandings of NATO members and serve as consensual and official guidelines for enlargement. No less important are statements by the representatives of the most important NATO member states. Given the paramount position of the United States in the alliance, it is justifiable to focus on U.S. documents and the U.S. debate.

The opponents of enlargement have voiced their skepticism mainly in specialized journals and on the op-ed pages of the leading newspapers. The antienlargement campaign in the United States has reached its apex in two letters sent to President Clinton in late June 1997, one by more than twenty senators, the other by more than forty former senior officials and government experts representing the opposition among the foreign policy establishment.[55] The opponents based their contra-arguments consistently (but usually implicitly) on rationalist assumptions. First, they argued that Russia, for the foreseeable future,

55. See Sonia Winter, "NATO: Expansion Critics Write To Clinton," *RFE/RL Newsline*, 27 June 1997. The following references are examples from the op-ed pages of the *International Herald Tribune*.

would be too weak to pose a threat to the other CEE countries.[56] Instead, the security of the CEE countries that do not become members would be reduced.[57] Second, they expected that NATO expansion would harden Russian resistance to further nuclear disarmament that would serve U.S. and NATO security better than the new allies in central and eastern Europe.[58] Third, the opponents put forward the view that enlargement would weaken NATO by creating more costs than security benefits and by causing internal divisions about the states to be invited and about the distribution of enlargement costs.[59] Finally, Fred Iklé criticized that NATO enlargement was regarded as a "nursery for the young democracies" of east and central Europe instead of asking whether new members were security producers or consumers.[60]

NATO documents and statements by leading U.S. government officials confirm Iklé's perception. They corroborate the constructivist view of the basic motivation for enlargement—the most fundamental contribution to the security of the North Atlantic area is the spread of liberal democracies and multilateralist cooperation—and of the basic preconditions for states to be admitted: adherence to liberal values, to the liberal strategy of security and peace, and to the alliance norms of multilateralist and consensual decision making. Already the PfP Framework Document (§2) establishes the values to be served by the program:

> Protection and promotion of fundamental freedoms and human rights, and safeguarding of freedom, justice, and peace through democracy are shared values fundamental to the Partnership. In joining the Partnership, the member States of the North Atlantic Alliance and the other States subscribing to this Document recall that they are committed to the preservation of democratic societies,

56. See George F. Kennan, "NATO Expansion Would Be a Fateful Blunder," *International Herald Tribune*, 6 February 1997, 8; and William Pfaff, "European Security Isn't Broken, So Why Try to Fix it Now?" *International Herald Tribune*, 18 February 1997, 8.

57. Francois Heisbourg, "At This Point, Only Washington Can Slow the Reckless Pace," *International Herald Tribune*, 28 November 1996, 8.

58. Thomas L. Friedman, "Forgetting that Russia's Nuclear Weapons Are the Problem," *International Herald Tribune*, 3 June 1997, 6.

59. Frederick Bonnard, "NATO: Slow Down and Be Sure the Alliance Remains Strong," *International Herald Tribune*, 4 July 1997, 8; and Philip H. Gordon, "Will Anyone Really Pay to Enlarge NATO—and If So, Who?" *International Herald Tribune*, 30 April 1997, 8.

60. Statement at a NATO Roundtable organized by the Konrad Adenauer Foundation, cited according to Josef Joffe, "Kinderhort für die jungen Demokratien," *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, 3 June 1995, 9.

> their freedom from coercion and intimidation, and the maintenance of the principles of international law.

In chapter 1 (§2) of the Study on NATO Enlargement, entitled "Purposes and Principles of Enlargement," NATO describes security and democracy as inextricably linked:

> The benefits of common defence and...integration are important to protecting the further democratic development of new members. By integrating more countries into the existing community of values and institutions...NATO enlargement will safeguard the freedom and security of all its members.

NATO secretary-general Solana emphasizes the identity- and legitimacy-building functions of NATO enlargement as "a means of reinforcing the new democracies with a confidence in their destiny and giving them a sense of belonging." Although he also sees "many practical benefits," he stresses the "moral obligation for us to help them fulfil their legitimate aspirations."[61] Strobe Talbott, U.S. deputy secretary of state, regards it as a part of the post–cold war mission of NATO

> to open its door to the new democracies that have regained their sovereignty. They aspire and deserve to be part of the trans-Atlantic community. All of Europe will be safer and more prosperous if these postcommunist lands continue to evolve toward civil society, market economies and harmonious relations with their neighbors.[62]

Finally, Ronald Asmus, then an analyst at the RAND Corporation and now deputy secretary of state, named as "the goal" of NATO enlargement "to do for Eastern Europe what was done for Western Europe—create a security framework under which these countries can safely complete their transition to Western democratic societies."[63]

The representatives of the invited central European countries have also emphasized the community of values and the moral obligations of NATO in order to promote the cause of enlargement against the skeptics in the NATO member countries. Vaclav Havel, the Czech president, probably enjoys the highest authority with the Western public:

61. Javier Solana, "Preparing for the Madrid Summit," *NATO Review* 45, no. 2 (March-April 1997), 3.

62. Strobe Talbott, "Why the Transformed NATO Deserves to Survive and Enlarge," *International Herald Tribune*, 19 February 1997, 8.

63. Ronald D. Asmus, "Stop Fussing About NATO Enlargement and Get On With It," *International Herald Tribune*, 9 December 1996, 8.

> The alliance should urgently remind itself that it is first and foremost an instrument of democracy to defend mutually held and created political and spiritual values. It must see itself not as a pact of nations against a more or less obvious enemy, but as a guarantor of European-American civilization....The opportunity to make decisions about common defense should not be denied a priori to countries that have embraced and advanced Euro-American political and cultural values.[64]

NATO documents and statements by members of the U.S. administration strongly suggest that political conditions pertaining to shared values and alliance norms are the primary and indispensable prerequisites for membership. U.S. president Clinton plainly summarized which countries do not qualify:

> Countries with repressive political systems, countries with designs on their neighbors, countries with militaries unchecked by civilian control, or with closed economic systems need not apply.[65]

Also, Secretary of State Albright made clear that liberal values and norms are a sufficient condition of membership, since "no European democracy will be excluded because of where it sits on the map."[66]

By contrast, the factors emphasized by rationalist approaches to the study of alliances (balances of power or threat, the costs and benefits of sharing defense, or organizational costs) play only a secondary role in the Western alliance's catalogue of enlargement conditions. They are cast in rather vague terms. In the Study on NATO Enlargement, no military threat is named. Instead, NATO prefers to speak of "risks" which are "hard to predict and assess" (§10). True, "the ability of prospective members to contribute militarily to collective defence and to the Alliance's new missions will be a factor in deciding whether to invite them to join the Alliance" (§75). Yet, NATO only demands minimum standards of interoperability and a general ability to contribute to its tasks; it does neither require a certain quality or quantity of contributions nor that the new members' contributions equal their prospective utilization of the alliance goods and compensate the old members for the disproportionate organizational costs they cause. Rather, NATO demands "a contribution level based, in a general way, on

64. Vaclav Havel, "The Euro-American Alliance Needs to Deepen as it Expands," *International Herald Tribune*, 15 May 1997, 8.

65. Cited in http://www.nato.int/usa/info/info2.htm.

66. Speech at the North Atlantic Council Ministerial Meeting in Sintra, 29 May 1997, cited in http://www.nato.int/usa/specials/970529-a.htm.

'ability to pay'" (§ 65)—which will be fairly limited in the case of CEE members.

A PROCESS OF TEACHING AND LEARNING

In preparing the candidate states for membership, NATO emphasizes the importance of active participation in Partnership for Peace. Whereas the rationalist analysis regards PfP as the equilibrium solution to the asymmetrical interests of NATO members and CEE countries, constructivism suggests interpreting PfP as an intermediary and probationary stage in the socialization of potential new members. During this stage, NATO teaches the values, norms, and practices of the Western international community to the aspiring states and tests whether they meet the learning objectives.[67] The Study on NATO Enlargement, in paras. 38 and 39, confirms this interpretation:

> Through PfP planning, joint exercises and other PfP activities, including seminars, workshops and day-to-day representation in Brussels and Mons, possible new members will increasingly become acquainted with the functioning of the Alliance....Possible new members' commitment to the shared principles and values of the Alliance will be indicated by their international behaviour and adherence to relevant OSCE commitments; however, their participation in PfP will provide a further important means to demonstrate such commitment as well as their ability to contribute to common defence. For possible new members, PfP will contribute to their preparation both politically and militarily, to familiarise them with Alliance structures and procedures and to deepen their understanding of the obligations and rights that membership will entail.

Since enlargement could put a strain on the principle of consensual decision making, NATO further stresses that "it will be important that prospective new members become familiar with the Alliance decision-making process, and the modalities and traditions of consensus and compromise, before joining." Finally, the "varying degree of participation is a key element of the self-differentiation process" (§46). NATO explicitly states that countries which take part in the Planning and Review Process (PARP) and are ready to reinforce and deepen their Individual Partnership Programmes, thus distinguishing themselves by

67. See Risse-Kappen, *Cooperation Among Democracies*, 224.

"demonstrating their capabilities and their commitment," enhance their prospects of (early) NATO membership (§40–41).

During the probationary period starting with Partnership for Peace, the aspiring countries have regulary received "grades" for their progress on the way to membership. Former U.S. secretary of defense Perry, for example, toured central and eastern Europe in September 1995, confirming that the Czech Republic met all prerequisites for NATO membership whereas Slovakia would have to intensify the democratization process.[68] According to the proponents of NATO enlargement, this socialization process has been a success. At the NATO Ministerial Meeting in Sintra on 29 May 1997, Albright said that

> we want to give the nations of Central and Eastern Europe an incentive to make the right choices about their future. We want to encourage them to resolve old disputes, to consolidate democracy, and to respect human rights and international norms. So far, that is exactly what the prospect of enlargement has done.

Asmus concurs with the view that the

> prospect of NATO enlargement has already contributed enormously to reform and reconciliation in Eastern Europe. From the Baltic to the Black Sea, foreign and defense policies are being reconstructed in order to bring these countries into line with alliance norms. Rarely has a Western policy had such an impact in eliciting such positive change.[69]

The many bilateral basic treaties between CEE countries concluded to settle territorial disputes and ethnic minority conflicts are the most important foreign policy changes attributed to the conditions of membership explicitly stated by NATO. Among the domestic changes, the introduction of civilian control of the military can most clearly be linked to the prospect of NATO membership—above all in Poland where it was long contested and had to be secured by the dismissal of the Polish chairman of the joint chiefs of staff in the spring of 1997.

In April 1997 NATO discussed and adopted individual reports on the 12 candidates for NATO membership in order to give a precise picture of the political and military situation of each aspiring state as well as of

68. Interestingly, Perry praised Slovenia as a role model for the rest of Central Europe and as a strong candidate for membership in NATO (see "Perry: Slowenien ist Vorbild für Mitteleuropa"; "Perry ruft Slowaken zu mehr Demokratie auf"; and "Perry: Prag erfüllt Bedingung für NATO-Beitritt," *Süddeutsche Zeitung* 19, 20, and 21 September 1995).

69. Asmus, "Stop Fussing About NATO Enlargement," 8.

the consequences of its accession, on which the political representatives of the member states could then base their decision about the countries to be invited to become members.[70] The decision to choose only the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland for the first round of enlargement was justified by their progress in the internalization of alliance values. The chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Shalikashvili, said that these three countries had

> come far toward political democratization and an opening of their economies...had large and competent military forces and had made important strides politically and economically. All had contributed importantly to the peacekeeping operation in Bosnia.[71]

As to Slovenia and Romania, whose membership was supported by a majority of the European NATO members, Defense Secretary Cohen praised their "efforts to qualify for NATO membership, but said the reform process undertaken by those governments had not had sufficient time to become firmly rooted."[72] NATO encouraged these countries, though, to proceed further on the path of liberal reform and peaceful conflict management in order to qualify for later rounds. In its Madrid Declaration, it specifically recognized the progress achieved in Romania, Slovenia, and the Baltic countries. Finally, at their joint press conference at the Madrid summit, the heads of state or government of the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland confirmed the view of membership as a consequence of successful socialization and as a boost to their identity and legitimacy:

> We see the invitation extended to us in Madrid as recognition of the tremendous efforts undertaken by our societies following the changes in 1989/1990. We are indeed very proud that the transformation of our political systems and economies have made us eligible to be considered as an integral part of the Alliance.[73]

70. "Reformvorschläge des NATO-Militärausschusses," *Neue Zürcher Zeitung*, 24 April 1997, 2.

71. Brian Knowlton, "Top General Defends U.S. Choices for NATO," *International Herald Tribune*, 17 June 1997, 2.

72. William Drozdiak, "Europeans Protest Clinton's Limit on Widening NATO," *International Herald Tribune*, 13 June 1997, 1 and 11.

73. Cited in http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/1997/s970708h.htm.

PUTTING THE CONSTRUCTIVIST EXPLANATION IN PERSPECTIVE

IN THIS ARTICLE I have attempted to show that a constructivist approach to the study of international organizations based on the notion of international socialization provides an elegant explanation for NATO enlargement to central Europe, whereas the most prominent rationalist approaches, namely neorealism and neoliberal institutionalism, have difficulties in accounting for the decision of NATO to accept the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland as full members. In this final section, I will add some qualifications to the refutation of rationalist approaches and suggest some avenues for further research necessary to substantiate the constructivist explanation.

(1) I do not claim that there are no rationalist explanations for the interest of NATO in enlargement. My argument is limited to the core propositions of the mainstream rationalist approaches which have, to a very large extent, framed the academic debate about international institutions and international cooperation in the last two decades. In principle, it is possible to find some rationalist (as well as, probably, constructivist) explanation for any social event if the necessary modifications or qualifications to the original propositions are introduced. Neorealist propositions on alliance-building and international integration, in particular, have been modified considerably in order to account for anomalous empirical phenomena.[74] Moreover, it may be possible to find explanations for NATO enlargement that do not fit in with the neorealist or neoliberal frameworks but are based on the assumption of egoistic instrumental action nevertheless. For instance, a "critical" or "radical" explanation of NATO expansion as a means to protect the assets and interests of Western multinationals appears to have some plausibility given the fact that the three CEE countries selected for full membership have attracted by far the largest share of

74. For modifications to Waltz's balance-of-power theory, see Walt, *The Origins of Alliances*; and Schweller, "Bandwagoning for Profit." For the study of European integration, see Joseph M. Grieco, "State Interests and Institutional Rule Trajectories: a Neorealist Interpretation of the Maastricht Treaty and European Economic and Monetary Union," *Realism: Restatements and Renewal*, ed. Benjamin Frankel (London: Frank Cass, 1996), 261–306. See John A. Vasquez, "The Realist Paradigm and Degenerative vs. Progressive Research Programs: An Appraisal of Neotraditionalist Research on Waltz's Balancing Proposition," *American Political Science Review*, 91, no. 4 (December 1997): 899–912, for a critical review of these efforts (as well as the realist rejoinders in the same issue).

Western direct investments in the region.[75] The international socialization approach is preferable, though, because it provides the more parsimonious and determinate explanation of NATO enlargement and it is, at the same time, more in tune with the core propositions of its research program than any of the rationalist approaches.

(2) Rationalist and constructivist explanations do not have to exclude one another but can be combined in different ways:

(a) It may be the case that one group of state actors, the CEE governments, are motivated by egoistic interests, whereas the other, the NATO governments, act value-rationally. This would be compatible with the finding that rationalist approaches are able to explain the behavior of CEE countries and with the observation that governments leaning toward authoritarianism have not refrained from applying for NATO membership.

(b) There is some evidence that, even though the general decision to expand NATO is best explained as a value-rational action, the concrete terms and steps of enlargement are also motivated by instrumental considerations. The fact that the first round of enlargement was limited to three countries (and did not include Slovenia) is best explained by U.S. concerns about ratification and the costs of enlargement. The (temporary) exclusion of the Baltic states cannot be attributed only to the unsolved minority question in Estonia and Latvia, but, perhaps more convincingly, to the Western desire not to antagonize Russia completely. Finally, instrumental cost-benefit calculations explain best why NATO continually presses for the candidates to raise their defense expenditures and why its members decided to make the CEE countries bear the costs of modernizing their armed forces.

(c) If one starts from the assumption that NATO represents the military branch of the Western community of liberal values whose members share not only the purpose of protecting and disseminating their beliefs, but also the perception that undemocratic governments are a threat to their preferred world order, and the belief that peace depends on joint democracy, then the democratic socialization of countries bordering on the Western community becomes an instrumentally rational strategy for advancing the security of NATO members.[76] It is obvious, however, that in all these combinations of rationalist and con-

75. I thank one of the anonymous reviewers of *Security Studies* for alerting me to such alternative explanations.

76. I thank Bernhard Zangl and one of the reviewers for pointing out this combination of constructivist and rationalist explanations to me.

structivist explanations, the constructivist element is more fundamental: The liberal democratic identity of NATO members determines the ideas and purposes on which NATO enlargement is based and toward which instrumental action is oriented.

(3) Further research is required in order to substantiate the constructivist explanation. In this article, I have focused on a single organization, a single region, a single round of enlargement, on NATO as a collective, and on the enlargement outcomes. For this reason, the analysis of enlargement should be extended in five ways.

(a) In order to test the constructivist explanation offered here, the integration of central and eastern Europe into NATO should be compared to the eastward enlargement processes of other Western international organizations. As I have tried to show elsewhere, the eastern enlargement of the European Union resembles NATO expansion: It is driven by the same commitment to liberal values and norms, especially since the costs of enlargement exceed the benefits for the current members even more clearly than in the case of NATO.[77]

(b) Furthermore, the eastward enlargement must be compared to enlargement processes in other regions of Europe. As Mary Hampton shows, the integration of West Germany into NATO can be regarded as the prototype case of a successful socialization of a former enemy by the Western international community.[78] Another salient case is southern Europe. Here, the explanation of enlargement as the international socialization of formerly authoritarian countries to the values and norms of the Western international community appears to hold as well—most obviously for the accession of Greece, Portugal, and Spain to the Council of Europe (in the 1970s) and to the European Community (in the 1980s). The picture is less clear for NATO: Whereas Spain joined the alliance after the democratization of the country, Greece, Portugal, and Turkey became or remained NATO members in spite of periods of authoritarian rule. Moreover, the international socialization approach appears to be less suitable prima facie in the cases of "northern enlargement." If Austria, Finland, or Sweden were to join NATO, this could certainly not be explained by the diffusion of liberal

77. Frank Schimmelfennig, "Liberal Norms and the Eastern Enlargement of the European Union: A Case for Sociological Institutionalism," *Österreichische Zeitschrift für Politikwissenschaft* 27, no. 4 (December 1998).

78. See Mary N. Hampton, "NATO at the Creation," *Security Studies* 4, no. 3 (spring 1995): 610–56; and Mary N. Hampton, "NATO, Germany, and the United States: Creating Positive Identity in Trans-Atlantia," *Security Studies* 8, nos. 2/3 (winter 1998/99–spring 1999): 235–69.

democratic values which these countries have shared with NATO since its foundation. If constructivism was to provide a convincing explanation for these possible enlargements, it would have to demonstrate that the internalization of the community norm of multilateral and common defense as opposed to the previously dominant norm of neutrality was the decisive factor.

(c) The future development of NATO expansion is a crucial test for the constructivist explanation of enlargement as international socialization. Further rounds of enlargement in which the countries with the best record of liberal democratic transformation and multilateralist foreign policies accede to NATO would support this explanation. If NATO enlargement, however, stopped with the first round or did not include the Baltic countries in spite of further progress in the peaceful and democratic management of their minority problems, or if Slovakia and Croatia became NATO members without a thorough democratization of their political systems, the constructivist account would run into severe difficulties.

(d) To treat NATO as a collective and the United States as its representative member, as I have done in this article, is a highly simplifying assumption. This summary analysis should therefore be complemented by an analysis of the enlargement preferences and policies of the (main) individual member countries. As a consequence, the constructivist explanation may have to be refined. As it stands, constructivism would lead us to expect a uniform position of all member countries on the desirability of enlargement and the choice of individual new members. In reality, however, the enlargement preferences varied—less so with regard to the decision to enlarge NATO at all and to the choice of the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland, but very much so with regard to the speed of enlargement and the accession of further CEE countries.[79]

(e) The focus of this article is on the enlargement decisions and outcomes. The analysis of process has been largely limited to showing that the motivation of the actors implied in the constructivist explanation of enlargement as international socialization is consistent with their basic texts and statements and the stages of the enlargement. One im-

79. Even Chancellor Kohl pleaded for postponing enlargement and criticized the U.S. administration for forcing the pace in February 1996, although the German government had declared itself in favor of enlargement early on. The division on the number of CEE countries to be invited in the first round of enlargement lasted until the final decision was reached at the Madrid Summit on 8 July 1997.

portant question relating to process is not treated and answered: How did the value-based preference for enlargement form and assert itself? The present explanation seems to suggest that NATO has had the preference to enlarge to the democratic CEE countries ever since the east European revolutions and has pursued enlargement as its new "grand strategy" since the end of the cold war and after containment had become an obsolete doctrine. This was clearly not the the case. Whereas the central European countries began to raise the question of NATO membership almost immediately after the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Union, the United States and then NATO did not firmly commit themselves to enlargement before 1994. The enlargement process of NATO was not the implementation of a "grand strategy" but was characterized by "halting diplomatic discussions and haphazard, last-minute decision making, [and] of symbolic gestures made through 'photo opportunities'."[80]

There are competing suppositions as to why enlargement occurred nevertheless, which reach from the courting of the voters of central and eastern European origin by the Clinton administration to the successful lobbying by CEE governments (and perhaps the German government). In order to be consistent with constructivism, process-tracing would have to show that persuasive appeals to the shared values and to the moral obligation of NATO members to act in solidarity with the democratic CEE countries produced this outcome. It is conceivable that the constant reference by NATO and its members to liberal values, the democratic international community, and its solidarity with the (former) "captive nations" of central and eastern Europe created an argumentative self-commitment that NATO members could not ignore—or only at the expense of their own credibility.[81] There are strong indications, indeed, that such a process was at work: In his analysis of U.S. decision making, Goldgeier indicates that President Clinton was persuaded of NATO expansion after he had met with the

80. Jonathan Eyal, "NATO's enlargement," 695.

81. Cf., Elster's discussion of the "civilizing force of hypocrisy" and the problems of opportunistic argumentation in Jon Elster, *Arguing and Bargaining in Two Constituent Assemblies*, Storrs Lecture (New Haven: Yale Law School, 1991); and Jon Elster, "Arguing and Bargaining in the Federal Convention and the Assemblée Constituante," in *Rationality and Institutions. Essays in Honour of Knut Midgaard*, ed. Raino Malnes and Arild Underdal (Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 1992), 13–50. Thus, the analysis of process provides further opportunities for combining constructivist and rationalist factors.

presidents of the Czech Republic and Poland, Havel and Walesa, at the opening of the Holocaust Museum in Washington in April 1993:

> These two, having struggled so long to throw off the Soviet yoke, carried a moral authority matched by few others around the world. Each leader delivered the same message to Clinton: Their top priority was NATO membership. After the meeting, Clinton told [national security adviser] Lake how impressed he had been with the vehemence with which these leaders spoke, and Lake says Clinton was inclined to think positively toward expansion from that moment.[82]

Finally, the process of socialization and internalization needs to be unpacked. How does NATO socialize the CEE states and societies? Who exactly does the "teaching" of constitutive beliefs and practices, and by what means? How are community values and norms internalized in the CEE countries? Which learning processes occur at what level? A full account of international socialization has to address the agency dynamics not only within the the organization and its member countries but also within the candidate societies.[83]

82. James M. Goldgeier, "NATO Expansion: The Anatomy of a Decision," *Washington Quarterly* 21, no. 1 (winter 1998): 86–87. See, however, his more cautious assessment of the causes of the U.S. decision (ibid., 100–101).

83. Thanks to Jeff Checkel for insisting on this point. See also his review of some of the constructivist literature (Jeffrey T. Checkel, "The Constructivist Turn in International Relations Theory," *World Politics* 50, no. 2 [January 1998]: 324–48).